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Security, Stability, and International Migration

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Migration and refugee issues, no longer the sole concern of ministries of labor or of immigration, are now matters of high international politics, engaging the attention of heads of states, cabinets, and key ministries involved in defense, internal security, and external relations. Certainly the most dramatic high-politics event involving international migration in recent years was the exodus of East Germans to Austria through Czechoslovakia and Hungary in July and August 1989; it precipitated the decision of the German Democratic Republic to open its western borders, a massive migration westward followed by the fall of the East German government, and the absorption of East Germany by the Federal Republic of Germany. It was flight, not an invasion, that ultimately destroyed the East German state.[1]

Examples abound of migration flows – both of economic migrants affected by the push and pull of differentials in employment opportunities and income, and of refugees from the pushes of domestic turmoil and persecution – that have generated conflicts within and between states and have therefore risen to the top of the political agenda. Among these examples are the rise of right-wing anti-migrant political parties throughout Western Europe; the conflict between the United States and Great Britain over the forcible repatriation of refugees from Hong Kong; the U.S.-Israeli controversy over the settlement of Soviet Jews on the West Bank; the placement of Western migrants by Iraq at strategic locations in order to prevent air strikes; the anxieties in Western

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Europe over a possible influx of migrants from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; a threat by Palestinian radicals that they would launch terrorist attacks against airlines that carried Soviet Jews to Israel; an invasion of Rwanda by armed Tutsi refugees in Uganda aimed at overthrowing the Hutu-dominated government; the successful defeat of the Kabul regime, after thirteen years of warfare, by the Afghan mujaheddin. One could go on, drawing examples from the daily press to make three points:

First, international migration shows no sign of abating. Indeed, with the end of the Cold War there has been a resurgence of violent secessionist movements that create refugee flows,[2] while barriers to exit from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have been lifted. The breakup of empires and countries into smaller units has created minorities who now feel insecure.[3] Vast differentials in income and employment opportunities among countries persist, providing the push and pull that motivate economic migrants.[4] Environmental degradation, droughts, floods, famines, and civil conflicts compel people to flee across international borders.[5] And new global networks of communication and transportation provide individuals with information and opportunities for migration.[6]

Second, more people want to leave their countries than there are countries willing or capable of accepting them. The reluctance of states to open their borders to all who wish to enter is only partly a concern over economic effects. The constraints are as likely to be political, resting upon a concern that an influx of people belonging to another ethnic community may generate xenophobic sentiments, conflicts between natives and migrants, and the growth of anti-migrant right-wing parties.

Third, it is necessary to note that while the news media have focused on South/North migration and East/West migration, this focus is narrow and misleading. The movement of migrant workers from North Africa to Western Europe, migration from Asia and Latin America to the United States and Canada, and the increase in the number of people from the Third World and Eastern Europe claiming refugee status in the West represent simply one dimension of the global flows. Only a fraction of the world's seventeen million refugees are in the advanced industrial countries and only a small portion of global migration has flowed to Western Europe (where migrants total 5 percent of the population) or to the United States. Most of the movement has been from one developing country to another; the world's largest refugee flows have been in Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and most recently in the Persian Gulf.[7] In South Asia alone, 35 to 40 million people have crossed international borders within the region.[8] In the Middle East, wars and civil conflicts have led to large-scale population flows from Iraq, Kuwait, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Lebanon. In Africa, civil wars and famines have produced some of the largest refugee populations to be found anywhere in the world.[9] Attention has been given by economists to the ways in which economic differentials between countries influence migration,[10] and by some political scientists to the ways in which conflicts within countries lead to refugee flows.[11] But little systematic comparative attention has been given to the ways in which international population movements create conflicts within and between states, that is, to population flows as an independent rather than as a dependent variable. A study of these effects is necessary to understand why states and their citizens often have an aversion to international migration even when there are economic benefits.

These features of population movements – a growth propelled by economic differentials, internal political disorder, and global networks of communication and transportation; the political as well as economic constraints on the admission of migrants and refugees; and the truly global character of migration – suggest the need for a security/stability framework for the study of international migration that focuses on state policies toward emigration and immigration as shaped by concerns over internal stability and international security. Such a framework should consider political changes within states as a major determinant of international population flows, and migration, including refugee flows, both as cause and as consequence of international conflict.

A security/stability framework can be contrasted with an international political economy framework, which explains international migration primarily by focusing on global inequalities, the economic linkages between sending and receiving states including the movement of capital and technology and the role played by transnational institutions, and structural changes in labor markets linked to changes in the international division of labor. The two frameworks have much in common. Both turn our attention from individual decision-making by migrants to the larger social, political, and economic context within which individuals act; both are interactive frameworks emphasizing the linkage between migration processes and other global processes; and both pay close attention to the behavior of states and to the importance of borders, although the security/stability framework gives somewhat greater importance to state decision-making than does a political economy approach, which often regards the state as a weak actor buffeted by larger global forces.

The two frameworks direct us to study different aspects of international migration, to ask different questions, to offer different explanations for international flows, and to create different conceptual tools for analysis. While they are at times complementary, the frameworks often yield different outcomes. A more narrowly economic perspective, for example, may lead the analyst to regard the movement of people from a poor country to a rich country as mutually advantageous (the one benefiting from remittances, the other from needed additions to its labor force), whereas a security/stability perspective of the same migration flow may lead one to point to the political risks associated with changes in the ethnic composition of the receiving country, and the attending international strains that result if there are clashes between natives and migrants. Alternately, an economic perspective might

lead the analyst to conclude that migration results in a brain drain from the sending country while worsening unemployment and creating housing shortages in the receiving country, while a security/stability framework might lead the analyst looking at the same migration flow to argue that internal security and international peace can be enhanced because the migrants are an ethnic minority unwelcomed in their home country but readily accepted by another country. The movement of people may be acceptable to both countries even though each incurs an economic loss. Thus, cost/benefit analyses may yield different assessments and policies, depending upon which framework is chosen.

Much of the contemporary literature on international migration focuses on global economic conditions as the key determinants of population movements.[12] Differentials in wages and employment opportunities – a high demand for labor in one country and a surplus in another – stimulate the movement of labor. According to economic theories of migration, individuals will emigrate if the expected benefits exceed the costs, with the result that the propensity to migrate from one region or country to another is viewed as being determined by average wages, the cost of travel, and labor market conditions. Accordingly, it is argued, changes in the global economy, such as a rise in the world price of oil or shifts in terms of trade and international flows of capital, will increase the demand for labor in some countries and decrease it in others. Moreover, the development strategies pursued by individual countries may lead to high growth rates in some and low growth rates and stagnation in others. Uneven economic development among states and a severe maldistribution of income within states may induce individuals and families to move across international boundaries to take advantage of greater opportunities.

These economic explanations go a long way toward explaining a great deal of international population movements, but they neglect two critical political elements. The first is that international population movements are often impelled, encouraged, or prevented by governments or political forces for reasons that may have little to do with economic conditions. Indeed, much of the international population flows, especially within Africa and South Asia, are determined only marginally, if at all, by changes in the global or regional political economy. And secondly, even when economic conditions create inducements for people to leave one country for another, it is governments that decide whether their citizens should be allowed to leave and governments that decide whether immigrants should be allowed to enter, and their decisions are frequently based on non-economic considerations. Moreover, governments vary in their capacity to control entry. States that are capable of defending themselves against missile, tank, and infantry attacks are often unable to defend themselves against the intrusion of thousands of illegals infiltrating across a border in search of employment or safety. Governments want to control the entry of people and regard their inability to

do so as a threat to sovereignty. Any effort, therefore, to develop a framework for the analysis of transnational flows of people must also take into account the political determinants and constraints upon these flows.[13]

A security/stability framework complements rather than replaces an economic analysis by focusing upon the role of states in both creating and responding to international migration. The object of this article is to identify some of the circumstances in which security/stability considerations become paramount in how states deal with issues of international migration. I do so in three ways, first, by identifying types of international movements generated by considerations of state security and stability, as distinct from those flows largely shaped by the regional or international political economy. I provide a brief description of forced and induced emigrations as examples of politically-driven population movements with international repercussions. Secondly, I identify those circumstances when international migration is regarded as a threat to a country's security and stability. This leads us to consider how and when refugees and economic migrants come to be regarded as threatening by receiving and sending countries. And thirdly, I consider the various ways states react when faced with population movements they regard as a threat to their international security and internal stability.

Forced and Induced Emigrations: A Global Perspective

It would be inaccurate to use the passive voice to describe much of the world's population flows. They do not merely happen; more often they are made to happen. We can identify three distinct types of forced and induced emigrations in the contemporary world.

First, governments may force emigration as a means of achieving cultural homogeneity or asserting the dominance of one ethnic community over another. Such flows have a long and sordid world-wide history. The rise of nationalism in Europe was accompanied by state actions to eject religious communities that did not subscribe to the established religion, and ethnic minorities that did not belong to the dominant ethnic community. In the fifteenth century the Spanish crown expelled the Jews. In the sixteenth century the French expelled the Huguenots. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the British crown induced Protestant dissenters to settle in the American colonies. And in the early decades of the twentieth century minorities throughout Eastern Europe – Bulgarians, Greeks, Jews, Turks, Hungarians, Serbs, Macedonians – were put to flight.[14]

Contemporary population movements in post-independence Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia are similarly linked to the rise of nationalism and the emergence of new states. The boundaries of many of the new post-colonial regimes divided linguistic, religious, and tribal communities, with the result that minorities, fearful of their future and often faced with

discrimination and violence, migrated to join their ethnic brethren in a neighboring country. Many Third World countries also expelled their ethnic minorities, especially when the minorities constituted an industrious class of migrant origin in competition with a middle-class ethnic majority.[15] Governments facing unemployment within the majority community and conflicts among ethnic groups over language and educational opportunities often regarded the expulsion of a prosperous, well-placed minority as a politically popular policy. Minorities have often been threatened by the state's antagonistic policies toward their religion, their language and their culture, as the state sought to impose a hegemonic ethnic or religious identity upon its citizens.[16] Economically successful minorities have often been told that others would be given preferences in employment, a policy of discrimination which effectively made it difficult for minorities to compete on the basis of merit.[17] Many governments expelled their minorities or created conditions that induced them to leave, and thereby forced other countries, on humanitarian grounds or out of cultural affinity, to accept them as refugees. The list of expulsions is long: Chinese from Vietnam, Indians and Pakistanis from East Africa, Tamils from Sri Lanka, Bahais from Iran, Kurds from Turkey, Iran and Iraq, Ahmediyas from Pakistan, Chakmas from Bangladesh, and in Africa the Tutsi from Rwanda, Eritreans and others from Ethiopia, and non-Arab peoples from the south in Sudan, to name a few.[18] To this list from the Third World, we must now add the minorities in each of the successor states of Yugoslavia.[19]

Secondly, governments have forced emigration as a means of dealing with political dissidents and class enemies. The ancient Greeks were among the earliest to strip dissidents of citizenship and cast them into exile. Socrates himself was offered the option of going into exile rather than being executed. Contemporary authoritarian governments have expelled dissidents or allowed them to go into exile as an alternative to imprisonment. Exiles from the Third World – from Ethiopia, Iran, Cuba, South Korea, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Chile – have largely replaced exiles from Europe in the United States.[20]

Governments may expel not just a handful of dissidents, but a substantial portion of the population hostile to the regime. Revolutionary regimes often see large-scale emigration of a social class as a way of transforming the country's social structure. The exodus of more than a half million members of the Cuban middle class was regarded by the Castro regime as a way of disposing of a social class hostile to socialism. In 1971 the Pakistani government sought to weaken the insurgency in East Pakistan by forcing large numbers of Bengali Hindus out of the country. The Vietnamese government justified expulsions as a way of eliminating a bourgeois social class opposed to the regime. The Khmer Rouge regime killed or forced into exile citizens tainted with French and other western cultural influences in an effort to reduce Cambodia's cultural and economic ties with the West. And in Afghanistan, the Soviet and Afghan military forced populations hostile to the regime to flee to Pakistan and Iran.[21]

A third type of forced emigration can be described as part of a strategy to achieve a foreign policy objective. Governments may, for example, force emigration as a way of putting pressure on neighboring states, although they may deny any such intent. The refugee-receiving country, however, often understands that a halt to unwanted migration is not likely to take place unless it yields on a demand made by the country from which the refugees come. In 1981, for example, the United States government believed that the government of Haiti was encouraging its citizens to flee by boat to Florida to press the United States to substantially increase its economic aid. (It did.)[22] In the 1980s, Pakistani officials believed that Soviet pressure on Afghans to flee was intended in part to force Pakistan to seek a settlement with the Afghan regime and to withdraw military aid to the insurgents.[23] The Malaysian government feared that the government of Vietnam sought to destabilize it by forcing Malaysia to accept Chinese refugees.[24] The Federal Republic of Germany believed that the German Democratic Republic was permitting Tamil refugees to enter through the Berlin border to force the FRG to establish new rules of entry that would tacitly recognize the East German state or, alternatively, as a bargaining ploy for additional financial credits (which the FRG subsequently granted in return for a halt to the flow).

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, colonization was an instrument of foreign economic policy that served to extend control over a territory. The British settled their colonies in the western hemisphere, in southern and eastern Africa, and in the Pacific; the French settled North Africa; the Portuguese populated Angola and Brazil; the Russians moved into nearby territories in the east, south, and southwest.[25]

The imperial powers also moved populations from one territory to another in pursuit of their own economic interests. Slaves were transported from Africa to the Caribbean and to North and South America. After the abolition of slavery, the British established a system of indentured labor that enabled them to satisfy the labor needs in their colonies (especially on British-owned plantations) by moving Indians to East Africa, Mauritius, the Caribbean, and Fiji.[26] The colonial powers also encouraged the migration of entrepreneurial communities, traders, and money lenders whom they regarded as politically pliable, e.g., Indians to the Gulf, Lebanese to West Africa, and Chinese to Southeast Asia.

While the colonization of distant territories rarely led to enduring political or economic control, the colonization of nearby territories has almost always had permanent consequences. Americans moved westward into Mexican and Indian territories. The Chinese colonized non-Han areas. The Russians colonized the Ukraine, Moldavia, the Baltic states, and portions of Muslim-populated Soviet Central Asia. And the Germans moved eastward in central Europe. These flows displaced the local populations and transformed the politics of the areas that were colonized.

With independence from European colonialism, many newly-established regimes sought to "decolonize" themselves by pressing for the exodus of populations they regarded as imposed upon them by the imperial power. With few exceptions, white settlers were pressed to return home. French settlers vacated Algeria; most Portuguese left Angola and Mozambique; many British left Zimbabwe. The new regimes often pressed for the exodus of those who had been brought in by the imperial rulers as indentured servants, although they were now free laborers and many had become prosperous businessmen and members of the middle class. Uganda forced South Asians to leave.[27] Sri Lanka pressed for the departure of Tamil tea estate workers. The Fijian military overthrew an elected government dominated by Indian descendants of estate workers, and native Melanesian Fijians rioted against Indians in an apparent effort to force them to leave the island.[28] A similar process of rejection may soon be at work in the former Soviet republics, where millions of Russian "colons" are regarded as illegitimate settlers imposed by the Soviet regime.[29]

Forced emigration can be an instrument by which one state seeks to destabilize another, force recognition, stop a neighboring state from interfering in its internal affairs, prod a neighboring state to provide aid or credit in return for stopping the flow, or extend its own political and economic interests or those of a dominant ethnic group through colonization or decolonization. An examination of both historical and contemporary population movements thus demonstrates that countries of emigration have more control over international population flows than is usually accounted for by political analysts, and that what often appears to be spontaneous emigration and refugee movements may represent deliberate emigration policies on the part of sending countries. To view refugee flows as simply the unintended consequences of internal upheavals or economic crises is to ignore the eagerness of some governments to reduce or eliminate from within their own borders selected social classes and ethnic groups, and to affect the politics and policies of their neighbors.[30]

When Is Migration a Threat to Security and Stability?

Migration can be perceived as threatening by governments of either population-sending or population-receiving communities. The threat can be an attack by armed refugees; migrants can be a threat to either country's political stability; or migrants can be perceived as a threat to the major societal values of the receiving country.

"Security" is a social construct with different meanings in different societies. An ethnically homogeneous society, for example, may place a higher value on preserving its ethnic character than does a heterogeneous society and may, therefore, regard a population influx as a threat to its security. Providing a haven for those who share one's values (political freedom, for

example) is important in some countries, but not in others; in some countries, therefore, an influx of "freedom fighters" may not be regarded as a threat to security. Moreover, even in a given country, what is highly valued may not be shared by elites and counter-elites. The influx of migrants regarded as radicals may be feared by a monarch, but welcomed by the opposition. One ethnic group may welcome migrants, while another is vehemently opposed to them. The business community may be more willing than the general public to import migrant workers.

Similarly, countries differ in whether or not they regard the mistreatment of their citizens abroad as a threat that calls for state action. While some countries are prepared to take armed action in defense of their overseas citizens, others prefer not to antagonize a government that has enabled its citizens to find employment and a country that is a source of much-needed remittances.

Any attempt to classify types of threats from immigration quickly runs into distinctions between "real" and "perceived" threats, or into absurdly paranoid notions of threat or mass anxieties that can best be described as xenophobic and racist. But even these extreme notions are elements in the reaction of governments to immigrants and refugees. It is necessary to find an analytical stance that, on the one hand, does not dismiss fears, and, on the other, does not regard all anxieties over immigration and refugees as a justification for exclusion.

Before turning to an analysis of how, why, and when states may regard immigrants and refugees as potential threats, it is first necessary to note that some obvious explanations for the response of population-receiving countries are of limited utility. One example is economic absorptive capacity. It is plausible, for example, that a country with little unemployment, a high demand for labor, and the financial resources to provide the housing and social services required by immigrants should regard migration as beneficial, while a country low on each of these dimensions should regard migration as economically and socially destabilizing. Nevertheless, using these criteria, one might expect Japan to welcome migrants and Israel to reject them, when in fact the opposite is the case.[31]

A second plausible but unsatisfactory explanation is the volume of immigration. A country faced with a large-scale influx should feel more threatened than a country experiencing a small influx of migrants. From this perspective one might have expected the Federal Republic of Germany to regard a trickle of Sri Lankan Tamils in the mid-1980s with equanimity, but to move swiftly to halt the 1989 influx of 2,000 East Germans daily, or for the countries of Africa to feel more threatened by the onrush of refugees and hence less receptive than the countries of Western Europe confronted with a trickle from the Third World. Again, however, the opposite has been the case.

Economics does, of course, matter. Even a country willing to accept immigrants when its economy is booming is more likely to close its doors in

a recession. But economics does not explain many of the differences between countries, nor does it explain the criteria countries employ to decide whether a particular group of migrants or refugees is acceptable or is regarded as threatening. Similarly, volume can matter, but again it depends upon who is at the door.

The third and most plausible explanation for the willingness of states to accept or reject migrants is ethnic affinity. A government and its citizens are likely to be receptive to those who share the same language, religion, or race, while it might regard as threatening those with whom such an identity is not shared. But what constitutes "ethnic affinity" is, again, a social construct that can change over time. Australians and Americans, for example, redefined themselves so that Asians are no longer excluded as unassimilable peoples. Many West Europeans now regard East Europeans as fellow-Europeans, more acceptable as migrants than people from North Africa. Who is or is not "one of us" is historically variable. To many nineteenth-century American Protestants, Jews and Catholics were not "one of us," and today, for many Europeans, Muslims are not "one of us." Moreover, what constitutes cultural affinity for one group in a multi-ethnic society may represent a cultural, social, and economic threat to another: note, for example, the hostile response of some African-Americans in Florida to Cuban migrants,[32] Indian Assamese response to Bangladeshis, and Pakistan Sindhi response to Biharis. Cultural affinity – or its absence – clearly plays a critical role in how various communities within countries respond to a population influx; this is a theme to which we shall return.

We can identify five broad categories of situations in which refugees or migrants may be perceived as a threat to the country that produces the emigrants, to the country that receives them, or to relations between sending and receiving countries. The first is when refugees and migrants are regarded as a threat – or at least a thorn – in relations between sending and receiving countries, a situation that arises when refugees and migrants are opposed to the regime of their home country. The second is when migrants or refugees are perceived as a political threat or security risk to the regime of the host country. The third is when immigrants are seen as a cultural threat or, fourth, as a social and economic problem for the host society. And the fifth – a new element growing out of recent developments in the Gulf – is when the host society uses immigrants as an instrument of threat against the country of origin.

Refugees and Immigrants as Opponents of the Home Regime

Conflicts create refugees, but refugees can also create conflicts. An international conflict arises when a country classifies individuals as refugees with a well-founded fear of persecution,[33] thereby accusing and condemning their

country of origin for engaging in persecution. The mere granting of asylum can create an antagonistic relationship. Thus, the January 1990 debate in Congress over whether Chinese students should be permitted to remain in the United States because of the persecutions in China was regarded by the People's Republic of China as "interference" in its internal affairs. President Bush was prepared to permit graduating students and other Chinese in the United States to remain by extending their visas, but not to grant asylum, while many Congressmen wanted to grant formal asylum status in order to condemn China. Moreover, to classify individuals as refugees with a well-founded fear of persecution is also to acknowledge that they have a moral (as distinct from a political) right to oppose their country's regime. The view of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) is that the granting of refugee status does not necessarily imply criticism of the sending by the receiving country, but such a view contradicts the conception of the refugee as one with a fear of *persecution*.[34] Moreover, democratic regimes generally allow their refugees to speak out against the regime of their country of origin, allow them access to the media, and permit them to send information and money back home in support of the opposition. The host country's decision to grant refugee status thus often creates an adversary relationship with the country that produces the refugees. The receiving country may have no such intent, but even where its motives are humanitarian the mere granting of asylum can be sufficient to create an antagonistic relationship. In the most famous asylum episode in this century, Iranian revolutionaries took violent exception to the U.S. decision to permit the shah of Iran to enter the U.S. for medical reasons; many Iranians regarded it as a form of asylum and used it as an occasion for taking American hostages.

A refugee-receiving country may actively support the refugees in their quest to change the regime of their country of origin. Refugees are potentially a tool in inter-state conflict. Numerous examples abound: the United States armed Cuban refugees in an effort to overthrow the Castro regime at the Bay of Pigs; the United States armed Contra exiles from Nicaragua; the Indian government armed Bengali "freedom fighters" against the Pakistan military; the Indian government provided military support for Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka to give the Indian government leverage in the Tamil-Sinhalese dispute; Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China, and the United States armed Afghan refugees in order to force Soviet troops to withdraw from Afghanistan; the Chinese provided arms to Khmer Rouge refugees to help overthrow the Vietnamese-backed regime in Cambodia; and Palestinian refugees received Arab support against Israelis. Refugee-producing countries may thus have good reason for fearing an alliance between their adversaries and the refugees.

Non-refugee immigrants can also be a source of conflict between receiving and sending countries. A diaspora made up primarily of refugees is, of course, likely to be hostile to the regime of the country from which they fled. But even economic migrants may become hostile, especially if they live in democratic

countries while the government of their homeland is repressive. Thus, many overseas Chinese lost their sympathy for China's government in 1989 when the regime became repressive at Tiananmen Square. Thereafter, many overseas Chinese supported dissidents within China and pressed their host governments to withdraw support for China. The Beijing government came to regard many overseas Chinese as a source of support for dissidents.[35] There are numerous examples of diasporas seeking to undermine the regime of their home country: South Koreans and Taiwanese in the United States (who supported democratic movements at home), Iranians in France (Khomeini himself during the reign of the Shah, and opponents of Khomeini's Islamic regime thereafter), Asian Indians in North America and the UK (after Indira Gandhi declared an emergency), Indian Sikhs (supporting secession), and dissident Sri Lankan Tamils and Northern Irish Catholics among others.[36]

The home country may take a dim view of the activities of its citizens abroad, and hold the host country responsible for their activities. But host countries, especially if they are democratic, are loath to restrict migrants engaged in lawful activities, especially since some of the migrants have already become citizens. The home country may even plant intelligence operators abroad to monitor the activities of its migrants,[37] and may take steps to prevent further emigration. The embassy of the home country may also provide encouragement to its supporters within the diaspora. The diaspora itself may become a focal point of controversy between the home and host countries, among contending groups within the diaspora, or between sections of the diaspora and the home government.[38] Thus, struggles that might overwise take place only within a country become internationalized if the country has a significant overseas population.

Refugees and Immigrants as a Political Risk to the Host Country

Governments are often concerned that refugees to whom they give protection may turn against them if they are unwilling to assist the refugees in their opposition to the government of their country of origin. Paradoxically, the risk may be particularly high if the host country has gone so far as to arm the refugees against their country of origin. Guns can be pointed in both directions, and the receiving country takes the risk that refugees will seek to dictate the host country's policies toward the sending country. For example, the decision by Arab countries to provide political support and arms to Palestinian refugees from Israel created within the Arab states a population capable of influencing their own foreign policies and internal politics. Palestinians, for example, became a political force within Lebanon in ways that subsequently made them a political and security problem for Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, France, and the United States. The support of Iraqi invaders by Palestinians

in Kuwait was an asset to Iraq since some of the 400,000 Palestinians in Kuwait held important positions in the Kuwaiti administration. The decision after the war by the Kuwaiti government to expel Palestinians reflected its view that Palestinians had become a security threat.[39] Throughout the Middle East, governments must consider the capacity of the Palestinians to undermine their regimes should they adopt policies that are unacceptable to the Palestinians. Similarly, the arming of Afghan refugees in Pakistan limited the options available to the government of Pakistan in its dealings with the governments of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. The Pakistani government armed the Afghans in order to pressure the Soviets to withdraw their forces and to agree to a political settlement, but the Pakistani government was also constrained by the knowledge that it could not sign an agreement with the Soviet or Afghan governments that was unacceptable to the armed Afghans in Pakistan.

Refugees have launched terrorist attacks within their host country, illegally smuggled arms, allied with the domestic opposition against host-government policies, participated in drug traffic, and in other ways eroded governments' willingness to admit refugees. Palestinians, Sikhs, Croats, Kurds, Armenians, Sri Lankan Tamils, and Northern Irish, among others, have been regarded with suspicion by intelligence and police authorities of other countries and their requests for asylum have been scrutinized not only for whether they have a well-founded fear of persecution, but for whether their presence might constitute a threat to the host country.

Such fears, it should be noted, are sometimes exaggerated, and governments have often gone to extreme lengths to protect themselves against low-level threats[40] but these fears are nonetheless not always without foundation, especially in the context of an increase in international terrorism.

Migrants Perceived as a Threat to Cultural Identity

How and why some migrant communities are perceived as cultural threats is a complicated issue, involving initially how the host community defines itself. Cultures differ with respect to how they define who belongs to or can be admitted into their community. These norms govern whom one admits, what rights and privileges are given to those who are permitted to enter, and whether the host culture regards a migrant community as potential citizens. A violation of these norms (by unwanted immigrants, for example) is often regarded as a threat to basic values and in that sense is perceived as a threat to national security.

These norms are often embedded in the law of citizenship that determines who, by virtue of birth, is entitled as a matter of right to be a citizen, and who is permitted to become a naturalized citizen. The main distinction is between citizenship laws based on *jus sanguinis*, whereby a person wherever born is a

citizen of the state of his parents, and those based on *jus soli*, the rule that a child receives its nationality from the soil or place of birth. The ties of blood descent are broader than merely parentage, for they suggest a broader "volk" or people to whom one belongs in a fictive relationship. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, has such a legal norm. Under a law passed in 1913 – and still valid – German citizenship at birth is based exclusively on descent (*jus sanguinis*); thus the children of migrants born in Germany are not thereby automatically entitled to citizenship (no *jus soli*). The Basic Law (Germany's postwar "Constitution") also accords citizenship to those Germans who no longer live in Germany and who may no longer speak German but came (or are descended from those who came) from Germany, including the territories from which Germans were expelled after the war.[41] Thus, thousands of immigrants who entered the Federal Republic from East Germany or from Poland after the Second World War were regarded as German citizens returning "home." Other countries share a similar concept. Israel, for example, has a Law of Return, under which all Jews, irrespective of where they presently live, are entitled to "return" home to reclaim, as it were, their citizenship. Nepal also has a law which entitles those who are of Nepali "origin," though they may have lived in India, Singapore, Hong Kong or elsewhere for several generations, to reclaim their citizenship by returning home.

Where such notions of consanguinity dominate citizenship law, the political system is capable of distinguishing between an acceptable and unacceptable influx, without regard either to the numbers or to the condition of the economy into which the immigrants move. In general, countries with norms of consanguinity find it difficult to incorporate ethnically alien migrants, including refugees, into citizenship. These countries are also likely to have political groups that advocate sending immigrants home even though expulsion may impose severe economic consequences for the host as well as the home countries.

A norm of indigenousness may also be widely shared by a section of a country's population and even incorporated into its legal system. This norm prescribes different rights for those who are classified as indigenous and those who, irrespective of the length of time they or their ancestors resided in the country, are not so classified. An indigenous people asserts a superior claim to land, employment, education, political power, and the central national symbols that is not accorded to others who live within the country. The indigenous – called *bhoomiputras* in Malaysia, "sons of the soil" in India, and native peoples in some societies – may assert exclusive rights denied to others, often resting on the notion that they as a people exist only within one country, while others have other homes to which they can return. Thus, the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, the Malays (the *bhoomiputras*) in Malaysia, the Assamese in Assam, and the Melanesians in Fiji, among others, subscribe to an ideology of indigenousness which has, in various guises, been enshrined in the legal system and which shapes the response of these societies to

immigrants. The *bhoomiputras* in Malaysia regarded the influx of Chinese and others from Vietnam as a fundamental threat, indeed so threatening as to lead the government to sink Vietnamese boats carrying refugees. Similarly, the Assamese rejected the influx of Bengalis, Indian-born Nepalis, and Marwaris from other parts of India (as well as immigrants from Nepal and Bangladesh), fearing that any resulting demographic change would threaten their capacity to maintain the existing legal arrangement under which native Assamese are provided opportunities in education and employment not accorded other residents of the state.[42] Nativism, a variant of the norm of indigenousness, played an important role in shaping the U.S. Immigration Act of 1924, particularly its national origins clause providing for national quotas. This legislation, and the political sentiment that underlay it, resulted in a restrictive policy toward refugees throughout the 1930s and early 1940s. After the war, however, the older American tradition of civic pluralism became politically dominant. It shaped the 1965 Immigration Act, which eliminated national quotas and gave preferences to individuals with skills and to family unification. The numbers and composition of migrants then significantly changed. From the mid-1960s to the later 1980s, between five hundred thousand and one million migrants and refugees entered each year, with nearly half the immigrants coming from Asia.

Citizenship in the United States is acquired by birth or by naturalization. Originally, American law permitted naturalization only to "free white persons," but subsequent acts permitted naturalization without regard to race. Apart from the usual residence requirements, U.S. naturalization law requires applicants to demonstrate their knowledge of the American Constitution and form of government, and to swear allegiance to the principles of the U.S. Constitution. Political knowledge and loyalty, not consanguinity, are thus the norms for membership. It is in part because the United States has political rather than ethnic criteria for naturalization that the United States has been more supportive of immigration and in the main has felt less threatened by immigration than most other countries.

For much of its history a low level of threat perception has also characterized the French response to immigration. While a concern for cultural unity is a central element in the French conception of nationhood, the French have also had a political conception of citizenship derived from the revolutionary origins of the notion of citizenship. The French, as Rogers Brubaker has written, are universalist and assimilationist in contrast with the *Volk*-centered Germans.[43] The result is that the French have been more willing to naturalize immigrants than have the Germans and more open to political refugees than most other West European countries. Even so, France has a strong anti-migrant movement, the National Front, led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, a North African–born Frenchman who has won considerable support for his position that guest-workers from North Africa, and their French-born children, should "return" home to North Africa.

Legal definitions of citizenship aside, most societies react with alarm when there is an unregulated large-scale illegal migration of people who do not share their culture and national identity. Examples abound. Illegal migration into the Sabah state of Malaysia from the Philippines and Indonesia – an estimated 400,000 or more of Sabah's 1.4 million population – has created anxieties there. The government of Malaysia is particularly uneasy since the Philippines lays claim to Sabah and some Filipino leaders insist that, so long as the dispute continues, Malaysia has no right to consider Filipinos as illegal aliens. Should the Filipinos acquire citizenship, it has been noted, they might win a third or more of Sabah's parliamentary seats and pursue a merger with the Philippines. The Philippines might thereby acquire through colonization what it is unable to win through diplomatic or military means.[44]

Colonization as a means of international conquest and annexation can in fact be the deliberate intent of a state. The government of Morocco, for example, moved 350,000 civilians into Western Sahara in an effort to claim and occupy disputed territory. The Israeli government has provided housing subsidies to its citizens to settle on the West Bank. Since the annexation of the Turkic regions of central Asia in the nineteenth century, the Czarist and Soviet regimes have encouraged Russian settlement, while a similar policy of settling Han people has been pursued by the Chinese government in Sinkiang province and other areas.

Many governments are concerned that migration may lead to xenophobic popular sentiments and to the rise of anti-migrant political parties that could threaten the regime. Under such circumstances governments may pursue anti-migration policies in anticipation of public reactions.

Migrants Perceived as a Social or Economic Burden

Societies may react to immigrants because of the economic costs they impose or because of their purported social behavior such as criminality, welfare dependency, delinquency, etc. Societies may be concerned because the people entering are so numerous or so poor that they create a substantial economic burden by straining housing, education, and transportation facilities. In advanced industrial societies, services provided by the welfare state to migrant workers, permanent migrants, or refugees may generate local resentment. In less developed countries, refugees may illegally occupy private or government lands; their goats, sheep, and cattle may decimate forests and grazing land; they may use firewood, consume water, produce waste, and in other ways come to be regarded as an ecological threat. The willingness to bear these costs is likely to be low if the host government believes that the government of the sending country is engaged in a policy of population "dumping," by exporting its criminals, unwanted ethnic minorities, and "surplus" population at the cost of the receiving country. The United States, for example, distinguished between those Cubans who fled the Communist regime in the 1960s, whom it welcomed, and Cuban convicts removed from prisons and placed on boats for the United States in the 1970s, whom it did not.[45] After the 1947 partition, India accepted Hindus from Pakistan who preferred to live in India, but regarded as destabilizing and threatening the forced exodus of East Pakistanis in the early 1970s, which India saw as a Pakistani effort to turn West Pakistan into the majority province by "dumping" East Pakistanis into India. Governments also distinguish between situations in which ethnic minorities are permitted to leave (e.g., Jews from the Soviet Union) and those from which minorities are forced to flee (e.g., Bulgarian Turks or Sri Lankan Tamils), and are therefore more likely to accept the former than the latter.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, several European governments promoted emigration as a way of easing the social and political burdens that might result from poverty and crime. It has been estimated that between 1788 and 1868 England exiled 160,000 of its criminals to Australia as a convenient way to get rid of prisoners and reduce the costs of maintaining prisons.[46] In the middle of the nineteenth century, the British regarded emigration as a form of famine relief for Ireland. In seven famine years, from 1849 to 1856, one and a half million Irish emigrated, mostly across the Atlantic.[47] In Germany, from which 1,500,000 emigrated between 1871 and 1881, local officials believed that "a large body of indigent subjects constitute a social danger and a serious burden on meager public funds; better let them go."[48] Reacting to these policies, one American scholar wrote in 1890 that "there is something almost revolting in the anxiety of certain countries to get rid of their surplus population and to escape the burden of supporting the poor, the helpless and the depraved."[49] His reaction foreshadowed some of the popular concerns over Third World migration that grew in Western Europe in the latter part of this century.

The fears of western countries notwithstanding, however, population dumping has not been a significant element in the flow of migrants from the Third World to advanced industrial countries. To the extent that population dumping has occurred, it has largely been of ethnic minorities; flights – at least before the Yugoslav crisis – have primarily been to neighboring developing countries rather than to advanced industrial countries.

Forced population movements of ethnic minorities took place in Eastern Europe during the interwar period, placing enormous economic and social strains upon the receiving countries, taking a heavy toll upon the migrants themselves, and worsening relations among states. But because there was an element of exchange, and minorities moved to states in which their ethnic community was a majority, settlement was possible and violent international conflict was avoided. In 1922–23 Greeks fled Turkey and Turks fled Greece. An estimated 1.5 million people from both nations were involved. In a related population exchange, in 1923 the Greek government, in an effort to Hellenize

its Macedonian region, forced the exodus of its Bulgarian population. As the Bulgarian refugees moved into Greek-speaking areas of Bulgaria, the local Greek population fled southward to Greece.[50] The world's largest population exchange was in South Asia, where fourteen million people moved between India and Pakistan between 1947 and 1950. But since both countries respected the wishes of each other's ethnic minorities to settle in the country in which they constituted a majority, the exchange took place without causing a conflict between the two countries.[51] Similarly, the forced exit of Jews from North Africa to Israel in the 1950s was not a source of international conflict, since the refugees were welcomed by Israel. In contrast, however, the flight of Arabs from Israel in 1948 led to an interminable conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors since the Arab states did not recognize the legitimacy of the new state.[52]

Government officials, otherwise concerned with the plight of refugees, may fear that a decision to grant refugee status to a small number of individuals might open the floodgate beyond what society is prepared to accept. One reason states hesitate to grant refugee and asylum status to those fleeing because of economic and even violent conditions at home – as distinct from having a personal "well-founded fear of persecution" – is the concern that the number of asylum requests would then increase. States prefer restrictive criteria in order to keep the influx small. Since laws of asylum are often imprecise and the policy that states will admit refugees with a well-founded fear of persecution is subject to varied interpretations, individuals who wish to enter a country but cannot do so under existing guestworker and migration laws may resort to claiming political asylum. Western European governments are thus torn between a humanitarian sentiment toward refugees and the recognition that the more generous the law of asylum, the greater the number of applicants. As the number of asylum-seekers grows, governments become more restrictive, insisting on evidence that the individual does indeed have a well-founded fear of persecution, not "merely" a fear of being killed in a violent civil conflict. A major increase in asylum applications to Switzerland in 1986 and 1987, for example, led to passage of a referendum imposing a ceiling on the number of entries under the laws of asylum. In recent years Western Europe has become more restrictive as the requests for asylum have increased. Policy makers argue that to admit even a small number of refugees who enter because of political conditions or violence at home would be to open the door to larger numbers than their society is prepared to admit.

Migrants as Hostages: Risks for the Sending Country

Recent actions of the governments of Iran, Iraq, and Libya all demonstrate how migrants can be used as an instrument of statecraft in order to impose restraints upon the actions of the home government. Following the invasion

of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the government of Iraq announced a series of measures using migrants as instruments for the achievement of political objectives. The Iraqis declared that Westerners living in Iraq and Kuwait would be forcibly held as a shield against armed attack, in an effort to deter the United States and its allies from launching airstrikes against military facilities where hostages might be located. The Iraqi government then indicated its willingness to treat the migrants of those countries that did not send troops to Saudi Arabia, such as India, more favorably than the migrants of those countries that did, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. The Iraqi government subsequently declared that food would not be provided for Asian migrants (including Indians) unless their countries sent food supplies and medicines in violation of the United Nations embargo.

While the Iraqi strategy of using their control over migrants for international bargaining is thus far unique, the mere presence of migrants in a country from which they could be expelled has been for some time an element affecting the behavior of the migrants' home country. Since the late 1970s the countries of South Asia have been aware of their dependence upon migration to the Gulf and have recognized that any sudden influx of returning migrants would create a major problem for domestic security as remittances came to an end, balance of payments problems were created, families dependent upon migrant income were threatened with destitution, and large numbers of people were thrown into labor markets where there already existed substantial unemployment. Since the Gulf War, all of these fears have materialized. Sending governments aware of these potential consequences have hesitated to criticize host governments for the treatment of migrant workers.[53] When workers have been expelled for strikes and other agitational activities, the home governments have sought to pacify their migrants – and the host government – in an effort to avoid further expulsions. Governments have often remained silent even when workers' contracts have been violated. Thus, the understandable reaction of some governments with migrants in Kuwait and Iraq was to see first whether it was possible for their migrants to remain, and to assure the security of their citizens, rather than to support international efforts against Iraqi aggression.

More recently there were reports that Libya threatened to expel migrants of any home government that voted for the UN Security Council resolution invoking sanctions against Libya for its failure to extradite two men accused of terrorism in the Pan American flight which fell over Lockerbie, Scotland. The target of Libya's threat was clearly Egypt, which had one million citizens working and living in Libya.

A security threat, as Robert Jervis has reminded us, is often a matter of perception.[54] What are the enemy's capabilities? What are its intentions? Perceptions similarly shape decision-makers' assessments of whether refugees and migrants constitute a security threat. Time and again we have seen how different are the assessments that various governments make of the threat posed by a

population influx. With the rise of anti-migrant right wing parties in France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and elsewhere in Europe, European governments have virtually halted migration and made entry difficult for refugees from Third World countries; in contrast, the United States, Canada, and Australia, all traditional immigration countries, have strong pro-immigrant constituencies that have sustained pro-immigration policies even in the midst of substantial unemployment.[55] Moreover, perceptions of risk change. Prior to the invasion by Iraq, Kuwait had a larger number of guest workers than native workers, yet did not feel insecure in their presence. But as a result of the invasion and the support to Iraq reportedly given by some migrant communities, the government and citizens of Kuwait now have a different assessment of the political risks of foreign workers and are concerned both with their numbers and national origin. Moreover, a country's concern that a refugee influx is the result of population "dumping" by its neighbor – clearly a matter of perception of intentions – is likely to be greatest when there is a history of enmity between sending and receiving countries, as in the case of Pakistan and India. Countries almost always feel threatened if their neighbor seeks to create a more homogeneous society by expelling its minorities – the phrase now is "ethnic cleansing"[56] – but we have also seen that there can be circumstances when a population "exchange" or an orderly "return" of an ethnic minority can be regarded as non-threatening by the receiving country.

How governments assess one another's intentions with respect both to economic migrants and political refugees is thus critical to how conflictual population movements may become. A government is more likely to accommodate a refugee flow from a neighboring country if it believes that the flight is the unfortunate and unintended consequences of a civil conflict than if it believes that the flight of the refugees is precisely what is intended.[57] Similarly, a government's response to reports that its citizens abroad are maltreated will depend upon whether it believes that the host country is culpable.

But perception is not everything. As we have seen, there are genuine conflicts of interests among countries on matters of migrants and refugees. Countries quarrel over each other's entry and exit rules as some countries want those whom another will not let go, while some countries force out those whom others do not want.[58] How states react to international population flows can itself be a source of international conflict.

State Responses to Population Movements

How do states react when they are confronted with an unwanted population influx, either of economic migrants or of refugees? For the foreseeable future the numbers of people who wish to leave or are forced to leave their countries will continue to exceed substantially the numbers that other countries

are willing to accept. What strategies are available to states confronted with a rising demand for entrance? One possible response is to increase immigration. For many industrial countries, migration is advantageous, providing more young people to offset low national birthrates, manpower for service sector jobs that local people do not want, skilled manpower for labor-short occupations, and new investments by energetic, entrepreneurial newcomers. "The absorptive capacity of West European countries," wrote *The Economist*, "though not as great as that of America or Australia, is still bigger than timid people think. European politicians who run scared of racist or anti-immigrant feeling will be doing their countries no favours. Their guiding principle as they map out Europe's immigration plans should not be 'How few can we get away with letting in?', but rather, 'How many can we possibly take without creating unbearable social strain?'"[59]

But even countries that are relatively open to economic migrants and to refugees will not be able to admit all who want to enter. Sealing borders is one response, but rarely wholly effective even in the case of islands. Control is difficult for any country with large coastlines or land borders. Regulation of employers (including penalties for employing illegals) and the use of identity cards has made a difference in the countries of Western Europe, but is not a useful option for a country with large numbers of small firms, a poorly developed administrative structure, and officials who are easily corrupted. Moreover, however opposed the government and a majority of the population are to illegal migration, there are often elements within the society who welcome refugees and migrant workers: employers, ethnic kinfolk, political sympathizers, or officials willing to accept bribes. Finally, even if a country is able to fine-tune the number and characteristics of the economic migrants it admits, how can it cope with a massive influx of refugees in flight from a neighboring country?

Faced with unwanted flows whose entrance they cannot control, governments have increasingly turned to strategies for halting emigration.[60] We can identify three such strategies.

The first is to pay to avoid what one does not want. It has been suggested that an infusion of aid and investment, an improvement in trade, the resolution of the debt crisis, and other measures that would improve income and unemployment in low-income countries would reduce the rate of emigration. Meritorious as these proposals are, there is no evidence that they can reduce emigration in the short run. Indeed, high rates of emigration have often been associated with high economic growth rates. It was so for Great Britain in the nineteenth century, and in recent years for South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Algeria, and Greece. Only after an extended period of economic growth and a significant rise in wages do we see a substantial reduction in pressures for emigration.[61] Economic aid, however, may not be intended to remedy a country's high unemployment or low economic growth rate, but rather as payment to a government to halt a refugee flow. As noted earlier, United States

With the outbreak of war among the successor states of Yugoslavia, and a large outpouring of Croatian and Bosnian refugees to Germany, Hungary, Austria, and other former Yugoslav states, there were calls for armed intervention by NATO or by the United Nations.[66]

In each of these instances the high profile and highly conflictual nature of population movements has affected which institutions make exit and entry rules and engage in international negotiations. Decisions on such matters have come to be dealt with, not by ministries of labor, border control officials, or the courts, but at the highest levels of government, in the foreign and defense ministries, the security and intelligence agencies, and by heads of government. The very form and intensity of response to unwanted migrations is itself an indication that such population flows are regarded as threats to security or stability. These responses also suggest that states do not regard refugee flows and emigration as purely an internal matter, despite the assertions of the United Nations and other international agencies that countries do not have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of states that produce refugees, even when there is a perceived threat to the security and stability of countries upon whom the burden of unwanted refugees falls.

While the notion of sovereignty is still rhetorically recognized, a variety of "internal" actions by states are increasingly regarded as threats by other states. Thus, the spewing of nuclear waste and other hazardous materials into the atmosphere and the contamination of waterways which then flow into other countries is no longer regarded as an internal matter. In the same spirit, a country that forces its citizens to leave or creates conditions which induce them to leave has internationalized its internal actions.

A conundrum for Western liberal democratic regimes, however, is that they are reluctant to insist that governments restrain the exit of citizens simply because they or others are unwilling to accept them. Western liberal democracies believe in the right of emigration by individuals, but they simultaneously believe that governments retain the right to determine who and how many shall be permitted to enter. Liberal regimes may encourage or even threaten countries that produce refugees and unwanted immigrants in an effort to change the conditions that induce or force people to leave, but they are often reluctant to press governments to prevent people from leaving, or to force people to return home against their will. They do not want regimes to prevent political dissidents or persecuted minorities from leaving their country; rather, they want governments to stop their repression.

Advanced industrial countries that admit immigrants prefer an immigration policy that creates the fewest domestic or international political problems. One policy option is to admit those who best satisfy the requirements of the receiving country: those who have skills needed in the labor market, or capital to create new businesses, or relatives who would facilitate their integration into the society.[67] But a limited, largely skill-based immigration policy for Western

Europe or the United States would still leave large numbers of people banging on the doors, seeking to enter as refugees or, failing that, as illegals.

An alternative policy based upon the needs of immigrants and refugees, though morally more attractive, is more difficult to formulate, more difficult to implement, and legally and politically more contentious. But no policy, short of the obliteration of international boundaries and sovereign states, can deal with the vast numbers of people who want to leave their country for another where opportunities are greater and life is safer. A moral case can be made for giving preference to those in flight, even at the cost of limiting the number of immigrants admitted to meet labor needs or to enable families to reunite. If countries have a ceiling on the number of people they are willing to admit, there is a strong moral argument for providing admissions first to those who are persecuted or whose lives are in danger, and have few places to go. But for reasons indicated above, only a narrow definition of what constitutes a refugee, with a case-by-case review, will enable states to put a cap on what they regard as potentially unlimited flows.

As a matter of political realism, then, a significant increase in the flow of refugees or of unwanted illegal economic migrants is likely to lead the governments of population-receiving countries to consider various forms of intervention to change the domestic factors that force or induce people to leave their homeland. If a people violate the boundaries of a neighboring country, then they and their government should expect others to intervene in their internal affairs.

Notes

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1. Timothy Garton Ash, "The German Revolution," *The New York Review of Books*, December 21, 1989, pp. 14–17, provides an informed eye-witness account of how the exodus of East Germans in the summer and fall of 1989 led to the dismantling of the Berlin Wall and the absorption of the East German state into West Germany.
2. On secessionist movements, see Allen Buchanan, *Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991). This otherwise excellent analysis by a political philosopher does not deal with the problem of minorities that remain in successor states.
3. Democratization and political liberalization of authoritarian regimes have enabled people to leave who previously were denied the right of exit. An entire region of the world, ranging from Central Europe to the Chinese border, had imprisoned those who sought to emigrate. Similar restrictions continue to operate for several of the remaining communist countries. If and when the regimes of North Korea and China liberalize, another large region of the world will allow its citizens to leave. See Alan Dowty, *Closed Borders: The Contemporary Assault on Freedom of Movement* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), which provides a useful account of how authoritarian states engaged both

in restricting exodus and in forced expulsions. For an analysis of the right to leave and return, see H. Hannum, *The Right to Leave and Return in International Law and Practice* (London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987). As has happened twice before in this century, the breakup of an empire is producing large-scale ethnic conflict and emigration. With the withdrawal of Soviet power from Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet state itself, conflicts have erupted between Turks and Bulgarians in Turkey; Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania; Armenians and Azeris in the Caucasus; Albanians, Croatians, Slovenians, Bosnians, and Serbs in former Yugoslavia; Slovaks and Czechs in Czechoslovakia; and among a variety of ethnic groups in Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and in the new states of Central Asia. There is a high potential for continued emigration of minorities among each of these states. See F. Stephen Larrabee, "Down and Out in Warsaw and Budapest: Eastern Europe and East-West Migration," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 5–33.

4. A long-term decline in the birth rate in advanced industrial countries combined with continued economic growth may lead employers to seek low-wage laborers from abroad. Transnational investment in manufacturing industries may reduce some manpower needs, but the demand for more workers in the service sector seems likely to grow, barring technological breakthroughs that would replace waiters, bus conductors, nurses, and household help. Employers in Japan, Singapore, and portions of the United States and Western Europe are prepared to hire illegal migrants, notwithstanding the objections of their governments and much of the citizenry. So long as employer demand remains high, borders are porous, and government enforcement of employer sanctions is limited, illegal migration seems likely to continue and in some countries to increase.
5. There have already been mass migrations within and between countries as a result of desertification, floods, toxic wastes (chemical contamination, nuclear reactor accidents, hazardous waste), and threats of inundation as a result of rising sea levels. According to one estimate, two million Africans were displaced in the mid-1980s as a result of drought. See Jodi L. Jacobson, *Environmental Refugees: A Yardstick of Habitability*, Worldwatch Paper No. 86 (Washington, D.C.: WorldWatch Institute, 1988).
6. Information concerning employment opportunities and changes in immigration and refugee laws is quickly transmitted to friends and relatives. Not only do many people in the Third World view the United States and Europe as potential places for migration, but differences and opportunities *within* the Third World are also becoming better known. Indonesians, for example, are seeking (illegal) employment in peninsular Malaysia, Sabah, and Sarawak. Malaysians and others are aware of opportunities in Singapore. Oil-rich Brunei attracts workers from Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea export manpower, but also attract illegal immigrant workers drawn by their reputation for employment at high wages. Migrants continue to be attracted to the oil-producing countries of the Middle East. For one account of large-scale migration among Third World countries, see Michael Vatikiotis, "Malaysia: Worrisome Influx; Foreign Workers Raise Social, Security Fears," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 6, 1992, p. 21, which describes the concerns in Malaysia over the influx of an estimated one million migrants from Indonesia.
7. An estimated 5.5 million people from forty countries were temporarily or permanently displaced by the Gulf War. The largest single group was an estimated 1–1.5 million Yemenis who were forced to leave Saudi Arabia to return to Yemen. The other main displaced peoples were Kurds, Kuwaitis, Palestinians, and South Asians. See Elizabeth N. Offen, "The Persian Gulf War of 1990–91: Its Impact on Migration and the Security of States" (M.S. dissertation, Department of Political Science, MIT, June 1992).
8. For data on South Asia, including a description of the major bilateral flows that have led to conflict, see Myron Weiner, "Security, Migration, and Conflict," in *Defense Intelligence Journal* (forthcoming).

9. *World Refugee Survey, 1992* (Washington: D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1992). The World Refugee Survey is the best single source for annual world-wide data on both refugees and internally displaced persons, with brief accounts by country of source and destination.
10. See Sidney Klein, ed., *The Economics of Mass Migration in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Paragon House, 1987); Brinley Thomas, *Migration and Economic Growth: A Study of Great Britain and the Atlantic Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954); Charles P. Kindleberger, *Europe's Postwar Growth: The Role of Labor Supply* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), chap. 9; Theodore W. Schultz, "Migration: An Economist's View," in William H. McNeill and Ruth S. Adams, eds., *Human Migration: Patterns and Policies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), pp. 377–386. These and other works by economists deal with the benefits and costs as well as the determinants of migration. For a useful bibliography on the economics of migration, see Julian L. Simon, *The Economic Consequences of Immigration* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989).
11. Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo, *Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Michael R. Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), are among the most comprehensive treatments of the major world regions that have produced refugees in this century.
12. On the political economy of international migration see, for a neo-Marxist perspective, Saskia Sassen, *The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Alejandro Portes and John Walton, *Labor, Class, and the International System* (New York: Academic Press, 1981); Stephen Adler, *International Migration and Dependence* (Westmead: Saxon House, 1977); and Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973). For other political economy interpretations, see Kindleberger, *Europe's Postwar Growth*; Michael Piore, *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor in Industrial Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Wolf R. Bohning, *The Migration of Workers in the United Kingdom and the European Community* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972); and Wolf R. Bohning, *Studies in International Labour Migration* (London: Macmillan, 1984). Two recent works by economists on migration to the United States do not deal with the political or security dimensions of international migration. See Simon, *The Economic Consequences of Immigration*; and George J. Borjas, *Friends or Strangers: The Impact of Immigrants on the U.S. Economy* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
13. Among the studies that focus on the political determinants of refugee flows, the most comprehensive is Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, *Escape from Violence*. Few other studies so directly consider the relationship between population flows and the political processes within and between states that create them. For a study of the *effects* of migration, especially on foreign policy, see the particularly useful set of essays edited by Robert W. Tucker, Charles B. Keely, and Linda Wrigley, *Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990). Also see Michael S. Teitelbaum, "Immigration, Refugees and Foreign Policy," *International Organization*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Summer 1984), pp. 429–450. For an examination of how refugee flows affect and are affected by international relations, see Gilbert Loescher and Laila Monahan, eds., *Refugees and International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Leon Gordenker, *Refugees in International Politics* (London: Croom Helm, 1987). It should be noted that the standard works in international relations and in the political economy of international relations do not discuss international migration and refugee flows. See, for example, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of*

International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

14. See Eugene M. Kulischer, *Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes, 1917–47* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), pp. 248–249.
15. In 1969 Kenya announced that eighty thousand noncitizen Asians must leave and in 1972 Uganda expelled its Indian population, most of whom were part of the country's middle class. See Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, *Escape from Violence*, pp. 65–66.
16. Sri Lanka is an example. See Stanley J. Tambiah, *Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); and Stanley J. Tambiah, *Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
17. Two examples are Malaysia, where the government adopted a policy of giving preferences in employment and education to Malays over Chinese, and Sri Lanka, where government gave preference to Sinhalese over Tamils. For these and other examples see Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 185–228.
18. Ibid., pp. 198–199, 200–201, 208–209.
19. The war for "ethnic cleansing" in Yugoslavia is the latest example of governments seeking to force populations to move in an effort to establish ethnic hegemony over a territory; in this particular instance it is combined with an effort to force a change in the borders themselves by establishing Serbian demographic and military preponderance in areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina that could then be incorporated into Serbia. For an account see Misha Glenny, "Yugoslavia: The Revenger's Tragedy," *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. 34, No. 14 (August 13, 1992), pp. 37–43. Glenny notes that majority-minority conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia, accompanied by similar refugee flights, could lead to military action by Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, or Turkey.
20. On exile politics see the articles in *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (London: Third World Foundation, January 1987); and Yossi Shain, *The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation-State* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1989).
21. For accounts of forced migration as an instrument of both domestic and foreign policy, see Michael S. Teitelbaum, "Forced Migration: The Tragedy of Mass Expulsions," in Nathan Glazer, ed., *Clamor at the Gates: The New Migration* (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1985); and Peter H. Koehn, *Refugees from Revolution: U.S. Policy and Third-World Migration* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991).
22. As part of its effort to halt Haitian migration to the United States, the Reagan administration promised increased amounts of foreign aid to improve the conditions that purportedly promoted the flow. For an account of how the United States utilized its aid program to persuade the Haitian government to prosecute those engaged in trafficking in illegal migrants and to pledge not to mistreat return migrants, see Jorge Domínguez, "Immigration as Foreign Policy in U.S.-Latin American Relations," in Robert Tucker, Charles B. Keely, and Linda Wrigley, eds., *Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990). Also see Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan, *Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America's Half-Open Door, 1945 to the Present* (New York: Free Press, 1986).
23. U.S. Department of State, *Afghanistan: Eight Years of Soviet Occupation* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1987).
24. For an account of Malaysian and Thai government responses to refugees from Vietnam, see Loescher and Scanlan, *Calculated Kindness*, p. 135. Also see Lesleyanne Hawthorne, *Refugee: The Vietnamese Experience* (London: Oxford University Press, 1982).

25. For a political analysis of Russian colonization policy, see Alexandre A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, "Migration and Political Control: Soviet Europeans in Soviet Central Asia," in McNeill and Adams, *Human Migration*.
26. For accounts of how the British settled South Asians in British colonies in Burma, Uganda, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Guyana, Malaysia, South Africa, Fiji, and in the Caribbean, see Hugh Tinker, *The Export of Indian Labour Overseas 1830–1920* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974); and Hugh Tinker, *The Banyan Tree: Overseas Emigrants from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
27. M. Mamdani, *From Citizen to Refugee: Ugandan Asians Come to Britain* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1973).
28. Colonel Sitveni Rabuka, a Melanesian, took over the government and arrested all cabinet members. The coup was endorsed by the Great Council of Chiefs and was quickly followed by race riots and attacks on Indian property. For an account of the 1987 coup, see the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 4, 1987, p. 38. It is estimated that in 1987 Fiji's population of 714,000 was 48.6 percent of Indian origin and 46.2 percent of Melanesian origin. For an account of subsequent emigration by many Indians from Fiji see the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 28, 1990, p. 15.
29. Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnopolitical Migration from and among Soviet Successor States," in Myron Weiner, ed., *International Migration and Security* (forthcoming).
30. For a useful bibliographical guide to the vast literature on refugees, see *Displaced Peoples and Refugee Studies: A Resource Guide*, edited by the Refugee Studies Programme, University of Oxford (London: Hans Zell Publishers, 1990).
31. In fact, when Soviet Jewish migration reached 200,000 in one year, there were "euphoric expectations of a million-and-a-half newcomers within two or three years," wrote the editor of the Jerusalem *Post*. David Bar-Illan, "Why Likud Lost – And Who Won," *Commentary*, Vol. 94, No. 2 (August 1992), p. 28.
32. The ambivalent attitude of African-Americans toward immigration is described by Lawrence H. Fuchs, "The Reactions of Black Americans to Immigration," in Virginia Yans-McLaughlin, ed., *Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology and Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
33. The language is from the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, subsequently modified in a 1967 protocol. The Convention states that a refugee is a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country." This definition is the centerpiece of most Western law dealing with refugees. Some critics (see Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, *Escape from Violence*) believe that the definition is too narrow because it excludes those who only flee from violence. For a defense of the United Nations definition, see David A. Martin, "The Refugee Concept: On Definitions, Politics, and the Careful Use of Scarce Resources," in Howard Adelman, ed., *Refugee Policy: Canada and the United States* (Toronto: York Lanes Press, 1991), pp. 30–51. A wider definition of refugee was adopted in 1969 by the Organization of African Unity in its Refugee Convention, according to which the term refugee applies to every person who "owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality."
34. For an analysis of the UNHCR's concept of protection, see Leon Gordenker, *Refugees in International Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 27–46.
35. They have some cause to do so: in March 1990 the Chinese government sealed Tiananmen Square after receiving word that overseas Chinese, using fax machines,

had called upon dissidents to protest peacefully by gathering in large numbers in the Square. For a history of Communist China's relationship with its diaspora, see Stephen FitzGerald, *China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking's Changing Policy 1949–1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

36. For an analysis of the role played by Asian migrants and their descendants in the United States in supporting movements for democratization or for self-determination in their "home" countries, see Myron Weiner, "Asian Immigrants and U.S. Foreign Policy," in Tucker, Keely, and Wrigley, *Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 192–213; for an analysis of the political role of other diasporas in the United States, see Yossi Shain, "Democrats and Secessionists: U.S. Diasporas as Regime Destabilizers," in Weiner, *International Migration and Security*.
37. On the role played by the Taiwanese security apparatus in attempts to thwart support for Taiwanese independence sentiments within the Taiwanese community in the United States, see Weiner, "Asian Immigrants and U.S. Foreign Policy," p. 197.
38. Examples include conflicts between Turkish Muslim fundamentalists and their opponents within Germany and, earlier, among Indians in Britain who were divided in their attitude toward Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's government after she declared an emergency in 1975 and arrested members of the opposition.
39. For an analysis of the changing attitudes of Kuwaitis toward Palestinian migrants and toward foreign workers in general, see Jill Crystal, *Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 166–169.
40. One of the more extreme responses was the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act passed by the U.S. Congress in 1952, which excluded any aliens who might "engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety or security of the United States." The Immigration and Naturalization Service interpreted the act to go beyond barring known or suspected terrorists to exclude writers and politicians known to be critical of the United States.
41. Kay Hailbronner, "Citizenship and Nationhood in Germany," in William Rogers Brubaker, ed., *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1989).
42. For an analysis, with examples, of the notion of indigenousness as providing the basis of group legitimacy, see Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 202–216.
43. William Rogers Brubaker, ed., "Introduction," in Brubaker, *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*, p. 8.
44. Concern over colonization, it should be noted, can also be an internal affair in multiethnic societies. Territorially-based ethnic groups may consider an influx of people from other parts of the country as a cultural and political threat. Hence, the Moros in Mindanao revolted at the in-migration of people from other parts of the Philippines, Sri Lanka's Tamils oppose settlement by Sinhalese in "their" region, Nicaragua Miskito Indians object to the migration of non-Miskito peoples into "their" territory on the Atlantic coast, and a variety of India's linguistic communities regard in-migration as a form of colonization. In some cases such settlements can provoke an internal conflict between migrants and indigenes, with international consequences.
45. For an account of the history of Cuban migration to the United States from 1959 until the Mariel boatlift in 1980, see Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan, "U.S. Foreign Policy, 1959–1980: Impact on Refugee Flow from Cuba," *Annals*, Vol. 467 (May 1983), pp. 114–137. Also see Jorge I. Domínguez, "Immigration as Foreign Policy in U.S.-Latin American Relations," in Tucker, Keely, and Wrigley, *Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy*; and Felix Roberto Masud-Piloto, *With Open Arms: Cuban Migration to the United States* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1988).
46. Robert Hughes, *The Fatal Shore* (New York: Knopf, 1987).

47. H.J.M. Jonston, *British Emigration Policy 1815–1830: Shovelling out Paupers* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1972).
48. Mack Walker, *Germany and the Emigration 1860–1885* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).
49. Richmond Mayo-Smith, *Emigration and Immigration: A Study in Social Science* (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1890); reprinted 1986, pp. 197–198.
50. Michael R. Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
51. The population exchange proved to be violent, as the various communities slaughtered one another. However, it was neither the exchange nor the killings that led to war between India and Pakistan. The Indo-Pakistan war of 1947–48 was over the disputed territory of Kashmir.
52. Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
53. For a description of working conditions of South Asian migrants in the Persian Gulf, and the reluctance of South Asian governments to protest the mistreatment of migrants, see Myron Weiner, "International Migration and Development: Indians in the Persian Gulf," *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March 1988), pp. 1–36. For accounts of the benefits to Asian countries of migration to the Gulf see Godfrey Gunatilleke, ed., *Migration of Asian Workers to the Arab World* (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1986); and Rashid Amjad, ed., *To the Gulf and Back: Studies in the Economic Impact of Asian Labour Migration* (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 1989).
54. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
55. These countries have their anti-immigrant sentiments as well. Patrick Buchanan, candidate for president in the 1992 Republican primaries, was opposed to migration, particularly for what he regarded as its impact on employment and on welfare. The Australian debate is more pertinent to this article for its focus on the security dimensions of migration: Australian advocates of migration have argued that Australia's security is improved by opening its doors to migrants from Asia; opponents have been concerned with multiculturalism and population growth. See Katharine Betts, *Ideology and Immigration: Australia 1976 to 1987* (Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1988); and Robert Birrell, Douglas Hill, and Jon Nevill, eds., *Populate and Perish? The Stresses of Population Growth in Australia* (Sidney: Fontana/Australian Conservation Foundation, 1984).
56. The older expression "unmixing of peoples" was reportedly used by Lord Curzon to describe the situation during the Balkan Wars; Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 41.
57. The European community stiffened its views toward Serbia when it became clear that Serbs were seeking to force the exodus of Croatians and Bosnians; many German officials then concluded that their willingness to accommodate refugees was enabling the Serbs to achieve their objective of clearing areas of non-Serbs.
58. For an analysis of how the congruence or incongruence of rules of entry and exit influence the patterns of conflict and cooperation among states, see Myron Weiner, "On International Migration and International Relations," *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 1985), pp. 441–455.
59. *Economist*, "The Would-be Europeans," August 4, 1990, p. 15. The *Economist* adds, "For West Europeans it will be easier to absorb East Europeans than North Africans."
60. For a somewhat different view than is presented here, arguing that the challenge of migration can best be dealt with as part of dealing with other global issues, see Jonas Widgren, "International Migration and Regional Stability," *International Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 4 (October 1990), pp. 749–766: "The long-term solutions to the migration challenge are the same as those outlined for all the other burning global problems that

we face: stabilizing world population at a reasonable level, reinstalling human rights, reinforcing democracy, peacefully settling regional conflicts, halting environmental degradation, allowing for continued economic growth, abolishing trade protectionism, alleviating poverty, relieving the debt burden, increasing sound development aid, strengthening UN cooperation – and in general maintaining peace, regionally and globally" (p. 766). To the extent states regard migration and refugee flows as threats to their security, more direct and immediate measures will be taken.

61. For an attempt to deal with the relationship between migration, investment, and trade, see *Authorized Migration: An Economic Development Response* (Washington, D.C.: Report of The Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, 1990). The bipartisan Commission, created by Congress in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, concluded that "any serious cooperative effort to reduce migratory pressure at their source must be pursued over decades, even in the face of intermediate contrary results" (p. xvi).
62. John R. Rogge, "Thailand's Refugee Policy: Some Thoughts on Its Origin and Future Direction," in Howard Adelman and C. Michael Lanphier, ed., *Refuge or Asylum: A Choice for Canada* (Toronto: York Lanes Press, 1990), pp. 150–171. Rogge describes how the Thais came to regard the influx from Vietnam as a security threat (pp. 162–163).
63. In 1991–92 the United States sought to use its financial leverage to induce the government of Israel not to settle Soviet Jews on the West Bank, arguing that the settlement policy was damaging to the peace negotiations between Israel, the Palestinians, and Israel's neighboring Arab states. The Israeli Labor Party's opposition to settlements, and the implication that the suspension of settlements would lead the United States to provide guarantees for $10 billion in bank loans, may have been a factor in the Labor victory. See Bar-llan, "Why Likud Lost – And Who Won," p. 28.
64. *New York Times*, February 8, 1990.
65. Allied intervention to protect the Kurds is a rare instance of a UN-sanctioned military intervention to protect a minority within a country. For a useful account of the history of the efforts by the Kurds to create a state of their own, see Gerard Chaliand, ed., *People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan* (London: Zed Press, 1980). The Kurds have reportedly created their own government in the territory within the allied protected security zone; "Kurds Creating a Country on the Hostile Soil of Iraq," *New York Times*, August 12, 1992, p. 1.
66. For useful brief historical as well as contemporary accounts of refugee movements throughout the Balkans, see Minority Rights Group, *Minorities in the Balkans*, Report No. 82 (London: Minority Rights Group, October 1989).
67. See Ben J. Wittenberg and Karl Zinsmeister, "The Case for More Immigration," *Commentary*, Vol. 89, No. 4 (1990), 19–25; and Simon, *The Economic Consequences of Immigration.*