REFUGEE WATCH

A South Asian Journal on Forced Migration

A Special Issue on Displacements & Dispossessions

58

REFUGEE WATCH

A South Asian Journal on Forced Migration

A Special Issue on Displacements & Dispossessions

58

REFUGEE WATCH

CONTENTS

Geopolitical Framings of Subalterity in Education III: Context of Displacement

By

Ranu Basu [*]

Introduction

Interpreting the role that education plays in societal change in relation to questions of global violence and displacement, requires what Gramsci refers to as a "philosophy of praxis". As an epistemological and political project that offers to support an anti-imperialist approach to education, it falls within the broader mandate of conceptualizing education that is inherently transformative both materially and ideologically in response to hegemonic structural impediments. This similarly falls within the framework of Paulo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* where the realm of education is rooted in critical consciousness for radical change.

What then would similarly constitute a philosophy of praxis in relation to questions of conflict, exile, and displacement? And further, within the context of what Chimni refers to as a 'post-colonial imperial order'?[1] This paper presents geopolitical framings of subalterity in education as an analytical framework to explore these questions by focusing on the spatial dialectics of peace, settlement, and welfare-state practices. I will argue that the project of education particularly as it relates to violence and displacement cannot be analysed in the absence of the geopolitics of imperial hegemony compounded by the logics of the neoliberal state.[2] As the state reflects 'the variety of geopolitical ways of viewing the world'–the institution of state-funded schools could also be assumed to reflect contrasting 'geopolitical visions' as they relate to the 'geopolitical subject'.[3] Hence, this paper attempts to understand how the provision of education, particularly as it relates to the question of forced displacement–beyond its literary component but as a radical strategy of transnational consciousness building–needs to be further analysed by

* Ranu Basu, Associate Professor, Faculty of Environmental and Urban Change, York University, Toronto, Canada. Email: ranubasu@yorku.ca

examining the role of state-funded schools as sites for broader praxis and civic engagement.

This paper is part of a broader project *Subalterity, Public Education, and Welfare Cities: Comparing the Experience of Displaced Migrants in Three Cities*. The project explores the dire consequences of geopolitical displacement in its multiple forms and practices in three urban regions–Havana, Kolkata, and Toronto–that are a result of the historical legacies of colonialism and continuing imperialism; alongside the spatialities of refuge and subaltern educational praxis that have historically challenged, altered, and redefined these hegemonic relations. Through the disparate examples we gain insight into the complexities and relationalities of subalterity through displacement. A 'geopolitical vision', as Kearns notes, is often organized around a 'distinctive geopolitical subject' while various institutions are created by the hegemonic nation state to advance the interest of this global subject.[4] Often the 'geopolitical subject' is reflected in the subalterity of the displaced subject. This paper is the third of a series theorizing the geopolitical framings of subalterity in education within the context of displacement–[the first noting its compounding effect on the neoliberalized welfare state; while the second ruminating on the challenges for peace within the shadows of imperialism][5] – that conceptually builds on the inter-related and overlapping questions that were posed earlier including: what are the challenges of building transnational alliances when the neoliberal educational system predominates globally (materially, normatively, and ideologically)? What are the implications of this on the peace-building process? What are the counter-hegemonic propositions of peace-building within and through a state-based school system? What does a geographical approach offer us in terms of rethinking new strategies for change? In other words, the geopolitics of post-colonialism and imperialism are explored that investigate the ongoing territorial strategies and tactics of spatial exclusion *alongside* the creative politics of resistance. Hence, the theory of forced modes of displacement offered in this paper is grounded in subaltern geopolitics.

The paper evolves with heuristic cases related to the geopolitics of forced displacement and the vision of subalterity in education as the spatial implications for resistance in each of these examples. In the first section, the context of the geopolitics of subalterity is explicated through the lens of three forms of displacement grounded in the historical-colonial realities that have prioritized the structural and continuing legacies of forced displacement. First, *imperial-displacement* is discussed through the dire (yet rarely considered) long term deprivations created by economic and financial sanctions (i.e., embargoes or blockades) on the nation state implicated. Second, *dual-displacement* as encountered through the violence of forced migration from regions of conflict followed by the challenging realities of the resettlement process in settler-colonial societies of the global North. Third, *displacement* through the *continuing post-colonial conditions* refugees cross nebulous borders (i.e. partition-refugees) and live in precarity within urban regions of the global South, often undifferentiated from internally displaced people (IDPs). In this paper, interrogating displacement through its root-causes–as a *structural-political*

imperative (i.e., starting point rather than effect)–premise the motivation and complex dynamics of imperialism and the geopolitics of hegemonic states.[6] The second section explores the broad framings of education within zones of displacement. The broad guidelines used by the United Nations is noted as a global framework for education in zones of conflict; including more recent discussions of the Global Compact adopted in 2018.

The third section analyses contrasting and oppositional models of education–from Cuba, Toronto and Kolkata. Each context of displacement is followed by a brief discussion of state-based educational responses (i.e., free, universal, secular, public education). The terrain of education within the context of these frames of displacement thus explores the educational production of knowledge societies as a critical mode of intervention within state-based school systems. The four frames of educational displacement include: UN based Sustainable Development & Protection Model; Socialist Citizenship Model; Settlement-Integration Model; Poverty Alleviation Model. Finally, the paper analyses the four frames along three common themes: 'Institutional Structures & Geopolitical Relations' (in relation to imperialism/colonialism); 'State-based Educational Displacement Framework'; and 'Citizenship and Identity' (Peace, Belonging, Violence, Survival) and presents a framework incorporating critical ideology–where education is seen as praxis and radically transformative. The ethos of critical ideology (compared to neoliberal frameworks) offers an alternative formulation of education for broader structural change whereby the role of education further delves into the question of displacement, from the ideological to the political. The paper presents possible directives towards a theory of the geopolitics of subalterity in education–as a socio-spatial framework useful in critically examining the empirical and ideological context of displacement.

Framing the Geopolitics and the Spatialities of Displacement

The geopolitical conundrum more than a decade after the global financial crisis, and now further accentuated by the global pandemic of Covid-19, is compounded by several radical forces that have forged together to create severe structural imbalances. From the rise of ultra-right and fascist forces and militarized regimes; retrenchment of the welfare state due to the austerity measures of neoliberal policies; rising inequalities and social polarization as a result of increasing unemployment, precarious employment and mounting debt levels; and unprecedented flow of forced migrants as a result of war, violence, famine and environmental disasters among many other changes– collectively, these have become the new structural basis of neo-imperial regimes and an impending threat to global peace and security. Hyndman has long argued that migration has long been a "barometer of geopolitics, from human displacement generated by war to containment practices in particular territories or camps".[7] Consequently, the context of geopolitics of subalterity[8] takes on various forms of displacement depending on strategic imperialist

intervention; and in this paper, these are classified as heuristic frameworks to understand the broader contextual challenges: (i) *imperial-displacement* through blockades/embargoes/sanctions and military occupation; (ii) *dual-displacement* through forced migration and the resettlement process in settler-neoliberal welfare-states; (iii) *ongoing-displacement* and *dispossession through the condition of post-colonialism* as evident within the urban context. These include large-scale internal displacement of people (IDPs) in developing regions across the world, many of them in protracted conditions. The premise of displacement as a structural-political imperative is conceptualized accordingly and briefly discussed below [see Table 1].

The different forms of displacement, further, result in different structures of territorial fragmentation, spatial bounding, isolation, and scales of exclusion actively producing the alienating spaces of subalterity. The process of subalterity is articulated as the process of this geopolitical subjectivity, conditioning the ways of being a subaltern that is in an unsettled relation with the neoliberal/neo-colonial state.[9] And, in the case of geopolitical displacement–with an unsettled relation with the imperial logics of hegemonic empire. Gramsci traces the historical subjugation and political-cultural marginalization of the subaltern in their relation to ruling groups as an inevitable effect of hegemonic history. Yet the process of subalterity is also in constant contestation resulting in creative resistance at different scalar levels ranging from the international solidarity movements (histories of internationalism and anti-imperialism) to the everyday rhythms of local action. These subaltern movements, including the variational modes of educational resistance, provide insights into the complex forms of praxis from diverse contexts. The role of the state and educational provision in relation to questions of citizenship, belonging, and nationhood is especially insightful in the context of displacement. For those forcibly displaced migrants, "mass schooling system that produces citizens and workers is dependent on a national consensus about who the "we" of citizenship" will include.[10] Further, the project of 'revolutionary citizenship' works directly against the project of neoliberalism and in the interest of increased socialist democracy.[11]The next section briefly explores three heuristic yet relational vignettes of such disparate case studies, each offering different insights into the geopolitics and spatialities of displacement to the human condition, and the responses of state-based education.

(i) Displacement I: The Imperial Logics of Embargoes/Blockades

The first type of displacement (Displacement I) relates to the practice of sanctions and embargoes. This strategy is often used by hegemonic nation-states as an extension of foreign policy in creating 'hostile relationships' through the effects of economic destabilization on vulnerable states and communities. As a particular form of 'economic-statecraft' it is deployed to exercise economic power on the production or consumption of wealth in order to affect the flow of trade.[12] Von Amerongen defines the 'embargo concept' as follows:

> "By embargo we understand a *government* order influencing economic interaction and supervision of the domestic economy to comply with these policies, which are designed to *force the opponent into acceptable political conduct.* Embargo policies are based on the readiness to accept an unfavourable impact on the domestic economy"[13] (emphasis added)

Nephew similarly describes the strategy of sanctions and embargoes as foreign policy with a primary intent to inflict 'pain' particularly affecting civil society.[14] The collapse of economies, hyperinflation and material deprivation (including food and medicine) as a result of sanctions are detrimental to the local populations as it creates a volatile path of unrest and instability. Delevic notes that in the twentieth century, sanctions increased especially after the Cold War from two cases in the 1920s to more than twenty in the 1980s.[15] As an ideological and material construct, and a strategic form of imperial displacement, this often results (though rarely reported as such) in forced migration as conditions become untenable (e.g., US embargo on Cuba, Venezuela, Iran, Syria). For instance, UN agencies estimate that 5.1 million Venezuelans have fled the country as of August 2020. The situation is complex, yet the dire consequences of economic and political destabilization as a result of imperial embargoes, alongside the threat of military action and political coups, have led to hyperinflation and the forced exile of countless Venezuelan people. These imperial strategies often rendered invisible are overlooked in studies of forced displacement. The example of Cuba, which has experienced an embargo (referred to as blockade) for over six decades is discussed in the next section.

(ii) Displacement II: World Order of Forced Displacement and Settler-States

Geopolitical processes continue to cause mass displacement of migrants across the globe. The second type of displacement is linked to the mixed and mass forced migration. The different forms of exile and forced migration as a result of colonial and imperial practices of war, dispossession, exploitation, and extraction (labour, land, resources) has increased significantly. The world continues to witness high levels of displacement, whereby nearly 34,000 people are forcibly displaced every day because of conflict or persecution.[16] By the end of 2019, an unprecedented 79.5 million were forcibly displaced worldwide.[17] Among them, 45.7 million were internally displaced people (IDPs), while26 million were refugees. It is important to highlight that near half were under the age of 18. There are also 4.2 million stateless people who have been denied a nationality and access to basic rights such as education, healthcare, employment, and freedom of movement.[18] Most of the world's displaced population (over 80 percent) are affected by food insecurity, and yet 85 percent are hosted in developing countries. Many seeking refuge in settler-colonial societies of the global North are placed in situations of precarity

where settling in a neoliberal state leads to dual displacement. The example of Toronto is discussed in the following section.

(iii) Displacement III: Urban Refugees and the Post-Colonial Condition

Rapid global urbanization and the increasing flux of refugees into cities require us to rethink and conceptualize the relationship between the urban and forced migration.[19] In the 21st century urban centres, particularly in the global South, have increasingly become destinations for forced migrants, including internally displaced people.[20] According to the UNHCR as many as 50 percent of the world's 10.5 million refugees (under their mandate), live in cities and towns across the globe. Additionally, twice that number includes internally displaced people. The decision to settle in an urban area, rather than living within the restrictive parameters of a camp, is often based on a perception that the city offers better economic opportunities, increased security, a degree of anonymity, greater access to services, including humanitarian or developmental assistance. A large number of cities in the postcolonial era host significant refugee populations around the world including, among others: Kolkata, Kabul, Quito, Nairobi, Amman, Bangkok, Bogotá, Cairo.[21] The vulnerability of their situation often places them in exploitative conditions where they are subject to arrest, detention, working in precarious labour market conditions often in the informal economy, and denied access to health and educational services. They may also be targets of organized crime, violence, forced evictions, extortion, and other forms of abuse. The rights of forced migrants hence need to be juxtaposed with questions on how they might negotiate the urban terrain alongside their complex relationship with host communities and state institutions. Conceptually analysing '*urban as an intermediary space of refuge*'[22] provides the opportune spaces to think through how communities of care and political alliances develop within the realms of uncertainty in their lives while raising questions of urban citizenship and the right to the city. Darling notes how cities provide spaces of refugee politics by engaging with 'urban informality' and the 'political character of cities' thereby highlighting the agency of everyday life.[23] In the following section, the example of Kolkata as a historical city of refuge will be discussed.

Table 1

Frame I: Geopolitics and the Spatialities of Displacement		
Root Causes of Forced Displacement–As Structural-Political Imperative	Territorial Strategy of Subalterity	Institutional Framework of State-based Education
Displacement I: *Imperial- Displacement* [Ongoing Imperialism]	*Forced Containment (bounded forced-immobility):* Subalterity through Embargoes/Blockade and	Revolutionary Havana, Cuba Role of State-based Schooling–*Socialist Spaces of Education as Revolution*

	Military Occupation	*Framework towards Revolutionary Citizenship*
Displacement II: *Dual-Displacement* [Settler-Colonialism, Neoliberal-Multicultural State]	***Flows and Forced-Mobility*** *Subaltern Cosmopolitanism:* Subalterity through Exile and Forced Migration	**Settler-Colonial City Tkaronto/Toronto, Canada** Role of State-based-Schooling–*Spaces of Education as Neoliberal Framework-Settlement, Integration*
Displacement III: *Post-colonial condition of dispossession and displacement* [Post-Colonial legacies of partition-refugees]	***Spatial Fragmentation, Contested Borders, and the Urban Question*** subalterity, statelessness, and internally-displaced precarity.	**Post-Partition Calcutta/Kolkata, India** Role of State-based Schooling–*Spaces of Education as Reformist - Protection, Poverty Alleviation Framework*

What Framework Guides the UN Model of Education?

There is no such thing as a neutral educational process —Paulo Freire

Within the broader context of global displacement in its different forms and oppressive regimes, such as discussed above: How has the project of education been framed? What are the unique circumstances and challenges faced? What are the models used to guide pedagogical frameworks with regards to broader social relations among those displaced? Although education has increasingly taken on a *dimension of protection* in conflict zones and offers broader possibilities for investing in development, critics have noted a heavy reliance on the funds and interventions of international actors.[24]Hence the dichotomy of educational provision–between international actors and state-based provision suggests different forms of ideological interventions. The proliferation of reconstruction projects, especially after World War II, and the development of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child and Education for All certainly led to numerous initiatives to adhere to the right to education; yet, despite numerous declarations Mundy and Dryden-Peterson note that 'aid has tended to *prioritize countries of special geopolitical interests to the Western world*' (emphasis added).[25] This is noteworthy to keep in mind, when we evaluate the role of imperial hegemony and its close linkages to histories of capitalism and developmentalism.

What constitute among the unique challenges faced by global education and mass displacement? Children arriving from conflict regions of the world, for example, have experienced multiple forms of violence (physical, psychological, sexual, labour exploitation, among others) related to the

structural conditions of imperial wars and aggressions. The challenge to provide schooling for children who have experienced different forms of violence and displacement is regarded as critical for their overall wellbeing requiring as a fundamental right the provision of quality education. Attempts at recognizing these urgent challenges is addressed in numerous UN based reports which provide the broad discourse adopted by different educational agencies. These are often free from any geopolitical discussions of exile and dispossession but rather focus on the after and depoliticized-effects of displacement.

The Report on the High Commissioner's Five Global Priority Issues for Refugee Children for instance, brings forward the need for serious considerations of such troubling effects including: separation from families and caregivers, sexual exploitation, abuse and violence, military recruitment, education, and specific concerns of adolescents. For displaced children, particularly those who arrive from regions of war and conflict, schools are envisioned to provide distinctive spaces of 'protection', some form of 'normalcy', and 'opportunities' to their daily lives. Children from regions of conflict, the report notes, embody multiple experiences of trauma as survivors of torture and human rights abuses, with many experiencing further loss of families, friends, and communities during the process of forced migration and exile. No mention, however, is made of the educational experience of schools under sanctions/blockades and the effects of such displacement on systems of education.[26] Thus, the promise of schools that offer a safe-environments affirm peace education and are envisioned to offer a premise free from gender or racial discrimination, exclusion, abuse, and harassment containing the necessary support systems to empower communities of support.

Yet, UNHCR in assuming the role of the pseudo-state also incorporates in many places an 'Education for Repatriation' policy for migrant children whereby voluntary repatriation is planned as the primary route. The Global Compact adopted in 2018 and which is geared towards the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, for instance, outlines the principles of access, inclusiveness, and financial support within the realm of education that could assist in these goals.

> "In line with national education laws, policies and planning, and in support of host countries, States and relevant stakeholders will contribute resources and expertise to expand and enhance the quality and inclusiveness of national education systems to facilitate access by refugee and host community children (both boys and girls), adolescents and youth to primary, secondary and tertiary education. More direct financial support and special efforts will be mobilized to minimize the time refugee boys and girls spend out of education, ideally a maximum of three months after arrival"[27]

> "Depending on the context, additional support could be contributed to expand educational facilities (including for early childhood development, and technical or vocational training) and teaching capacities (including support for, as appropriate, refugees and members of host communities

who are or could be engaged as teachers, in line with national laws and policies). Additional areas for support include efforts to meet the specific education needs of refugees (including through 'safe school' and innovative methods such as online education) and overcome obstacles to their enrolment and attendance, including through flexible certified learning programmes, especially for girls, as well persons with disabilities and psychosocial trauma. Support will be provided for the development and implementation of national education sector plans that include refugees. Support will also be provided where needed to facilitate recognition of equivalency of academic, professional and vocational qualifications." [28]

Yet it is imperative to keep in mind that the broad UN guidelines outlined above, despite best intentions, operate within global systemic forces of capitalism and imperialism, and hence *cannot* be evaluated in the absence of the structural and political imperatives of a post-colonial imperial order, as discussed in the previous section. The challenge of nation-states in ideologically and materially envisioning the constructs of education relies on the foundation of the political economy of societal structures. Within capitalist states, the role of education is to produce 'workers' and economic growth within the paradoxical confines of an individualized and marketized neoliberal welfare state. The precarity of surplus/migrant labour (both in the global North and South) is often disenfranchised by the violent territorialities of border regimes. Within socialist states, the utopian role of education while also producing workers and economic growth relies on a collective ethos of 'equality of access' and 'social citizenship'. As Freire notes in the *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, the role of critical consciousness for learners in assessing their own conditions of displacement, exclusion, and corresponding subjugation, would cater towards developing an alternative pedagogy.[29]

The next section continues to discuss the three forms of displacements using disparate empirical examples from very different nation-state contexts (Cuba, Canada, India), each followed by brief discussions of the critical role that state-based education has played in shaping transformation.

Structural-Political Insights & State-based Models of Education —Cuba, Toronto, Kolkata

(i) Imperial Displacement: Displacement through Imperial Blockades and Military Occupation–The Cuban Context

Context of Anti-Imperial Cuba:
After the Cuban Revolution in 1959, radical implementation of socialist reforms rejecting capitalism as the basis of production, transformed all sectors of the economy and institutions as foundational to the new social system– including education. Yet, the continuing embargo imposed by the United States since 1961 is regarded as the longest embargo in modern history and is referred to as the *blockade* because of its debilitating effects on civil society in

an effort to stymie the revolutionary state. The detrimental effects of this economic, commercial, and financial blockade over six decades have had serious repercussions in all aspects of daily life of the Cuban people. As a form of material and psychological warfare it has used the violence of containment and immobility to disenfranchise the island state. *Displacement, in this case, in the form of forced-immobility and containment rather than displacement by the forced-mobility of exile–yet both materially and psychologically violent.* This became especially evident after the dissolution of the Soviet bloc in 1989–a period known as the '*Special Period*'–when economic trade and assistance came to a halt resulting in serious economic decline, food insecurity and malnutrition of the masses for a few years. In June 2015, a report to the UN by the Government of Cuba described the outdated nature of the policy in detail estimating the cumulative damage to be over USD 121,192 billion, deeply affecting the material conditions of everyday life with respect to food, medicine, health supplies, fuel, and humanitarian goods. To date, though the blockade has been rejected by the UN General Assembly over 24 times, it continues to exist despite being considered a violation of International Law. The report details the unjust nature of the policy and deep extent of US international control. Further, the hegemonic influence of imperial control that is worth noting is the extant of its control, whereby, beyond the function of the blockade serving as a bilateral issue its influence extends to an extraterritorial nature whereby "sanctions are applied to third parties". For instance, after visits to Cuba, ships are not permitted to dock at US ports, regardless of whether goods entailed are humanitarian hence enforcing the strategy of material containment beyond bilateral relations. The global pandemic has further accentuated the dire impacts of the blockade as medical equipment and critical supplies are restricted. Another serious point of geopolitical contention has been the demand for the return of the territory illegally occupied by the US Naval Base in Guantánamo, as part of a geopolitical strategic occupation of 800 US military bases in more than 70 countries. Both these policies continue to persist illustrating the immense global power and hegemonic control of empire and its allies in global regimes. Despite these challenges the Cuban Revolution remains one of the most resilient revolutions to date providing leadership to the internationalist socialist project. Cuba is known to have one of the best health care and education systems in the world, and a system of cultural and state-based institutions that have kept the socialist economy afloat over the years.

Role of State Based Schooling: Responding to Imperial Displacement—the 'Revolution within the Revolution':
The Cuban Revolution laid clear a commitment to *socialist development* including income equality, universal high-quality education, health care, access to housing, and agrarian reform among other changes. One of the first tasks towards the transformation of society was to launch a massive literacy campaign mobilizing the youth and reaching out to the most marginalized populations across the country. Prior to 1959, 25 percent of the population

was considered illiterate. Three central tasks included decolonizing the educational system; raising the educational standards of the system; mass literacy. The 1961 Cuban National Literacy Campaign-*Campaña de Alfabetización*–provided the foundation to the social, economic, cultural transformations that followed the 1959 Revolution. During this campaign, 250,000 volunteers taught 700,000 people to read and write in one year. Over half of these *brigadistas* were women–what Fidel Castro referred to as a *Revolution within the Revolution.* Education was the centerpiece of the revolutionary agenda and was critical in advancing social development of the masses and eliminating illiteracy–an ideation of what Perry Anderson referred to as the 'dialectical development between revolutionary theory and political praxis'.[30] Fidel Castro regarded education as a revolutionary activity and the literacy teachers as part of the army combatting *both* ignorance and imperialism. Further, the ideological vision of a new Cuban citizen referred to as the 'New Man' (Che Guevarra's vision) would be inspired by moral rather than material interests. The school system incrementally expanded over the years, in both urban and rural areas, using different pedagogical models including boarding schools referred to as '*schools in the countryside*' in the 1970s, which had a positive effect on student achievement.[31] It was important to produce highly skilled professionals for leadership of the Cuban economy, to staff government positions, universities, and other sectors and the socialist vision of education played a strategic role in achieving these goals. The legacy of the Cuban education system continues to the present day not just within the island state but through its internationalism on a global scale, sending teachers and doctors to developing countries. The *Yo Si Puede* program has extended to over thirty developing countries in the world and has taught nearly 10 million students to date. Despite the obstacles of the blockade, attempts have been made to engage in continual developments during the pandemic, such as in distance education that involve communities and families to turn 'homes into schools'. Building on initiatives that were implemented by Fidel Castro in 2001 these includes television programs devoted to education and national coverage extending to far ends of the island. Further, after the pandemic, the state has initiated a mass distribution of audio-visual and other educational products and a variety of supports for teachers such as those produced by CINESOFT.[32] As a cornerstone of the revolution, the intricate educational infrastructure along with the elaborate community-based institutions play a major role in shaping accessibility across the country.

(ii) **Dual Displacement**: World Order of Forced Displacement & Resettlement in Settler-Colonial societies—The Context of Tkaronto, Canada

Context of Settler-Colonial State, Tkaronto/Toronto, Canada:
As a settler-colonial state, the foundation of Canada is based on the colonization of Indigenous peoples. A central challenge for scholars of

migration and forced displacement, therefore, is to recognize the temporal and socio-spatial logics of settler colonialism that have attempted to eliminate and erase the presence of Indigenous peoples.[33] The settler state narrative as a 'nation of immigrants' built on the idea of 'settler futurity' intentionally erases the representations and historical legacies of Indigenous peoples and hence critics have argued that the complex relationship between Indigenous peoples, European settlers, and migrants needs to be recognized.[34] In this historical geopolitical context, the duality of displacement is evident–first, within the global-imperial hegemonic apparatus, how forced-migration flows are relationally linked within the settler-colonial context of the capitalist state. Second, in how the neoliberal welfare state dynamics play out in the settlement process in accommodating (or not) those displaced.

After the Second World War, Canada, as a settler-colonial society, granted refugee status to an estimated 37,500 Hungarians who had arrived in 1956-57, the largest single source country at that time; and to approximately 69,000 "boat people" who had arrived from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos from 1975-80.[35] By 2017, the Canadian state acceptance rate was 286,476 migrants of whom 41,477 (14.5%) were refugees.[36] Most of the refugees in Canada during the past ten years have come from different parts of the world most recently from Syria, Iraq, Sri Lanka, and Colombia. A large proportion settles in the major urban centers of the country making multiculturalism a largely urban phenomenon. Based on the 2011 National Household Survey, one-third of immigrants in Toronto had arrived in Canada during the past 10 years. The City of Toronto which prides its identity as a *City of Diversity* (as enshrined in its official motto) reports over half of its residents born outside of Canada, over 230 different ethnic origins. Porter and Yiftachel note that the settler city is often portrayed as symbolic of a 'new world'–a "space of liberalism and democracy, a hub of globalization, a magnet for international migration, or a center of investment and corporate power–all dominant discourses that conceal their ongoing colonial nature".[37] By 2016, international media outlets such as the BBC Radio announced Toronto as the most multicultural city in the world, yet, with little acknowledgment to its past. Further, it is important to bear in mind that Canada's system is closely aligned with neoliberal multiculturalism and accordingly favours economic migrants over family migrants and refugees. Between 2011-16 of those accepted, over 60% were economic immigrants, 26% were family class immigrants, while 11.6% were refugees. Canada classifies refugees according to five categories– either based on resettled categories from overseas or after successful refugee claims are made in Canada. These include Government sponsored refugees (GAR), privately sponsored refugees (PSR), Blended visa office-referred refugees (BVORs), and Refugees landed in Canada (RLCs) and Refugee dependents (see Table 2).

Between January 2015 and July 2018 Canada had admitted 109,945 refugees of which 57,240 were privately sponsored refugees (PSRs). The geographical concentration in the province of Ontario continues for both refugees and immigrants, whereby 50% (22,870) of refugees settle in the City of Toronto. The refugee claimants from the top 25 countries at this period

arrive from a range of countries. The sub/urban/altern cosmopolitanism of the settler city is reflected in the spatial landscape of the city.[38] Hence it is important to keep in mind that the pre and postmigration experience is closely bound to the heterogeneity of conditions that firmly affect the process of integration ranging from the geopolitical conditions of the source region, experiences of war and trauma, and professional and language skills acquired. Within this context of mass migration, the discourse of resettlement in the Canadian neoliberal welfare state has undergone over two decades of cutbacks due to austerity measures. The neoliberal welfare state is confronted with the challenge to resettle migrants–for example, through health, housing, language skills, education, and employment–yet the neoliberal state itself is faced with a crisis due to decades of rapid dismantlement of the social welfare system.

Table 2

Canada-Admissions of Resettled Refugees by Province/Territory and Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) of Intended Destination and Immigration Category, January 2015-July 2018

Province/Territory and Census, Metropolitan Area	Blended Sponsorship Refugee	Government-Assisted Refugee	Privately Sponsored Refugee	Total
Canada: Total	6,840	45,870	57,240	109,945
Ontario Total	3,670	18,280	23,425	45,375 (41%)
Toronto	1,220	5,935	15,715	22,870 (50%)

Source: Facts & Figures 2015: Immigration Overview-Temporary Residents–Annual IRCC Updates, https://open.canada.ca/data/en/dataset/052642bb-3fd9-4828-b608-c81dff7e539c?_ga=2.177479013.1915646597.1536851664-659409770.1536851664.

Role of State Based Schooling: Dual Displacement and the Neoliberal Welfare State:

The growing number of migrant children who are enrolled in Canadian state-based schools come from diverse backgrounds and experiences (immigrants, refugees, and non-status). In the province of Ontario there are currently76 publicly-funded school boards including public secular boards, public separate/Catholic boards, and French boards, and offer classes in elementary, middle, and secondary schools (JK to Grade 12) providing the educational context for migrant children. The school boards over the years aligned with the ethos of Canadian multicultural policy have developed an 'integration policy framework' that includes a range of programs and services including linguistic support (English and French Language Learners (ELL and FLL); welcoming policies; settlement workers (SWIS program), and other supports to meet the social, cultural, psychological and emotional needs of their students. The Inner City program offered by the Toronto District School Board (TDSB), provides additional resources in neighborhoods with a higher

percentage of migrant children from low socioeconomic groups. However, students arriving as refugees, asylum seekers, or without status face distinct challenges based on their premigration experience, many of them who had lived as protracted refugees in camps for many years. The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a rapid growth of the refugee population in Toronto mainly from nine major source countries. Yau discusses this rapid growth noting that by late 1994 refugee students made up 13% (approximately 3,900 students) of the secondary population and 7% (approximately 3,000 students) of its elementary students.[39] As mentioned earlier in the paper, the role of schools in the post-migration settlement experience includes numerous challenges. Based on a series of interviews, focus groups, and data from the TDSB, Yau documents the major challenges: from psychological distress and PTSD; precarious residency status; disintegration of family units; financial difficulties; frequent relocations; cultural disorientation, to relationships with teachers, peers, academic performance, working part-time among other themes.[40] Others have identified similar challenges incorporating workshops to familiarize teachers with the urgent questions, sensitivities, and care needed to address these structural challenges of displacement and exclusion on several levels.[41] Despite the policy framework that has been outlined above with the matrix of policies and practices, the neoliberal educational model, inherently part of the Ontario education system is differentially aligned. Driven by an individualistic, competitive, market-based, financially conservative model, schools have experienced cutbacks, closures, and deep retrenchment of critical services affecting migrants most closely. Thus, the harm and exclusion of dual displacement experienced both during pre-migration and in the settlement process of post-migration is accentuated by both geopolitics and the policies of the neoliberal welfare state. The denial of public services to non-status migrants places them in a further precarious situation during the post-migration process. Yet, this denial of basic services was challenged by Toronto based migrant activist groups like *No one is Illegal*–establishing Toronto as an official Sanctuary City–whereby every resident was granted access to public services in the city regardless of legal status. Similarly, the Toronto school boards were challenged by the activist group *Don't Ask Don't Tell* regarding linking student-identification and non-status information–whereby students were not compelled to reveal personal status during school admissions due to risk of deportation.

(iii) **Post-Colonial Condition of Displacement**: Urban Context of Subalterity–The Context of Calcutta/Kolkata, India

Context of Post-Colonial Partition Refugees, Calcutta/Kolkata:
After the partition of British India in 1947 and the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971, the city of Kolkata experienced an unprecedented flow of migrants to the city. The mass exodus of 10 million partition refugees to India from former East Pakistan in 1971 is rated as the largest refugee flow of the 20th century. Yet as Samaddar astutely reminds us, by bringing the context of the legacies of colonialism and the partition of the subcontinent into these

debates, the 'first wave to arrive in independent India *were not aliens but part of the nation*' (emphasis added).[42] Many had witnessed communal violence, destruction of property, and endured trauma and exile. These refugees spread all over West Bengal and other parts of India, but primarily settled around the greater Calcutta region. The border remains porous and fluid to the present and scholars of migration in the region have noted that there remains a fair amount of 'cross border movement of people' and 'people-to-people contact'[43] including many economic migrants crossing over in search of better livelihood and social opportunities.[44] The spatial morphology of postcolonial urbanism over the years reflects these flows and resettlements in the form of the numerous satellite colonies and squatter settlements scattered across the urban region due to the shortage of housing.

The role of the Indian State in the rehabilitation of the refugee population was central in the process of nation building despite the limited resources and experience of dealing with the immensity of such a humanitarian emergency. The rehabilitation programs and policies provided by the Central and State government following partition included the planning and implementation of reconstruction programs which went ahead with negligible international assistance.[45] In the study of policies, particularly in relation to the experiential lives and the sufferings of those forcibly displaced, Samaddar contends of the value to 'capture policy as the experience of the subject' and explore within this context the concept of 'power and care'.[46] Within this 'ethics of care' he highlights the 'paradoxes of hospitality' such as evident in the dualities of administration through 'law versus practices'; and the institutional infrastructure that were a concrete result of these practices.[47] Initially, the relief and rehabilitation programs for the displaced were marked by neglect and the institution of vocational programs were later planned according to caste, class, and occupation.[48]

Dasgupta classifies the four groups of Bengalis who arrived after partition by class, caste, education, and by type of labour.[49] These included the middle and upper-middle class who arrived with capital and investments; middle class who were able to access government positions; those with less wealth and who lived in resettlement colonies and suburbs without state assistance; and displaced peasants and agricultural workers from downtrodden communities who resettled in squatter settlements or *bustees* across the city working in menial and precarious occupations. Others were moved to camps and rehabilitation centres or were redirected to other inhospitable regions and many moved back to the city due to the difficult conditions. Politically, there were those that supported the state and believed that sufficient support was extended; while others, including the communist party who critiqued the state. Those living in colonies were successful at organizing themselves with support from the left.

Role of State Based Schooling: Spaces of Educational Policy Post-Partition—Protection, Poverty Alleviation Framework:

The challenge to provide a new model of education post-independence India in 1947 that would suit the aspirations and needs of the nation became a priority along with emergent nation-states in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. While tracing the *History of Education in Modern India*, Ghosh argues that the challenges faced in meeting the 'promised revolution in the education system' were not easy to materialize as India faced a host of pressing problems.[50] This included the rehabilitation of refugees after Partition from both West and East Pakistan (later Bangladesh). The Constitution drafted in 1949 made the provision of Education a State Subject where the responsibility for education was divided between the Government of India (i.e., Central or Federal) and the States (i.e., province). The intent of 'massive state supported expansion and democratization of schooling' was intended as a 'key instrument of change and emancipation', particularly for the schooling of children belonging to the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe communities. [51]

Today, education in India includes both publicly and privately funded schools. Public schools in Kolkata are managed and funded by all three levels of government–central (national), state (province), and local (including municipal). Ghosh notes four categories of schools in Kolkata which include private schools, state government schools, state government sponsored schools, union government schools, and union government sponsored schools.[52] State government schools are run by the West Bengal Board of Primary Education (WBBPE), and by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC), and provide free and compulsory education for children as outlined in the Indian Constitution under Article 21A. The Right to Education Act (RTE) was implemented in 2010 to ensure universal compulsory elementary education free of cost for children between the ages of 6-14 years of age. For those unable to afford schooling, especially children belonging to disadvantaged groups (SC and ST), migrant families, and undocumented workers – publicly funded schools provide the only access to education. The provision of textbooks, uniforms, school supplies are included in state-based schools. A number of initiatives have been used to draw children to the schools (primary and upper-primary) including the national Mid-Day Meal Scheme, which is designed to provide nutritional, hot lunches on a free and daily basis. Funded by the Government of India under the *Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan* and National Child Labour Project (NCLP). Meals are often cooked by local community members for an honorarium and often within the premises of the school. As parents or children are not subject to a screening process during admission (as per RTE mandates), these incentives are intended to not deter the enrolment of children of displaced migrants. Yet the harsh reality of poverty, and the practices of survival and earning a livelihood, discourage students from daily attendance and the necessary time required in school. These challenges among others hinder progress and have led to inequities in retention and attainment, higher drop-out rates, and school completion rates.

Conclusion: Towards a Theory of Geopolitics of Subalterity in Education

Educational relationships constitute the very core of hegemony, that any analysis of hegemony necessarily entails a careful study of educational activities and institutions, and that neither the complexities of hegemony nor the significance of education can be understood as long as one thinks of education exclusively in terms of "scholastic" relationships

---Antonio Gramsci

Previously I have argued that subalterity in education is grappling with a differential and complicated terrain.[53] I noted that the political and theoretical importance of this conceptual framing suggests that its form, function, and structural significance has posed a number of new challenges for those investigating social justice and rights in education. In a time of global economic crisis, cultural divides, and social and political uncertainties, an expanded notion of subalterity is crucial in understanding the underlying embedded and strategic workings of education.

The three heuristic examples provided in this paper, though each embedded within their own historical and geopolitical contexts, alongside capitalist and non-capitalist orientations, illustrate the complex underpinnings of forced displacement and provide theoretical insight into the broader socio-political impacts of education in response to anti-imperialism, anti-neoliberalism, and anti-colonialism. Despite their differences, the foundation of a 'geopolitics of subalterity in education' framework is embedded in a dialectical analysis where the relations among state ideology, policies, and practices are critical in understanding the role that education plays in assuaging not only the suffering of the violence of displacement; but also, to transform the social structures and build critical consciousness more broadly for political change. Space, as seen so far, plays a central role through the imperial project of territorial capture, colonial continuing strategies of mobility and immobility, or production of border regimes; while the dialectics of resistance include place-making practices, the politics of refusal, or usurping land rights and claims. The politics of education in relation to displacement is embedded within these structural systems.

The role of education in relation to displacement, therefore, presents multiple layers of possible analysis–from the ideological to the political. Four contrasting and oppositional models of education have been presented so far. Of course, as mentioned earlier it is important to keep in mind that the historical specificities and unevenness of economic and social development in different geographical contexts lead to different genealogical conditions of how displacement is understood, enacted, and contested. Nonetheless, the theoretical and political implications can be analysed within three broad lenses (See Table 3): 1) Institutional structures and geopolitical relations; 2) State-based educational principles in relation to displacement and social transformation; 3) citizenship and identity and implications on peace, belonging, violence and survival.

Table 3

Framing the Geopolitics of Subalterity in Education

Institutional Structures & Geopolitical Relations (in relation to imperialism/colonialism)	State-based Educational Displacement Framework	Citizenship and Identity (Peace, Belonging, Violence, Survival)
UN Model **Universal Orientation**	**Sustainable Development & Protection Model** – Ubiquitous model. Focus on conflict affected countries. Reduce vulnerabilities, more resiliency	Peace, Belonging, Violence, Survival
Cuba **Socialist Orientation** *Contentious*: Anti-Imperialism and claiming its own sovereignty Displacement in response to blockade and military occupation. Non-Signatory to the UNHCR.	**Socialist Citizenship Model** -*Education as Revolution* -Collective ethos and Political consciousness -Critical Pedagogy – anti-imperial -production of workers in socialist economy, nation building project -Equal access at all levels of education – primary to university – towards social transformation Work/Culture/Education -schools working with other sectors including local institutions. - internationalism of education on a global scale.	**Peace, Belonging** Violence, Survival Collectivist consciousness, anchored in social structural change, build on political participation
Tkoronto–Canada **Capitalist Settler Society Orientation** Liberal Capitalism, Settler Colonialism, Neoliberalism, Multiculturalism *Supportive*: Major Trade partner and ally. Part of NAFTA trade agreement, NATO. Foreign and economic policy in alignment with US interests. Signatory to the UNHCR.	**Settlement-Integration Model** - Liberal multiculturalism -Neoliberal Subjectivity and production of workers and surplus labour in marketized economy - Primary and Secondary level focus -Settlement Experience of migrants e.g., Language Acquisition	Peace, **Belonging** Violence, Survival Reformist, Individual and community integration, responsibilization. Differential access to settlement resources.

Displacement in response to hosting refugees (primarily with status).	(ESL, ELL), settlement workers. -Uneven spatial distribution of resources and programs within publicly funded schools. - dependence on fundraising, charity-funds, volunteers, NGOs - schools primarily working within their own sector.	
Kolkata–India **Capitalist Post-Colonial** **Nation Orientation.** Capitalism in developing country, postcolonial condition with ongoing wide social polarization in class structure. *Fluctuates post-independence*: Variable depending on foreign policy. Not signatory to the UNHCR. Displacement in response to hosting forced migrants (status, non-status, inter-provincial) alongside marginalized communities (hierarchies based on class, caste).	**Poverty Alleviation** **Model** -Primary Education focus -Uneven spatial development - Schools to provide: literacy, food, clothing, other basic material needs, attendance, livelihoods - status not important-resistance to nation-state formalized identities. -teachers role also as community workers and proxies to caregiving - schools working within their own sector.	Peace, Belonging **Violence, Survival** Focus on peace as survival; sustain livelihoods; vulnerabilities and avoidance of violence; protection

First, the Global UNHCR paradigm purports broad principles of protection and a sustainability model to education within conflict zones. This Sustainable Development & Protection Model advocates broad liberal principles of peace, belonging, survival, and protection from violence.

Yet, in democratic capitalist states, however, the educational systems plays a contradictory role. That is, on one hand, there is the requirement to maintain its geopolitical position and image in the international sphere as places of refuge; while simultaneously preserving social relations in the interests of a capitalist state. Thus, in this case the Settlement-Integration Model works within a neoliberalized ideology in a capitalist settler-colonial state–where education is construed within a multicultural paradigm for displaced migrants in an individualized, marketized ideology. Similarly, in capitalist-developmentalist contexts state educational systems practice a Poverty Alleviation Model–a reformist tool where the ambiguous and contested lived reality of extreme social polarization, mobility, and borders from a postcolonial condition remain. Finally, critical ideology–where education is perceived as praxis and radically transformative within the

socialist orientations of the collective allows for a Socialist Citizenship Model. In resistance to the antagonistic geopolitical relations with imperial hegemony develops an educational realm where political consciousness shapes a socialist citizen model.

The neoliberalization of education is a global condition, accentuated within a pandemic where the geopolitics of vaccines prevail. Its governance model is one based on the ideas of competition, marketization, and a language of efficiency guided by audit cultures and austerity measures. The modernist notions of nation-state systems–who 'belongs' and who does 'not belong', questions of whose status, citizenship and rights prevail–are closely bound to the colonial politics of education. Pedagogically as Apple notes the ideological aims of marketized policies are to provide educational conditions necessary for increasing international competitiveness and profit in the interest of serving the capitalist state; and to reproduce surplus, precarious labour (classed/raced, often displaced forced migrants).[54] In such models, less emphasis is placed on the development of critical pedagogies–such as a lack of building political awareness on the histories of colonialism, wars, dispossession, and structures of uneven global development. This in turn promotes a pedagogy of cultural imperialism thereby reproducing systems of capitalism, racism, and patriarchal societies. Neoliberal subjectivity, class/caste/racial/gender divides prevail in all aspects of daily life and modes of reasoning. In alleviating such inequalities, the educational policy takes on a reformist charitable/developmentalist approach rather than striving towards societal structural change. Inevitably, the neoliberalization of education across the globe has taken on different forms in different places–but the essence remains the same. Such measures result in the fragmentation of communities and civil society with the loss of local institutions and venues of building civic capacity.

In contrast, a critical ideology is where education is seen as revolutionary praxis that is radically transformative and provides a different context including a historical-political epistemology that is not passive but reflexive and aware of its alienated existence. This includes a critical pedagogy that addresses and reflects on questions of oppression and seeks solutions through questions of peace-building and solidarity movements–the production of knowledge for social transformation. In the global context of imperialism and forced migration, how do such educational directives work towards change in systemic and oppositional ways? Examples prevail that provide the impetus for contemplating such directions. Historically we can learn from the extraordinary example and strategies of the Cuban Model with its continuing legacies of the Literacy Campaign movement which transformed the educational landscape of a country despite the impacts of an imperial blockade. Fidel Castro's vision of 'Education as Revolution' continues to the present and provides a global framework to think counter-hegemonically and that can be applied to other conditions of forced displacement around the world. Ideas of Antonio Gramsci similarly have questioned how the liberation of the subaltern classes required a massive educational effort that would confront the challenges of a state educational

system designed to serve the interests of the upper classes and their hegemonic influence on the rest of society. Paulo Freire's work on the *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* and the implementation of popular education is another critical methodological framing that has historically attended to many of these challenges. The revelation of atrocities committed in residential schools on indigenous children from the *Truth and Reconciliation Report* in Canada, anti-racist, anti-colonial, and decolonizing educational directions are gaining new ground. The provision of education–as a site for broader praxis–argues for a need for more complex and radical interventions that move away from imperialist, neo-colonial, and neoliberal-reformist norms of education. The importance of building a critical ideological perspective on the intellectual foundations of such work, provide for us an anti-hegemonic basis for thinking through the geopolitics of subalterity in education.

Notes

[1]B.S. Chimni, "The Birth of a 'Discipline': From Refugee to Forced Migration Studies," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 22(1) (2009): 11-29.

[2]Ranu. Basu, "Geopolitical Framings of Subalterity in Education: Compounding a Neoliberalized Welfare State," in *Geographiesof Schooling,* eds. H. Jahnke, C. Kramer, P. Meusburger. Vol 14 of *"Knowledge and Space"* ed. Johannes Glucker (Germany: Springer, 2019).

[3]Gerry Kearns, "Imperial Geopolitics: Geopolitical Visions at the Dawn of the American Century," in *A Companion to Political Geography,* eds., J. Agnew, K. Mitchell, and G. Toal (UK/USA/ Australia: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 173-186.

[4] Ibid, 175.

[5]*Geopolitical Framings of Subalterity in Education I: Compounding a Neoliberalized Welfare State* (at14th Interdisciplinary Symposium on Knowledge and Space, *Geographies of Schooling,* September, 2016, Studio of Villa Bosch, Heidelberg, Germany (published Basu, 2019); *Geopolitical Framings of Subalterity in Education II: Challenges for Peace* (Enel Segundo Seminario Internacional "Realidades y Desafios de la Proclama de America Latina y el Caribe como Zona de Paz", ISRI, September 2018, Havana, Cuba (report to MOVPAZ and ISRI, 2018); *Geopolitical Framings of Subalterity in Education III: Context to Displacement* (Parts of this paper were presented at CRG Research Workshop and International Conference on 'The State of the Global Protection System for Refugees and Migrants,' November 2018, Kolkata, India; and more fully developed in the *Valedictory Lecture: Migrant Children and Education,* Reading Refugees, Reading Migration: An (Online) Orientation Course for College and University Teachers, organised by Calcutta Research Group.

[6]Chimni, "The Birth,"11-29.

[7]J. Hyndman, "The Geopolitics of Migration and Mobility," *Geopolitics* 17(2) (April 2012): 243-255.

[8]Basu, "Geopolitical Framings," 2019.

[9]Ranu Basu, "Multiplying Spaces of Subalterity in Education: From Ideological Realms to Strategizing Outcomes," in "The Canadian Geographer" ed. Tyler McCreary, Ranu Basu, and Anne Godlewska, special issue, *Critical Geographies of Education* 57, issue 3 (Autumn 2013): 260-270.

[10]Tony Waters and Kim Leblanc, "Refugees and Education: Mass Public Schooling without a Nation-State" *Comparative Education Review* 49, no. 2 (2005): 129-147.

[11]Peter McLaren and Ramin Farahmandpur, "Teaching Against Globalization and the New Imperialism: Toward a Revolutionary Pedagogy," *Journal of Teacher Education* 52, no.2 (March 2001):136-150.

[12]David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

[13]Otto Wolff von Amerongen, "Economic Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool?" *International Security* 5, no. 2 (Fall, 1980):159.

[14]Richard Nephew, *The Art of Sanctions: A View from the Field* (New York/Chichester/ West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2017).

[15]Milica Delevic, "Economic Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: The Case of Yugoslavia," *The International Journal; of Peace Studies* 3, no. 1 (January 1998).

[16]"Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019," UNHCR, last modified June 18, 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2019/.

[17]"Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2020," UNHCR, last modified June 18, 2021, https://www.unhcr.org/flagship-reports/globaltrends/globaltrends2019/.

[18]"Figures at a Glance," UNHCR, last modified June 18, 2021, http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html.

[19]Ranu Basu and Pelin Asci, "Intermediary Cities of Refuge: From Istanbul to Kolkata," in *Urban and Regional Planning and Development: 20th Century Forms and 21st Century Transformations*, eds. Rajiv R. Thakur, Sudhir K. Thakur, George M. Pomeroy (Netherlands: Springer, 2020).

[20]"Un Settlement: Urban Displacement in the 21st Century," International Displacement Monitoring Centre, last modified 2018, https://www.internal-displacement.org/research-areas/urban-displacement.

[21]"Urban Refugees," UNHCR,
https://www.unhcr.org/urban-refugees.html?query=urban%20refugees

[22]Basu and Asci, "Intermediary Cities of Refuge."

[23]Jonathan Darling, "Forced Migration and the City: Irregularity, Informality and the Politics of the Presence," *Progress in Human Geography* 4, no. 2(2017): 178-198, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0309132516629004.

[24] Karen Mundy and Sarah Dryden-Peterson, "Educating Children in Conflict Zones: An Overview and Introduction," in *Educating Children in Conflict Zones: Research, Policy and Practice for Systematic Change (A Tribute to Jackie Kirk)*, eds. Karen Mundy and Sarah Dryden-Peterson (New York/London: Teachers College Press Columbia University, 2015), 8.

[25] Ibid, 9.

[26]"Report on the High Commissioner's Five Global Priority Issues for Refugee Children", *Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme*, UNHCR, 2006, https://www.unhcr.org/excom/standcom/4486a1d92/report-high-commissioners-five-global-priority-issues-refugee-children.html

[27]UNHCR, "*Global Compact on Refugees*," adopted December 17, 2018, https://www.unhcr.org/5c658aed4.

[28]Ibid, 8.

[29]Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed,* trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York/ London/New Delhi/ Sydney: Bloomsbury, 2014).

[30]George Souvlis, "The Antimonies of Perry Anderson," *Jacobin,* last modified November 8, 2020, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/08/perry-anderson-marxist-historian

[31]Martin Carnoy, Amber K. Goove and Jeffery Marshall, *Cuba's Academic Advantage: Why Students in Cuba Do Better in Schools* (Stanford: Stanford University Press*,* 2007), 30.

[32]"Cuba is the First Country to Resume the Course with its Vaccinated Students," *Today.in-24,* October 14,2020, https://today.in-24.com/News/amp/453814.

[33]Glen Sean Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014); P.E. Villegas, Patricia Landolt, Victoria Freman, Ranu Basu, and Bojana Videkanic, "Contesting Settler Colonial Accounts: Temporality, Migration, and Place-Making in Scarborough, Ontario," *Studies in Social Justice* 14, issue 2 (2020): 321-351.

[34]Bonita Lawrence and Enakshi Dua, "Decolonizing Anti-Racism," *Social Justice* 32, no. 4 (102) (2005): 120–43.

[35]K. El-Assal, "2016: A Record-setting Year for Refugee Resettlement in Canada?" The Conference Board of Canada, http://www.conferenceboard.ca/commentaries/immigration/default/16-02-02/2016_a_record-setting_year_for_refugee_resettlement_in_canada.aspx

[36]"Facts and Figures 2017: Immigration Overview–Permanent Residents," Government of Canada, https://open.canada.ca/data/en/dataset/082f05ba-e333-4132-ba42-72828d95200bb

[37]Libby Porter and Oren Yiftachel, "Urbanizing Settler-colonial Studies: Introduction to the Special Issue," *Settler Colonial Studies* 9, no. 2 (2017): 177.

[38]Ranu Basu and R.S. Fiedler, "Integrative Multiplicity through Suburban Realities: Exploring Diversity through Public Spaces in Scarborough," Urban Geography 38, no. 1 (2017): 25-46, http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/mBFZ3nJ2MPUmsHYfIIxj/full

[39]Maria Yau, "Refugee Students in Toronto Schools," in *"*Refuge," special issue, *Child Refugees*, 15, no.5 (1996): 9.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Don Dippo, Ranu Basu and Marcela Duran, "Settlement and Schooling: Unique Circumstances of Refugees and Forced Migrants in Post-War Toronto Suburbs," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 44, no 3 (January 2013): 45-57.

[42]Ranabir Samaddar, *Refugees and the State: Practices of Asylum and Care in India 1947-2000* (Delhi: Sage, 2003), 33.

[43]Kaustubh M. Sengupta, "Taking Refuge in the City: Migrant Population and Urban Management in Post-Partition Calcutta" in *Cities, Rural Migrants and the Urban Poor – I. Migration and the Urban Question in Kolkata, Policies and Practices*, no. 72 (2015): 1-13.

[44]Augustine P. Mahiga, Foreword to *Refugees and the State: Practices of Asylum and Care 1947-2000*, ed. Ranabir Samaddar (New Delhi/ Thousand Oaks/ London: Sage, 2003), 7-18.

[45]Ibid.

[46]Samaddar, *Refugee and the State,* 22.

[47]Samaddar, *Refugee and the State,* 33.

[48]Sengupta, 2015.

[49]Abhijit Dasgupta, *Displacement and Exile: The State-Refugee Relations in India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2016).

[50]Suresh Chandra Ghosh, *History of Education in Modern India 1757-2012* (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2013), 178.

[51]"Policies, Programmes, and Schemes for Educational Development of Children from Scheduled Castes," NCERT 2007,

https://ncert.nic.in/degsn/pdf/degsnmodule6.pdf.

[52]Ausmita Ghosh, An Analysis of Primary Education in Kolkata, CCS Working Paper No. 149 (Delhi: Centre for Civil Society, 2006).

[53]Ranu Basu, "Multiplying Spaces of Subalterity in Education: From Ideological Realms to Strategizing Outcomes," Canadian Geographer 57(3) (Autumn 2013): 260-270, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cag.12029/abstract.

[54]Michael W. Apple, "Markets, Standards, Teaching, and Teacher Education," Journal of Teacher Education 57(3) (May 2001): 182-196,

https://doi.org/10.1177/0022487101052003002.

The Pandemic, Economic Recession, and the Indian Expatriates: Tiding over the Gloom in Indo-Gulf Relations

By

Shri Prakash Singh & Akshay Kumar Singh [*]

Mapping the Context

The unprecedented episode of the Covid-19, a global pandemic triggered in 2020, has shaken the world harshly, creating a global health crisis, taking a toll of more than 3.2 million lives, and infecting more than 150 million people worldwide. The global economy contracted by 4.4 percent in 2020, leading to the worst decline since the Great Depression of the 1930s.[1] The pandemic has thickened the global poverty layer, pushing additional "88 million people into the poverty trap"; however, as the World Bank forecasts, "in a worst-case scenario, the figure could be as high as 115 million".[2] Collapsing businesses, shrinking employment support-base, increasing distress among communities, besides, deepening catastrophe of health are critical side-effects of the Covid-19. The severity of the social cost the pandemic has imposed can be understood by UNESCO observation as "11 million girls might never return to their studies following the pandemic".[3] These are the mere tip of the iceberg of the entire damage caused to the world by the ongoing pandemic. The recent wave has again swept the world in April and hit hard many regions including South Asia. In April 2021, the tragedy suddenly exacerbated in India and other parts of Asia. Triggered by a new mutant of coronavirus (B.1.617) with the ability to cause severe contagion, the pandemic's new wave caused a huge death toll, posing apocalyptic challenges within and outside the sphere of governance.

* Shri Prakash Singh, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Delhi, Delhi, India. Email: spsinghdu@gmail.com. Akshay Kumar Singh, Assistant Professor, School of Law, Justice & Governance, Gautam Buddha University, Greater Noida U.P., India. Email: akshay.phd@gmail.com

Like any other region, the Gulf Arab region, widely known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), comprising Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, has also been hit hard by the coronavirus. The GCC countries are facing a twin blow: the Covid-19 pandemic and its spiralling effect on their economy. The economic downturn of the region is associated with the global economic recession followed by the pervasive spread of the pandemic. For instance, it was estimated that the Covid-19 era world had experienced a drastic decline of 20 percent in the demand for oil internationally, which consequently pulled down dramatically the oil price by 70 percent.[4] Since the oil fetches for more than 50 percent of the Gulf countries' fiscal revenues, except the UAE, the impact of the ongoing crisis on the socio-economic foundation of the region will be broader and deeper.[5] Moreover, the Gulf region's synergetic relations with India on account of the vital resource they share—human resources from India to the Gulf with more than 9 million expatriate workforce; while on the other, natural resources from the Gulf to India in which hydrocarbon constitutes more than 30 percent of the total import—seems to be the main casualty.[6] Against this critically challenging backdrop, the paper chiefly delves into how the Gulf society and India will tide over the complex realities of the pandemic hit relations affecting millions of people on both sides with significant geopolitical and geo-economic consequences.

The Pandemic and the GCC's Multiple Vulnerabilities

For more than a year, the Covid-19 pandemic has been wreaking havoc. First declared as "the public health emergency of international concern" and later a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO), the coronavirus has infected more than 150 million people across 220 countries and territories of the world and taken the toll of more than 3.2 million people.[7] Covid-19 has also had an impact on the means of livelihood and education, as measures to contain the contagion such as lockdowns have led to the economic slump and consequently vast erosion in employment; while educational institutions, from primary to higher, have also been shut. The world has also been experiencing deepening inequalities in several socio-economic sectors and unfortunately, the situation continues to worsen. The severity of the situation is documented by the World Health Organization as:

> Apart from the colossal loss of human life worldwide and unprecedented challenge to public health, food systems, and the world of work, the economic and social disruption caused by the pandemic is devastating: tens of millions of people are at risk of falling into extreme poverty, while the number of undernourished people, currently estimated at nearly 690 million, could increase by up to 132 million by the end of the year. Millions of enterprises face an existential threat. Nearly half of the world's 3.3 billion global workforces are at risk of losing their livelihoods. Informal economy workers are particularly vulnerable because a majority lacks social

protection and access to quality health care and have lost access to productive assets.[8]

The GCC region is intensely reeling under the pandemic-led situation. By April 2021, more than 1.7 million people in the region have been infected, causing more than 13 thousand deaths.[9] The spread of coronavirus in the GCC was reported first by the UAE on 29th January 2020 followed by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar in late February 2020, and on 2nd March 2020 by the Saudi Kingdom.[10] However, all GCC countries have attempted to contain the spread of the virus by putting in measures required as per the WHO guidelines. As a result, they suspended domestic and international travel, imposed lockdown, shutting down educational institutions, banned social gatherings and sports events, besides providing free-of-charge healthcare to patients, and launchedCovid-19 active testing and medication.

According to the WHO Health Emergency Dashboard, as of 30th April 2021, in Saudi Arabia, there have been 416,307 confirmed cases of Covid-19 with 6946 deaths; in Oman total confirmed cases reported were 193,253 with 2010 deaths; the UAE reported 518,262 confirmed cases with 1584 deaths, while Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain reported respectively 272,562; 204,976; and 175,752 infected cases and 1554; 450 and 639 deaths caused by the deadly coronavirus.[11] Under the ongoing situation, the Gulf region has been confronted with multifarious challenges. The sweeping international economic downturn disturbed the demand and supply equilibrium for crucial resources and commodities and, as a result, the oil-based economies faced a colossal slump in oil demand leading to the collapse of oil prices. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in a report Economic Prospects and Policy Challenges for the GCC Countries in October 2020 projected to decline the oil export "by around $150 billion (37 percent) in 2020 compared to 2019 while imports to drop by 14 percent due to weaker domestic demand and lower import prices".[12] The same report has also envisaged for the GCC economy reducing their real GDP growth by 6.5 percent; "the current account balance to decline from a surplus of 5.8 percent of GDP in 2019 to a deficit of 1.8 percent of GDP in 2020"; besides, "the drop in the financial account from a surplus of $26.5 billion in 2019 to a deficit of $92.2 billion in 2020".[13]

The severity of the economic onslaught can be understood: as the biggest economy of the region and the biggest oil exporter of the world, Saudi Arabia, has suffered "a budget deficit of $9 billion in the first quarter of 2020 alone".[14] Lower oil prices also hurt the UAE's finances, as "the deficit is projected 9.9 percent of the country's GDP besides a contraction of 6.2 percent in the economy". "Kuwait's current account deficit has reached 5.3 percent of GDP and fiscal deficit to 27.7 percent of GDP in 2020".[15] Given the pandemic-induced economic shocks and increasing fiscal deficit in the Gulf economy; some governments moved to "cut expenditure, reprioritize spending within existing budget envelopes so that new health and social priorities could be met without increasing overall spending, or raise additional non-oil revenues".[16] With all these developments nationals (citizens) and non-

nationals (international migrants) couldn't be let off as the two constitute equal proportion (50:50) in the region's demography. However, the (non-national) expatriate workforce, including India's has been exposed more to critical challenges of health and economic survival, ultimately impinging on the governments of India and the GCC countries to address their concerns such as to safeguard from the coronavirus contagion, providing emergency health support to bring them back home, utilizing good offices of the respective governments.

Indian Expatriates and the Gulf Oil: Indo-Gulf Relations' Pillars under Strain

Indo-Gulf relations are mainly driven by two "dominant verticals: the economic symbiosis and India's expatriate community".[17] In an estimate, every 10th migrant in the world lives in the GCC. International migrants comprise over 80 percent of the populations of the UAE and Qatar, 70 percent of Kuwait's, 55 percent of Bahrain's, 33 percent of Saudi Arabia's, and 26 percent of Oman's.[18] The expatriate workforce is the pillar of the Gulf economies, who are involved in the oil sector, tourism, manufacturing, construction, and the automobile; while on the other, they fetch remittances worth $120 billion through which they fulfil basic as well as auxiliary needs of their lives. However, about 9.3 million Indian expatriates—constituting 30 percent of the expatriate workforce in the region—live and work in the GCC countries, making the India-Gulf region "the second-largest migration corridor in the world".[19] Out of a total, more than two-thirds are blue-collar workers and the remaining one-third are skilled professionals. The large size of workforce drawn from India plays a key role in the region's economic development; and, at the same time, as the latest figure suggests, the remittances worth $50 billion they accrue constitutes "two percent of India's GDP and two-thirds of the total remittances generated from all across the world".[20] Moreover, of the total remittance in 2018, according to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), "the UAE's share was 26.9 percent, Saudi Arabia's 11.6 percent, Qatar's 6.5 percent, and Kuwait's 5.5 percent".[21] Besides, the Gulf countries are India's biggest trading partner, with $121.34 billion bilateral trade in 2018-19 with hydrocarbon as the largest share.[22] In 2019-20, "India's hydrocarbon trade with the region was worth $62 billion, which is 36 percent of the total hydrocarbon trade".[23] Two countries of the region the UAE and Saudi Arabia secure places in the top five of India's trading partners.

But the twin-pillar of the bilateral relationship has been exposed to critical challenges. The nine million Indian expatriates were among the worst affected lots. The pandemic has exposed the vulnerable workers mainly employed in sectors such as manufacturing, construction, and automobile and increased the challenges to their living conditions. The containment measures and subsequent economic interruptions rendered hundreds of thousands jobless; forced the same number to strand without adequate resources in

swarming and unhygienic labour camps in which social distancing was virtually impossible. They were highly susceptible to contagion. For instance, last year as of 7 May 2020, what the Ministry of Health of Saudi Arabia's report wrote, 75 percent of all confirmed cases were among migrants.[24] The pandemic made the Gulf region fatal for migrant workers. The Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India, in response to a question in the Rajya Sabha, reported that as of 31st December 2020, out of the total death toll (2,072) caused by Covid-19 on foreign soil, about 90 percent (1,892) took place in the six Gulf countries: "The highest death toll of 906 people, was in Saudi Arabia, followed by 375 in the UAE, 369 in Kuwait, 66 in Oman, 48 in Bahrain, and 34 in Qatar".[25] However, the condition of migrant workers in the Gulf region had been harsh even before the pandemic as they had been subjected to excessively long working hours, and the working conditions rendered them vulnerable to developing mental health issues; many of them succumbed to cardiovascular and respiratory illnesses.[26]

In this situation to rescue and repatriate its nationals, India opened the world's biggest evacuation operation Vande Bharat Mission (VBM) in May 2020. Under this mission, as the External Affairs Minister, S. Jayshankar in a statement to the Indian Parliament said, "a total of 45,82,043 people from 98 countries returned to India till March 2021 out of which the maximum number of stranded Indians returned from the UAE, followed by Saudi Arabia, USA, and Qatar".[27] Touted as "the largest civilian evacuation mission by a country in the world", the Vande Bharat Mission has surpassed India's last biggest evacuation operation during the first Gulf War (1990) in which above one lakh people were airlifted.

Owing to the return of the expatriate workforce both India and the Gulf countries are poised to face a difficult situation: in India integrating back into their society with the potential threat of joblessness and other societal insecurities is a daunting task; while on the other, dearth of the workforce in the Gulf after the full-fledged opening of the economy will cause operational hurdles. Moreover, the pandemic seems to expedite the already undertaken process of nationalization that had been kicked off in the region well almost a decade back. The nationalization of the workforce in Saudi Arabia in terms of Saudisation and *Nitaqat*, for instance, has forced tens of thousands to return home back. Through the exercise of nationalization of the workforce the GCC countries are securing employment for their citizens in private sectors which are largely occupied by the migrant workforce so far. During the low-oil price especially between 2015 and 2018, as many as "7 lakh, foreign low-wage workers were laid off in Saudi Arabia"; besides, barring foreign workers from working in more than 80 job categories in Oman; and restricting the job nationalization drive to government jobs by the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain.[28]

Another interrelated impact is visible in the trade activity. The bilateral trade between India and the GCC countries has dwindled. In an estimate, "the total trade during April and October 2020, was $39.98 billion, with the share of GCC in India's foreign trade during the period being 12

percent; in contrast, during the corresponding period in 2019-20, the share of India-GCC trade was about 33 percent of India's total foreign trade".[29] Although in 2018-19, India's trade with GCC countries had registered strong growth, with imports from the Gulf to India soared to worth "$79.70 billion, almost double the $41.55 billion exports from India to the Gulf region. Among the GCC countries, UAE accounted for the major chunk of India's exports and imports with $30.08 billion and $29.77 billion respectively in FY19".[30] Most conspicuously, even the lion share in the bilateral trade, "the hydrocarbon-related items, have dropped off to $17.5 billion during April and October 2020".[31]

Overcoming the Gloom

There is no doubt that the whole world has been stumbling under a shocking wave of the Covid-19 pandemic, whose menacing impact on the societies of the world is inconceivable. India and the GCC countries share a historic bond. However, as rightly described, "the relationship today has moved much beyond being a function of an organic historicity".[32] Nonetheless, the ongoing scenario is driven by multiple factors including a fortuitous one, besides the internal dynamics of the two sides. This has spawned an unpleasant gloom in the relationship which neither side would prefer to sustain. There are three areas of Indo-Gulf relations, primarily, need to be cultivated for a better harvest.

Firstly, the two sides require accelerating their engagement in crucial strategic areas. The diversification drives of the Gulf economies essentially necessitate going beyond their reliance on the hydrocarbon trade. When looked at the export items of the GCC countries, as of now Kuwait and Qatar are only 10 percent, Saudi Arabia and Oman's 20 percent, and the UAE and Bahrain's about half exports are non-hydrocarbon. However, in attempts to diversify, Dubai has emerged as a financial, business, and logistics hub for the region; at the same time the remaining are striving to become, what a Brookings' Doha report writes, "high-tech knowledge economies, but this requires a level of skills and research facilities that remain in short supply, and therefore, the GCC might be able to build a competitive technology ecosystem by importing talent from other Arab and Asian countries".[33] Given India's high skilled human resources, the Gulf countries can look beyond the blue colour workers by bringing in place progressive labour laws.

Lately, the GCC countries have stepped forward in diversifying the *carte du jour* of cooperation with India. For instance, the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) has reported that as many as 322 Indian companies have entered in either joint ventures or fully owned entities worth US $1.4 billion in the Kingdom for projects in sectors such as management and consultancy services, construction projects, telecommunications, information technology, financial services, and software development, pharmaceuticals.[34] On the other, Saudi's investment in India has gained a

giant stride as "Saudi's Aramco and Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) have committed to invest $44 billion in the West Coast Refinery-Cum-Petrochemical Project". Besides, Al-Fanar, a Saudi Company, has been executing a 300 MW power project in Kutchh; and Aramco, an oil giant has signed an MoU with the Mumbai based GumPro to set up a drilling fluids facility in 2018 along with an announcement of a plan to "acquire 20% share in the Reliance Industries Limited's Oil and Chemical business at an enterprise value of US $75 billion".[35] GCC's other major economy, the UAE, is India's second-largest export destination, while India is its second-largest trading partner during 2018 with US$ 36 billion (non-oil trade).[36] The UAE with an investment in India of $13-14 billion in five sectors, services, sea transport, power, construction activities, and infrastructure development is the 10th biggest FDI investor for India. Moreover, despite the global menace, GCC countries' attraction towards India is increasing as in the first six months of the financial year 2021, India has received a total of $30 billion in FDI from the GCC constituting 13 percent of the total FDI inflows during that period.[37] This is a quantum jump as compared to the last year's FDI, indicating that the GCC's maritime neighbour India will be a strong factor in future ventures of drifting towards sustainable economic development.

Secondly, management of the Indian migrant workforce from both sides requires more economically viable and humane treatment. Unquestionably, the emerging current of nationalization of the workforce in the region has discouraged migrant workers from India. The pandemic has added further woe to them. The largest size of temporary blue-collar workers from India pay exorbitant recruitment fees to secure employment under a foreign labour sponsorship system, the *Kafala* system, ensure to tie them to their employers, formalizing their insecurity, making this whole process of employer-employee relation "a maze of exploitation".[38] However, Saudi Arabia has signalled recently to bring changes in the labour-contract system to replace the *Kafala* policy considering the long term objectives of economic reform, acknowledging the voice of human rights forerunners, liberalizing the foreign workforce on the issues of entry, exit, and employer contact system, and allowing to freely changing employers within one year into their first contract.[39]

However, to address the multiple flaws, the Government of India has beefed up "the institutional framework" both at home and abroad. On the domestic front, the government has "developed a suite of pre-departure, protection-during-work-abroad, and rehabilitation-upon-return migration safety awareness programs and on the ground in the Gulf, an Indian Workers' Resource Center in Sharjah (UAE), to assist those who may be at risk of exploitation".[40] In the Covid-19 era, a comprehensive policy framework on mapping and recognizing the skills of the returnee workforce a programme called "Skilled Workers Arrival Database for Employment Support (SWADES), under the aegis of the Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship, has been introduced aiming to reintegrate them into the domestic labour market through sharing information on the skill sets of

returnees with potential employers".[41] But most importantly, once the pandemic period is over, the migrant workforce will head back to the Gulf region. In this situation what is needed is, as the International Labour Organization (ILO) recommends, discontinuing "individual sponsorship and having a host-country agency or ministry regulate the recruitment, allow exits without employer approval, and impose penalties for those who withhold workers' passports, mobile phones, etc".[42] Yet, there has been a remarkable bend in the approach of GCC countries to the sensitivities of the Indians working there–be they cultural or in their social engagements. "Allowing the construction of a Hindu temple in the UAE, for example, is an indication of this trend."[43]

Thirdly, India and the GCC countries find themselves mutually fit into their strategic calculus. Given some of the crucial developments in the region and around such as US-Iran embroilment, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, China's entrenched inroads into the Middle-East and African region through its BRI projects, the US' renewed interest in the Pacific region with the Indo-Pacific venture especially in the wake of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, the polarization of the West and Russia on the issue of Syria and recent Israel-Palestine violent conflict oblige the two sides to calibrate judiciously their strategic chessboard thinking for long-term implications. India has accorded high importance by inducting the region into its high resonance 'look west policy'. Therefore, as Kadira Pethiyagoda rightly observes, India's growing "regional aspirations across the Indian Ocean" have driven New Delhi to undertake "the Gulf and South Asia as strategically interactive and interrelated regions and has increased its focus on the Gulf accordingly".[44]

In recent years, high-level visits to the two sides mark an upward trend in the intense partnership. There was no visit of any Indian Prime Minister to Bahrain even after 70 years of independence. In 2019, the first-ever visit by an Indian Prime Minister and award to the PM Modi with "the Member 1st Class of the King Hamad Order of the Renaissance" by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa for strengthening bilateral relations between India and Bahrain scripted well how India sees towards each member of GCC.[45] The PM Modi's three visits from 2015 to 2019 to the UAE and the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan's (MBZ) visit to India in January 2017 as the Chief Guest at India's Republic day celebrations geared up the relations to the level of "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership".[46] India, home to the third-largest population of Islamic faith, was honoured at the 46thSession of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the 57 member Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) held in the UAE in March 2019. India's inroads to the OIC have been mend by the UAE substantiates that the two countries share unsnapable ties. During PM Modi's visit to Riyadh in 2019, "the Strategic Partnership Council Agreement" was signed, according high eminence to India as one of the Kingdom's "Strategic Partner Countries under Vision 2030".[47] India's emergence in the GCC region's strategic calculus is evident with Oman's grant of access of its deep

seaport Duqm to the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy further fortifying its already formalized defence relations.

Yet, during the pandemic, both sides' high-level talks through the means of ICT took place. India and the GCC leaders engaged them via video conferencing and telephone conversations, and facilitated the exchange of medical and pharmaceutical equipment and personnel, giving rise to a new term "Covid diplomacy". With the ease of the pandemic situation, New Delhi has embarked on re-engaging the GCC countries as both the ministers of External Affairs (Cabinet and MoS) S. Jaishankar and V. Muraleedharan, visited the region one after the other.[48] Therefore, as rightly illustrated, "the strategic depth of India's multilateral construct" with the Gulf has been soaring high; as a result, "this heady mix of pragmatism, geopolitical tactic, and historic relations" is bound to generate "massive commercial boost for India".[49]

Conclusion

The unprecedented wave of pandemic Covid-19 has been causing excruciating pain to humanity for over a year and the spell of distress yet continues with new mutants of the coronavirus. The GCC countries and India as well are confronting the second wave of the pandemic, which has returned with a more lethal impact. Ever since the pandemic thickened in early 2020, societies of the world began taking measures to face it. This global menace smashing all walks of human lives, incapacitating health, halting economic activities, tearing down the flow of trade and commerce, robbing the means of livelihood, and shutting down avenues of employment all across the world has compelled billions to suffer. Significantly, India and the GCC countries share deep linkages in economic, strategic, political, and cultural arenas. The three core components of the Indo-Gulf relations' mainstay—the economic complementarily through hydrocarbon trade; the strong Indian migrant workforce for the GCC economy and their return in terms of huge remittances for India's socio-economic foundation; and, the emerging strategic symbiosis of the two sides—have been subjected to an ordeal. The pandemic's impact on the world economy proved to be a big blow for the GCC: the oil demand dropped, resulting in the oil price crash leading finally to inflict deep wounds on the expatriate workforce. This has essentially engendered smooth affairs between India and the GCC. The intriguing developments as to why the rich Gulf countries treat millions of migrant workforce, including Indians indifferently just as a senseless instrument of economic activities and forcing them to confine into unhygienic and diminutive dwellings to just contain the pandemic and primarily save their nationals and, forcing them to return home vindicate that there has been a serious absence of the universally-observed moral principle of treating human-beings more humanely. Overnight no Gulf economy can replace the migrant workforce with their nationals. And, therefore, the return of migrant workers to the GCC is imminent. However, India's embrace of an institutional

framework for managing the outgoing and incoming migrant workers will face headwinds with the scarcity of resources to integrate them fully (socially and economically) that can be eased only after the opening of the GCC's economic operation soon. This requires a strong institutional mechanism for the two sides to get rewarded with the sharing of human resources. India's Covid diplomacy and intensified high-level visits to the GCC countries supported by GCC's initiative of massive FDI is a good indication of dissipating the gloom. Nonetheless, the two sides require to judiciously calibrate the strategic chessboard to successfully guard their mutual interests.

Notes

[1]Gita Gopinath, "The Great Lockdown: Worst Economic Downturn Since the Great Depression," *IMF* (blog), April 14, 2020, https://blogs.imf.org/2020/04/14/the-great-lockdown-worst-economic-downturn-since-the-great-depression.
[2]Paul Blake and Divyanshi Wadhwa, "2020 Year in Review: The impact of COVID-19 in 12 charts," *World Bank* (blog), December 14, 2020,
 https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/2020-year-review-impact-COVID-19-12-charts
[3]Ibid.
[4]Key Policy Responses from OECD: Tackling Coronavirus (COVID-19), Contributing to a Global Response, *"The Impact of Coronavirus (COVID-19) and the Global Oil Price Shock on the Fiscal Position of Oil-Exporting Developing Countries,"* OECD, last modified September 30, 2020, https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/the-impact-of-coronavirus-COVID-19-and-the-global-oil-price%20shock-on-the-fiscal-position-of-oil-exporting-developing-countries-8bafbd95/.
[5]"Economic Prospects and Policy Challenges for the GCC Countries*,"* International Monetary Fund (The Middle East and Central Asia Department*),* last modified December 10, 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2020/12/08/Economic-Prospects-and-Policy-Challenges-for-the-GCC-Countries-49942.
[6]Annapurna Mitra and Ria Kasliwal, *"Twin Crises in the Gulf: Implications for India,"* Special Report No. 105, Observer Research Foundation, last modified on April 30, 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/research/twin-crises-gulf-implications-india-65432/.
[7]"WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard," World Health Organization, last modified April 30, 2021, https://COVID19.who.int/.
[8]"Impact of COVID-19 on People's Livelihoods, Their Health and Our Food Systems: Joint Statement by ILO, FAO, IFAD and WHO," World Health Organization, last modified October 13, 2020, https://www.who.int/news/item/13-10-2020-impact-of-COVID-19-on-people's-livelihoods-their-health-and-our-food-systems.
[9]"WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard."
[10]A.Thamir, Faizo A. Arwa and Azhar I. Esam, "Coronavirus Disease of 2019 (COVID-19) in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries: Current Status and Management Practices," *Journal of Infection and Public Health* 13, no. 6 (June 2020): 839-842.
[11]"WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard."
[12]International Monetary Fund (The Middle East and Central Asia Department*),* *"Economic Prospects and Policy Challenges".*

[13]Ibid.

[14]Maher Chmaytelli and Davide Barbuscia, "Saudi Arabia Cuts Q1 Deficit, Reaping Benefits of Fiscal Measures," Reuters, last modified May 4, 2021, https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide/citation-guide-1.html#cg-website

[15] International Monetary Fund (The Middle East and Central Asia Department), *"Economic Prospects and Policy Challenges".*

[16]Ibid.

[17]Mahesh Sachdev, "A Double Whammy for India-Gulf Economic Ties," *The Hindu*, April 10, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a-double-whammy-for-india-gulf-economic-ties/article31302542.ece.

[18] Yara M. Asi, "Migrant Workers' Health and COVID-19 in GCC Countries," Arab Centre Washington DC, last modified July 7, 2020, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/migrant-workers-health-and-covid-19-in-gcc-countries/.

[19]Annapurna Mitra and Ria Kasliwal, "Twin Crises in the Gulf: Implications for India".

[20]Ibid.

[21]Issac John, "The Pandemic in the Gulf: What It Portends for NRIs in the Region," ORF Special Report No. 104, Observer Research Foundation, last modified April 20, 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-pandemic-in-the-gulf-64882/.

[22]"Robust Trade Growth Lays Foundation for India-GCC FTA," India Inc., last modified December 27, 2020, https://indiaincgroup.com/robust-trade-growth-lays-foundation-for-india-gcc-fta/.

[23]Dharmendra Pradhan, "India is Looking West: Relations Between New Delhi and the Gulf Nations have Undergone a Fundamental Reset", *The Times of India,* December 6, 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/india-is-looking-west-relations-between-new-delhi-and-the-gulf-nations-have-undergone-a-fundamental-reset/

[24]"Migration Data Relevant for the COVID-19 Pandemic," Migration Data Portal, last modified December 1, 2021,
 https://www.migrationdataportal.org/themes/migration-data-relevant-COVID-19-pandemic.

[25]Rejimon Kuttappan, "Many Indian Workers Died of COVID-19 In the Gulf: Expanding Insurance Coverage Could Help Their Families," *The Hindu*, April 9, 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/society/many-indian-workers-died-of-COVID-19-in-the-gulf-expanding-insurance-coverage-could-help-their-families/article34279531.ece.

[26] Ibid.

[27]"45.82 Lakh People From 98 Countries Have Returned Under Vande Bharat Mission," Mint, last modified March 15, 2021,
https://www.livemint.com/news/india/4582-lakh-people-from-98-countries-have-returned-under-vande-bharat-mission-11615822875119.html.

[28]Issac John, "The Pandemic in the Gulf".

[29] Md. Muddassir Quamar, "India-GCC Relations: Looking Beyond the Pandemic" Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, last modified January 25, 2021, https://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/india-gcc-relations-muddasir-150121.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32]Dharmendra Pradhan, "How India-Gulf Ties are Undergoing a Fundamental Reset", *The Economic Times*, December 7, 2020,

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/view-how-india-gulf-ties-are-undergoing-a-fundamental-reset/articleshow/79602451.cms?from=mdr.

[33]Nader Kabbani and Nejla Ben Mimoune, "Economic Diversification in the Gulf: Time to Redouble Efforts," Brookings Doha Centre, last modified January 31, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/research/economic-diversification-in-the-gulf-time-to-redouble-efforts.

[34]"India-Saudi Arabia Bilateral Relations," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, accessed April 30, 2021, http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Saudi_Arabia_Bilateral_Jan_2020.pdf.

[35]Ibid.

[36]"India-UAE Bilateral Relations", Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, accessed April 30, 2021, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Bilateral_Brief_feb_2020_.pdf.

[37]Md. Muddassir Quamar, "India-GCC Relations," 2.

[38]John Calabrese, "India-Gulf Migration: A Testing Time," Middle East Institute, last modified April 14, 2020, https://www,.mei.edu/publications/india-gulf-migration-testing-time.

[39]Michal Rutkowski and Johannes Koettl, "Saudi Arabia Announces Major Reforms for its Migrant Workers, *"World Bank* (blog), December 18, 2020, https://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/saudi-arabia-announces-major-reforms-its-migrant-workers.

[40]Anurag Babu, "COVID-19 and India–Gulf Migration," *Delhi Post*, September 16, 2020, https://delhipostnews.com/COVID-19-and-india-gulf-migration.

[41]Ibid.

[42]Omer Karasapan, "Pandemic Highlights the Vulnerability of Migrant Workers in the Middle East," Brookings Institution, last modified September 17, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2020/09/17/pandemic-highlights-the-vulnerability-of-migrant-workers-in-the-middle-east/.

[43] Dharmendra Pradhan, "How India-Gulf ties are Undergoing a Fundamental Reset".

[44]Kadira Pethiyagoda, "India-GCC Relations: Delhi's Strategic Opportunity, "Brookings Doha Centre Analysis Paper No 18, last modified February 22, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/research/india-gcc-relations-delhis-strategic-opportunity/.

[45]Manama, "Bahrain Confers the King Hamad Order of the Renaissance to PM Narendra Modi," *India Today,* August 25, 2019, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/bahrain-confers-the-king-hamad-order-of-the-renaissance-to-narendramodi-1591389- 2019-08-25.

[46]Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, "India-UAE Bilateral Relations".

[47]Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, "India-Saudi Arabia Bilateral Relations".

[48]Md. Muddassir Quamar, "India-GCC Relations".

[49]"Why India Rejoiced as Gulf States Made Peace," India Global Business, last modified February 13, 2021, https://www.indiaglobalbusiness.com/geopolitics/gcc/why-india-rejoiced-as-gulf-states-made-peace.

Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement: A Case Study of Gujarat

By

Shubhra Seth [*]

Introduction

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are afflicted by a lack of belonging. Living in relief colonies or camps, their condition is similar to that of refugees as they are forced to leave their homes, resulting in severed community ties, disintegration of families, unemployment, and limited or no access to land, housing, food and education. The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement ('Guiding Principles,' hereinafter) define IDPs as 'persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border.' This definition spells out the situations leading to internal displacement, and the phenomenon can be classified into different categories with reference to the causes of displacement. The visible and acknowledged mark of separation that differentiates IDPs from refugees is 'an internationally recognised State border.' Faced with situations such as armed conflicts, internal strife, and continuous and systematic violation of human rights, those who seek asylum in a country other than that of their origin are recognised as refugees, whereas those who continue to stay within the border of their own country, seeking protection and support from their own government, join the category of IDPs.

* Shubhra Seth, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Indraprastha College for Women, University of Delhi, Delhi, India. Email: sseth@ip.du.ac.in

Principle 6 of the Guiding Principles establishes the following:

'1. Every human being shall have the right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or her home or place of habitual residence.
2. The prohibition of arbitrary displacement includes displacement:
(a) When it is based on policies of apartheid, "ethnic cleansing" or similar practices aimed at/or resulting in altering the ethnic, religious or racial composition of the affected population;
(b) In situations of armed conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand;
(c) In cases of large-scale development projects, which are not justified by compelling and overriding public interests;
(d) In cases of disasters, unless the safety and health of those affected requires their evacuation; and
(e) When it is used as a collective punishment.'

Conflict-induced Internal Displacement in Gujarat

Detailed literature in terms of independent reports, newspaper and journal articles, as well as books is available on the severity of the communal riots that occurred in the Indian state of Gujarat in 2002. The riots brought national and international ignominy, highlighting gross human rights violations. A few reports, mostly done by Gujarat-based NGOs and independent citizens' initiatives, are also among the available literature on the families displaced by the violence.[1] Since India has a repertoire of communal violence, most of the writings and reports focus on understanding the causes of violence and the government response in terms of setting up enquiry commissions and announcing compensation. Though these are important, it is equally important to examine if people forced to flee during violent attacks have been able to return to their original homes, and if there is sufficient help from the state and its agencies to assist them in rebuilding their lives socially, economically, physically and emotionally. The ease with which the words 'refugees' and 'internally displaced' have been interchangeably used in reports and documents, without much thought being given to the distinction between them, is a cause of concern. Conflict-induced internal displacement as a residue of communal violence and the existing relief colonies in Gujarat where those displaced by the violence of 2002 continue to reside are the pertinent concerns of this essay that presents a case study of a few IDP colonies located in the state.

Narratives from the Field

Within the broad objective of understanding conflict-induced internal displacement in India, Gujarat put forth a strong case for examining internal displacement as a direct consequence of the communal violence in 2002. The academic sojourn began with the list of eighty-three internally displaced

colonies existing in Gujarat as given in a Status Report released in 2012 by the NGO Janvikas,[2] and a few journal articles.[3]

Janvikas, an 'Organizational Development Institute,' has been working in Gujarat for more than twenty-five years and today stands as a coalition of several value-based organizations working in the field of social development. While reading on various NGOs functioning in Gujarat, Janvikas came across as an organization that has continuously worked for the cause of assuring fair compensation and rehabilitation to those displaced due to the violence in 2002. Also, the founder-president of Janvikas, Gagan Sethi, was one of the members of the Monitoring Committee appointed by the National Human Rights Commission in Gujarat. Along with the Special Rapporteur P.G.J. Nampoothiri, the Janvikas-Centre for Social Justice team guided and prepared the first preliminary study that surveyed and gave a Status Report in April 2004 on the rehabilitation of the victims displaced due to the violence. Since then, this organization has been working consistently with IDPs in Gujarat, the focus being on conflict-induced internal displacement.

The districts selected for the study were Ahmedabad (the former capital city of Gujarat and one of the most riot-prone cities in India), Panchmahal (situated in eastern Gujarat and the trigger point for the violence in 2002), and Sabarkantha (which, even a decade after 2002, had the highest number of relief colonies, numbering up to nineteen).

Survivors Speak

The responses collected from focussed group discussions with Janvikas teams and community workers through intermittent meetings arranged in the latter half of 2013 present narratives that map the trajectory of a decade. The respondents in this field study were mostly women. These women, each representing a household of usually five to six members, joined the group discussions out of their own volition. A few women spoke sparingly while others interacted keenly and vociferously in an effort to make their voices heard. Most of these interactions began as freewheeling interactions that gradually became more of a sharing of experience by the respondents of their lives post 2002. While collating the data and responses gathered across the three districts, it emerged that some issues were repeated in almost all the discussions and they gained salience as matters requiring urgent attention in all the IDP colonies that were visited. These issues were housing, basic amenities, livelihood, documents, and education−identical to the variables identified in the Model of Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR Model) utilised by Michael M. Cernea[4] while discussing the movement in time from destitution in displacement to recovery in resettlement. The manner in which the Guiding Principles have addressed these issues require immediate attention from the government.

In light of the above, the narratives collected from the IDP colonies shall be presented as five themes, each highlighting a variable of the IRR Model and also reflecting the components of the Guiding Principles.

1.   Housing and Homelessness

The category of displaced people gives the understanding that there is an evident territorial dislocation of the affected victims. In Gujarat, the months following February 2002 witnessed thousands of Muslim families being forced to flee their homes in search of protection from the violent armed mobs that unleashed plunder and murder. Within a fortnight, more than a hundred relief camps were set up to shelter people displaced by the violence. Even by a conservative estimate, around 1,50,000 people took shelter in relief camps spread across several districts. Added to this were thousands of other Muslims who stayed with relatives or friends. Since India does not have any mechanism or organization to tabulate the number of those displaced due to conflict, the numbers continue to remain in approximate figures or have the phrase of 'conservative estimate' prefixed to it. All the relief camps were set up and run by private initiatives mostly coming from minority organizations or faith-based organizations like the Islamic Relief Committee (IRC) [the relief wing of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)] and the Gujarat Sarvajanik Relief Committee (GSRC) affiliated to Jamiat-el-Ulema-e-Hind (JU.) Civil society organizations like Janvikas and Aman Biradari also stepped in to help the affected families relocate and resettle, though much of the burden was shouldered by JI and JU. On June 30, 2002 all the relief camps were declared closed by the state government in a bid to declare 'normalcy.'[5] For thousands of families who could not return to their original homes, the journey from being victims of communal violence to being internally displaced within the state of Gujarat began from here. With persisting threats from neighbours of further killing and destruction, and loss of home and property, almost the entire population residing in difficult conditions in the relief camps did not feel secure to return.

The next step for faith-based and civil society organizations was to construct relief colonies, most of them one-room tenements built on a plot not exceeding twenty-four feet by twelve feet, with a small kitchen space and common bath and toilet facilities. The IRC, as learnt through group discussions with affected families, set up around eleven colonies with nearly six hundred such small units. These colonies are commonly addressed as 'IDP colonies.' While the GSRC constructed six to seven such IDP colonies benefitting over eight hundred families, clusters of twenty-five to thirty houses in different IDP colonies spread across districts were built by a few civil society organizations. Located in secluded hamlets, away from the arterial roads and townships, these IDP colonies present a world of a different hue where one could gather through narratives, and at times through unspoken emotions, the years of forced seclusion, trauma and continued struggle of these families displaced due to conflict.

Most of the residents have not been given any ownership papers, nor can they transfer occupancy rights to anybody else. They only have an assurance given by the concerned Trust that they will not be displaced from the homes where they are residing now. Though the families do not have ownership papers, they are required to pay a 'development fee.' This became a sore point that led to a unanimous lamentation by the respondents that the

violence has displaced the affected families forever. They are caught in a complicated web where the house is a structure given to them when they were looking for shelter yet it does not legally belong to them, and they live in perpetual fear of being asked to vacate. Many of the IDP colonies have been built on what the state government claims as 'land for agricultural use.' Hence, residential construction on such land is not recognized or regularized, and the colonies stand as illegal encroachments. The loss of their homes and the persistence of that loss for over a decade was a pertinent expression which highlighted the dilemma of the respondents, a feature characteristic of conflict-induced internal displacement and the resultant traumatic cycle of being homeless at home.

Juhapura, the largest Muslim ghetto in Ahmedabad, is a research question in itself. The population of this area has almost doubled in the last decade after 2002, and it requires several visits to Juhapura to understand the sequence of its scattered IDP colonies. Juhapura presents two variants of IDPs—those who lost their dwellings and savings in the violence and could not rebuild their homes, and those who had savings to fall back upon. These families bought houses in areas with a sizeable Muslim population because of continued threats after the violence. They had lived in a constant pall of insecurity in their earlier places of residences, and therefore sold off their property in those locations and shifted to Muslim ghettos often against their wishes. Juhapura is a collective of different forms of housing clusters where IDP colonies (Asim Park, Ekta Row House, and Imaarat-e-Sariah) share space with modest houses for those who can afford a dwelling with two rooms, a kitchen, and attached bath and toilet facilities. Alongside these houses stand three- or four-storey apartment blocks like the one in Javed Park.

2.   Lack of Basic Amenities

The location of these IDP colonies is nondescript, and it is difficult to locate these hamlets in the absence of any signage. Halol and Kalol in Panchmahal district required more time to examine as there were several IDP colonies located there. The colonies in Halol (beginning from the 101 Colony built by Haji Majid Kaka Cooperative Society to the Falah Nagar Colony built by Falah-e-Alam Trust), and the two colonies of Sanjri Park and Karim Colony (built by IRC and GSRC respectively) had similar status with respect to basic amenities.

At 101 Colony (the colony was named thus because it contains 101 houses built for the displaced families), the residents had persisting water and electricity woes. Water supply through a private arrangement was available for two hours during the day and electricity supply too was erratic and available for only a few hours. There is no approach road from the state highway to the colony and it must be reached through meandering, untarred or kutcha roads that only the local people can navigate.

Anganwadis, or Integrated Child Development Service centres (ICDS), are required in most of the colonies. Juhapura has one *anganwadi* in Imaraat-e-

Shariah Colony where more than sixteen children aged under four years share space in a one-room tenement while loudly reciting poems in unison.

Kasimabad in Kalol stands as an example amid the struggle and turmoil, and is often pointed out as a model settlement where, with the effort of the families therein, tireless work by volunteers from civil society organizations and duty-bound district officials has achieved much. It is significant that close to 125 families in the Kasimabad IDP colony have got ownership papers and their documentation is in process.

Located in the district of Sabarkantha, one of the worst-hit districts during the communal violence, Kifayatnagar and Hussainabad both show gross neglect and difficult conditions in which families have continued to live for more than eight years. There are no street lights, only limited electricity supply, and most of the houses still have asbestos sheet roofs with brick structures and their walls are yet to be plastered. The condition with respect to basic amenities can be summarized thus:

- The IDP colonies in Ahmedabad are neglected islands in the outskirts of the city. They still lack access roads and internal roads, and sewage systems are still awaited. Citizen Nagar seems to be worst hit during the monsoons−as it is located right next to the landfill area of Ahmedabad city, tons of garbage that is dumped there flows down clogging the colony and makes even movement difficult. Potable water is still not supplied to several colonies and, despite being forced to live in challenging conditions, most of these colonies do not have any health coverage. There are no hospitals or health clinics nearby and there was no mention of a health officer visiting these families to evaluate their living environment and surroundings.

- Panchmahal district also shows similar lack of basic amenities where several colonies still do not have access to safe drinking water. A colony in Halol has only common tap facility, and about thirty households shared that single tap for cooking, cleaning and washing. Street lights are yet to be installed and electricity arrangement in most colonies is self-financed by the families or through the Trust. Health centres are in the pipeline for all the colonies and schools are located at a distance of more than three kilometres from the colonies. Many women community workers in Halol have been demanding for some years the opening of primary schools in the IDP colony clusters because children below the age of ten years had no schools in their vicinity and find it difficult to travel on foot to schools located far away from home. With no approach roads and internal roads, the residents found it impossible to arrange transportation for these children.

- Sabarkantha showed the most severe lack of basic amenities among all the three districts selected for the study. A few colonies here still have no access to electricity or water supply. The houses are bare brick structures with asbestos sheet roofs making them cauldrons in the summer and have no sewage system. The affected families were

living in abject poverty as many still struggle to find jobs as casual labourers. Health centres and *anganwadis* are awaited even after a decade of the existence of these eighteen IDP colonies with a population of approximately more than four thousand.

3.   Livelihood Struggles

Location of the IDP colonies in the hinterland with no approach roads makes job seeking a daily ordeal for the displaced families. The episode of violence was followed by an economic boycott that persisted informally in many villages and urban settlements. Another major blow to livelihood prevails because every relief colony is a cluster of families hailing from several villages−hence, they compete with each other for the very few jobs available. Also, much time, labour and money are spent on commuting from the IDP colonies located on the outskirts to reach the town or village centres where jobs could be found on daily-wage basis or to sell some small items in *laaris* (push carts). Several women respondents who became bread winners for their families after the tragic events of 2002 said that the only options available for them was to stitch clothes−a skill they knew well−or sell *bhaaji* (vegetables).

In almost all the focussed group discussions in the IDP colonies, women were eager to work and earn their livelihood since they wanted to assure a better future for their children. The targeted attack on the minority families followed by an economic boycott has had spiralling effects on their livelihood. Former petty-shop owners have now become casual workers in factories and shops, and families that once owned tailoring shops now sell vegetables for a living. In Sabarkantha a family that had a flourishing catering business for decades now finds it difficult to feed its members. Compensation amounts being meagre as compared to the losses, the affected families have not yet been able to recover from the scourge of displacement. The condition with respect to livelihood struggles can be summarized thus:

- Families living in IDP colonies face severe livelihood problems because of the economic boycott that still persists informally in the towns and villages of the state. The condition is further aggravated by the distant location of the IDP colonies.
- To sustain their families, women are eager to work and all the IDP colonies wanted tailoring units or *mehendi* (henna) art classes.
- Children are worst affected as they have had to forgo their limited options of education and have been forced to do casual work like rolling joss sticks, making match sticks and paper bags or assisting their elder siblings in selling vegetables or other small items of daily use in the local markets.

4.   Compensation and Documents

Compensations were fixed at low levels, and these were assessed and distributed by an administration that was 'openly hostile on communal

grounds' to the survivors of the violence.[6] Despite the sub-human survival
conditions in the relief colonies, the state government returned Rs. 19.10
crores from the grant of Rs. 150 crores originally made by the central
government, citing it as unutilised. The state government claimed that since
rehabilitation was complete and it did not find any affected families as per the
framework or category under which the grants had been forwarded by the
centre, the money was returned after due consultation with auditors. The
National Commission for Minorities noted in its report that many more
families could have been covered under the existing and relevant schemes and
the entire grant could have been well utilised.[7]

        Documents, some as basic as electoral identity cards, are still waited
for the families in the IDP colonies, even after three state elections having
been held since the riots. Document processing is an arduous cycle and, in the
absence of permanent residence papers, voter identity cards become difficult
to be issued making the process stagnated or delayed. In all family clusters in
the IDP colonies, one common question revolved around why poverty-
stricken displaced families were issued Above Poverty Line (APL) ration cards
when it was evident that they should have been issued Below Poverty Line
(BPL) ration cards.[8] This makes a big difference because BPL ration-card
holders are entitled to food grains, edible oil, kerosene, etc. at subsidised rates.

        The condition with respect to compensation and documents can be
summarized thus:

- Compensation amounts have been low and few families have been
  covered. For most families the loss of household goods has been
  either covered under the small sum of *gharvakhari* or the evaluators
  have found 'nil' damages.
- Documents have been delayed for the displaced families who have
  lost everything in the violence. For example, residence proofs cannot
  be produced by families whose homes were damaged and burnt
  down.

5.   Yearning for Education

The displaced families seemed most proactive when the discussion shifted to
education and the future of their children. Since these discussions and
meetings were mostly with women, they shared the dire need to get their
children educated. Mothers were unhappy that their children were growing up
in ghettos and did not have friends from other communities. They reasoned
that getting the children educated in Gujarati-medium schools is important to
open doors for better job prospects.

        In Citizen Nagar, a novel initiative has been taken by a resident and
her family. The mission was to enable the children of the colony aged below
twelve years to have some experience of schooling. A room in the colony
functions as a primary school under the Kadam Education Programme run by
the Centre for Development, Ahmedabad which works to bring education to
poor and vulnerable children. With only one teacher teaching in two shifts, it

is inspiring to see the enthusiasm of the children reciting poems, perfectly arranging the alphabets in Gujarati and using shades of colourful crayons in their craft books. All the children had similar bags. Books were kept in the school and were shared by the students. This novel endeavour is a joint effort by displaced families and civil society to share the light of learning with a generation that has just started to blossom amid neglect, poverty and tough survival battles.

Meghdhanush, yet another novel and encouraging education initiative, creates a new model of teaching and learning. This school was started by Janvikas in 2006 in Kasimabad Colony in Halol. By 2013, the school had more than 170 students and wove some beautiful educational patterns working with children from the displaced families. Its first batch of students, as shared by the team of eleven teachers and the principal, were those children who had witnessed the violence in 2002 with their families. They took months to adjust and seldom spoke to each other. Their drawings were depressing expressions as they drew disfigured huts in red colour, which a teacher explained was symbolic of their burnt homes that had left an indelible mark on their minds. Following a curriculum given by the state education board, the school has made additions like teaching human rights to primary-school children. It was interesting to learn that in their classes the teacher explained to the students of standard III that all human beings are equal and in times of need neighbours must help each other. At the end of the class, upon the instruction of the teacher, the students hugged each other to show solidarity and the feeling of togetherness. Since the students come from families of daily wage earners or casual labourers, the school has a unique method of fee payment that is open throughout the month. The records are painstakingly kept by the teachers. For example, a student, as per the daily earning of the family, pays Rs. 20 in one week and Rs. 50 in the following week, adding up to the monthly fee ranging between Rs. 70 and Rs. 200 as per the grade in which s/he studies. The classrooms are creatively decorated and the teachers proudly convey that the students excel in crafts. Several students have joined this school from the nearby town in Kalol and a few non-Muslim parents are also keen to send their children to Meghdhanush because of its innovative teaching methods. With a dedicated army of teachers and community workers, this school with limited space and a few classrooms is doing great service for the displaced families. The condition with respect to education can be summarized thus:

- Primary schools are the need of the hour as repeatedly opined by the families in the colonies.
- The displaced families want to educate their children in Gujarati-medium schools and do not want only religious education imparted through madrassas.
- Initiatives like Kadam Education Programme and Meghdhanush are novel efforts which are filling the gap left by the state's apathy towards the IDP families.

Repertoire of Displacement

Several fact-finding reports and the published list of the IDP colonies show a factual interrelation between the communal violence of 2002 and the subsequent displacement of the affected families. Harsh Mander, a social worker and writer who works with survivors of mass violence as well as homeless people, correctly terms these IDP colonies as 'relief colonies.' According to Mander, these 'relief colonies'[9] have a more permanent character than relief camps yet they are not systematically built by the state for the resettlement of the affected families. In the context of Gujarat, the colonies were built mostly by civil society organizations and faith-based organizations. Hence, Mander uses the hybrid term 'relief colonies,' a step ahead of relief camps yet miles away from being a regularised colony with basic amenities.

It can then be said that the IDP colonies built after 2002 in various districts of Gujarat present a factual case of conflict-induced internal displacement. The residents of these colonies were displaced due to communal violence and they continue to live in these changed locations not for reasons of economic benefits or better employment opportunities but largely because of insecurity and lack of assurance or support from the state government, which disables their safe return to the homes where they lived prior to the episode of violence.

This denial and neglect are the developing fault lines between the displaced families and the state. And such fault lines are warning signals for democracy because continued denial and refusal to accept the existence of families displaced due to violence points to the absence of a robust rehabilitation policy urgently needed to address this growing crisis of conflict-induced internal displacement.

In the absence of dedicated rehabilitation and reconciliation, many of the affected Muslim families have shifted into ghettos; some continue to live amidst humiliating conditions in their earlier residences prior to 2002, while a large number resides in the relief colonies or the IDP colonies unable to return to their native villages and towns. The state government having looked away from the affected Muslim families and their rehabilitation has left a vacant space that is now occupied by faith-based organizations. This has serious implications on the future of the country. In the words of Asghar Ali Engineer, communal upheavals form a continuous sequence of violence in India since its independence.[10] Therefore, we already have a repertoire of communal violence.[11] Charles Tilly sees repertoire as the whole set of means that a group has for making claims of different kinds on different individuals or groups.[12] With repeated displacement of a certain section of the population as a result of communal violence, India might put forward its own variant, manufacturing a repertoire of displacement which is not a pleasant prospect for the country.

Notes

[1]*Concerned Citizens Tribunal—Gujarat 2002* (Mumbai: Citizens for Justice and Peace), 19.

[2]*Gujarat's Internally Displaced: Ten Years Later: The 2012 Survey of Gujarat's IDP Colonies* (Janvikas).

[3]Harsh Mander, "Inside Gujarat's Relief Colonies: Surviving State Hostility and Denial," *Economic and Political Weekly* 41, no. 51 (2006): 5235-39. Also, "Life miserable in Gujarat relief colonies: court panel," *The Hindu*, June 5, 2007; Atul Thakur, "India ranks 11th in 'domestic refugees' list," *The Times of India*, August 28, 2012, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-ranks-11th-in-domestic-refugees-list/articleshow/15859672.cms.

[4]Michael Cernea, "Social Integration and Population Displacement," *International Social Science Journal,* 143, no. 1 (1995).

[5]Reports by Concerned Citizen Tribunal, Janvikas and Centre for Social Justice.

[6]Harsh Mander, "Living in Times of Fear and Hate: Failures of Reconciliation in Gujarat," *Economic and Political Weekly* 42, no. 10 (2007): 847-52.

[7]Report of the National Commission for Minorities, August 2006.

[8]Harsh Mander, "Broken Lives and Compromise Shadow Play in Gujarat," *Economic and Political Weekly* 47, no. 8 (2012): 90-97.

[9]. Harsh Mander, "Inside Gujarat's Relief Colonies: Surviving State Hostility and Denial," *Economic and Political Weekly* 41, no. 51 (2006): 5235-39.

[10]Asghar Ali Engineer, "Communal Riots in 2002," *Economic and Political Weekly* 38, no. 4 (2003): 280-82.

[11]Paul Brass, *On the study of Riots, Pogroms and Genocide* (Delhi: Three Essays Collective, 2006), 3.

[12]Charles Tilly, *The Contentious French: Four Centuries of Popular Struggle* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), cited in Sidney Tarrow, "Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the Repertoire of Contention," *Social Science History* 17, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 281-307.

City as a Method

By

Ayşe Çağlar[*]

What I refer to by city as a method is an argument that city serves as a crucial entry point to understand the multiscalar dynamics of migration and migrants' emplacement as well as the migrants' crucial role in understanding the processes of city making. This is an argument about the entanglement of migration and urban studies.

I will start by claiming that the urban question has always been a question of migration. What I mean by this is that we cannot think of cities being constituted without various forms of migration and migrant labour. In fact, if we were to simply follow Bertolt Brecht in his famous poem "Questions From a Worker Who Reads" which starts with the question of "Who built Thebes of the seven gates", and continues to ask about those who erected the triumphal arches of Great Rome and "[w]ho cooked the feast for the victors"[1], we would ask ourselves: who builds the cities, who enables the running of the services, who maintains and cleans the offices, hospitals, who works in the construction and especially in the infrastructure projects that are crucial for urban growth—we will quickly find the displaced and dispossessed migrant labour at the heart of cities. It is almost impossible to think of cities without migration and migrant labour. Thus, studying the making and remaking of cities gives us a very good entry point to study migrants and migration.

Today the urban question is even more of a migration question. This is so, not only because increasingly high percentage of the world population lives in cities, but also because cities are at the forefront in the generation of wealth within the current forms of the capitalist ordering of the economy. Cities are strategic sites for regimes of accumulation.

* Ayşe Çağlar, Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology, University of Vienna, and Permanent Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna. Email: caglar@iwm.at

Why Do the Cities have Such a Prominent Position Now?

For this, we have to start from the particular dynamics of cities in pursuit of the generation of wealth and the migrants' place in these dynamics. First of all, many cities utilize very proactively, entrepreneurial strategies to increase their competitive advantage to accrue capital and power. They utilize such strategies in pursuit of greater local, national, regional, and global connectedness so as to be able to achieve growth and generate wealth and power. Migrants are central to these dynamics. Because Migrant labour is crucial to the processes of reordering urban spaces and related regimes of value, migrants are essential for the restructuring of capital and politics in the city. Thus, studying these urban dynamics necessitates studying migrants in these processes. Both processes are mutually constitutive.

What Kind of Sites do we Speak of when we Talk About Cities Today?

Cities are, first of all, sites of hyper commodified land, sites of extraction (mainly based on rent), and logistical nodes. But they are also crucial sites for new forms of servicing (new place-based services) that are crucial for the logistical, economic, and financial sectors (cleaners and maintenance workers for the finance offices, headquarters, which Saskia Sassen has shown very clearly in her work). Cities' importance in this regard, as centers of logistics and servicing, as well as informal economies, became more obvious with Covid-19. Within the neoliberal reordering, cities require flexible, easily disposable, increasingly informal labour in varying forms of legal, economic, social, and political dispossession. A labour that is fractured in various ways in terms of their social, economic, and legal standing and rights, is at the heart of these cities' growth-based economies. This is the migrant labour which the bordering regimes continue to multiply and dispossess in multiple ways. Thus, frontier polices, which fracture, hierarchize, and cheapen the value of labor are crucial for urban economies and governance.

City as a method in the title is an allegation to S. Mezzadra's work *Border as Method*. What I refer to here is how cities could be a fruitful methodological entry point from which a whole series of strategic concepts of migration, as well as their relations can be recast (such as displacement and dispossession). Focusing on the interface between migrants and city making enables us to explore and understand the crucial role that a particular way of looking at cities play in understanding migrants and migrant dynamics in times of global capitalism.

In a nutshell, the city provides us a viewpoint to describe and understand multiple and mutually constitutive relations between migrants and cities (city making).[2] Here, it is important to note that the urban processes are essential not only for the production and the circulation (mobility) of labour, but also to keep labour disposable, dispossessed, dispersed, and as surplus

which is inherent to capitalism and even more so valuable for neoliberal cities. In that sense, cities become the frontiers of migration in the real sense of the term. This is why I think the city is a suitable methodological entry point for studying the location of migrants and migration in accumulation processes.

Here it is important to note that what I am talking about is not only the multiplification of labour through frontier policies, but also the juxtaposition of the differentially situated and cheapened migrant labour upon differently valued spaces of neoliberal cities. City spaces are fractured by a plethora of zoning and varying social, economic, and legal regulations in terms of rights, working conditions, and tax regulations. Thus, we have the juxtaposition of a double fracturing process, i.e., the juxtaposition of fractured/multiplied labour to differentiated city spaces and territory. We could understand the place of migrants in relation to the dynamics and the governance of these spaces and vice versa. That is why the urban and migrations question are mutually constitutive and the urban question is also a question of migrant governance in the context of neoliberal urban politics.

Now I would like to complicate the relationship between migrant labour and city making further. Though the figure of a migrant is crucial to the city making processes as labour, I do not think that their location in these processes could be reduced only to labour. Yes, migrants are a substantial part of the urban poor, but not only reducing migrants to urban poor would be to reduce the multiple locations of migrants in city making. This becomes clearer in the current form of urban dynamics in today's capitalism. As I mentioned, migrants are definitely part of the way capital is accrued and labour is governed in urban redevelopment, but they are also crucial to the multiscalar political, economic, cultural, and religious networks that make and remake the cities' power. Migrants are part of these networks which position the cities in relation to global, regional, and national networks of power.

It is important to recognize that migrants become part of the social, economic, political, and cultural landscapes of the cities in multiple ways, as they take up multiple social positions. What are the positions they take up: they are residents, taxpayers, students, debtors, money-landers, tenants, landlords, household members, neighbours, friends, officials, and last but not the least are activists and political actors. It is important to focus on migrants 'place in various urban domains as actors who contribute to the repositioning of cities within a particular power geometry. It might be also useful to remember that migrants are often actors of urban politics with other residents in raising political claims for social and historical justice. They become part of the participatory claims of the excluded and very often the dispossessed. I will come back to this point later. In a nutshell, these are the contours of why looking at the dynamics of urban transformation is crucial to understand the varying forms and location of migrants and migration. Here, it is important not to forget that it is the dynamics and paradoxes of neoliberal urban development which shape the value regimes in the cities.

Neoliberal urban development entails processes of accumulation, dispossession, and revaluation of city spaces, population segments, and particular periods of the city's (pasts) and related practices. The regeneration

processes in each city, for example, the ones which we have studied (Manchester New hemp shire, USA, Halle an der Saale, Germany and Mardin, Turkey) in our book *Migrants and City Making*³were intertwined with incentives to revalue property, sites, local histories and segments of the population. In each of these cities, migrants (but also some minorities) acquired an increased value within such revaluation processes which are connected to the accumulation of wealth and power in relation to the positioning of these cities as part of the networks of institutions of power and investments. In our research, we found that, for example, migrants were integral to the value creation processes fuelled by the real estate and international subprime mortgage industry. They served as real estate and mortgage brokers and as city residents who redeveloped property, stabilized neighbourhoods', took out subprime mortgages, and suffered foreclosures with the collapse of the property market. We saw that migrants and refugees revalued the aging housing stock or stored value in decaying houses, apartments and became part of the financialization of housing and property markets as much as they contributed to the construction sector and infrastructure projects, logistic networks, and service sector.

Migrants/refugees not only become cheapened and dispossessed labour but they also become means to access funding on varying scales. In several places, migrants and refugees became the ground through which property developers were able to reach out to (federal) funding as well as to powerful institutions of various scales, such as federal funding or supranational institutions like the EU. Thus, migrants–or for that matter, minorities–despite their racialization could acquire value in city leaders' attempts to access funding by being framed as part of the disadvantaged in need of services or of diversity. In this way, of course, depending on the conjunctural forces, they facilitate cities' reach to the power-laden networks of multiple funding institutions. This is one of the examples of migrants becoming city-makers beyond simply as migrant labour.

Consequently, migrants became part of cultural industries in connection to capital and urban restructuring geared toward establishing and enhancing the competitive worth of the city in order to attract capital and investment and reach out to funds (national but also supranational) in that regard too. As soon as cultural industries become part of the re- and de-valuation processes in and through urban regeneration, they opened possibilities and spaces for migrants and refugees to be located within the institutions and networks of cultural production (namely in music, literature, film, and theatre production, and circulation). For example, in one of the cities we have focused on in our work, we have seen very clearly that the neo-liberal restructuring of the city has depended heavily on urban restructuring projects within which migrants' (and in this case, minorities) presence played an important role in reaching out to global and supranational cultural institutions and funds such as UNESCO or EU. Their presence in turn was important to perform the stability, safety, and openness of the city to attract and secure further investment and capital flow to the city.

For example, in that city, particular kind of artistic production and heritage connected to migrants/minorities became prominent within the image of the city. In underlining this aspect, my aim is not to degrade or belittle these productions and practices, but to argue for the need to approach these migrants/minorities-centered/related cultural productions in relation to the broader dynamics of neoliberal city making. In this way, we could complicate the entanglement of the urban question with the question of migration beyond labour. However here it is important to keep in mind that these processes often go hand in hand with the use of fully dispossessed migrant labour (be cross-border or from the rural population). Thus, though migrants are crucial to the city making processes in various forms of labour, their location in these processes could not be reduced to labour.

We could extend these examples to some general theoretical points. In order to understand the value regimes in the neoliberal order of cities, it might be useful to approach these dynamics from the perspective of the colonial and racial logic of capitalism, namely from the perspective of "coloniality of power". Coloniality of power refers to the legitimizing and naturalizing narratives of racialized, culturalized and gendered differences which are fundamental for the appropriation and the dispossessive processes underlying capital accumulation. Such a perspective urges us to analyse both of these processes in relationship to each other. Most importantly, the centrality of the legitimizing narratives of difference is true not only for dehumanization and demonization narratives of appropriation, but also for the valorization of particular spaces, practices, and pasts ("heritage") which also are entangled with capital accumulation. Both forms of re-valuation processes especially in relation to migrants and refugees take place simultaneously as part of the neoliberal cities' strategies and dynamics of accumulating capital, investments, and power. It is in these broader dynamics of capitalism and urban dynamics that migrants (but also minorities) acquire value, presence, and visibility within the cultural and artistic networks and city imaginaries. Migrants could be simultaneously emplaced in contradictory ways in the value regimes of cities. They could be simultaneously subject to de-valuation and re-valorization simultaneously.

Approaching dynamics of cultural production which includes migrants/refugees/minorities beyond their quality as labour force (though labour is their essential connection to the urban economy), is to embark on an analysis of the political economy of cities' cultural reach and cultural industries and of the place of migrants in these dynamics. The location of migrants/refugees in these processes–often ambiguous and selective–become legible once we read them in relation to the dynamics of cultural institutions and practices of the urban reordering dynamics. The proliferation and valorization of migrant and refugee literature and artistic productions could be situated within this frame. Again, it is not to say anything about the content and quality of such productions, but it is about situating them and their actors within the dynamics of value regimes of neoliberal cities. We could understand these dynamics once we make the city as the entry point of our analysis.

Neoliberal Austerity Urbanism, Contentious Politics and Migrants

Now I would like to come to the ways in which migrants become important political actors in urban politics. To do so, one needs to focus on the paradoxes of neoliberal austerity urbanism and their impact on urban contentious politics. The massive and various rollbacks of welfare states and austerity measures inflicted deep crises on cities.

Neoliberal austerity urbanism is characterized by sharp reductions in central government spending on local government and it provokes growing conflict over payment for resources such as water, electricity, and basic services. It primarily yields in private wealth rather than public services for the residents especially through the public-private partnerships and debt economy. These transformations impact governance structures, public services, the funds, and opportunities available to all urban inhabitants. This contributes to the fact that cities become extremely contested and conflictive spaces where various groups and actors fight for resources, rights, presence, and justice confronted with the increasing impoverishment, disparities, and debt economies. In the context of finance-driven accumulation, where the main mechanisms of rent extraction are centered on debt-funded privatization, urban growth became increasingly rent-centered. As Harvey has rightly put, in the context of accumulation by dispossession (not by expanded reproduction) the growth of profits and capital follow the closure of access to assets, massive devaluation, and a reduction of social rights and commons.

Consequently, cities, which have been taking a more corporate character have increasingly become a battlefield marked by the struggle of groups for resources, space, rights claims, and for justice. So, cities are not only centers of wealth accumulation, but are also the most important sites where new forms of social relations and politics are made and remade.[4] Thus, cities become frontiers in the economy and contentious politics in several senses. Here I would like to open a caveat; I am not saying that cities become contentious sites only now. On the contrary, *the city has never been a harmonious entity, but an extremely contentious place marked by groups of people fighting for resources, space, rights, claims, and justice.* However, the neoliberal austerity urbanism makes the cities even more contentious places and migrants become crucial actors in such claims by challenging the lines of participation, membership, the boundaries of 'the public' and governance.

Now I would like to say a couple of things on contentious politics and the communing processes city-based claims could unleash. We all know that city-centered protests increasingly dominate politics. One of the striking characteristics of these protests is their heterogeneous composition defying social and class divides. The urban protestors range from precarious laborers, cultural and service workers, displaced members of the middle and working classes, unemployed and underpaid youths, indebted professionals, and community activists as well as migrants/refugees.[5] In fact, I think the heterogeneity of the participants of these urban protests (be anti-austerity or

for refugee and migrant claims), could be seen as an important ground for urban politics rather than a weakness.

One of the important aspects of the contentious nature of urban protests lies in their acts of collective production of the city as *commons*. Cities provide opportunities for people living together to act collectively in staking their claim to resources. As James Holston argues, this acting together beyond the (in)formal status of work, housing, and legal standing lies at the core of becoming political and of how practices of city making and citizenship become closely entangled. City protests become key strategic sites for creating new forms of sociabilities and alliances. There is a process of collective learning and a basis for mutual trust in the activity of shared struggle.[6]

The transformative nature of these mobilizations then may well lie in the *communing processes* pursued.[7] As has been repeated in relation to different cases, diverse groups of people including those that have historically been in conflict with one another, come together to claim, occupy and appropriate various spaces in these protests. For sure, this co-existence is not without frictions. The protestors, regardless of their status and background, exercise their right to urban resources and enact solidarities/alliances resulting from their shared discontent with the injustices inflicted upon them by the particular form of urban redevelopment. Drawing on Hannah Arendt, who sees the political realm of the polis as emerging directly from acting together, from common words and deeds, we could argue that the insurgency and the political value of urban uprisings lie in this common act of city making. Residents become political subjects through these city making activities. Different groups come together in public space with an active sense of producing a common project while maintaining multiple, separate alliances around specific goals and identities with respect to gender, class, ethnicity, and legal status without erasing difference.[8]

Such relations in which one acts *as though all were equal despite differences*, are important.[9] These sociabilities emerge from shared experience and are built on the recognition of mutual respect, affection, and aspiration. The acting together of the dispossessed and the displaced, the communing of urban protestors, could be seen as the basis for generating companionship among the differently positioned participants in urban protests beyond the historic divides.

Unfortunately, there is a tendency to discuss such communing processes almost exclusively in relation to anti-austerity mobilizations without taking note of the presence of migrants/refugees in them. Despite the emphasis on the discursive presence of migrants and refugees in the politics and public debates of urban protests, there is a kind of silence about the presence of migrants/refugees as actors in mobilizations for broader social justice claims (not simply about migrants and refugee rights). There is a silence about the communing processes they entail. Studies on the entanglements of protests with diverse forms of urban struggles over labour, gentrification, access to public goods, among others, and support of social justice are rare. They often escape the attention of migrant scholars. But this does not mean that they are absent. I would like to draw attention to one striking example

from Brazil. There are a number of cases where migrants increasingly become part of the contentious urban politics for social justice (together with the "non-migrant residents") and are central to urban politics beyond migrant/minority/ethnic politics. However, we need a particular perspective to capture these multiple locations of migrants in city making. We need to go beyond an analytical lens that operates with an *a priori* categorical divide between migrants and "natives"[10] and beyond an ethnic lens of migration studies.

The challenge is to explore the multiple ways the migrants become the objects and subjects of city making as well as the social justice movements. Approaching the city as a method could be a way to respond to this challenge. This requires not only a particular epistemological position, but also a particular kind of data collection and a particular reading of different kinds of data being juxtaposed to each other. For example, in our own research with Nina Glick Schiller, we collected a wide range of data to understand and relate these revaluation narratives to the shared adoption of a specific mode of urban regeneration. We collected a wide range of data about the way city residents, both migrants, and non-migrants, lived their lives and interacted with each other and talked about their city, as well as structural data about the urban and economic development and the projects of these cities (with their funding structures). We examined the emerging visions of each city based on what we learned from interviews with leaders, planners, officials, heads, and members of religious, cultural, educational, nongovernmental, and political institutions. Our ethnographic methods included asking about and observing how both migrants and non-migrants spoke about their city and interacted as they went about working, shopping, parenting, borrowing, obtaining schooling, neighbouring, and politicking, interacting with officials, including police, and obtaining or losing housing. We read public documents, minutes of public meetings of governing bodies, glossy publicity brochures developed to promote the city, planning documents, websites, and Facebook pages.

Most importantly, this data collection was guided by a theoretical awareness of the connection between the accumulation of capital and the features and dynamics of neoliberal forms of urban restructuring at a particular conjuncture and their interface with migrant lives. The global features of this form of urban development (unfolding differently in cities of different scale) and their paradoxes established the theoretical backdrop guiding our data collection and the specification of analysis. This form of research was built on an epistemological understanding of "city as method".

[This lecture was part of Reading Refugees, Reading Migration: An (Online) Orientation Course for College and University Teachers, organized by Calcutta Research Group, in collaboration with IWM, Vienna in July-August 2021.]

Notes

[1]Bertolt Brecht, *Poems 1913-1956*, eds. John Willet and Ralph Menheim (London: Eyre Metheun Ltd., 1976).

[2]Here, I am drawing from our book Ayşe Çağlar and Nina Glick Schiller, *Migrants & City Making: Dispossession, Displacement & Urban Regeneration* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2018).

[3]Ibid.

[4]James Holston, "Metropolitan Rebellions and the Politics of Commoning the City," *Anthropological Theory* 19, no.1(February 2019): 120-142.

[5]Don Kalb and Massimiliano Mollona, eds. *Worldwide Mobilizations: Class Struggles and Urban Commoning* (New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2018); Ida Susser, "Re-envisioning Social Movements in the Global City," in *Worldwide Mobilizations* eds. D. Kalb and M. Mollona, 2018.

[6]Holston, "Metropolitan Rebellions",2019; Saskia Sassen, "Local Actors in Global Politics," *Current Sociology* 52, no.4 (July 2004): 649-670.

[7]Holston, "Metropolitan Rebellions",2019; Ida Susser and Stéphane Tonnelat," Transformative Cities: The Three Urban Commons," *Focaal: Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology* 66 (01 June 2013); Ida Susser ed., Focaal: Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology, special Issue, *Exploring the Commons* 79 (2017).

[8]Susser, "Exploring the Commons," 2017; James Holston, "Insurgent Citizenship in an Era of Global Urban Peripheries," in "City & Society" ed. Petra Kuppinger, special issue, *Street Life: Joshua Barker* 21, no. 2 (December 2009):245-267.

[9]Georg Simmel, "The Sociology of Sociability," trans. Everett C. Hughes, *American Journal of Sociology* 55, no. 3 (November 1949): 257.

[10]Çağlar and Glick Schiller, *Migrants & City- Making,* 2018.

Forced Displacement and Access to the Labour Market: The Case of Gaziantep

By

Doğuş Şimşek [*]

Introduction

Gaziantep, bordering Syria, is an economic centre in the southeast Anatolia region of Turkey. The city plays an important role in the Turkish economy with its industrial and commercial infrastructure, and acts as a bridge between important regions due to its geographical location.[1] Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria, in that order, are the top three importers of goods from Gaziantep.[2] Gaziantep has the second highest number of displaced Syrians in Turkey and the city has, to some extent, recently developed an infrastructure with their arrival and the consequent increase in its economic relations with the Syrian city of Aleppo. One of the main reasons why Gaziantep has a large number of internationally displaced Syrians[3] is the aspiration of this population to remain close to Syria and carryon the cross-border trade relationship. While many internally displaced Kurds—[4] most of whom fled their ancestral villages during the conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in the mid-90s—settled in Gaziantep, over 445,000 internationally displaced Syrians live in Gaziantep and many of them have started their own businesses, even though 80% of these were unofficial in 2016.[5] The Syrian Economic Forum (SEF), an organisation based in Gaziantep which aims to strengthen the Syrian economy to support democratic life and sustainable development among the Syrian population, has estimated the number of companies founded or co-founded by Syrians to be over 10,000 when the informal sector is included.[6] According to the Deputy Executive Director of SEF, in Gaziantep alone, 1,250 Syrian companies are registered with the Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce (GCC).[7]

* Doğuş Şimşek, Lecturer in Sociology and Criminology, Department of Criminology, Politics, and Sociology, Kingston University, London, UK.
Email:d.simsek@kingston.ac.uk

In Turkey, the presence of Syrians has not only contributed to the country's economic growth, but also has filled its labour needs although their labour is not officially recognised. The Syrian workforce has been in high demand in sectors facing labour shortages and, with the arrival of the displaced Syrian population, the number of informally employed workers have dramatically increased.[8] This, of course, necessitates a scrutiny of the location of the labour of displaced people (in this paper, 'displaced people' refers to both internationally displaced Syrians and internally displaced Kurds) in interaction with class dynamics as well as the variegated legal regimes (carried out with actors of various scale) that shape this interaction. The fragmented legal geography of rights, and the local and international institutional actors that draw into the picture, are crucial components in this interplay.

The literature on the access of displaced people to the labour market is mostly studied in relation to the national framework, and focus on the labour-market integration of migrants and refugees as well as the impact of refugees on the host economy.[9] For instance, Betts et al. introduce the concept of refugee economies which highlights the fact that refugees are a part of the distinct sub-economy of receiving countries, but do not mention refugee labour.[10] Samaddar, rightfully, suggests that a refugee is seen as an economic actor, an informal trader, an entrepreneur, but not as labour and asks 'why economies are unable to function without the so-called refugee economies, which supply informal labour for the host economy.'[11] In order to understand how labour moves and the increase in casualisation, there is a need to focus on the relation between migration and capitalism. This paper takes this relation into account. More specifically, it takes into account the role of neoliberal migration policies on the access of displaced people to the labour market.

Exploring the settlement processes of migrants and their access to the labour market within the framework of the nation-state constructs hierarchies between migrants and natives by differentiating them. As stated by Cağlar and Glick-Schiller, methodological nationalism and its ethnic lens represent homogeneous national culture, and scholars who adopt this approach dwell on differences in national origin and view migrants as ethnic groups who are socially and culturally discrete.[12] This analysis makes inequalities that are created due to class, race, and gender differences seem less important. Taking cities as the unit of analysis to examine forced displacement, this paper focuses on class as an analytical concept in exploring the experiences of displaced people in accessing the labour market in Gaziantep.

The 'multiscalar global perspective' of Cağlar and Glick-Schiller offers a useful and comprehensive analysis in examining unequal power within multiple actors−regional, national, supranational, and global−in the process of remaking the city.[13] Adopting this perspective, this paper aims to examine how, in the processes of building 'a resilient city for all in a time of crisis,' power relations within multiple actors of various scale—such as the European Union (EU), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs)—influence the access of displaced

people to the labour market. Drawing on in-depth interviews with displaced people and emphasising their experiences in accessing the labour market, it delves into the role of multiple actors in reconstructing the neoliberal model−supporting displaced people who are wealthy and professionally skilled, and celebrating entrepreneurship and co modifiable skills−that reshapes class and power dynamics between displaced people. Following Harvey's definition,[14] this paper uses the notion of neoliberalism as a political project carried out by the corporate capitalist class through constructing a free market that produces greater social inequality and competition between workers and favours wealthy people. The value structure of neoliberalism has defined the migration policies of many receiving states which make a clear distinction between 'good' and 'bad' migrants and refugees based on where they come from, their religion, ethnicity, migratory status and, most importantly, their class.[15] In this paper class is understood as an analytical category that shapes one's position in society. More specifically, class is understood as a set of inequalities, power, exploitation, and differences in the way people are valued.[16] In the case of Turkey, this division is visible through income levels that are supported by neoliberal policies.

This paper is divided into three sections. The first section sets out an overview of Gaziantep in terms of its labour market. The second section introduces the ethnographic context. The third section explores, using empirical data, the experiences of displaced people in this labour market including their working conditions, social capital, class, entrepreneurial activities, and the role of the EU, NGOs, and INGOs in the settlement processes of Syrians in Gaziantep.

Gaziantep's Labour Market

According to a recent report published by the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Syrians established 778 businesses in the first half of 2018, and 7,243 businesses in the last seven years.[17] The report also indicates that 13% of newly-established companies in Turkey have a Syrian partner.[18] Gaziantep's economic growth is likely related to informal market activities as approximately half of the labour force in the city had been already employed informally prior to the migration of Syrians.[19] In Turkey, firms often rely on some form of undeclared labour which can take the form of wage labour, self-employment, 'paid favours' or family work.[20] According to the Turkish Statistical Institute,[21] one in every three Turkish workers is employed informally, meaning that they are working under precarious conditions without social security. According to recent statistics released by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 34% of Turkish employees in Gaziantep were working informally as of June 2018.[22] Between 2009 and 2017, the presence of Turkish citizens in the informal labour force clearly declined[23] and, with the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, the number of informally employed displaced people has increased. Syrians mostly access informal markets due to difficulty in receiving work permits, lack of language

skills, and low levels of education. A survey conducted by the Turkish Red Crescent in 2018 revealed that 20.7% of the Syrians working in the education sector, and 92% of the Syrians employed in the agricultural sector, do not have regular employment.[24] The International Crisis Group reported that, as of January 2018, between 750,000 and 950,000 Syrians work in the informal sector.[25] However, according to the Interior Minister of Turkey, only around 76,443 work permits have been issued till 2019.[26] As a result of being forced to work in the informal economy, Syrians experience exploitation; they are overworked, underpaid, and have no social security or pension rights.[27] The arrival of Syrians has allowed businesses in Gaziantep to employ them informally and reduce labour costs.

As of June 2021, 450,294 Syrians reside in Gaziantep and they amount to 21.6% of the city's population.[28] The city has adopted an economic integration model through businesses established by Syrians. Access to the labour market has been stated as a granted right for Syrians in the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (2014) and its implementation rests with the Ministry of Social Security and Work. In January 2016, Turkey issued a new regulation allowing registered Syrians to apply for work permits. However, accessing work permits is difficult and depends on employers' willingness to offer contracts of employment and on whether the applicants have held Turkish identification documents for at least six months. According to a study conducted by Building Markets, Syrian enterprises employ on average 9.4 Syrians, the majority of whom previously worked in the informal sector.[29] According to the International Crisis Group's recent report, as of December 2017, there were about 8,000 registered Syrian businesses in Turkey and about 10,000 unregistered enterprises.[30] These businesses are established in Istanbul, Ankara, Gaziantep, Hatay, Şanlıurfa, Mardin and Kilis, and numerous Syrian businesspeople contribute to the Turkish economy by investing their capital in Turkey.[31] There are other fundamental rights for Syrians; however, especially regarding work permits, there are visible barriers to full participation within the formal economy. Yet, unlike in many European countries, the way to be an entrepreneur is not prevented in Turkey.[32] In Europe, there are barriers for refugees trying to establish businesses. For instance, in Belgium, refugees suffer more barriers in establishing business than other immigrants.[33] Turkey, therefore, implements a self-sufficient model for refugees.[34] Syrian entrepreneurs have been visible in the manufacturing, textile, catering and service sectors, as well as in trading; their businesses have been supported by the Gaziantep municipality through easing procedures in the organised industry district called GATEM.[35]

Gaziantep is also a city where NGOs and INGOs actively work around the settlement processes of Syrians.[36] Government bodies such as the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) provide basic services with the help of NGOs and INGOs. The services implemented for refugees by national NGOs includes financial assistance, outreach monitoring and 'integration' programs. The Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (ASAM) delivers services including legal, social and

medical counseling, 'social cohesion'[37] activities, psychosocial services, and protection programs.[38] Similar to ASAM, the Kamer Foundation fulfils the basic needs of refugee women, such as legal consultancy, health, and vocational courses. In addition to these national NGOs, a small number of local organisations have been taking an active role in raising social awareness regarding displaced people through the projects they implement. One of these local organisations is Kırkayak Kültür. Established in 2011, it conducts field research in and around Gaziantep and run social-cohesion projects, including social, cultural, and artistic activities to help empower socially and culturally disadvantageous groups such as the displaced Dom community. Apart from Kırkayak Kültür which has a rights-based approach, there are also value-based associations in Gaziantep, such as the Bülbülzade Foundation which provides educational facilities, language classes, vocational courses, financial support, as well as Arabic newspapers and radio broadcasts for Syrians.[39] Some of these local organisations receive grants from the EU and donations from international organisations such as Danske Diakonhjem (DEACON), GIZ (Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit), and conduct joint projects with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).[40] These local NGOs have been cooperating with the Gaziantep municipality in providing services for refugees. The municipality has also been influential in responding to the needs of refugees through establishing centres in the refugee neighbourhoods.

Besides national NGOs, there are many INGOs operating in Turkey. They belong to European countries such as Germany, United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, and are funded by their respective governments or the EU to run projects aiming the 'integration' of refugees and their retention in Turkey.[41] At the beginning of the movement of displaced Syrians to Turkey, INGOs offered humanitarian aid such as shelter, food, and clothes inside Turkey. For instance, UK-based Care International provided humanitarian aid to the refugees in Gaziantep. As the number of Syrians in Turkey increased and their-long term requirements became evident, INGOs started to diversify their projects and focus more on sociocultural and psychosocial support.[42] The main services INGOs implement cover registration, legal assistance, education, language, livelihood, and repatriation. However, some of these INGOs—such as International Medical Corps, Mercy Corps, and Dan Church Aid—were closed by the Turkish government because they provided humanitarian aid to Syrian Kurds, especially in and around Kobanî.[43]

The Ethnographic Context

As of June 2021, the number of registered Syrian nationals in Turkey reached 3.6 million.[44] 98% of this population prefer to reside in towns and cities−including the border cities and metropolitan areas−rather than in the camps where they experience limited access to accommodation, social services and job opportunities. The rising number of Syrians living in cities opens up,

for both the refugees and the wider society, discussions around permanency, economic stabilisation, political representation and accessibility of public services.[45] Syrians in Turkey are heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity, religion, gender, generation, social class, etc. According to Erdoğan, who conducted research on the social acceptance of Syrians in Turkey, Syrians are represented as a burden on the country, and as criminals, murderers and rapists. This representation shapes public perception of them and increases the level of discrimination they face in Turkey. With the mass movement of Syrians from Turkey to Europe since the summer of 2015, the EU's response to Syrian migration has moved towards stopping the migration of refugees and irregular migrants. As part of the deal, the World Food Programme and the Turkish Red Crescent administer a cash payment programme to alleviate the worst cases of poverty, wherein refugee households have been receiving monthly payments of 120 Turkish liras. Even though daily crossings dropped 97% between 2015 and 2017, the EU-Turkey Statement has received criticism from human rights organisations and rights-based NGOs for regarding Turkey as a 'safe third country' and not ensuring the safety of refugees. Although Turkey does not provide refugee status to people coming from non-European countries—relying on the geographical limitation permitted by the 1951 Refugee Convention—and does not recognize the rights of refugees mentioned in that Convention, the presumption of Turkey as a 'safe third country' is mainly based on ensuring non-refoulement of refugees and their access to fundamental rights. The EU has also received criticism for not providing safe and legal ways for asylum seekers to reach other European countries for family reunification, relocation or humanitarian visas. On July 2, 2016, the Turkish President announced that millions of Syrians living in Turkey would be granted citizenship. According to Turkey's Directorate General of Migration, 93,000 Syrians have been granted citizenship.[46]

In exploring how displaced people experience Gaziantep, particularly in accessing the labour market, and whether there are differences in the ways they experience the city, I conducted in-depth interviews with Kurdish and Syrian displaced people in Gaziantep in 2018. I interviewed a total of fifty displaced people—twenty-five Syrians and twenty-five Kurds—including those who established businesses and those working in the informal economy. 80% of them were men, aged between nineteen and fifty-four years. While some were in receipt of very low incomes, others were living in more affluent districts of Gaziantep. Those who own businesses stated that they brought investment capital with them when they were migrating and that they had owned restaurants, cafes and off-licences in Syria. Although many Syrian research participants were Sunni-Arabs, I also interviewed a few Syrians with Kurdish and Turkmen backgrounds. Pseudonyms are used when referring to all research participants. I contacted research participants through establishments run by Syrians, NGOs, and city districts. While some interviews were conducted in English and Turkish, others were conducted in Arabic and translated to English during the interviews by an interpreter. Once I had made some connections, I used a snowballing approach to identify

further interviewees. Interview questions were relatively open to enable respondents to tell their stories in their own words and focused on their experiences of living in Gaziantep, particularly in accessing the labour market. I used qualitative content analysis to identify a set of common themes from the narratives, and then employed a thematic coding system with NVivo, which helped to create analytical categories.

Experiences in Accessing the Labour Market

Gaziantep has undergone a massive transformation with the arrival of half a million Syrians since 2011. The city has even introduced its own migration model. According to Önder Yalçın, head of the city's migration office, the city remains a model of tolerance and has taken important steps in migration governance. In doing so, it has established a Municipal Migration Department to provide municipal services to migrants.[47] In constructing a comprehensive migration model, the Migration Department works with the United Nations (UN), development agencies, and NGOs and INGOs. Highlighting the fact that cities are at the forefront of managing the settlement of Syrians, Yalçın stated that 'Gaziantep experiences improved governance, increased social cohesion between our existing and new residents, enhanced inclusive identity, and sustained livelihoods for refugees and our entire community.'[48] In this section, I use in-depth interview data which is particularly based on the experiences of displaced people in accessing the labour market to understand how they experience the settlement processes in Gaziantep and whether there are differences in the ways they experience the city.

The struggle to enter the labour market and lack of economic resources prevent many Syrians living in Gaziantep from receiving affordable housing and education.[49] This can be illustrated by the quotation below:

> I work in textile manufacturing. All workers here are Syrians, and we all work informally. Getting a work permit is very difficult, because employers are not keen on applying for work permit. We sometimes get our wages late and less than Turkish workers. Our working conditions are very hard. We work long hours and sometimes seven days a week (Mahdi, informal worker, Syrian).

Syrians primarily work in the largely informal agricultural and textile sectors, with few safety protections. According to figures from the Worker Health and Safety Council, 108 refugees lost their lives in work-related accidents in 2018. In turn, the low socio-economic status of Syrians leads to their relative exclusion from the wider Turkish society.[50] The Turkish labour market poses high exploitation risks not only for informal adult workers but also for children, given the widespread phenomenon of child labour in sectors such as agriculture, textile factories, and restaurants in various cities of Turkey.[51] Kaya and Kıraç argue that at least one child works in almost every third Syrian household in Istanbul.[52] According to a United Metal Workers Union report, the textile sector employs approximately 19% of underage

workers; 29% of these underage workers are Syrian children under the age of fifteen. In fact, the majority of school-aged Syrian children are working instead of attending school.[53] Kaya and Kıraç convey that 'half of Syrians sending their children to work stated that their children work in textile sector (clothing, shoes, etc.) while the others work in service sector (small shops, catering, cafes, restaurants), construction sector and industrial sector (furniture factories, automobile factories, etc.).'[54] In Gaziantep, many Syrians are informally employed in small workshops that act as subcontractors for larger factories to produce shoes and clothes that are sold across Turkey, the Middle East, and Europe. Working conditions can be dangerous and pay is far below Turkey's minimum wage of 480 Turkish liras per week. Children in workshops say the rate for young adults is 160 Turkish liras per week, with the smallest children receiving just 50 Turkish liras.[55] The Turkish economy will hardly function without the informal labour of displaced people.

Syrians who work in the informal market face difficulties in building bridges with the Kurdish and Turkish working class, due to competition over employment opportunities. Hassan, who works in footwear manufacturing, said the following about the competitive labour market and its weakening of social bridges between Syrian workers and their Kurdish and Turkish counterparts:

> I used to work in construction when I came to Gaziantep. The employer preferred to work with Syrians instead of Kurdish workers, because he paid Syrians less. This created a problem between Syrian and Kurdish workers. Kurdish workers blamed Syrians for job losses. (Hassan, informal worker, Syrian Turkmen).

The structuring of the labour market, which is based on the economic interests of employers, construct hierarchical categories between Syrian and Kurdish workers and make them even more vulnerable. It creates invisible boundaries between the displaced Kurds who have been involved in the labour market in Gaziantep for much longer than Syrians and have the right to work, and the displaced Syrians who have been working in Gaziantep for lesser duration than Kurds and who are mostly employed informally. As stated in the previous section, employers prefer to hire Syrians informally in order to pay them less than the minimum wage without social security. This practice produces greater social inequality and competition between low-waged workers. Syrians who work in the informal sector are seen as competitors by the low-waged Kurdish and Turkish workers. This increases the level of racism Syrians face in society. Turkey's settlement policy favours skilled contributors to the economy and refugees with access to financial capital. The policy does not equally support the settlement of all Syrians residing in Turkey but is class-based; only 'selected' Syrians are deemed worthy of state support. The Turkish government has pursued a neoliberal approach to the settlement of Syrians, where their economic utility has come to form the main entry point for accessing rights. Current settlement policies, therefore, undermine Syrian refugees' access to fundamental rights by making

such rights directly conditional to Turkey's economic gain. This informal labour of displaced people cannot be separated from global capitalism which relies mainly on informal labour.

While many Syrians experience difficulties in accessing certain rights that are crucial for settlement, those who are wealthier do not experience such difficulties. The settlement process of Syrians who engage in entrepreneurial activities in accessing the labour market are easier compared to the ones who are employed in the informal labour market. Ahmad, who runs his own restaurant in Gaziantep, stated the following about his experience in the labour market:

> I have been living in Gaziantep since 2014. I brought my investment with me when I and my family had to leave Syria. The investment helped me to establish my own business and our settlement process was easier compared to other Syrians. The Turkish government supports entrepreneurs and enables them to establish their businesses easily. I am happy to be in Turkey as I had a similar life back in Syria.

Ahmad has established his life in Turkey more easily compared to other displaced Syrians. There is a visible distinction between the displaced people who are benefiting from the neoliberal policy through economic gains and those who are employed informally in the labour market, are contributing to the system, and are treated by the receiving society in a very different way. Syrians who establish businesses construct social bridges with members of the receiving society through their businesses and engage in sociocultural activities, thus making their settlement process smoother than those who do not have ready economic resources.[56] The social aspect of the settlement processes also reflects the role of class, as the Syrians who work longer hours and do not have access to employment construct fewer social connections with members of the receiving society due to being isolated.[57] Research shows that the experiences of refugees in accessing the labour market are highly affected by their class as a result of Turkey's neoliberal migration policy.[58] Although it has been highlighted that 'the government is becoming more likely to demographically instrumentalize Sunni-Muslim-Arabs to counter balance the ethno-nationalist and centrifugal claims of the Kurds,'[59] ethnicity is not a striking dynamic in accessing the labour market among displaced people in Gaziantep.

Kurdish entrepreneurs also have positive experiences in the labour market in Gaziantep. Hüseyin, who owns a jewellery shop, emphasised the opportunities for running his business in the city. He said:

> This is our family business. My father used to run this jewellery shop. After we lost him, I started running the family business. In this bazaar, businesses are old. Gaziantep went through an important economic growth driven by its business community's will to establish trading links with neighbouring countries. Gaziantep has strong economic ties with Syria and particularly Aleppo. The business owners with whom I established business links migrated to Gaziantep and started running their own

> businesses here. With their arrival, Gaziantep's economy has grown even
> more as they brought resources and skills to our city.

Hüseyin links the success of Gaziantep's economy to its trading relationship
with neighbouring countries. When he referred to Syrians, he only mentioned
Syrian businesspeople rather than Syrians who are employed informally. This
quotation also emphasises that as long as Syrians are contributing to the
receiving society through creating job opportunities rather than requiring
employment they are 'good' Syrians.[60] The settlement process of wealthier
refugees is supported and the entrepreneurs among them are welcomed
according to the Turkey's migration policy.[61] However, the majority of Syrians
who are predominantly employed in manual jobs, and do not possess any
qualifications, contribute to the economy of the city through their labour
which is not officially recognised. The transformation of the city with the
arrival of Syrians is not only limited to economic aspects but also related to
urban development. The presence of European institutions in the city,
especially since the arrival of the Syrians, has played a major role in the
producing the urban space. As argued by Yüksel, 'the new forms of
entanglements between the local and the global has caused new forms of
power to emerge in the global neoliberal context.'[62] This has caused
international competition between local, national, and international NGOs. In
the case of Gaziantep, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) has provided grant to help the municipality to meet
the growing demand for services due to the sharp increase in population with
the arrival of Syrians. However, Syrians have different experiences in receiving
these services. For instance, Amena expressed her frustration at not receiving
the services she needed:

> When we arrived in Gaziantep, we had no resources; we did not speak
> Turkish. My husband had to find a job. We did not know anyone here, so
> my husband went to an organisation to ask for help and advice. It was very
> difficult to get help because there were a lot of people in need of help and
> the organisation was short staffed.

Although many local, national, and international NGOs provide
humanitarian aid and protection programs, it is not easy to receive services.
Main local actors such as the Gaziantep Municipality, ASAM, and Kamer
Foundation work together with international donors such as UN Agencies
and European institutions to provide protection-based services as well as
basic needs of legal consultancy, health and vocational courses to refugees.[63]
On the one hand, local NGOs such as the Kırkayak Cultural Centre aim to
improve and extend cooperation between artisans, cultural activists and
NGOs in Turkey, the Middle East, and Europe to empower disadvantageous
groups and to integrate society through dialogue and solidarity to end
prejudices and discrimination against these groups. On the other, the EBRD
and the GCC have been supporting and encouraging entrepreneurship in
Gaziantep and its surrounding region. These partners work together to

strengthen the ability of the GCC to deliver more and better services to private-sector companies in Turkey's southeast and build the economic resilience of the region which has been deeply affected by the movement of refugees from neighbouring Syria.[64] The EBRD has followed six transitional principles including resilience, competitiveness, green, governance, integration, and inclusion in its approach to the countries where it invests.[65] In identifying opportunities and barriers for the private sector in the region, including for enterprises led by Syrians, it aims to help entrepreneurs and small and medium-sized enterprises reach their full potential. While the economy of Gaziantep has strengthened with the arrival of displaced Syrians, this has been achieved through supporting businesses and the private sector rather than through implementing a rights-based approach to develop the access of displaced people to the labour market and improving their working conditions.

Conclusion

Gaziantep is an important case in understanding a broader view of the labour of displaced people in Turkey and the failure of Turkey's migration policy. Although there are various displaced groups in Gaziantep, this paper mainly focused on the experiences of displaced Syrians and Kurds in accessing the labour market due to lack of information and reliable data on the labour-market encounters of other displaced groups. In exploring how displaced people become part of labour and how different discursive and institutional sources−including European institutions−are pulled in, empirical data shows that Turkey's migration policy favours skilled contributors to the economy and those with access to financial capital. This policy reshapes class and power dynamics between displaced people. It also shows that the informal labour of displaced people plays a significant role in Turkey's economy but their labour is not as visible as entrepreneurial activities. This is, of course, related to Turkey's legal and policy arrangements on the access of displaced people to the labour market.

      The Turkish government has pursued a neoliberal approach to the settlement of displaced Syrians, where their economic utility has come to form the main entry point for accessing rights, and this can clearly be seen in the case of Gaziantep. The current policies, therefore, undermine Syrians' access to fundamental rights by making such rights directly conditional to Turkey's economic gain. Data shows that displaced Syrians experience more vulnerability compared to displaced Kurds due to being employed informally as a result of visible barriers to full participation in the formal economy. It also indicates that class dynamics become more predominant than ethnic cleavages. The policy excludes Syrians who are 'unskilled' and have limited economic resources for investment in the receiving country. The dominant presence of displaced people in the informal economy has been reproduced in cooperation with international and national organisations, especially the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Notes

[1] Serap Gültekin, "Gaziantep: Executive Summary Economic Sectoral Review & Cluster Selection," SME Networking Project, September 2011.

[2] Gültekin, "Gaziantep."

[3] In this paper, 'internationally displaced Syrians' refers to Kurdish, Turkmen, Arab, Shi, Dom, Abdal, Armenian, Yazidi, and Assyrian Syrian nationals; Palestinian and Iranian refugees coming from Syria; working-, middle-, and upper-class Syrians; and Syrians from diverse religious backgrounds, including Christians, and Muslim Alawites and Sunnis.

[4] In this paper, 'internally displaced Kurds' refers to Lullubi, Guti, Cyrtians, Carduchi, Alewi and Sunni Kurds, and Kurds from different class backgrounds who are Turkish citizens and are displaced within Turkey.

[5] Liz Maddock, "Syrian entrepreneurs strengthen economy of Turkey's Gaziantep," TRT World, last modified February 20, 2018, https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/syrian-entrepreneurs-strengthen-economy-of-turkey-s-gaziantep-15360.

[6] Luana Sarmini-Buonaccorsi, "Syrian entrepreneurs thrive in Turkey", *Oman Daily Observer*, May 16, 2018, https://www.omanobserver.om/syrian-entrepreneurs-thrive-in-turkey/.

[7] Sarmini-Buonaccorsi, "Syrian entrepreneurs thrive in Turkey."

[8] Gergerly Sebestyen, Bruno Dyjas, and İhsan Kuyumcu, "Establishing the Formal Economic Identity of Syrian Refuges in Turkey: The Case of Gaziantep," *Journal of Turkish Social Sciences Research* 3, no. 2 (2018).

[9] Steven Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (Hampshire, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003); Alexander Betts, Louise Bloom, Josiah Kaplan, and Naohiko Omata, *Refugee Economies: Forced Displacement and Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Naohiko Omata, "Refugees' engagement with host economies in Uganda," *Forced Migration Review* 58 (2018); Martin Ledstrup and Marie Larsen, "From refugee to employee: work integration in rural Denmark," *Forced Migration Review* 58 (2018).

[10] Betts, Bloom, Kaplan, and Omata, *Refugee Economies*.

[11] Ranabir Samaddar, *The Postcolonial Age of Migration* (London: Routledge, 2020).

[12] Ayşe Çağlar and Nina Glick-Schiller, *Migrants and City-Making: Dispossession, Displacement and Urban Regeneration* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2018).

[13] Çağlar and Glick-Schiller, *Migrants and City-Making*.

[14] David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

[15] Doğuş Şimşek, "'Winners and losers of neoliberalism': The intersection of class and race in the case of Syrian refugees in Turkey," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 44, no. 15 (2021), DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2020.1854812.

[16] Andrew Sayer, *The Moral Significance of Class* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Beverly Skeggs, *Class, Self, Culture* (London: Routledge, 2004).

[17] Report of the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) on Syrian businesses, July 2, 2018.

[18] TEPAV report on Syrian businesses.

[19] Sebestyen, Dyjas, and Kuyumcu, "Establishing the Formal Economic Identity of Syrian Refuges in Turkey"; Semih Tumen, "The economic impact of Syrian Refugees

on host countries: Quasi-Experimental evidence from Turkey," *American Economic Review* 106, no. 5 (2016).

[20]Emre Eren Korkmaz, "How do Syrian refugee workers challenge supply chain management in the Turkish garment industry?" Working Paper 133 (2017), International Migration Institute, University of Oxford; Sebestyen, Dyjas, and Kuyumcu, "Establishing the Formal Economic Identity of Syrian Refuges in Turkey."

[21]Turkish Statistical Institute, Labour Force Statistics, March 2019.

[22]Reyhan Atasü Topçuoğlu, "Syrian Refugee Entrepreneurs in Turkey: Integration and the Use of Immigrant Capital in the Informal Economy," *Social Inclusion* 7, no. 4 (2019).

[23]Topçuoğlu, "Syrian Refugee Entrepreneurs in Turkey."

[24]Kemal Kirişci and Gökçe Uysal, "Syrian refugees in Turkey need better access to formal jobs," The Brookings Institution, July 18, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/07/18/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-need-better-access-to-formal-jobs/.

[25] "Turkey's Syrian Refugees: Defusing Metropolitan Tensions," International Crisis Group, report no. 248, January 29, 2018, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/248-turkey-s-syrian-refugees.pdf.

[26]"Süleyman Soylu: Bu güne kadar 76 bin 443 Suriyeliye vatandaşlık verdik," T24, January 7, 2019.

[27]Doğuş Şimşek, "Integration processes of Syrian refugees in Turkey: Class-based integration*," Journal of Refugee Studies* 33, no. 3 (2020).

[28]For DCMM's recent statistics on demographics of Syrians under temporary protection in cities and camps, see https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27, accessed June 14, 2021.

[29]"Another Side to the Story: A market assessment of Syrian SMEs in Turkey," Building Markets, June 2017, https://buildingmarkets.org/sites/default/files/pdm_reports/another_side_to_the_story_es_en.pdf.

[30]"Turkey's Syrian Refugees: Defusing Metropolitan Tensions."

[31]Oytun Orhan and Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, "Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey," Orsam report no. 195 (2015).

[32]Şimşek, "Integration processes of Syrian refugees in Turkey."

[33]Bram Wauters and Johan Lambrecht, "Barriers to Refugee Entrepreneurship in Belgium: Towards an Explanatory Model," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 34, no. 6 (2008).

[34]"Turkey's Syrian Refugees: Defusing Metropolitan Tensions."

[35]Topçuoğlu, "Syrian Refugee Entrepreneurs in Turkey."

[36]Şimşek, "Integration processes of Syrian refugees in Turkey."

[37]'Social cohesion' is used instead of 'integration' by Turkish authorities and related organisations.

[38]Yasemin Kalaylıoğlu, "Field note: Civil society organisations in the refugee reception in Gaziantep and Izmir," *Hypothesis*, November 2017, https://lajeh.hypotheses.org/955.

[39]Kalaylıoğlu, "Field note."

[40]Bülent Aras and Yasin Duman, "I/NGOs' Assistance to Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Opportunities and Challenges," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 21, no. 4 (2019).

[41]Aras and Duman, "I/NGOs' Assistance to Syrian Refugees in Turkey."

[42]Aras and Duman, "I/NGOs' Assistance to Syrian Refugees in Turkey."

[43]Aras and Duman, "I/NGOs' Assistance to Syrian Refugees in Turkey."
[44]Omer Karasapan, "Turkey's Syrian refugees- the welcome fades," The Brookings Institution, November 25, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2019/11/25/turkeys-syrian-refugees-the-welcome-fades/.
[45]Şimşek, "Integration processes of Syrian refugees in Turkey."
[46]Karasapan, "Turkey's Syrian refugees."
[47]Önder Yalçın, "The Gaziantep Migration Model for Building a Resilient City for all in a time of Crisis," The German Marshall Fund of the United States, June 1, 2020.
[48]Yalçın, "The Gaziantep Migration Model."
[49]Doğuş Şimşek, "Transnational activities of Syrian refugees in Turkey: Hindering or supporting integration," *International Migration* 57, no.2 (2019).
[50]Şimşek, "'Winners and losers of neoliberalism.'"
[51]Education and Protection Programme for Vulnerable Syrian and Host Community School-aged Children, in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, 2017, https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/project/education-and-protection-programme-vulnerable-syrian-and-host-community-children-lebanon.
[52]Ayhan Kaya and Aysu Kıraç, "Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Istanbul," Support to Life, April 2016.
[53]Suriyeli Sığınmacıların Türkiye'de Emek Piyasasına Dahil Olma Süreçleri ve Etkileri, Birleşik Metal-İş, 2017.
[54]Kaya and Kıraç, "Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Istanbul."
[55]Laura Pitel, "A day on the factory floor with a young Syrian refugee," *Financial Times*, September 20, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/abd615a4-76d7-11e7-a3e8-60495fe6ca71.
[56]Şimşek, "Integration processes of Syrian refugees in Turkey."
[57]Pitel, "A day on the factory floor with a young Syrian refugee."
[58]Şimşek, "Integration processes of Syrian refugees in Turkey."
[59]Ayhan Kaya, "Syrian Refugees and Cultural Intimacy in Istanbul: 'I feel safe here!'" EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2016/59 (2016), https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/44025/RSCAS_2016_59.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
[60]Şimşek, "'Winners and losers of neoliberalism.'"
[61]Şimşek, "Integration processes of Syrian refugees in Turkey."
[62]Ayşe Seda Yüksel, "Rescaled localities and redefined class relations: neoliberal experience in south-east Turkey," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 13, no. 4 (2011): 437.
[63]Kalaylıoğlu, "Field note."
[64]Olga Rosca, "EBRD and Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce join forces to support businesses in Turkey's south-east," European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, February 23, 2017, https://www.ebrd.com/news/2017/ebrd-and-gaziantep-chamber-of-commerce-join-forces-to-support-businesses-in-turkeys-southeast.html.
[65]Rosca, "EBRD and Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce join forces to support businesses in Turkey's south-east."

Refugee Labour and the Politics of Care in Satellite Cities: The Case Study of Eskişehir, Turkey

By

Meriç Çağlar Chesley [*]

Introduction

As a result of Turkey's geographic limitation on the 1951 Geneva Convention, asylum seekers under international protection can only stay in specified spaces called satellite cities—designed to provide temporal residence for refuges who live in a liminal state—in Turkey till their eventual resettlement to a third country. The resettlement process and the regulations on the free movement of a refugee had implications on their integration and inclusion into Turkish society, particularly in the informal labour markets where most refugees are employed. The satellite city regime came into place in 1950 with the Law on Residence and Travel of Foreigners (No:5683) stating that asylum seekers can only reside in cities appointed by the Ministry of Interior and the restriction has been repeated in the following legal documents regarding asylum. There are currently 62 satellite cities in Turkey, tripled since 2000.[1] The satellite city of Eskişehir represents a unique case of hosting the refugees with a more enigmatically liberal mechanism that determines its peculiarities in terms of a different economy, class structure, opportunity structures and resources including the institutional resources for refugees. This necessitates a scrutinization of the location of the various refugee groups in Eskisehir with variegated (il)legal positions and their interaction with the class, race/ethnicity, and gender dynamics in the city. Refugee inclusion in the labour market is not a simple articulation but rather refines labour relations in a sphere outside of the law. Gender and racial discrimination, translating into body politics, sharpens these relations and their interaction of the legal labour regime in Eskisehir will be situated within a broader view of migration/refugee

* Meriç Çağlar Chesley, Doctoral Fellow, Gender Studies, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. Email: caglar_meric@phd.ceu.edu

governance policies and a plethora of legal categories which produce legal dispossession and illegality in Turkey.

Turkey's refugee reception regime is mainly left in the hands of the free market where most of the refugees, as well as migrants of varying legal status, work as informal labour. In this context, the politics of care plays a role who cannot 'take care' of themselves. The policies and interventions of local and international institutional actors, such as local administrations and refugee aid NGOs financed and supported by the UN and the European Union, play a crucial role in terms of providing institutional resources to the livelihood possibilities of different forced migrant groups in the city. Protection and aid structures also contribute to maintaining surveillance and control over the refugee community who live in a 'modern-day open-air prison', as the refugee community refers to it.

Building upon year-long ethnographic research conducted in Eskişehir with refugees under international protection, NGO workers and UN agency representatives, this article lays out the particularities of the Turkish asylum and the satellite city regime in terms of creating precarious labour relations in the informal labour markets strongly marked by gender and racial discrimination.

Turkish Asylum and Satellite City Regime

Turkey arrived at a crossroads in terms of its migration policies with the arrival of 3.5 million Syrian refugees, becoming the largest refugee recipient country in the world. Turkey signed the 1951 Geneva Convention with a geographic limitation clause[2] whereby Turkey grants full refugee status only to those escaping persecution in Europe, meanwhile asylum seekers from other parts of the world can only obtain conditional refugee status until their resettlement to a third country.

Following long-term negotiations with the European Union (EU) regarding harmonization of the Turkish asylum legal framework with the EU legislation[3]—that started with Turkey's membership process—the new Law on Foreigners and International Protection (Law No:6458) was adopted in April 2013. The law foresaw the establishment of a new civic authority, Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) under the Turkish Ministry of Interior that became functional in 2014, with the gradual transfer of UNHCR's responsibilities regarding asylum seekers under international protection that was realised by 2018. Before this transfer, there was a dual registration procedure in place. All non-European asylum seekers who arrived in Turkey and applied to UNHCR in order to get resettled to a third country were required to file a separate asylum claim with the Turkish government. Even though the criteria of examination in the 'dual procedure' are exactly the same as the Geneva Convention criteria for refugees, the Turkish procedure granted non-European asylum seekers the right to temporarily reside in Turkey, whereas the UNHCR application granted the refugee status with the right to seek third-country resettlement.[4] The new law thus created two

categories of conditional refugees: (i)Syrian forced migrants with temporary protection under Article 91 and can be considered more of an ad hoc precarious category which is limited to situations where foreigners were forced out of their country, could not return and were in need of emergency temporary protection; (ii) international protection for those from other non-EU countries such as Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq, and African countries.

In terms of access to services, both groups are entitled to health care services, education, social assistance, and translation according to the legal framework. However, following an amendment to Article 89 of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, the general health insurance of international protection applicants and status holders has been deactivated with the exception of those aged under 18 and persons with special needs.[5] But even before the new amendment, the DGGM was arbitrarily deactivating the general health insurance of some groups under international protection, such as Afghans. According to some social workers, the reason was to decrease the number of international protection applicants who are inherently believed to be not asylum seekers but economic migrants or bogus refugees who wish to take advantage of the free healthcare services. In terms of labour, the Law dictates that international protection status holders are entitled to apply for a six months work permit after lodging their international protection application but functions under reasonable restrictions administered by the government. According to the Temporary Protection Regulation adopted in October 2014 (Article 29), Syrians, who hold a temporary protection identification document, are entitled to apply for a work permit in sectors, professions, and geographic areas that are determined by the Council of Ministers. The Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection was issued in January 2016 for the Syrians, and in April 2016 for the international protection applications and conditional refugee status holders, non-Syrians, in order to facilitate their access to formal employment[6] in their registered cities, and in case of employment in another city, they must demand relocation from the DGMM office. In terms of settlement within the country, while Syrian refugees under temporary protection can benefit from a free settlement regime, refugees under international protection are assigned to reside in satellite cities only. Both international and temporary protection status holders are expected to reside in these cities they are registered at and can only benefit from services such as healthcare, education or social assistance in that specific city. Their travel within the country, with the exception of short-term visits, is prohibited to avoid the concentration of the asylum seeker population in the Eastern border cities, which indicates that the refugees' settlement is considered a security issue by the State. While there are no public guidelines for the settlement patterns, the refugees are assigned satellite cities by their entry point in Turkey and by gender, age, sexual orientation, relatives in Turkey, and concentration of the refugee communities in the cities.[7] Unlike other refugee settlements, such as refugee camps, the satellite city regime foresees temporariness and self-sustainability on the parts of the forced migrants. Refugees are expected to meet their own needs

without regulated structures of financial, social, and legal aid. The legal restrictions on settlement and travel, and the lack of infrastructure in order to support the emplacement of the refugees, create a surveillance regime and disciplining structure that creates a different experience than a normal urban refugee settlement.[8]

The satellite city regime presents a particular case in terms of refugees' emplacement compared to other refugee-hosting countries where refugees are either settled in closed spaces such as detention centres or camps, or the countries where the settlement or travel is not restricted at all. Similar practices of redistribution of refugee communities by region, city or municipality can also be found in countries such as Germany or Sweden.[9] According to Sert and Yıldız, while a satellite city is not a camp, it resembles a camp-like situation because of the restrictions and regulations on free movement as well as the opportunity structures.[10] The disciplining mentality behind the satellite city regime represents refugees as potential security threats who need to be controlled and surveilled by being assigned to commonly conservative small to mid-size cities. The emphasis on public order and security found in the legal papers support these claims. The *sui generis* characteristics of the satellite city regime that assigned forced migrants to urban spaces that are actually formed as semi-camp spaces create a state of permanent temporariness. In fact, the precarity of the legal status of conventional refugees, in addition to the prolongment of the resettlement period, which may take up to ten years or more depending on the refugee claims and force refugees to live in a permanent state of liminality, neither able to settle nor leave. From a rather Eurocentric perspective, refugees' experiences of waiting in transit countries such as Turkey can be looked at through Sert and Yıldız's conceptual frame called 'mobistasis'.[11] The journey from asylum-seeking to resettlement is never a linear, straightforward movement from point A to B. Rather, it involves multiple (im)mobility through multiple paths, gateways, entry and exit points, and territories on the way to their country of resettlement. The concept of mobistasis is useful to understand the flow of statuses imposed upon or undertaken by asylum seekers.

The bigger cities of Turkey that present job opportunities for refugees are not listed as satellite cities. Refugees are expected to reside in smaller cities of Anatolia, with very limited jobs in construction, restaurants, and housework which make it almost impossible for forced migrants to work. The travel permit from the local DGMM offices allows travel for up to fifteen days for a specific reason, such as medical necessity or family visitation. The issuance of travel permits is also extremely arbitrary and unpredictable since they differ not only by the city but also from refugee to refugee.[12] In this sense, the satellite city regime with travel restrictions, called an open-air prison by refugees themselves, strongly shapes the opportunity structures available to refugees, as well as their socio-economic inclusion. During our conversations with a Farsi translator Shirin, who has been waiting to be resettled to Canada for the last five years, she mentioned that she wants to be resettled to Canada

only to get Canadian citizenship so that she can return to Turkey, only then she could reside in whichever city she wants. For Shirin, who already have a social network and a life in Turkey, resettlement meant being able to come back to Turkey as a privileged expat who is not bounded by the restrictions of the asylum procedure.

In some satellite cities, refugees are expected to visit their local DGMM office weekly for signature that eventually restricts their freedom of movement, especially for those who instead of their assigned satellite cities reside in nearby bigger non-satellite cities and had to commute only for signature. These cities like Istanbul and Ankara, provide forced migrants job opportunities in their informal labour market with more access to civil society organizations, solidarity organizations and networks, communication opportunities due to translation services, and religious, cultural, and entertainment activities.[13] While not residing in one's assigned satellite city and travelling without necessary permits have legal and social consequences like suspension of their legal refugee status and thus cannot benefit from social rights and access to services such as health and education.

Eskişehir as a Changing and Welcoming City

With a population of 870,000, Eskişehir is a midsize North-western Anatolian city situated between İstanbul and Ankara and connected by a fast train with a travel time of is 2.5 hours and 1.5 hours respectively. The city's proximity and accessibility to socio-economic hubs of the country facilitate and promote internal tourism as well as inter-city socio-economic relations.

Eskişehir called the 'Castle of Republicanism' in Anatolia is not ruled by the governing party, Justice and Development Party (AKP). The metropolitan municipality is under the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP) since 1999 under the mayorship of the former president of the Anatolian University, Yılmaz Büyükerşen. It underwent an urban restructuring as a result of capital restructuring and reallocation of city resources despite being strongly underfunded by the State because of its oppositional politics. The political conflict between the metropolitan municipality and the ruling AKP reached its peak with the planned construction of a thermic plant near Eskişehir in the Alpu Plain, against which the municipality openly campaigned due to the potential contamination of the farming land and water resources of the city.[14] According to Büyükerşen, "what makes Eskişehir a rising star of Anatolia is not its industrial performance or export potential, but the urban culture of tolerance and respect to diversity which makes people embrace and protect the city; this urban culture is the reason behind Eskişehir's difference".[15]Under his Mayorship, the rebranding as a modern European city led to its profound urban restructuring. While urban renewal generally signifies all kinds of dispossessions, tensions, conflicts and interests, in Eskişehir it was celebrated festively by the municipality as well as habitants as a sign of modernization of the city.[16] Despite its limited economic growth, Eskişehir became an exceptional city as its progressive local administration

invested in turning the city into a cultural hub by transforming the urban spaces. The 'urban entrepreneurialism'[17] strategy undertaken by the metropolitan municipality; the deindustrialization and the commodification of the city centre through erosion of the urban public places and spaces of production; creation of consumption spaces and entertainment centres for the middle class led to considerable gentrification of the city.[18] The historical fabric of the city has been promoted through restoration in the historic downtown, Odunpazarı, while on the other hand, a postmodernist 'artificial' city ecstatic has been aimed through gentrification and the expansion of spaces of consumption in the Tepebaşı neighbourhood. The city has been thus branded as a place where tradition meets modernity and promoted as a destination for domestic tourism.

Historically, Eskişehir has been known as a migrant welcoming city since the late Ottoman period. In the mid-nineteenth century, Turkic Crimean Tatars, who migrated to Anatolia due to the Crimean war, settled in Eskişehir.[19] The Crimean dish *çibörek* (beautiful börek) is still one of the cultural symbols of the city today. After the establishment of the Turkish Republic, ethnic Turks from the Balkans settled in Eskişehir as well. Today, the liberal and modern social fabric of the city, progressive local administration, and heterogeneous cultural structure all combined might be expected to present a welcoming city for the forced migrants. Although the anti-refugee sentiments[20] and contestations between the refugee and local community are on the rise, Eskişehir still presents a relatively better alternative in terms of refugees' emplacement. It currently hosts 25.000 refugees under international protection from Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia and other African countries. When the settlement strategy and individual claims made by those residing in Eskişehir is examined, two patterns emerge—(i) escaping from war and violence (Iraq and Afghanistan) and, (ii) Sexual and gender-based violence or SGBV (Iran mostly LGBTI+ refugees, Somalia, and other African countries, such as Democratic Republic of Congo or DRC and Ivory Coast). The reason why Eskişehir has been chosen for by sexual minorities and women with SGBV experience is believed to be its progressive politics and open-mindedness where the experiences of phobia and (sexual) harassment are expected to be less, unlike other more conservative satellite cities.

Refugees mostly reside in relatively low-income neighbourhoods in the outskirts of the city, not yet influenced by the growing and urban gentrification of the city, where the university campus of Osmangazi and Anadolu Universities are located. The only exception is some of the Iraqi community living in the very centre of the city in Odunpazarı neighbourhood, which is mostly inhabited by an older migrant community from Crimea, living with experiences of discrimination. For example, the increasing number of Iraqi children in the classes of Şeyit Piyade Üsteğmen Gökhan Yavuz Elementary School results in the discontent of Turkish parents who chose to send their children to school in other neighbourhoods where there are fewer refugee students. The local administration impacts the settlement and

opportunity structures for refugees. Settlements within the progressive Tepebaşı municipality, as opposed to the more conservative Odunpazarı municipality under AKP rule, had more municipal supports for refugees with material aid as well as cultural and educational activities such as hosting the African dance group Old City Fire, the Iranian music band Over the Rainbow and university exam preparation classes for foreigners. Unlike refugees under international protection who are appointed to satellite cities by UNHCR, Syrian refugees under temporary protection have the opportunity to choose their city of settlement. In Eskişehir, unlike refugees under international protection who reside in the urban areas, there are around 4,500 Syrian refugees living in the rural areas and working in agriculture. However, because of their settlement pattern, they are quite invisible in society.

Forced Migrants Participation in Labour

The predominant outcome of legal dispossession is unemployment. Due to the legal procedure of obtaining a work permit for foreigners in Turkey, the employers who are willing to employ foreigners are expected to go through an expensive and difficult online application procedure with the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Work. The employers also have to respect the 1/5 rule, which signifies that for each foreign employee under international protection, they have to employ at least five Turkish employees, and in most circumstances, the employer should be paying their foreign employees an amount determined by the law,[21] which is more than their Turkish counterparts. As a result, employees prefer not to employ foreigners unless it is highly necessary or employ them without a work permit, illegally, in order to reduce their production costs. The lack of work permits creates a precarious refugee experience similar to those of 'illegal' migrants. In other words, the legal framework gives freedom to the labour market to create 'illegality' out of the category of illegal migration.

      Illegality is not the absence of law rather it is produced by law. According to Genova, the legal production of illegality is a way that immigration laws constitute categories of differentiation within the society and create the social group of illegal migrants.[22] Illegality, like citizenship, is a legal status that determines migrants' social relation to the state both theoretically and practically, as well as their constructed political identity. Drawing attention to the organic link between capitalism and illegality, Genova argues that the criminalization of migrants is a way of constructing migrants' otherness where their cheap and flexible labour is more vulnerable to exploitation.[23] In a way, illegality or legal production of illegality aims to create a non-citizen subject in a precarious legal status exploitable in informal labour markets. Similarly, Coutin argues that it serves as an instrument to supply discipline and coercion among non-citizens and generates forced invisibility, exclusion and repression in particular public places at particular times and generates spaces of non-existence or only temporalized presence.[24] Catherine Dauvergne defines illegality as the "the most vulnerable migrant

status" and immigration law is not about "who gets in and who stays out" but rather about structuring the vulnerability of those who enter by assigning them to categories of precariousness as illegality.[25] According to Genova, migrant illegality is lived through a palpable sense of deportability meaning the possibility of being removed from the space of the nation-state.[26] Ayşe Çağlar's work on EU citizens Roma in Berlin challenges this assumed organic relationship between illegal status and deportability by showing how migrant deportability itself is constituted outside of the law and acquires an aura of legality through dominant legal discourses.[27] In Eskişehirthe legal construction of refugees' illegality in relation to labour, and their deportability as a consequence is also not bounded by their legal status in the country but determined by labour relations outside of the law. Building upon Genova's interpretation, Goldring-Bernstein-Bernhard in their work on precarity and migrant status in Canada, takes a binary approach to the problematic and argues that the dichotomous understanding of migrant status as legal or illegal do not reflect the social relation in which migrants live. Instead of considering illegal migrant status as a source of precarity, they conceptualize it as precarity and advocate for the term 'precarious status' to capture the multiplicity and flexibility of migrant status and the multidimensional insecurities of labour, residence, entitlements and rights under the umbrella of precarity. They argue that precarious migratory status, like citizenship, is multi-dimensional and constructed by specific state policies, regulations, practices of policy implementation, activism, discourses, and that there may be multiple pathways to precarious status, depending on the context at various levels.[28]

In the case of Turkey, the conditional refugee status, for both asylum seekers under temporary or international protection, is a precarious legal status that does not entitle refugees to enjoy rights like right to work which is the case for full refugee status. The legal production of illegality in the labour market also exceeds precarious employment norms, creating precarious subjectivities, dispossessed, invisible in society through their legal, physical, spatial, and cultural exclusion, all of which determine the refugee community's relationships among themselves as well as with the State and the host community. Without work permits they are generally forced to work longer hours under more precarious labour conditions, thus exposed to more labour related incidents, significantly underpaid relative to their Turkish counterparts, and doing mostly heavy manual labour less preferred by the locals. In addition, because of their lack of legal labour protection, in the cases of incidents or wrongful dismissal, forced migrants, who face legal penalties and the risk of deportation in the case of illegal employment, are unable to approach the police and file an official complaint. The impunity created by illegality contributes to further labour exploitation and precarity. In this sense, illegality becomes a disciplining power that dispossesses employees from their access to rights. In the case of Eskişehir, the illegality created by the market itself trumps the local welcoming practices in the absence of coordinated labour market integration. Refugees often approach NGOs concerning wrongful dismissal but none of them is willing to approach the authorities to

file an official complaint due to the fear of facing severe consequences. Chris, a middle-aged man from Congo, approached authorities for wrongful dismissal. Similar to many African men in Eskişehir, Chris was working in construction without a work permit and was dismissed without any notice or the payment of his last months' salary. He approached migrant supporting NGOs in order to seek mediation with his previous employer or assistance with approaching the authorities in order to file an official complaint. Unlike many others in his position, he was not intimidated by the penalty he might be facing for illegal employment. However, Chris was demotivated by civil society actors and social workers claiming that an African man's claims would never be enough in the eyes of the police to prosecute a Turkish citizen. After months of visits to the local police station and the prosecution office, filing official complaints against his previous employer respectively, the verbal contract between parties due to the informal nature of the employment was not proved to be valid and Chris was told to let go of his case by the police if he does not wish to be penalized for working illegally.

The ambiguities and uncertainties of the asylum procedure present barriers to the economic integration of refugees in Eskişehir. For refugees residing in satellite cities, the waiting period from registration to resettlement is variable and subjective, ranging from several months up to years, depending on the asylum seekers' background and the availability of resources and caseload of the concerning authorities. Refugees are expected to live in their assigned cities for an indefinite amount of time, in a liminal stage of waiting, without being fully informed about the process.[29] In this context of not knowing when/if they will be resettled, refugees are reluctant to settle, find legal work and apply for a work permit, putting their lives on hold. According to social worker Cem, as a result of the lack of transparency and ambiguity of the resettlement procedure, many believe that being well integrated into the Turkish society, having permanent accommodation, sending their children to school, learning the language and especially having legal employment might harm their resettlement procedure. Thus, the lack of legal employment is not always only a simple outcome of the labour market relations but even a strategy to avoid prolongation of the time spent in the limbo in Turkey. Uncertainties become a source of vulnerability and precarity during the time spent in Turkey.

Due to the urban renewal and deindustrialization of Eskişehir, refugee men are commonly employed in construction and relatively less in heavy industry or raw material production such as sugar. For African men, the visibility accompanying Blackness commonly associated with illegality in the given context limit their opportunities to the construction sector. Unlike women, refugee men are generally not entitled to benefit from financial assistance as they are expected to fulfil their traditional gender roles by working and providing for themselves and their families. On the other hand, refugee women remain unemployed, trying to survive on the financial aid from the State such as the ESSN or other institutions such as UNHCR due to

unemployment or the risks of employment such as harassment or sexual violence.

During the 1990s, the feminization of migration from neighbouring areas to Turkey took place, especially former-Soviet countries followed by the Middle East and African countries in the 2000s. It was marked by the employment of women in 'feminized domains' such as care/domestic work, sex work, entertainment.[30] Toksöz and Ulutaş show how Turkey's flexible visa regimes towards former Eastern Bloc countries such as Moldova, Romania, Georgia, and Turkmenistan responded to the growing need for flexible and cheap labour for care and domestic work as a result of increasing participation of middle-class women in wage labour.[31] While migrant women from Former-Soviet countries are exclusively preferred because of their 'European' and 'more civilized' characteristics, women from Turkic republics are preferred for their assumed cultural similarities and submissive nature. In the case of Sub-Saharan migrant women, colour racism is very crucial, as it is very unlikely for Black women to be employed in these feminized domains of labour, with the exception of sex work. Similar racial discrimination exists in the service sector as described by an Arabic translator from Somalia, 'customers do not want to eat from plates touched by black people,' and they work in the kitchen, where they can remain invisible to the eyes of the customers.

In Eskişehir, migrant women's labour participation is highly limited, with the exception of African and Iranian women working in the beauty industry as a hairdresser or in beauty salons, serving their own community, as well as some Iranian women working in restaurants. During my research, I have only met one refugee woman from Iran who was legally employed as a speech therapist with a professional degree and work experience in Iran. She has native level Turkish language skills. Although most refugee women, especially from Iran and African countries such as Somalia, DRC and Ivory Coast, have higher education and work experience in their home countries, the impossibility of finding work, untransferability of labour skills, the language barrier, and the risk of harassment in the workplace, force women out of the labour market.[32]

Justine, a refugee woman from DRC, had been waiting in Eskişehir for four years to be resettled to a third country and lives in shared apartments with other refugees from DRC. Despite her university degree in hospitality management, and experience of working at luxurious hotels back in DRC, she had failed to find a job in the service sector in Eskişehir. As a result, she had been living on donations from religious charity organizations and refugee supporting NGOs. According to Cem, this is a common thread for most African women. Justine had even tried smuggling in order to cross the Aegean Sea several times. Although illegal smuggling might be punishable by deportation, she was resettled in her satellite city after being apprehended by the coastguard because of her pregnancy. After returning to Eskişehir and having a baby, finding a job became more impossible for Justine. After unsuccessfully trying to cross the Greek border from Edirne in March 2020 once again, Justine settled in Istanbul and works as a fixer for African

businessmen visiting Istanbul for exporting goods. Justine explains her reasoning to move to Istanbul as such:

> Life in Eskişehir is easy, not like Istanbul but there is nothing, no work. I tried everything. I am a mother now and I want to provide a better life for my daughter. I want to earn money and send my child to kindergarten. If I stayed in Eskişehir, I would stay home, all day, every day. I want something more for myself and my child. I want a better life.

During an interview with Aisha, an Iranian woman with three teenage girls and when complimented for her beauty, she said:

> Don't call me beautiful. Beauty is my enemy. I cut my hair to be less visible, less attractive, not more. Whenever I find a job, in a shop or in houses, after a week or so, the employer starts talking about how beautiful I am, how much they want to marry me. If I reject them, they fire me. I cannot hold a job for more than a couple of weeks. I have three children to take care of. I cannot provide for them. They want to move back to Iran, where my ex-husband can provide them with a wealthy life.

In fact, after our conversation, Aisha's children one by one returned to Iran—where they have to hide their Christian religious identity, which was the reason why they left Iran in the first place—as they were not able to cope with financial difficulties in Turkey. Similar to Aisha, many refugee women employed as shop keepers, domestic, care workers are forced to engage in romantic or sexual relationships with their employers and lose their jobs in the case of refusal. While Turkish employers force Muslim women from Iraq or Iran to engage in marriage, sexual harassment or violence against African women are generally in the form of forcing transactional sex. I have been told by many African women that the Turkish sentence '*ne kadar*' (how much) is one of the first sentences they learn when they arrive in Turkey.

EU-Turkey Deal and Financial Assistance to Refugees through International Organizations

The EU-Turkey deal of March 2016[33] has been considered as a preventive response to the increasing illegal crossing through the eastern border of Europe, namely between Greece and Turkey after the arrival of forced migrants from Syria, but it should be contextualized within the long-lasting EU policies of externalization of migration management and border control as well as the responsibility of sharing and/or shifting efforts to refugee protection.[34] Similar deals were made with Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Tunisia, Nigeria, Jordan and Lebanon.[35] Turkey's long-lasting reluctance to lift the geographic limitation on the Geneva Convention and signing of a readmission agreement such as the Turkey-EU deal could be found in the concerns of becoming a hub for unwanted refugees and asylum seekers by the EU.[36] Nevertheless, the impact of the increasing number of forced migrants in

Turkey and the illegal border crossing of not only Syrians but also other forced migrant communities such as Afghans, Iraqis, and Africans in the realization of the EU-Turkey deal is undeniable. Despite the humanitarian and protection efforts of the Turkish State, the ambiguity of legal protections, as well as the lack of opportunity structures motivate forced migrants in Turkey to seek a better life and a permanent solution in Europe.[37] Following the death of Alan Kurdi while crossing the Aegean Sea from Turkey to Greece, the need for a more substantial and secure way of admitting refugees to Europe has been finally addressed with the signing of 29 November 2015 EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan[38] and March 7, 2016, EU-Turkey Statement,[39] whereby the European Union and Turkey agreed to a 'one in, one out' deal. The deal has foreseen the return of all new irregular migrants reaching the Greek islands after the deal, and for every Syrian who is sent back, one registered Syrian refugee in Turkey would be resettled in the EU.

The EU-Turkey deal led to an intense debate regarding the legal protection of refugees and Turkey being a safe country for refugees to be readmitted to. Readmission agreements only apply in the case of resending unauthorized migrants back to a safe country. The reoccurring claims of deportation, push-back, arbitrary detention and physical violence against asylum seekers in Turkey support these claims.[40] The deal also included a roadmap for the liberalization of visa requirements for Turkish citizens to the EU's Schengen zone, re-energizing Turkey's EU accession process and granting of EUR 6billion in two instalments to the Facility for Refugees in Turkey to fund and support the aid efforts for the Syrian refugees.[41] The Turkish government's claims regarding the reluctance of the EU to provide monetary aid to Turkey in support of refugees dominated the political debate around the deal. According to the EU Facility, of the total budget foreseen, EUR 3 billion was conceived for 2016-2017 and 2018-2019 each respectively. Both instalments combined, all operations funding has been committed, EUR 4.7 billion was contracted, and more than EUR 3.4 billion were disbursed.[42] The funding had been distributed through contracted implementing partners such as INGOs and UN agencies who also financially support local implementing partners through project financing in addition to their own actions. The priority areas are protection, health, basic needs, and education. Eskişehir hosts several local NGOs providing services such as protection and health to refugees in different capacities supported by INGOs financing from the EU-Turkey deal and can be classified into two categories. Firstly, the implementing partners of UNHCR like the Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (ASAM) and Human Resources Development Foundation (HRDF). Secondly, the implementing partners of UNFPA like Red Umbrella and ESOGU/UNFPA women's health centre.

ASAM established in 1995 in Ankara as an independent non-profit NGO providing social and legal support, psychosocial support, and integration-related courses and activities for refugees and asylum seekers, currently have sixty offices across more than forty provinces in Turkey. The Eskişehir branch is situated in Tepebaşı neighbourhood, on the same street as the main local

DGMM office and helps refugees with their registration with the DGMM and UNHCR, applying for financial aid schemes, providing financial assistance to those in an urgent vulnerable situation, psychosocial consultations by trained phycologists, translation services in Arabic and Farsi, integration activities such as sports and art classes and workshops for women and children, festivals where both Turkish and refugee communities, and offering Turkish language courses. According to the legal requirements in Turkey, organizations are not entitled to organize Turkish language courses themselves but rather a trained Turkish language teacher must be appointed by the Ministry of Education. ASAM is currently the only organization providing language classes at different levels to forced migrants habiting in Eşkişehir.

HRDF, founded in 1988 focusing on health, education, and employment problems that have a negative impact on human development especially for vulnerable populations in Turkey such as women, irregular migrants, forced migrants and victims of human trafficking. Like ASAM, the HRDF's Eskişehir office provides socio-legal counselling, psychosocial support, translation services, and organize extra-curricular cultural events like the African dance group Old City Fire and the Iranian music band Over the Rainbow. ASAM and HRDF are visited by different communities of forced migrants. The former is approached by the Iraqis while the latter is mostly visited by the French and Farsi speaking communities as well as LGBTI+ refugees from different nationalities due to the popularity and reputation of their translators for being helpful and LGBTI+ friendly. The translation services and the ability of social workers to provide a safe place for different communities shape their consultation patterns.

Ankara based organization Red Umbrella Sexual Health and Human Rights Association aims to raise awareness and address the human rights violations experienced by sex workers in Turkey. In 2018, in cooperation with UNFPA, Red Umbrella, and another LGBTI+ organization, Positive Living Association, started a project entitled 'Access to Protection Services by Key Refugee Groups' financed by European Civic Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO). Five service units in different cities of Turkey (Ankara, Denizli, Eskişehir and two in Istanbul) functions as places where protection activities such as case management, counselling related to sexual and reproductive health, legal assistance regarding international protection and access to support mechanisms take place, and a 24/7 hotline was established to provide information about the existing services and reporting ongoing problems. Refugees with LGBTI+ claims are placed in 'open-minded' satellite cities of Turkey like Denizli, Yalova and Eskişehir in order to reduce the possible phobia, refugees might experience.

Eskişehir Osmangazi University and UNFPA Women's Health Centre founded in Eskişehir with financial aid from Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and the Turkish Ministry of Health, aims to provide sexual and reproductive health (SRH) services to forced migrant girls and women from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Founded as a safe space for girls and women, the health centre acts as a place for

socialization for women who do not or cannot leave their houses because of cultural reasons and provides services aiming to empower and help women through social activities, case management consultations, vocational training, awareness-raising classes on women's issues and health services.

These local organizations fill the gap present in Turkey's geographical limitation on the Geneva Convention by providing services to meet the basic needs of vulnerable refugee populations especially non-European and non-conventional refugees in Turkey. According to Biehl, this purposeful burden-sharing among multiple local and international actors created confusion over who is responsible for the well-being of refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey and furthers the structural ambiguities and uncertainties as legal quandaries in the satellite city regime.[43] The rapid NGOization in the field of refugee protection and a plethora of services provided by these various local actors, in fact, can be interpreted, as Biehl suggests, the intentional unwillingness of the Turkish State to provide assistance and services which would be expected from the most refugee-hosting country of the world.

In order to meet the basic needs of forced migrants in a vulnerable situation in Turkey, different organizations provide financial aid schemes for different target groups. For refugees who cannot find a job in the labour market, these financial aid schemes present are crucial for their survival and livelihood. The most prominent nationwide refugee protection scheme in Turkey is Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) program also known as *Kızılay Kart* (Red Crescent Card) is a result of a partnership between the European Union and Turkey, implemented by IFRC, the Turkish Red Crescent and the Turkish Ministry of Family, Work and Social Services. It is the biggest humanitarian project by the European Union with EUR 998 million funds invested by 2019 covering 1.4 million refugees under international and temporary protection in Turkey. The scheme provides refugee families with a debit card which gives them access to a fixed amount of money, TRY 120 for each family member every month. The aid is only monetary with the assumption that refugees should be able to allocate their resources where it is the most needed, such as rent, food, medicine etc. The eligibility criteria for the ESSN aid are—(i)a single woman, (ii)a single parent with at least one minor child, (iii)elderly people above sixty with no other adults in the family, (iv)families with three or more children, (v)families with at least one member with a disability, (vi)families with a high level of dependents (i.e., children, elderly and disabled).

Only registered refugees under temporary and international protection are eligible for the ESSN aid scheme. As a result, refugees whose registration has been rejected or scheduled for a further date, as is the case for Afghan asylum seekers, cannot benefit from the scheme despite their de facto vulnerabilities. The aid addresses families rather than individuals. So, a family with two parents and two children does not qualify for the ESSN, while a family with two parents and three children receives the ESSN aid for five individuals which can be enough for a family to live on. Mass migration of refugees escaping war in Syrians and Iraq generally result in the displacement

of extended families or families with a traditional family structure and qualify for the family aid but individual refugee status applicants as well as nuclear families with none or less than three children which is the case for many Afghans, Sub-Saharans and Iranians, with the exception of single women, are not eligible for the aid. The perception of a family as a heterosexual unit with children seems to ignore all non-normative ways of family formation. Although SRH and family planning are stressed by ESOGU/UNFPA Women's Health Centre in Eskişehir, the criteria of three children unwillingly promote refugee families to have more children to be eligible for the aid. In addition, despite the fact that the aid criteria explicitly mention single parents with children, in practice, only single women are considered to be eligible for the aid. ESSN was initially meant for the Syrian refugees under temporary protection but now it has been expanded to cover refugees under international protection as well. Additionally, the program is financed by the European Union, as a result of the EU-Turkey deal, its distribution through the Turkish Red Crescent. This creates a misunderstanding and consequently discontent among the nationals, who believe refugees are being provided with a social welfare provision to which the Turkish nationals are not entitled.

Before ESSN, UNHCR was the main provider of financial assistance and cash-based intervention to most vulnerable refugees under its mandate, as a part of its protection mission. [44]According to UNHCR protection officer Pelin, it is important to provide cash transfer rather than non-monetary assistance such as food stamps or discount coupons because, despite all the needs assessment efforts, refugees are the ones who know their needs best and have the right to spend their money however they see fit and goes beyond the limits of 'knowing better what is best for the others' and challenges the protectionist idea of providing only the basic needs to refugees. After vulnerability assessment by UNHCR, those who are eligible receives a monthly amount of TRY 120 (similar to ESSN. However, as ESSN and UNHCR cash-based intervention are mutually exclusive, the number of refugees benefiting from UNHCR's aid decreased dramatically. As a result, instead of a general vulnerability-based cash-based intervention, UNHCR Turkey is currently providing more thematic financial aid such as the trans+ aid scheme started in November 2017 to support intersex and trans refugees who will receive an amount of TRY750/ month which is six times more than ESSN. The aim of the aid is to provide additional financial support to transgender refugees who have more expenses than cis-refugees. Transgender refugees generally have to live in more middle-class neighbourhoods where rents are slightly higher, to avoid transphobic attitudes and possible security problems, and also have more expenses related to transitioning like hospital bills, travel, hormone therapy etc. Transgender refugees, especially women struggle with finding a regular income. Post gender reassignment surgery, the mismatch with the gender mentioned in the ID's become a reason for the trans-refugees' unemployment. As DGMM uses previous ID documents such as passports as a reference instead of individual statements, this mismatch occurs for all those who did not go through the legal procedure of changing

the gender identification in their ID's. In addition to the difficulties of finding work, transwomen also cannot benefit from various financial aid schemes targeting women such as ESSN for the same reason.

Since December 2018, UNHCR provides a similar amount of aid to survivors of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV)[45] to cover medical fees, housing, and other immediate needs. However, the scheme has been criticized by social workers for several reasons. Firstly, the eligibility criterion of the aid is that the experience of SGBV must take place in Turkey. As a result, not all refugees who have SGBV claims with UNHCR can benefit from this particular aid. Secondly, survivors are expected to provide a legal document from the police as proof of their situation. Considering not all refugees reside in their satellite city and also are afraid of approaching the police as a result of arbitrary attitude towards foreigners, many survivors report that they are reluctant to file an official complaint. As a result, the number of refugees benefiting from this particular aid remains low compared to other financial aid schemes.

While these financial aid schemes aim to help the most vulnerable populations to cope with extreme poverty, they are far from being long term solutions to the financial incapacities that forced migrants are facing in Turkey. The lack of policies regarding livelihood opportunities, especially legal employment, turn forced migrants into simple receivers of aid, without opportunities for self-reliance. The politics of 'taking care' seems to be non-sustainable as refugees living in satellite cities seeks opportunities in the informal markets of bigger cities such as Istanbul and Ankara despite the growing number of institutional support mechanisms operating in satellite cities.

Conclusion

While disciplining, surveillance and lack of opportunity structures are the common threads of all satellite cities, unlike Isparta, Kütahya and Yalova where conservatism shape the relationship between the refugee and local community,[46] the uniqueness of Eskişehir lies in its deindustrialization and promotion of the city as a cultural and education hub intertwined with its progressive politics and hence experiences of exclusion and discrimination for being a foreigner are relatively less with liberal local administration and relative open-mindedness of the local community. The obstacles to legal employment in Eskişehir determine migrants' involvement in the already segmented labour market from a vulnerable position, where their labour is exposed to exploitation. Gender and racial discrimination in the labour market, particularly forcing refugee women out of the even traditionally feminized domains of labour results in refugee women's dependence on financial aid. While refugee men are expected to work and provide for themselves and their families, even when the legal channels of work are closed, refugee women are considered as the real deserving subjects of humanitarian aid, mostly financed by the EU as a result of the Turkey-EU Refugee Deal.

Notes

[1]Özge Biner, *Türkiye'de Mültecilik Iltica, Geçicilik ve Yasallık: Van Uydu Şehir Örneği* (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2016); Özlem Kahya Nizam and Songul Sallan Gul, "Türkiye'de Mültecilere Yönelik Yerleşim Politikaları ve Uydu Kentler: Güvenlik Kıskacında Yaşamlar," *Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi* 22 (January 2017): 1385–1410.

[2]Kemal Kirişci, "The Legal Status of Asylum Seekers in Turkey: Problems and Prospects," *International Journal of Refugee Law* 3, issue 3 (July 1991): 510–28, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/3.3.510.

[3]Kemal Kirişci, "Immigration and Asylum Issues in EU-Turkish Relations: Assessing EU's Impact on Turkish Policy and Practice," in *Migration and the Externalities of European Integration*, eds. Sanra Lavenex and Emek Uçare (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Lexington Books, 2003), 125-42; Kemal Kirişci, "The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union-Turkish Relations," *Turkish Studies* 4, no. 1 (2003):79–106,https://doi.org/10.1080/714005726; Ahmet İçduygu, "EU-Ization Matters: Changes in Immigration and Asylum Practices in Turkey," *The Europeanization of National Policies and Politics of Immigration*, 2007, 201–22,https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230800717_10; Ayhan Kaya, "Europeanization and De-Europeanization of Turkish Asylum and Migration Policies," in *EU-Turkey Relations: Theories, Institutions and Policies*, eds. Wulf Reiners and Ebru Turhan (New York City: Springer International Publishing, 2021), 342-72.

[4]Kristen Biehl, "Migration 'Securitization' and Its Everyday Implications: An Examination of Turkish Asylum Policy and Practice," *CARIM IV Summer School on Euro Mediterranean Migration and Development 2008—Best participants Essay Series 2009/01,* Robert Schulman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole, European University Institute, 2009. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/11761.

[5]"Turkey Operational Update," UNHCR, last modified February 27, 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2020/03/UNHCR-Turkey-Operational-Update-February-2020.pdf.

[6]Ahmet İçduygu and Eleni Diker, "Labor Market Integration of Syrians Refugees in Turkey: From Refugees to Settlers," *Göç Araştırmaları Dergisi: The Journal of Migration Studies* 3, no. 1 (2017): 12–35, https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/gad/issue/43547/532534; Ahmet İçduygu and Doğuş Şimşek, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Towards Integration Policies," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 15, no.3 (Fall 2016): 59-69, http://turkishpolicy.com/files/articlepdf/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-towards-integration-policies_en_2781.pdf.

[7]Özge Biner, *Türkiye'de Mültecilik Iltica, Geçicilik ve Yasallık,* 2016.

[8] İbid.

[9]Bruce Katz, Luise Noring and Nantke Garrelts, "Cities and Refugees: The German Experience." Brookings, last modified September 18, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/research/cities-and-refugees-the-german-experience/; "National Resettlement Programmes: Sweden," European Resettlement Network, accessed 2021, https://www.resettlement.eu/country/sweden.

[10]Deniz Şenol Sert and Uğur Yıldız, "To Be or Not To Be: The Case of Refugees in the Satellite Cities of Turkey," Paper presented at the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies (CPRS) *Human Security Conference: New Challenges, New Perspectives*, Kadir Has University, Istanbul, Turkey, October 27-28, 2011.

[11]Uğur Yıldızand Deniz Şenol Sert, "Dynamics of Mobility-Stasis in Refugee Journeys: Case of Resettlement from Turkey to Canada," *Migration Studies* 9, no.2 (February 2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mnz005.

[12]Cemile Gizem Dinçer and Elif Sarı, "Toward a New Asylum Regime in Turkey?"in"Movements: Journal for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies" eds. Ilker Ataç, Gerda Heck, Sabine Hess, Zeynep Kaslı, Philipp Ratfisch, Cavidan Soykan, Bediz Yılmaz, special issue, *Turkey's Changing Migration Regime and its Global and Regional Dynamics* 3, issue 2 (November 2017): 59-80, https://movements-journal.org/issues/05.turkey/movements.3-2.turkey-migration-regime-full.pdf

[13]Deniz Sert and Uğur Yıldız, "Autonomy Despite Restrictions: Asylum Seekers in Isparta, İstanbul and Yalova," Marmara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Dergisi 1.1, (2013): 143, https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/marusbd/issue/289/1353.
https://movements-journal.org/issues/05.turkey/movements.3-2.turkey-migration-regime-full.pdf.

[14]Kemal Atlan and Hakan Türktan, "Büyükerşen: Termic Plant Means Murder of Eskişehir" *Evrensel,* December 1, 2017,
https://www.evrensel.net/haber/339453/buyukersen-termik-santral-eskisehir-icin-bir-cinayettir.

[15]Nuray Özbay, "A Tale of Two Anatolian Cities: Globalization, Europeanization and the Political Economy of Kayseri and Eskişehir" (Unpublished MA Thesis, Koç University, 2009), PDF file.
https://acikbilim.yok.gov.tr/bitstream/handle/20.500.12812/170174/yokAcikBilim_348709.pdf?sequence=-1&isAllowed=y

[16]Cansu Civelek, "Urban Renewal with Dancing and Music'?" *Focaal*, no. 84 (2019): 47–61.https://doi.org/10.3167/fcl.2019.840104.

[17] David Harvey, *Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography* (New York: Routledge, 2001).

[18]Erhan Akarçay and Nadir Suğur, "Eskişehir'de Kentin ve Tüketim Mekânlarının Dönüşümü," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 71, no. 3 (2016): 797–825.

[19]Henryk Jankowski, "Crimean Tatars and Noghais in Turkey," International Committee for Crimea, last modified February 2002,
https://www.iccrimea.org/scholarly/jankowski.html.

[20]Filiz Göktuna Yaylacı, "Eskişehir Yerel Basınında Mülteciler ve Suriyeliler." *Sosyoloji Araştırmaları Dergisi* 20, no. 1 (2017): 1–40, https://doi.org/10.18490/sosars.308638.

[21]"Türkiye'deki Uluslararası ve Geçici Koruma Altındaki Yabancıların: Çalışma İzni Hakkında Sıkça Sorulan Sorular," UNHCR,
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/67638.pdf.

[22]Nicholas de Genova, "Migrant 'Illegality' and Deportability in Everyday Life," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31, no. 1 (October 2002): 419–47, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.anthro.31.040402.085432; Nicholas de Genova, *The Legal Production of Mexican/Migrant 'Illegality'*, in *Working the Boundaries: Race, Space and "Illegality" in Mexican Chicago* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005), 213–50, https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822387091-010.

[23] İbid

[24] Susan Bibler Coutin, "Illegality, Borderlands, and the Space of Nonexistence," in *Globalization under Construction: Governmentality, Law, and Identity*, eds. Bill Maurer and Richard Warren Perry (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003); Susan Bibler Coutin, "Contesting Criminality: Illegal Immigration and Spatialization of Legality," *Theoretical Criminology* 9, no. 1 (February 1, 2005): 5–33,

https://doi.org/10.1177/1362480605046658.

[25]Catherine Dauvergne, "Security and Migration Law in the Less Brave New World," *Social and Legal Studies* 16, no. 4 (December 1, 2007): 533–49. https://doi.org/10.1177/0964663907082734.

[26] Genova, "Migrant 'Illegality'," 419–47.

[27]Ayşe Çağlar, "Displacement of European Citizen Roma in Berlin: Acts of Citizenship and Sites of Contentious Politics," in "Citizenship Studies" eds. Ilker Ataç, Kim Rygiel and Maurice Stierl, special issue, *The Contentious Politics of Refugee and Migrant Protest and Solidarity Movements: Remaking of the Citizenship from the Margins* 20, no. 5 (June 24, 2016): 647–63, https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2016.1182678.

[28]Luin Goldring, Carolina Berinstein, and Judith K. Bernhard, "Institutionalizing Precarious Migratory Status in Canada," *Citizenship Studies* 13, no. 3 (July 6, 2009): 239–65, https://doi.org/10.1080/13621020902850643.

[29]Kristen Sarah Biehl, "Governing Through Uncertainty: Experiences of Being a Refugee in Turkey as a Country for Temporary Asylum," *Social Analysis* 59, no. 1 (March 1, 2015): 57-75, https://doi.org/10.3167/sa.2015.590104.

[30]Leyla Gülçür and Pınar İlkkaracan, "The 'Natasha' Experience: Migrant Sex Workers from the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in Turkey," *Women's Studies International Forum* 25, no. 4 (July 2002): 411–21. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0277-5395(02)00278-9; Ayşe Akalin, "Hired as a Caregiver, Demanded as a Housewife," *European Journal of Women's Studies* 14, no. 3 (August 1, 2007): 209–25, https://doi.org/10.1177/1350506807079011; Mine Eder, "Turkey's Neoliberal Transformation and Changing Migration Regime: The Case of Female Migrant Workers," in *Social Transformation and Migration: National and Local Experiences in South Korea, Turkey, Mexico and Australia*, eds. Stephen Castles, Derya Ozkul and Magdalena Arias Cubas (UniteKingdomom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 133–50, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137474957_9; Çağla Ünlütürk Ulutaşand Aslıcan Kalfa, "Göçün Kadınlaşması Ve Göçmen Kadınların Örgütlenme Deneyimleri," *Fe Dergi:Feminist Eleştiri* 1, issue 2 (December 24, 2009): 13–25, https://doi.org/10.1501/fe0001_0000000008; Gülay Toksöz and Çağla Ünlütürk Ulutaş, "Is Migration Feminized? A Gender and Ethnicity Based Review of the Literature on Irregular Migration to Turkey" in *Turkey, Migration and the EU: Potentials, Challenges and Opportunities*, eds. Elitok Seçil Paçacı and Thomas Straubhaar (Hamburg: Hamburg University Press, 2012), 85-111.

[31]Toksöz and Ulutaş, "Is Migration Feminized?" 85-111.

[32]Deniz Şenol Sert, "From Skill Translation to Devaluation: The De-Qualification of Migrants in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 54 (2016): 97–117, https://doi.org/10.1017/npt.2016.9.

[33]Council of European Union, "EU-Turkey Statement," press release no. 144/16, March 18, 2016, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/.

[34]Aysen Üstübici, "The Impact of Externalized Migration Governance on Turkey: Technocratic Migration Governance and the Production of Differentiated Legal Status," *Comparative Migration Studies* 7, no. 1 (December 11, 2019): 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-019-0159-x.

[35]Arne Niemann and Natascha Zaun, "EU Refugee Policies and Politics in Times of Crisis: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives," in "Journal of Common Market Studies" eds. Arne Niemann and Natascha Zaun, special issue, *EU Refugee Policies and Politics in the Times of Crisis* 56, no. 1 (December 14, 2017): 3–22, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12650.

[36]Kemal Kirişci, "Turkey's New Draft Law on Asylum: What to Make of It?" in *Turkey, Migration and the EU: Potentials, Challenges and Opportunities*, eds. Elitok Seçil Paçacı and Thomas Straubhaar (Hamburg: Hamburg University Press, 2012), 63-84.

[37]Seçil Paçacı Elitok, "Three Years On: An Evaluation of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal" (working paper, Migration Research Centre, Koç University, Istanbul, April 2019), https://migrationresearch.com/item/three-years-on-an-evaluation-of-the-eu-turkey-refugee-deal/469788.

[38]European Commission, "EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan," press release no. MEMO/15/5860, October 15, 2015,
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_15_5860.

[39]Council of European Union, "EU-Turkey Statement," 18 March 2016.

[40]Ahmet İçduygu and Evin Millet. "Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Insecure Lives in an Environment of Pseudo-Integration" (seminar working paper, The Humanitarian Dimension of the Refugee Crisis in Turkey: Challenges and Prospects, Stiftung Mercator, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), and Istanbul Policy Center, Istanbul, August 5, 2016), https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/syrian-refugees-turkey-insecure-lives-environment-pseudo-integration.

[41]Ibid; Seçil Paçacı Elitok, "Three Years on," 2019.

[42] European Commission, "EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey: List of projects committed/decided, contracted, disbursed," accessed May 31, 2021,
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/system/files/2021-12/Facility%20table_November%202021.pdf.

[43] Biehl, "Governing Through Uncertainty,"57-75.

[44]"Strengthening Protection and Access to Quality Services of Refugees with Specific Needs," UNHCR-Turkey, last modified July, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2019/08/7.4-UNHCR-Turkey-Protection-of-refugees-with-specific-needs-Fact-Sheet-July-2019-FINALV-1.pdf

[45]Beatrix Senoner and Can Eminoğlu, "Providing a lifeline to survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in Turkey," UNHCR-Turkey, last modified October 23, 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/providing-a-lifeline-to-survivors-of-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-in-turkey

[46]Sert and Yıldız, "To Be or Not To Be," 178.

Book Reviews

The 2021 Nobel Prize in Literature was awarded to author Abdulrazak Gurnah "for his uncompromising and compassionate penetration of the effects of colonialism and the fate of the refugee in the gulf between cultures and continents." Born in Zanzibar in 1948, Gurnah came to England after the revolution of 1964, as a student. Gurnah has retired as a professor of English at the University of Kent.

In the current issue of *Refugee Watch*, we have included two reviews of Gurnah's novels—as his works carry experiences of migration and displacement at their core, engaging with issues of colonialism, racism, immigrant experience, refugeehood, asylum, search for identity, and for home. Through novels such as *Memory of Departure* (1987), *Paradise* (1994), *Admiring Silence* (1996), *Desertion* (2005), etc., Gurnah's East African protagonists unsettle fixed identities—and received ideas about migrants and migrations.

Reading Gurnah is of seminal importance to those interested in migration and forced migration, the Nobel a recognition of migration as central to our present history.

Sukanya Bhattacharya [*]

Gravel Heart by Abdulrazak Gurnah, London/Oxford/New York/New Delhi/Sydney: Bloomsbury Publishing 2017, pp. 272, ₹270. ISBN 978-1526603692 (Paperback).

Nobel laureate Abdulrazak Gurnah's novel *Gravel Heart* is a tale of migration and exile, portraying the first three decades of a young man's life. It centres around the life of Salim, a young man from Zanzibar who, at seventeen years of age, leaves his country to go to the United Kingdom. In the first part of the novel, Salim muses about his rosy childhood which is abruptly broken when his father moves out of their house and starts living elsewhere. As a child, Salim is bewildered and later disgusted at his father who seems to be battling invisible demons but cannot overcome them. His loving relationship with his mother starts to deteriorate when he realizes that she has given birth to his

* Sukanya Bhattacharya, M.A., Women's Studies, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai, India. Email: sukanya.mimi28@gmail.com

half-sister with a powerful man who happens to be a minister in the national government.

To escape his feelings of jealousy, hurt, and betrayal, he goes to London to study business with the financial support of his uncle Amir who holds an important position. What follows is a universal tale of a young boy and his first taste of freedom in another country far from his parents. Feeling homesick and guilty for enjoying himself while his parents are suffering, he simultaneously undergoes emotional turmoil at the hands of his overbearing uncle and aunt who want him to act as they want because of his financial dependence on them.

The theme of migration is never overtly stated but it is implicit in every page of the novel. While Salim's grandfather could easily leave his country for better financial prospects, his father stayed back as he had fallen in love. The other African-origin people he meets in the novel also have their own unique stories of migration and want to return home but are never really able to.

Salim himself returns to his home once his mother dies, and comes face to face with his father and his mother's lover. As a grown man with his own experiences involving life, death, love, and shame, he listens to the story of why his father had left their home in his childhood and untangles a complex event that had a tremendous impact on his parents.

The women in the novel are hardly given a voice except as nosy neighbours, dutiful sisters, or potential love interests. Told through the eyes of a young man growing into adulthood, the different kinds of women Salim encounters are all mostly one-dimensional characters even though he searches for love and companionship in all of them. The most important voice that seems to be missing at a crucial point in the novel is that of Salim's mother. Perhaps, the author deliberately keeps her silent to keep the reader guessing about her actions and intentions.

Some of the characters in the novel also show how life in a newly independent, post-revolution, and postcolonial state in Africa was like. While the postcolonial state as a concept is never directly spoken about in the novel, it is still omnipresent as different members of Salim's family interact with the state and its laws in a variety of ways while trying to live their life.

The beauty of the story lies in the vivid imagery of the vibrant personalities of the people Salim meets in his journey from Zanzibar to the United Kingdom. His experience of living with other men who have emigrated from Africa provides a rich description of the life of young, male African emigrants who came to the United Kingdom in the 1980s and 1990s.

Trevor Noah in his autobiography *Born A Crime* also writes about growing up in poverty in an African nation during the same period. Salim's description of his childhood in *Gravel Heart* might remind one of Noah's writings. However, while Noah writes about each person and grants them a space in his story no matter how insignificant they are, Gurnah uses the people in his novel to create a strong background through which Salim's parents and uncle can stand out. Even though the events they undergo as a family have immense repercussions that last through time and space, Salim's

unaffected reminiscence never turns them into larger-than-life characters but simple, flesh-and-blood human beings who keep living their lives. The triumph of this novel lies in showing the universality of certain human feelings, emotions, and sentiments, regardless of one's geographical location. The novel ends with the establishment of a tragic correlation between the title of the novel and the Shakespearean play that Salim's father had tried to read. As Salim reminds his father, human stories sometimes resemble fiction but the oppressors, unlike their fictional counterparts, hardly ever meet justice.

Tamoha Majumdar [*]

Afterlives by Abdulrazak Gurnah, London/Oxford/New York/ New Delhi/Sydney: Bloomsbury Publishing 2020, pp 288, ₹449. ISBN 978-152661586 (Paperback).

Through its rich storytelling and attentive details to the East African society, Abdulrazak Gurnah's 2020 novel *Afterlives* attempts to construct a historical narrative from the underrepresented perspective of African lives in a European colony. It is a tale of human survival, love, and kindness in the times of political unrest, set against the backdrop of the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century in what was then known as Deutsch Ostafrika, under German colonial rule. Gurnah intimately weaves the stories of his protagonists and brings them together in an endeavour to portray the lives of ordinary Swahili people and their struggles in the constantly changing socio-political climate of the two World Wars.

The novel primarily revolves around the stories of three men, Khalifa, Ilyas, and Hamza, written in a third-person narrative. Despite being unrelated by blood, they become closely associated with each other in the course of the novel. Khalifa, who was working at a private bank owned by two Indian brothers, comes to work for the merchant, Amur Biasharain an unnamed town on the Swahili coast, during a time when German atrocities against the natives were increasing, which ultimately gave a turn to the Maji Maji uprising of 1905. In an attempt to suppress the rebellion, the Germans inflicted cruelty upon the common people - by starving them, plundering, and destroying villages, as Gurnah describes, "They burned villages and trampled fields and plundered food stores. African bodies were left hanging on roadside gibbets in a landscape that was scorched and terrorised."

Khalifa and his wife Asha did not have to witness such horrors since their own town was free from any visible German violence but the new German policies for *Zivilisierungmission* (civilizing mission) brought many changes in their lives. Food and resources became scarce and the trade policies grew stricter, often forcing the merchants to smuggle supplies. On one hand, the German government tried improving the living conditions of the land by building roads, uplifting the people by setting up hospitals and

* Tamoha Majumdar, MA, Comparative Indian Language and Literature, University of Calcutta, Kolkata, India. Email: tam.msc2@gmail.com

schools, while on the other, it was done with the help of cruel forced labour regime, exploiting the native Africans and deliberately forcing them under conditions of famine. The novel also traces the journey of Hamza from a soldier to a worker and carpenter who comes to live with Khalifa and falls in love with Afiya, the sister of Ilyas. Through the character of Afiya and Asha, we get an insight into the lives of women in a society caught between social and religious orthodoxy and the new wave of European modernity. Afiya is taught to read and write by her brother Ilyas, for which her uncle inflicts severe physical violence on her. Gurnah provides a detailed account of Afiya's growth, from her childhood with her brother and teenage years under the roof of Khalifa and Asha, and her later days spent with her husband and son.

Despite the potential to delve deeper into the history and politics of a dehumanizing colonial past, Gurnah chooses to focus more on the personal lives of his characters, the society they live in, their individual experiences, and the ordinary yet complex bonds they develop with each other. Ilyas represents the likes of the natives who found glory and power in serving the Germans and being educated in German ways. He even goes on to defend the German violence against his fellow people, "They had to be harsh in retaliation because that's the only way savage people can be made to understand order and obedience. The Germans are honourable and civilised people and have done much good since they have been here".

Ilyas voluntarily goes to serve Germany during the first world war and becomes a part of the *schutztruppeaskari*, a group of native soldiers who were used as an instrument of the German military to inflict violence on the natives. After going off to join the German troops, his whereabouts become unknown to all and is only revealed gradually in the course of the novel. Hamza is also recruited by the *schutztruppe* and the novel explores extensively the everyday life of an *askari* soldier, his struggles, and the abuse and ill-treatment that he has to tolerate as a native 'savage'. The meticulous sketch of the soldiers, graphic descriptions of racial violence against the *askari,* and dialogues which often switch from Swahili to German, perfectly capture the nuances of the military life of the extremely hierarchical *schutztruppe*, providing a rich emotional experience to its readers. During the last days of the war, Hamza suffers a near-fatal injury from the blows of a German officer and survives because of the kindness of his *Oberleutnant*, a German commanding officer who had taught him to read and write in their language. Through the character of the *Oberleutnant*, Gurnah also briefly introspects the coloniser's troubled conscience, the white man's burden, who realises the "cunning plot" of civilising mission.

Afterlives, as the name suggests, is set to tell the story of the aftermaths of lived human experiences of war, separation, loss, and dislocation which spans over more than fifty years. The choice to layout the story over such a vast time frame is perfectly suitable to address intergenerational trauma that is caused due to years of suppressive colonial rule and warfare. Traumas experienced by adults are often transmitted to children through stories of war and indirect exposure, as it happens in the case of Afiya and Hamza's son. Gurnah also explores the role of individual

memory in the making of a collective African history that has remained absent for so long from the dominant western historical narratives and archives. The search for Ilyas is not only a search for a relative but an attempt to trace back one's past that has been repeatedly subdued and erased by state brutality. It is here where Gurnah's novel resonates deeply with the stories of thousands of people across the globe who have been displaced from their homes in the face of unjust systemic violence.

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

Articles submitted for consideration of publication in REFUGEE WATCH should be around 5,500 -7,500 words. Book reviews can be around 1000 words and review articles can be around 2000 words. Articles will have endnotes and not footnotes. Endnotes should be restricted to the minimum. Please refer to www.mcrg.ac.in for a details style sheet. Round-tables can also be proposed for publication. Enquiries about possible submissions are welcome.

For submission of articles and all other matters, correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, Refugee Watch, Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group, IA-48, Ground Floor, Sector-III, Salt Lake, Kolkata – 700 097 or editor@mcrg.ac.in. For book review and review-articles correspondence to be addressed to Samata Biswas, Review Editor, Refugee Watch, at the same address or at bsamata@gmail.com.

Authors will have to submit articles both hard and soft copies (in MS Word). All articles are peer reviewed and it may take 3 to 4 months before a decision is reached on the proposed publication. Contributors will get 2 copies of the journal.

Individual contributor retains his/her copyright. However, in reproduction of the article elsewhere, full citation of the journal will be appreciated.

*See also "***Refugee Watch Online***"(http://refugeewatchonline.blogspot.com)
for brief news, reports, views and comments on issues of forced displacement.*

REFUGEE WATCH

In this Issue

Essays

Book Review

58

December 2021