CHAPTER THREE

FORCED MIGRATION AND TERRORISM: SOUTHEAST ASIAN HUMAN SECURITY CHALLENGES

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Introduction

Southeast Asia faces many security challenges in contemporary world affairs. Whilst world affairs in general host the wide variety of divergent security challenges, Southeast Asia has its own local dynamics, which are characterised by many of its common experiences: colonial rule; independence movements; modern industrialisation; religious penetration by Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam; economic shifts from agricultural based economies towards manufacturing in the recent past decades; a reliance on patron-client bonds[2] for achieving goals; and a strong sense of the village as the primary unit of identity (Neher. 2002;2). These experiences demonstrate the diversity of peoples within the region and this chapter will look at what effects that such a rich diversity of experience has on the region. Terrorism and forced migration are two salient issues in the region, for which its shared histories have been the catalysts. Whilst the region is also home to other equally important contemporary security challenges forced migration and terrorism focus on their direct human consequences and that is the subject of this investigation. The aim of the chapter is to map the region's experiences with both forced migration and terrorism and determine how these two challenges shape regional interactions.

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[1] The authors would like to thank Derek McDougall for commenting on an earlier draft of this chapter. They would also extend their thanks to Jonathan Symons who offered continued feedback throughout. All errors remain their own.

[2] Patron-client bonds are a reference to a "superior-subordinate" relationship. It describes how "people with access to finite resources form alliances with those at a higher socioeconomic level. The patron expects labour or some reward in return for benefits to the subordinate" (Neher. 2002; 2).

Whilst Southeast Asian states have their own individual experiences with both forced migration and terrorism some have significant regional implications. This chapter looks at what the experiences of the region are and how they shape the interactions between the states. Southeast Asian states have long been subject to extra-regional influences, be they cultural, linguistic, or political in nature. The substantial religious diversity of the region, both in affiliation and practice, is one example: Hindu, Buddhist, Islam and Christian traditions. These religious traditions are practiced in substantial numbers within Southeast Asia, a result of both external influences and intra-regional development. While heterogeneous states are hardly unique to Southeast Asia, this diversity continues to have important implications for the development of terrorism and forced migration within and between states. In particular, the application of the Westphalian model of statehood to such diverse polities requires the consideration of how this diversity impacts upon the development and continuing problem of both terrorism and forced migration. The structure of this chapter groups together the states of mainland Southeast Asia and maritime Southeast Asia as the nations within these sub regions share similar characteristics. Each state is analysed in turn within these two groups apart from the Indochinese peninsula (Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) which is assessed together as their shared histories of forced migration and terrorism overlap considerably and so avoiding duplication of the same events.

The shared experiences in Southeast Asia of forced migration and terrorism allow for a greater understanding of intra-regional interactions. This chapter provides insight into these intra-regional interactions and provides detailed analysis of how to understand these complex and multifaceted contemporary security challenges.

Maritime Southeast Asia

Indonesia

Terrorism in Indonesia has a long history. Resistance to Dutch control during the colonial period (eighteenth – twentieth Century) occasionally took the form of politically-oriented and sponsored terrorism, but independence in 1945 brought such violence to the fore. The Darul Islam (DI) movement sought to establish Sharia'ah (Islamic law) as the foundational legal basis of an independent Indonesian state and to codify Indonesia's Islamic identity after the Second World War, committing relatively isolated acts of terrorism throughout the 1950s (Vickers 2005). The intellectual, organisational, and inspirational roots of present-day terrorism can in many cases be traced to the DI movement.

Though the rebellion was effectively suppressed by the Indonesian government armed forces by 1962, veterans of the DI movement provided the basis and inspiration for the first *Komando Jihad* movement in Indonesia. Leaders of the movement included Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar, both of whom were imprisoned in the late 1970s. Despite this, the group made international headlines with its hijacking of a Garuda Indonesian Airways flight in March 1981. Both men later founded Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in the early 1990s. While the organization grew increasingly violent in the 1990s and was responsible for a series of bombings in 2000, it received its greatest global attention as a result of the 2002 Bali bombings, which resulted in over 200 deaths. Subsequent investigations and arrests indicated JI activity throughout the region, although the group's dedication to a Southeast Asian caliphate rather than an Islamic Indonesia has been contested (Jones et al 2003; S. Jones 2005). Arrests have weakened the organization, although a string of attacks – including a 2003 attack on the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta; a 2004 attack on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta; and a 2005 triple suicide bombing in Bali – indicates the group remains active and dangerous (ICG 2007, Abuza 2007).

Forced migration in Indonesia has historically resulted from armed conflict, which due to the relative weakness of Jakarta's central authority and the enormous ethnic and linguistic diversity within the archipelago has frequently found form in separatist movements. The government's policy of promoting migration from Java to other areas of Indonesia, designed to both lessen crowding on Java and assert greater central control over outlying regions, has further escalated tensions and resulted in some violence, most notably in West Papua and Kalimantan (Borneo). Communal tensions have resulted in population transfers – most notably in the Maluku Islands (especially Ambon and Poso), reflecting ongoing tensions between Muslim and Christian communities. By the end of 2000, half a million people were displaced in the Maluku provinces (White 2002, 119). The province of Aceh, which has resisted rule by Jakarta even before the advent of Dutch colonial rule, represents an example of terrorist violence in support of a separatist cause, coupled with the resulting reaction by the military, reinforcing forced migration. This form of displacement is most often short term and localized in nature (White 2002, 120).

Jakarta's concern with maintaining domestic order and stability has resulted in an inward-looking, domestically oriented Indonesian military. Throughout the New Order period political elites placed high value upon maintaining domestic order and the unitary nature of the state, and this remains the case today (Anwar 1998). Separatists tend to be viewed by Jakarta as a more serious threat to the unitary nature of the state than terrorists, even as Jema'ah Islamiyah's role in the 2002 Bali bombings dramatically demonstrated the capabilities of such organizations. While the jihadist inspiration of JI is linked to the CIA backed Afghan resistance to the Soviet Union in the 1980s and al Qaeda sponsored training camps of the 1990s, the role of religion in providing inspiration to violent extremists remains highly contentious. The influence of a worldwide Islamic revival and growing Islamic solidarity within the region has made such delineation difficult.

Singapore

Owing to its small geographical size, internal displacement within Singapore has not been an issue of significant historical importance; however, it experiences regional refugee influx and forced migration, most notably during the Indochinese exodus in the 1970s and 1980s. Singapore became known for its strict entrée regime, at its most liberal allowing up to 1000 refugee claimants into its territory for a maximum of 120 days at any one time (Davies 2006). Singapore continues its strict asylum policy using its geographical size as its motivation for its strict entrée regime. At the same time, external pressures – especially with neighbours Malaysia and Indonesia – have been significant at times, particularly in the period surrounding independence, the Indonesian policy of *konfrontasi*, and expulsion of Singapore from the Malayan Federation in 1965. The creation of ASEAN in 1967 and Singapore's active diplomatic involvement has helped prevent a repeat of such tension, though relations with its larger neighbours are still punctuated by occasional flashpoints.

While the conditions that could lead to widespread forced migration remain extremely unlikely, Singapore's strategic location and role within ASEAN has meant that the elusive search for security within the region remains an ongoing part of Singapore's political dialogue and foreign policies.

While Singapore was not completely immune to terrorism during the Cold War – incidents included a ferry attack by the Japanese Red Army in 1974 and a spate of bombings in the 1980s[4] – political leaders have in more recent times flagged radical jihadist attacks as one of the most serious facing the city-state, predating the 2001 al Qaeda attacks on the United States. Singapore's location astride one of the world's busiest shipping channels, cultural and economic association with the West, and the extremely small but growing jihadist fringe within the region caused many to worry about it as a potential target. A number of JI-affiliated activists were arrested in Singapore in early 2002, and detained without trial under the Internal Security Act (ISA). Further investigations following the 2002 Bali bombings indicated an active JI cell in Singapore, although opinion remains split about how much of a threat it posed – even as investigations revealed plans to target Western embassies, commercial interests, and Singaporean military facilities (Tan 2002). This served as a stark reminder to many political elites of Singapore's vulnerability to regional trends largely beyond its direct control.

As a result, Singapore has pushed for greater cooperation and coordination on counterterrorism measures on both the bilateral and regional level. Following the 9/11 attacks in the US, Singapore supported greater intelligence sharing between Southeast Asian countries, in particular with Indonesia and Malaysia, and has been strongly supportive of the US proposals to strengthen counterterrorism capabilities of states within the region.[5] Singapore has increased military links with the United States and has granted it access to its naval base. This association has come at some cost to its relations with its neighbours, as both Malaysia and Indonesia have been more guarded in their responses for a number of reasons, including domestic politics (Capie 2004).

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[4] http://www.tkb.org/Country.jsp?countryCd=SN (accessed 18 March 2007).

[5] On 1 October 2001, Kishore Mahbuhani, Singapore's Ambassador to the United Nations stated that "Americans are not alone in this fight against terrorism. Singapore stands with the United States and the international community in this struggle. This is a fight between people who stand for civilized society and those out to destroy it." See: http://app.mfa.gov.sg/2006/press/view_press.asp?post_id=535 (accessed 18 March 2007).

Malaysia

While the long-running Communist rebellion that followed World War Two led to significant dislocation amongst Malaysia's population, the relative peace that Malaysia has enjoyed following independence in 1957 has largely forestalled forced migration, but during the Emergency of the Malaysian Communist Party (MCP) uprising, many villages and their inhabitants were resettled and relocated to 'secure' areas. The notable exception to this pattern involved the 1969 inter-communal riots that targeted the mainly significant ethnic Chinese minority and basically due to the economic disparity between this group and the ethnic Malay majority. While the overall number of people required to evacuate their homes was relatively small, the resulting declaration of a national state of emergency, the introduction of pro-Malay affirmative action policy programs, and continuing communal tensions has led to an uneasy peace between the ethnic groups rather than the settlement of outstanding issues. In recent years, the ongoing conflict in southern Thailand between the Malay speaking Muslim separatists and Bangkok military forces has led to the evacuation and settlement of some from southern Thailand to Malaysia.

The multi-faceted nature of the conflict in southern Thailand, which involves linguistic, ethnic, religious, and economic grievances, has made long-term settlement unwieldy and difficult. Solidarity with the ethnic Malay and predominately Muslim population of southern Thailand has led Bangkok to accuse the Malaysian government of materially supporting separatist organisations. As such, it has been a major issue in Thai-Malaysian bilateral relations. While this issue has been settled on official levels, in part due to Malaysia's declared opposition to terrorist measures, the heavy-handed measures of the Thai government under Thaksin and continuing under current Prime Minister General Surayut Chulanon to subdue the movement has made a clear resolution elusive. Even as some political leaders have distanced themselves from the most violent separatist groups and Malaysian police have cooperated with their Thai counterparts in cross-border law enforcement raids, the conflict's recent violent escalation and the porous nature of the Thai-Malaysian border remain a serious issue.

Similarly, Indonesia has accused Malaysia of supporting the Free Aceh Movement, the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM) in northern Sumatra. This tension, owing in part to the substantial Acehnese expatriate population in Malaysia and considered by some to be a reaction to Indonesia's *konfronti* (armed confrontation) policy of the early 1960s, has led to bilateral tension and threatened cooperation within ASEAN at various times. The August 15, 2005 ceasefire agreement between Jakarta and GAM, followed by successful provincial elections, offers hope for the conflict's settlement, even as significant challenges remain (ICG 2006).

On a regional level, Malaysia has also acted to disrupt terrorist attacks planned by the Indonesia-based group Jemaah Islamiyah. Successful cooperation with Singapore and Indonesia to address the vulnerability of the Malacca Straits to potential terrorist action has proven difficult to operationalise (Teo 2007). In August 2001 Malaysian officials also arrested members of Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), a previously unknown extremist group with aims of establishing a Southeast Asia-wide caliphate and has been suspected of taking part in Christian/Muslim communal clashes in Indonesia mainly in Ambon and Sulawesi. While reluctant to develop regional intelligence-sharing along the lines advocated by Singapore, in part due to the role played by the United States in such efforts, some Malaysian political leaders have expressed repeated concerns about the threat posed by radical jihadism within the region. Some have noted that the concerns over terrorism have allowed Malaysia to repair bilateral ties with the United States, which frayed badly during the late 1990s over its monetary collapse and other factors. This has further been aggravated by Kuala Lumpur having vocally opposed US actions in the Middle East and the "militarization" of the "War on Terror" (Sodhy 2003; Capie 2004, 230-233). The delicate balancing act Malaysian leaders have settled upon thus far – committed and cooperative efforts to arrest suspected members of terrorist organizations while distancing themselves from less popular aspects of the US-led "War on Terror" – may prove difficult to sustain as international and domestic pressures mount.

The Philippines

As the only predominantly majority Christian state within ASEAN and geographically separated by the South China Sea from most of Southeast Asia, the Philippines have often been viewed as distinct and separate from the other ASEAN states. While such differences are important – including its former colonial relationship with the United States – it can be easy to overdraw the distinctive nature of Filipino history and neglect the common dynamics and themes reflected in other areas of Southeast Asia.

The long-running conflict in Mindanao has been the largest source of both forced migration and terrorist activity in the Philippines. Following World War II, the Manila government actively promoted settlement in the south, including amongst the Huk rebels that were involved in the Communist rebellion of the 1950s, in order to help alleviate population pressures in the north. This policy, designed in part to "buy off" the former rebels with promises of land in the largely agrarian south, aggravated communal tensions between the Moro people of the Muslim south and the largely Christian transmigration settlers. This migration pattern, further fuelled by economic underdevelopment, neglect by Manila, and perceived ethnic chauvinism by the Christian north, contributed to the establishment of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the early 1970s. The separatist struggle fused economic and ethnic grievances, largely avoiding overt religious appeals. Discussions between the MNLF and the Manila government led to an eventual peace settlement in 1996; under the leadership of Salamat Hashim, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a more radical and avowedly Muslim offshoot, sworn to continue the separatist campaign.

The conflict has resulted in large-scale forced migration, as populations have sought refuge from the resulting conflict. As the military conflict flared in 2000, 800,000 to one million people were forced to flee their homes (White 2002, 123). Such disruption occurred as Filipino President Joseph Estrada claimed that efforts to diffuse the conflict were "simply coddling the MILF"; his subsequent ouster from office brought renewed efforts to engage in conflict settlement, with President Gloria Arroyo declaring a unilateral ceasefire (Abuza 2005, 455). While the conflict has not been definitively settled and violence continues to flare intermittently, the impact upon Mindanao's residents appears to have calmed for the time being.

While the 1980s and 1990s saw a sustained separatist campaign that involved terrorist activities and resulting reaction from the Filipino military and material support from the US military resources, the debate of links between MILF and other regional terrorist organizations remain highly unresolved. Cooperation and the sharing of resources and training facilities between al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, and MILF in the 1990s led some to believe in a region-wide radical Islamic insurgency, although in more recent years MILF has gone to significant lengths to distance itself from JI and al Qaeda. A more recent and much smaller offshoot, the Abu Sayyaf group, similarly drew inspiration from the Afghanistan conflict but has been far more willing to use violence to advance its goals and less reluctant to internationalize the conflict beyond the region by linking with JI and al Qaeda. Military cooperation and training with American troops has allowed Filipino troops to put Abu Sayyaf members on the run, and since 2001 it has been noted that Abu Sayyaf's activities have largely consisted of banditry and kidnapping.

Mainland Southeast Asia

Burma

The emergence of an independent Burma in 1948 from the UK brought about many difficulties in its territorial composition. During the colonial era the territory demarcated as Burma (lower and upper Burma) and frontier areas which included many ethnic groups: Tai (ethnic nationality: Shan); Karen (ethnic nationalities: Karen, Karenni, Pao, Padaung, Kayaw); Tibeto-Burman (ethnic nationalities: Burman, Rakhine, Kachin, Chin, Akha, Lisu and Naga); and Mon-Khmer (ethnic nationalities: Mon, Wa and Paulung) (Pilger 1996). After independence some of the frontier areas were promised greater autonomy and the prospect of full independence after ten years. These prospects were dashed with the 1962 military coup led by General Ne Win, who ruled Burma for the next 26 years. During this time the military leadership embarked Burma on a *Burmese way to socialism* as the ideological framework for the consolidation of the state. Their insistence that Burma should keep the territory achieved after independence intact was accompanied by a conflict for control of the frontier areas by the various ethnic nationalities' own administrative structure and military forces and those of the military junta in Yangon. Under Ne Win, the military junta implemented a "four cuts" strategy, which was designed to cut off the insurgents from food, information, money and recruits. The junta outlawed all contact with the ethnic nationalities and demarcated territory either "black" (entirely insurgent controlled), "”brown" (areas disputed by both sides), or "white" (for 'free' areas) (Mason 2000, 5).

The 1988 pro-democracy protests brought about another coup with Saw Maung coming to power, although Ne Win wielded considerable power from behind the scenes; elections were organised but relations between the ethnic nationalities, pro-democracy activists and the military junta rapidly deteriorated after the nullification of these results in 1990. After which the military leadership suppressed pro-democracy activists and made further incursions into the frontier areas which has led to the wide scale displacement of people. The greatest concentration of this displacement has been inside Burma estimated at 500,000 people internally displaced (TBBC 2005) whilst over 150,000 have crossed the eastern border into Thailand (TBBC 2005a). The occurrence of this displacement is a direct result of the military junta's attempts to take control of the frontier/ethnic nationalities' lands and assert their control over the internationally recognised territorial borders of Burma. With the 1989 renaming of Burma to Myanmar the military junta used this as a vehicle to reignite integration efforts to bring all the ethnic nationality lands under their control. Since this time an ongoing conflict between the ethnic nationalities and the military junta has caused mass displacement. During the course of the conflict there have been several agreements reached with various ethnic nationality groups that has led to a cessation of official hostilities (see South 2007). However, there remain skirmishes between these groups and the military junta. However, the agreements are neither comprehensive nor between all ethnic nationalities; one of the largest ethnic nationalities – the Karen – have not made an agreement with the military junta.

Since independence, Burma has undergone many changes moving from self-imposed isolationism and a *Burmese way to Socialism* to being accepted as an ASEAN member state in 1997. There were also changes to the country and government from *SLORC* (State law and order restoration council) to *SPDC* (State peace and development council) signifying the movement towards a state moving cautiously towards greater economic interaction with its neighbours: ASEAN member states, China and India. However, forced migration and terrorism have remained constant in Burma since independence as people within its internationally recognised boundaries strive for recognition of their rights under the 1947 Panglong agreement and subsequent 1948 Union of Burma Constitution. With the increased international interaction of the Burmese military junta and the current international campaign against terrorism, the ethnic nationalities are facing increased hardship in the (frontier) border-lands as Burma's neighbours clamp down on internal and external threats to state integrity. Most recently, the Indian government has provided the Burmese military junta with military hardware since they agreed to attack the separatists on the India-Burma border (Bhaumik 2007). Throughout the Thaksin Shinawatra era (2001-2006) on the Thai-Burma border there was increased cross border cooperation with the arrest and deportation of ethnic nationalities back to the Burmese authorities. This increased international interaction has taken the initiative away from the ethnic nationalities that, during the long isolation, were much better internationally connected than the military junta. Even though there has been an increase in regional and international interaction, forced migration and insurgency remain significant for Burma and those inside its borders. Burma remains a failing state in that it remains unconsolidated with disparate groups fighting for recognition and autonomy. The recent move of the capital from Yangon to Pyinmana highlights the military junta's concerns with external aggression. Also international pressure led to the 2004 formation of a constitutional convention although the delegates are hand-picked and it continues to be boycotted by the opposition groups and so little progress has been made to alter the current domestic situation in Burma.

Thailand

Thailand was the only Southeast Asian nation that was not colonised by Europeans and formed a buffer zone between British and French interests in the region. Although not colonised it remains a diverse state with many dialects, religions and customs. Since 1932 Thailand has held the same territory, although there have been various military, appointed, and democratic governments throughout this period. These dramatic governance shifts underline the fragility of a state trying to consolidate its territory and national identity. The diversity and independence of Thailand has ensured that the issues of forced migration and terrorism remain salient with the former being more prevalent as a recipient of neighbouring conflicts and the latter as a result of its diverse ethnicities and religious traditions.

Thailand received the majority of forced migrants during the Indochinese exodus from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and remains the largest neighbouring recipient state of forced migrants fleeing Burma. These exoduses posed significant concerns in Bangkok over what the impact of large numbers of forced migrants would have on national stability as well as potentially drawing Thailand into the neighbouring conflicts. During the Indochinese exodus, Thailand hosted over 640,000 forced migrants/refugees along the Thai border cumulatively from 1975 – 1995 (Cutts 2004, 98). The main government concern was over the ethnic composition of the forced migrants, many of whom were ethnic Chinese. The ethnic Chinese were seen as the 'fifth column' of the People's Republic of China (PRC) who had dual allegiance both to their residing state and the PRC. They also held a disproportionate amount of wealth due to their strong hold on the economy of the country compared to other ethnicities in Thailand and Southeast Asia generally which provoked deep suspicion (Robinson 2000a). With other ethnicities there were different concerns; Cambodian 'refugee warriors' threatened to draw Thailand into the neighbouring conflict (Robinson 2000b); and the political affiliation of those seeking refuge to name the salient concerns. Ethnically, many of the forced migrants could assimilate easily into the Thai borderlands as they were home to the same ethnic groups; the central issue here was over state capacity to provide sustenance and medical help for these new arrivals.

Along the Thai-Burma border, Thailand has received a constant stream of forced migrants of Burma's ethnic nationalities since the 1962 military coup. Many of these forced migrants are ethnically similar as those on the Thai side of the border. The government concern here is over Thai-Burma relations which in the Thaksin era (2001-6) blossomed through economic relations. Much cooperation was sought by the Burmese military over those it felt were rebels or insurgents along the frontier lands in exchange for access to its natural resources. Thus there was a policy change from Thailand as a lenient recipient state to one enforcing border control and repatriating illegal migrants to the Burmese authorities (Colm 2004). Since the 2006 military coup in Thailand, there were signals that the establishment were more sensitive to the ongoing conflict in Burma and were changing their policy stance towards a more lenient approach to these forced migrants (Zaw 2006). The issue of forced migration is of great importance to Thailand as it serves, as it did during the colonial era, as a buffer state to the region, providing a space for the displaced of mainland Southeast Asia.

It is this experience as a buffer state that Thailand also experiences insurgency and terrorism both during the Indochinese exodus and in the Southern Muslim states. In the first instance, the refugee warriors emerged out of the Cambodian conflict where competing political factions utilised the refugee camps as recruitment grounds for their cause, maintained political control over the camps and used them as a de facto cree for regrouping, rest and rehabilitation (Robinson 2000b). In the latter instance, Muslim insurgency occurs in the southern Thai states of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala. These three states have majority Muslim populations and were formally brought under Thai control in the 1909 Anglo-Siamese treaty. Since their formal secession there have been ebbs and flows of support for various degrees of independence. Since 2001, the central Thai government's involvement in the international campaign against terrorism led to increased autonomy of the military's generals and the imposition of martial law in the south (Zissis 2007). The main characteristic of the southern insurgency is that no one group claims responsibility for the attacks and so many would argue that this highlights the myriad of insurgency actors involved some with local history and connections whilst others have claimed international connections to global movements such as global jihadism. However, the connections have largely not been substantiated and remain highly contentious amongst scholars. Since the

2006 military coup which saw Prime Minister General Surayut Culanon come to power, the government has had a conciliatory tone to the southern insurgency and has attempted to dialogue with known southern military groups to bring the violence to an end (Zissis 2007). However, progress remains limited as the anonymity of the insurgents continues.

The southern Thai insurgency has continued since the formal 1909 Pattani annexation from British Malaya, taking on various identities since then. Whilst the post 11th September 2001 world focuses on the rise of global Islamic terrorism, a level of diversity remains amongst the southern Thai insurgents. Whilst the Thai forced migration experience comes largely from those with similar indigenous ethnicities to its own (apart from the ethnic Chinese Indochinese forced migration wave), the domestic terrorism largely comes from the ethnic Malay and Muslim majority southern states, which remain largely outside of the integrated Thai state, economically, politically, linguistically and religiously as evidenced by the Thaksin government's insistence on education being conducted in Thai and not local languages mainly Malay. This is in stark contrast to the military government's[6] less combative current policies to the Southern states as they seek to conclude the conflict. The heavy handed approach of Bangkok and its focus on the Muslim nature of terrorism in the Southern states fails to address the plethora of other equally important local concerns over integration (Liow 2004). Whilst these local concerns and discontentment exist, terrorism activity will remain and be exploited by international terrorist groups. As long as these activities persist so will the displacement of people.

The Indochinese Peninsula

Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam

The Indochinese peninsula has seen large-scale population displacement and challenges to state authority since independence in the postcolonial French era. The forced migration experience is characterised by various ethnic groups allying or seen to be allying themselves with groups challenging government authority during the Cold War. Reactionary government policy ensured that these groups were targeted and forcibly displaced in what came to be known as the Indochinese exodus due to directly or indirectly to the US war against the communists in Vietnam. The forced migration patterns that occurred also contained insurgency elements which characterised the terrorism experienced by Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. The 1975 American withdrawal from the Indochinese peninsula and the Cold War politics ensured that those who were supportive of one side were targeted by the other. The targeting of civilians close to the American backed regime was known in advance and there were several attempts to airlift supporters out of Vietnam. However, the extent of the airlift did not extend to lower level employees and those who benefited economically from the former regime (Robinson 2000a). Many of those left behind fled on small fishing boats or were located to new economic zones[7] and re-educated[8]. There was mass forced displacement both internally to the new economic zones and externally[9] to seek asylum from the unified communist leadership of Vietnam.

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[6] The Thai military staged a coup of the Thaksin government on 20th September 2006 and declared martial law.

Forced migration is broadly applicable to the other Indochinese states of Cambodia and Laos where the effects of international power politics were also replicated. Cambodia endured a power struggle, which started with the 1970 military coup ousting Prince (now King) Norodom Sihanouk and establishing the Khmer Republic. Less than five years later, the Khmer Rouge took control of Cambodia with Phnom Pehn quadrupled in size with refugees escaping from American and Communist aggression. Once in power, the Khmer Rouge revolutionised the country through dispersing all quarters of the population from the cities into the countryside, leaving up to two million forcibly displaced (Robinson 2000a, 10) and approximately 1.7 million dead during the period 1975-1979 (CGP 2006). The overall Indochinese forced migration experience during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s was characterised by the superpower rivalries that dominated the Cold War. In this instance, the Indochinese peninsula provided a theatre in which the superpowers could play out their competing claims for leadership and ideological direction alongside the domestic and regional actors.

The Cambodian ‘refugee warriors’ provide an example of where conceptions of forced migration and terrorists became closely associated. Whilst the refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodian border were used as a means for different political factions to regroup, recruit and rearm, there were many within these contexts who were non-combatants but were under the notional control of one or other political faction (Kroef 1980). Whilst the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia saw an end to the Khmer Rouge regime, the replacement communist regime was not recognised internationally and there was a competing claim over who was the legitimate government with the coalition government of democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge and non-communist resistance forces) sitting at the United Nations but not in Phnom Penh (Robinson 2000a). As with Cambodia and Vietnam, Laos experienced a similar situation with the 1975 communist revolution with mass displacement into neighbouring Thailand (Osborne 1980). The Indochinese experience of terrorism has been in the form of insurgency movements during the Cold War, which came hand-in-hand with forced migration as one political faction targeted the other for control. The forced migration experience of mainland Southeast Asia is characterised by insurgency and terrorism vying for control of the state and separatist groups wanting to gain independence from the state. Whereas the experience of maritime Southeast Asia has more experience with religious based separatist movements.

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[7] By 1977 it is estimated that 850,000 were relocated to New Economic Zones (Robinson 2000a, 27)

[8] More than one million people undertook the three-day re-education course and were released. As many as 200,000 were kept for many years (Robinson 2000a, 27).

[9] Between 1975-97 over 700,000 Vietnam1ese were resettled elsewhere (Cutts 2000)

Southeast Asian Dynamics

On the whole over the past fifty years, Southeast Asia has transformed from direct domination by Western powers into a region emerging and formalising its own identity. While the dynamics underlying each case retain highly individualized causes, histories, and manifestations, and therefore prevent the emergence of a single all-encompassing regional paradigm, there are nonetheless several key factors that the conflicts of the region share in common. Through its experience with forced migration and terrorism some of its characteristics become apparent; most notably, the fragility of the state system. The continuance of the Westphalian system on Southeast Asia and the awkward grouping of peoples make the region susceptible to both forced migration and terrorism as the highly heterogeneous natures of many Southeast Asian states make western style pluralism difficult. This understanding of the state, based on a particular set of circumstances and historical influences unique to the European experience, differed significantly from the pre-existing methods of political organization within the region. As such, it should be of little surprise, therefore, that the states of the region struggled to varying degrees of successes with the adoption of the Westphalian political model. The rapid decolonization of the region and international pressures reinforced the importance of the state in both internal and international politics. Political leaders throughout the region emphasized nation-building, even as regional and great power politics made Southeast Asia a key theatre within the Cold War and site of considerable conflict. In the first instance, forced migration occurs mostly from one group of people seeking to control the state system in which they live and forcing another different group to relocate as is prevalent in mainland Southeast Asia; or it occurs in response to communal violence and resettlement strategies within and from maritime Southeast Asia. In the second instance, armed resistance of one group against the other give birth to insurgency and terrorism. It is basically a response or a reaction to domination through insurgency.

The mapping of the forced migration and terrorism experiences allows the reader to appreciate and understand the salient Southeast Asian characteristics. The insurgency and terrorism that has occurred since the early years of independence were perpetuated by the superpower's support for one of these groups against the other during the Cold War as one side sought to outplay and dominate the other. The impact and human consequences of these policies as demonstrated through regional forced migration and those non-combatants that were at the receiving end of terrorist acts by insurgency groups and the military counter insurgency actions. The effects of the Cold War were seen most clearly in the Indochinese exodus, which saw over half a million refugees between 1975 and 1979 leave the Indochinese peninsula initially to the neighbouring countries and later resettled in the West. The Cold War superpowers played out their power politics in the region which provided a catalyst to distinguishing between different groups of people and utilising superpower backing to further their own goals. The knock on effect of this was the continuation of regional state fragility and vulnerability as states were unable to consolidate their territory as an acceptable entity to those that it governed and represented. In particular, the extreme diversity of the peoples of Southeast Asia – ethnic, religious, cultural, economic, and linguistic, to name but a few key determinants – has frequently led to a fractured political structure and polity within individual states. Under such circumstances, all states within the region have within them some identifiable group that actively questions or denies the legitimacy of the state if it had been democratically established. In some cases, this has resulted in the low-level political tensions or opposition to the government. In others, it has led to wide-scale violence and forced migration, either precipitated or reinforced by terrorism. Within Indochina, armed insurgency has been more common, as groups vie for control of the existing state. In maritime Southeast Asia, separatist violence has been the greater threat to state stability, with groups attempting to achieve greater autonomy and/or self-determination from the existing state. Indonesia, the largest and most populous state in the region, is a particularly prime example. Though fears have largely receded following the consolidation of democratic practices and institutions, however imperfect. The downfall of the New Order government in Indonesia in 1999, led some scholars to question Jakarta's ability to maintain the unitary structure of the state and role within ASEAN as it faced renewed separatist pressures across the archipelago (Smith 1999).

After the end of the Cold War, the international system was in flux. The Cambodian peace process sought to bring an end to the civil war that had brought the country to its knees over the previous thirty years. The success of the Cambodian case remains untested as it attempts to consolidate a fragile state system recognising the different political factions and moving the country forward into a democratic state where there is respect for all within its borders. In contrast to this example there was the 1999 referendum in Timor Leste (East Timor) which saw the emergence of a new nation within the region in 2002. Although the smallest Southeast Asian state it demonstrates the artificiality of the Westphalian state system in Southeast Asia. It was a nation that was not part of the Dutch East Indies was brought into the independent Indonesia by force during the Cold War. It had grown culturally and linguistically apart from neighbouring Indonesia but during the power politics era this was of little concern. During the years of occupation there were attempts to assimilate the island nation into the greater Indonesian project. With Australia playing a major role it was ultimately propped up by external funds which resulted from the Cold War realism that dominated international affairs during its lifetime.

The 1990s saw a movement towards the right of self-determination, which gave the necessary weight to the Timor Leste cause and eventually saw the establishment of a United Nations Transitionary Administration – UNTAET – and an internationally recognised independent state. The opportunity for change came about with the domestic upheaval in Indonesia with the demise of the New Order. The case for Timor Leste is exceptional in that its annexation into Indonesia came after Indonesian independence from the Netherlands. The fact that Timur Timor was part of and within the Indonesian archipelago made its annexation and inclusion into a pan-Indonesia a key part of a post-independence Indonesian nationalism although it was associated with the Cold War rather more than decolonisation. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia there were limited attempts at state consolidation; most notably in Cambodia and most notably lacking in Burma between the Burmese military junta, the ethnic nationalities and the pro-democracy movement; in Indonesia and the Philippines between the Christians and Muslims; in Malaysia between the Malays, Chinese and Indians; in Thailand between the Buddhist majority and the Muslim minority; and in Vietnam between the ethnic Vietnamese and Montagnards.

These ongoing tensions within Southeast Asia demonstrate the unease with which the region continues to deal with the dominant state system. Whilst the Cold War attempted to bed down the state system in Southeast Asia, the tensions that existed before and were accentuated during the Cold War remain. The prospects for state consolidation remain plausible if not predictable. At the same time as Southeast Asian states have struggled with largely imported and modified state structures and models of governance to suit local need, however, the high value associated with sovereignty and non-interference by ASEAN states has demonstrated that the politics of state-building are rarely a one-way street. Political elites have frequently employed state sovereignty as a strategy to deflect criticism of domestic affairs (including political dissent and human rights concerns). While the norm of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a member state is well established as a central component of the 'ASEAN Way' and thought to be partially responsible for the peaceful inter-state relations within the region in recent decades, critics have also cited this norm as one that serves to further empower established political elites by favouring political stability over liberal democratic ideals (Kuhonta 2006).

For state consolidation to occur there needs to be support from the international community to facilitate this change by ensuring that the agreement reached is acceptable to those it represents. The history of Southeast Asia has no doubt served to familiarize ASEAN states with the consequences of dual issues, spurring greater discussion and awareness. While it is clear that security threats in Southeast Asia remain rather more likely to be found internally than between the states, the increasingly transnational effects of such challenges present a considerable political and institutional challenge to ASEAN. The organization's dual traditions of the inviolability of sovereignty and strict non-interference within the domestic affairs of fellow member states, based in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration that established ASEAN, have come under pressure following the end of the Cold War (ASEAN 1967, Tan and Boutin 2001).[10]

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[10] This consensus-based approach to regional security, developed in response to the sovereignty concerns raised during the Cold War, has frequently been referred to as the "ASEAN way". (Acharya 1997, 2000)

More recently, the significant threats posed by terrorist organizations like JI or the continued political repression in Burma that has resulted in thousands of refugees establishing camps along the Thai-Burma border. The nesuing effect evoked calls for a change in the traditional "ASEAN Way" to promote greater cross-border cooperation and coordination between governments. This approach, promulgated by former Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan and former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim during the late 1990s, sought to adopt "constructive intervention" as a means of pressuring fellow ASEAN states to reform destabilizing policies that affected areas outside their borders (Anwar 2003). The Burmese junta's basic disregard for human rights, which had an enormously negative impact upon Thailand and were anathema to liberals like Ibrahim, was in question at the time. The ongoing issue relevance nearly a decade later is still unresolved up to today. While regional politics and the still-fragile political structure of other ASEAN member states led to the rejection of this approach, it is clear that as ASEAN moves forward, questions related to the non-intervention norm at ASEAN's heart remain some of the most pressing issues the organization faces. The inherent tension between intervention and sovereignty, in the face of transnational security threats like forced migration and terrorism, remains an open debate and challenge to internal relations within ASEAN.

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