In the recent upsurge of violence in Kyrgyzstan (in April and thereafter in May 2010), most western media reportage of events highlighted the instances of attacks on migrant (Uzbek) communities. Kyrgyz and Russian reports were more nuanced and at time, prone to obfuscation in the reporting of what exactly had led to the targeting of Uzbeks in the southern city of Osh in Kyrgyzstan. Most websites, especially interactive portals, had Kyrgyz Internet users decrying the involvement of “a third force”. A majority of the net users did not have pejorative things to say about Uzbeks, Turks and other minorities who live in Kyrgyzstan, but bemoaned (what they perceived as) the biased reporting about events in their country. What then, is one to make of this divergence between lived realities and media representations? Are all media representations therefore guilty of bias?

At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the media (with all its attendant diversity and differences) has something definitive to say about all conflicts that lead to human tragedies such as forced migration. Sociologically, the media has generally looked at such events as those that occur within societies bounded within definite and discrete territorial units. Hidden behind this apparently universal definition of what society is, are two specifically European philosophical preoccupations. The first is the preoccupation with social order, arising in the sociological tradition with anxieties about the impact of mass proletarianisation and industrialization. Secondly, European philosophical tradition also shaped a very specific conception about the ‘state’.

Amongst an array of philosophers who theorized on the state, Max Weber’s concern with identifying the distinctive features of the modern state – which he defined as a type of political community possessing a monopoly of the legitimate use of force in addition to the association with a territory – is important to consider. In non-European/Northern societies where state formation had a different history, the need to extend the discussion (on conflict) to include “non-state”, segmented societies is of extreme importance. For greater part, the media has followed the political organisation of modern societies as its baseline and set up typologies of other cultures according to the categories thus defined.

This becomes clearer when one considers the fact that nearly one fourth of humanity inhabits the region we call South Asia. Their voices are an important consideration, therefore, in the manner in which conflicts are expressed and experienced. The voices of this critical mass of humanity range from outright secession from states created and carved out of colonialisation, to range, to ethnic homelands within a specific nation-state, devolution of powers and demands for autonomy. What differentiate these conflicts from each other is the causes that lead people to express the need for change and the forms that such expressions take. At one level, security analysts would have us believe in the all-powerful catch word that insurgencies (be it in Punjab, or Northern Sri Lanka, or North West Pakistan) are essentially about losing control to non-state actors and therefore re-emphasizing the need for establishing order and discipline. This is however far from the only view (on conflict) that one can be reconciled to. Identity – be in religious, tribal or ethnic – is a recurring theme in South Asian conflicts. In a sense, these calls to organize around notions of peoplehood are all the more important in South Asia because the existing “modern” states have not found a language to engage with residues of social formations that predate the formation of the states. The only area where the states have found common ground, as mentioned earlier, has been in their security-oriented view to assertions of identity and claims to power (by those marginalized by nation-building processes). In all these forms of conflict, there is an attendant reorganisation of space, where individuals and collectives are either corralled in, or chased out of.

Media Managers and the Public Domain

It is a fact that social representation often falls short of actual representation and the media has a lot to do with perpetuating the illusions of democratic participation. Interactive television programmes, complete with a sample audience and well-dressed host, typify the remote, impersonal nature of modern democracies. While it is true that in most people share an orientation to the public world, where matters of common concerns are addressed, the public connection is focussed principally on the mediated versions of that public world.

The 20th and 21st century public spheres are actually conscious of status differentials, where alternate and opposing cultures are not readily accommodated. Hence it is worthwhile to examine four dimensions of the media that go on to create a public sphere: (a) media institutions, where one can specifically look at ownership patters; (b) media representation, where representatives and experts stand in for citizens; (c) general social structure with its multiple public spheres and (d) face-to-face interaction. In the interplay between the four dimensions, one can have a fairly accurate understanding of the nature of the public sphere, vis-à-vis issues of conflict and forced migration of vulnerable people.

In the South Asian context, the media is party to sustaining the fear of the outsider and driving home the “need” to drive out undesirable people from the land. There is a perception of anarchy amongst different sets of actors, where the reality of undocumented and (often) forced migration is seen as a sign of weakness on the part of the parent state, to police its borders and effectively control its population.