



Cultures of Governance
and Conflict Resolution
in Europe and India



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D.2.1 Background report and work plan

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D.2.1 Background report and work plan: A Framework for Exploring New Horizons of Postcolonial Peace

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1. CORE's Objectives¹

CORE's critical purpose is to contribute to the consolidation of a fourth generation of postliberal or postcolonial peace (Richmond 2002) by drawing on a range of postcolonial and other innovative theorisations and non-rationalist, interpretative methodologies that help it to break out from the narrow ethical, ideological and technological focus in liberal peace- and statebuilding (theory and practice) and to explore the hybrid and fragmented practices and archives that make up (post-)conflict societies and local-regional-state-international-global interaction in such environments. In particular, CORE aims at recovering and adding to the emancipatory impulses that initially fuelled liberal peace theories, impulses related to the notion of positive peace. It stages a debate between peacebuilding and conflict resolution research and a range of critical thinkers associated with postcolonialism, feminism, anthropology, sociology and other fields of study whose insights into the global, local, indigenous, universal, hybridity, culture, resistance, the everyday, emotions and agency have so far been ignored in mainstream research on liberal peace. Also, CORE aims at critically engaging with local, critical and subaltern agencies in post-conflict settings while avoiding the orientalist trap of creating new meta-narratives of post-liberal peace and of speaking on behalf of liberal peace's others and filtering local knowledges and ways of sense- and meaning-making through dominant Western or metropolitan *pouvoir-savoir*. In this way, CORE aims at critically engaging with and consolidating emerging hybrid knowledges about a fourth or postcolonial generation of peace, which represents an everyday peace that goes beyond the currently dominant third-generation approaches with their focus on institution-building, the prioritisation of rights over everyday needs and social justice, depoliticising good governance, the reconstruction of state sovereignty, the policing of territorial borders and with their distancing of local and critical agencies and the privileging of western forms of subjectivity as supposedly universal. CORE aims at investigating cultural agencies, local and often marginal peacebuilding practices, contextual needs and hybrid institutional forms that are indicative of this emerging postcolonial and, possibly, post-sovereign peace that is based on the re-politicisation and post-sovereign deflection of technologised peace- and statebuilding and the mutual de-romanticisation of and agonistic negotiation between the global, national, regional and local.

2. CORE's Postcolonial Methodology

Postcolonialism is at the heart of the project, in terms of methodology and the research agenda. Here the former dimension of postcolonialism is discussed. The more concrete research implications of postcolonialism for CORE are laid in section 4, which highlights the originality and added value of CORE. Conceived in a post-positivist register, methodology is concerned with reflections about the ontological, epistemological assumptions and perspectives underpinning research, the ethical responsibilities of researchers towards their subjects and method choices. Methods will be discussed further below.

CORE postcolonial methodology involves, first, a commitment to disrupte and undermine 'asymmetric ignorance' (Chakrabarty 2000) in peacebuilding research brought about by 'muscular' forms of positivism. The global South – understood as a hyperreal category that

¹ The document is based on input by many. The principal guidance and input came from Oliver Richmond. Thanks also to the comments provided by Roger Mac Ginty. The input of others is highlighted in the text. The framework is a living document that will be adjusted as our research unfolds.

refers to contestable and contested imaginaries, which, though reifying, do influence how we think about the world (Chakrabarty 2000) – knows the New York peacebuilding consensus, which is dominated by Western ontologies, epistemologies and methods of peacebuilding. Western-dominated peacebuilding research knows much less about non-Western modes of peacebuilding, though there has been a recent interest in and research into indigenous peacebuilding practices, which, however, often falls into the trap of essentialising and/or romanticising local agencies (Richmond 2009a; Mac Ginty 2008; 2010a). Second, CORE wishes to provincialise, anthropologise and de-naturalise the EU and the Indian state (Chakrabarty 2000; Scott 1999), subjecting their peacebuilding practices to each other's critical gaze and comparisons. It aims at creating a debate between the EU and Indian cultures of peacebuilding and conflict resolution as part of the move towards stimulating hybrid forms of postcolonial peace that critically engage and reflect upon both Indian and European experiences and critiques. In particular, CORE aims at opening up liberal peace to modification by the other, including the non-liberal other, and to think about how this can be achieved and what forms of hybridity it might include, without trying to come up with a de-contextualised checklist of determinants. Third, CORE adopts an across-level approach to exploring cultures of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. It goes beyond mainstream work by studying conflict governance from the bottom up, taking seriously the contextual and everyday life of ordinary people and local authorities in their struggles to build or disrupt peace. At the same time, CORE is cognizant of the importance of doing institutional ethnography (Escobar 1995) to understand and intervene in the powerful peacebuilding and conflict resolution machinery. Also, as part of its across-level approach CORE critically looks at local elite-subaltern relations and local-regional-national-international-global relations, interactions and negotiations in order to explore the transversal connections among different analytical and practical levels of conflict governance, which affect each level and the actors located there.

Fourth, CORE goes beyond the essentialism that characterises much peacebuilding and conflict resolution research. Hence, it does not reify liberal contemporary peacebuilding & conflict resolution as monolithic practices but as always already fractured by internal differences and hybridity. Equally, the local is not an essence either something timeless and, before it came into contact with the international, pure and authentic. CORE is attuned to the ambivalence, instability and hybridity characteristic of all social structures and discourses (Bhabha 2004; Butler 2006; Prakash 1999). Hence, CORE refuses homogenising, unifying conceptions of the social structures and processes it studies, and recognised hybridity as the ontological terrain on which any social practice, including peacebuilding and conflict resolution unfolds. Moreover, CORE acknowledges that ontological hybridity has to be correlated with an epistemological hybridity that 'is open to difference in everyday settings' (Richmond 2011b: 9). In short, contra positivist methodologies, CORE does not simplify and fix social phenomena so that they can be more readily brought under the gaze of seemingly objective researchers and more easily counted and tabulated so as to produce uncritical problem-solving theory. Fifth, unlike positivist research that treats subjects and objects as separated by an epistemological barrier, CORE aims at giving local, everyday, subaltern, critical and resisting agencies a voice in its research (de Certeau 2000; Haynes and Prakash 1992; Highmore 2002; Elden 2004; Gupta 1998). This focus on uncovering the infrapolitics – the hidden transcripts of critical and resisting agencies (Scott 1985; Richmond forthcoming; 2011a) of peacebuilding – goes hand in hand with interrogating the mostly unquestioned assumption of mainline research according to which peace is to be lodged at the regional, state or international level. Yet, sixth, CORE is not naïve. It is fully aware that knowledge production, however much influenced by postcolonial sensitivities, cannot escape relations of unequal power (Spivak 1993; 1999; Kapoor 2003; Bhabha 2004; Spivak 1988). However,

these power inequalities can be limited through translation. The issue of translation is underestimated, if it is recognised as at all in liberal peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Translation is both an epistemological and ethical problem. It flags the problem of the differential cultural contexts in which claims, including knowledge claims are made (Butler 2000). It flags the problem of translation- as-violence among unequal languages and the issue of linguistic imperialism when ‘translators’ refuse to allow their language and conceptual systems to be affected by the translated language, thus producing the translated language in translation as subordinate (Spivak 1999; Yengoyan 2003). It flags the problems of whether the subaltern can speak and the dialogic conditions that have to be created to allow it to be heard in its own idiom, rather than filtered through the conceptual framework of the listener, since ‘no speech is speech if it not heard’ (Spivak 2000). More generally, translation is a problem beyond semiotics in that it concerns all relations across different *pouvoir-savoir* (Spivak 1993).

Seventh, CORE is aware of the dangers of orientalist discourses in peacebuilding research. Ever since Edward Said (Said 1978) we know how seemingly objective scholarship can be complicit in and even facilitate relations of domination, say, by using Western presuppositions, concepts and frameworks to study and interpret local needs, cultures and behaviour. CORE does refrain from imposing ready-made concepts on local contexts and proceeds inductively (see method section). Eighth, CORE is committed to doing critical research in the sense that it sketches a picture of alternative forms of peacebuilding (Cox 1981), although it does not seek to establish a new meta-narrative - a global challenger to liberal peacebuilding and conflict resolution. CORE’s utopia, albeit one that is already emerging in practice, however inchoately, is a fourth-generation of postcolonial and post-liberal peace that it understands as ‘an everyday form of peace [that] offers care, respecting but also mediating culture and identity, institutions, and custom, providing for needs, and assisting the most marginalised in their local, state, regional and international contexts’ (Richmond 2011b: 3-4).² CORE’s epistemological programme thus involves an ethical repositioning of liberal peace to engender ‘an ontological commitment to care for others in their everyday contexts, based upon empathy, respect and recognition of difference’ (Richmond 2009a). Last but not least, CORE takes note of various critiques of postcolonialism. In particular, it avoids the postcolonial bias that privileges the semiotic and the cultural over the material as embodied in class position and relations (Kapoor 2002) and that marginalises the materiality of everyday social life, say, the materiality of rights in peacebuilding (Richmond 2011b). Also, it seeks to correct the bias in much of the postcolonial literature that privileges the micro – the local and minute, the study of which is crucial – but which neglects to trace the connections between it and the international in shaping macro-political and social phenomena such as the liberal peacebuilding.

Turning to more narrowly conceived methodological considerations related to CORE’s method toolbox, CORE will carry out both experience-near and experience-distant research (Geertz 1974). It will carry out research that is concerned with the subjective experience of the agencies of conflict governance, notably critical local ones but also national, regional, international and global ones. This is an under-researched area. CORE will also contextualise subjective experiences through methods that situate subjectivity in broader discursive and material structures such as discourse analysis and narrative process tracing. To this end, CORE, firstly, is committed to a dialogue between theory and empirics – in the manner of grounded theory. Grounded theory is opposed to the *a priori* formulation of a rigid or rigorous

² Important for CORE, the EU is one of the international actors that explicitly aspires to a fourth-generation peace (Richmond, et al. 2011), though much of its practice is still stuck in third-generation approaches.

theoretical framework. Instead, it calls for theoretical and methodological openness and flexibility and the willingness to consider case studies as ‘inconvenient facts’³. Second, CORE uses inductive and contextualised methods that do not betray orientalist attitudes by assuming that positivist methods based on logic and probability are universally portable to any locale and suitable for any social science research project. It draws on an interdisciplinary methods toolbox including tools developed and used by anthropology, sociology, feminisms, postcolonial studies and poststructuralism to empathetically understand and critically engage with the everyday in conflict governance; to uncover the hidden infrapolitics of peacebuilding; enable local agencies in post-conflict societies to speak for themselves; explore the relations between the local, regional, national, international and global and the ways they mutually affect each other; understand the organisation and day-to-day material and semiotic workings of the liberal peacebuilding machine and the views and practices of those working in them. To this end CORE will use and, if necessary, further refine methods such as ethnography, including institutional, multi-sited and auto-ethnography, discourse analysis, genealogy, participant observation, open-ended interviews, conversations and empathetic reconstructions (Fairclough 2003; 2009; Foucault 1991; Brigg and Bleiker 2010; Escobar 1995; Burawoy, et al. 2000; Comaroff and Comaroff 2003; Geertz 1974; Haraway 1988; McLaren 2002; Ackerly, et al. 2006; Marcus 1995).

3. CORE’s Critical Engagement with Mainstream Research

3.1. Conflict Resolution, Management and Transformation and Their Limits

Conflict resolution research is a broad church and many of the peacebuilding, statebuilding and governance strategies that pertain to the CORE project can be contained within it. Studies that can be placed in this category are truly wide-ranging and interdisciplinary. Developed from the 1950s onwards, the field of conflict resolution went through different waves. In very brief terms, we can see a progression from the minimalist conflict management, through conflict resolution, to the more expansive conflict transformation (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 9-14). Conflict management accepts conflict and conflict actors, and attempts to manage that conflict to acceptable levels. It is often restricted to the politics of the possible and recognises that fundamental change (perhaps a revision of power asymmetries) is impossible. Traditional peacekeeping that interdicted between combatants, but did little else to address the causes of conflict, fits the conflict management model. Conflict resolution (often used as a generic, catch-all term for many forms of conflict amelioration) attempts to be a little more ambitious and holistic. In particular, it believes that conflicts can be resolved, and that we should pay attention to the causes of conflict. The goal of ‘conflict resolution is not the elimination of conflict, which would be both impossible, and [...] sometimes undesirable. Rather, the aim of conflict resolution is to transform actually or potentially violent conflict into peaceful (non-violent) processes of social and political change’ (Miall, et al. 1999: 30). Conflict resolution draws on liberal notions of the reformability of institutions and human behaviour. It has been criticised as being ‘too neat’ and technocratic, believing that conflict can be compartmentalised and that people can move on (Lederach 1997). Conflict transformation is the latest iteration of thinking about how to deal with conflict. It is interested in the deepest foundations of conflict and questions the constitution of the individuals, groups and institutions that make and sustain conflict. So, rather than accepting Israelis and Palestinians as they are, it questions what makes Israelis and Palestinians act in the ways that they do. It seeks to transform individuals, societies and institutions so that they can recalibrate their relationships and worldviews to the extent that conflict is unnecessary.

³ Roger Mac Ginty used the phrase during the workshop in Brussels, 10 February 2011.

Conflict management, resolution and transformation remain a vibrant research area and many of its insights and analytical concerns have been reworked and incorporated into both liberal peacebuilding (research and practice) and emancipatory models critical of it. CORE, too, draws on its insights. CORE may be regarded as an extension of this research agenda. Conflict resolution is an umbrella concept within which peacebuilding and conflict-related governance initiatives can fit.

Its diversity notwithstanding, much of the conflict resolution and especially conflict transformation research subscribes to a number of interrelated assumptions, which give it its identity. To begin with, it has a far-reaching agenda, which is not limited to managing conflicts and ensuring order (international and national) but resolving underlying conflicts. This ethos informs the massive social engineering that today is, tellingly, often referred to as whole-of-government approaches to peace and statebuilding. Second, it adopts a human security centred approach to conflict and peace. This was truly a revolutionary departure when it was developed in the 1950s. Placing the individual, and the structures in which she is embedded, at the centre of research constituted a frontal attack on the orthodox state-centrism of political studies, especially International Relations. The focus on human security, which is defined broadly by the conflict resolution literature, retains its critical force at a time when statebuilding has stripped away much of the emancipatory ethos initially fuelling liberal peacebuilding. Third, the focus on individuals amounts to a focus on universal human needs and what happens when they are not fulfilled (Burton 1972). This needs-based approach is closely related to a reconceptualization of violence. In a conflict resolution perspective, violence includes not only direct physical violence but also structural violence (Galtung 1969). The terms refer to oppressive political, economic but also psychological structures, which prevent individuals to fulfil their human needs such as well-being, freedom and identity. Thus, building sustainable peace is not simply about stopping direct violence – negative peace – but about the construction of positive peace – peace with justice that caters to the everyday needs of people in conflict societies. Virtually all critical approaches to liberal peace subscribe to this view. Fourth, the centrality given to individuals in conflict resolution goes hand in hand with the assumption that human agency, including that of the conflict parties and the victims of conflict, is crucial in bringing about sustainable peace. This assumption is clearly present in the current turn towards indigenous peacebuilding and the new focus on resistance to international peace- and statebuilding. In line with the ontological and epistemological commitments of conflict resolution, proponents have developed and advocated both official and unofficial, public and private, traditional and unconventional intervention technologies such as third party mediation, multi-track diplomacy, peace education and bottom-up approaches to conflict resolution.

Conflict resolution, management and transformation research has for many years been dominated by rationalist approaches. For instance, an important mainstream literature argues that built into peace processes is a commitment problem. Combatants find it difficult to commit credibly to peace, even if they wish to do so, because the concessions involved in a peace settlement increase their vulnerability and limit their ability to ensure their opponents comply with the treaty's terms. In particular, once combatants they lay down their weapons, 'it becomes almost impossible to either enforce future cooperation or survive attack' (Walter 1997: 336). This creates an incentive structure that resembles a Prisoner's Dilemma game. While the parties to the conflict prefer peace to war, each side has an incentive to defect from the settlement so as not to endanger its security and to avoid being worse off than before the settlement. This research suggests that intervention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding has to be able to wield real material incentives, or even force (Bercovitch 2009; Bercovitch, et al.

2008; Bercovitch and Jackson 2009; Walter 2001; Stedman, et al. 2002; Ramsbotham, et al. 2005; Keating and Knight; Crocker, et al. 2008; Berdal 2009; Collier, et al. 2003; Jeong 2009). Importantly, the world of rationalism is not a world without ideas. However, ideas are construed as discreet factors that people carry around in their heads. As such they can relatively easily be manipulated by policy entrepreneurs. Rational choice research regards conflict entrepreneurs as actors who manipulate individuals for instrumental reasons to stir up or maintain relations of violence that benefit them, say, by cementing their grip on power. Conversely, external peacemakers can manipulate ideas to promote peace (Crawford 2007; Kaufman 2001). Recently constructivists have made important inroads into conflict resolution, management and transformation research. They emphasise socialising individuals and communities into cultures of peace or a security community and other discursive technologies such as education, tools which they regard as important because they reshape conflict identities (Tocci 2010; Diez, et al. 2008; Paffenholz and Spurk 2010; Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007).⁴

CORE builds on the insights and analytical concerns of conflict resolution, management and transformation research, including the importance it gives to taking seriously the actual experiences of the conflict parties and the victims. Yet it also takes note of and seeks to transcend its limits, notably the clear-cut distinction between a negative and a positive peace; the approach to universal human needs, which largely rests on the generalisation of Western experiences; and the neglect of cultural and emotional aspects of conflict structures and peace practices (Richmond 2010: 21).

3.2. Liberal Peace and Its Critics

Liberal peace has recently become the target of powerful and theoretically sophisticated critiques for its cultural biases and its focus on the constitutional and institutional parameters of peace at the expense of other equally important dimensions and for its empirical failures. The critics argue that neoliberally deflected peace- and statebuilding leads to virtual peace and is more concerned with creating and maintaining international order rather than with the emancipation of populations from conflict & conflict structures and the tutelage of internationals.

Liberal peacebuilding has been defined in a number of ways. A by now classic definition is that by the United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 'Agenda for Peace'. There peacebuilding is defined in terms of efforts 'to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict' (Boutros-Ghali 1992). As the 1990s progressed, the scope of peacebuilding operations increased beyond security and constitutional issues to encompass a wider range of social and economic issues. Peacebuilding can be carried out primarily by domestic actors or with a substantial and often determining international involvement. Some analysts prefer the term peace process for domestically owned peacebuilding (Selby 2008; Darby and Ginty 2000). In the 1990s, a peacebuilding consensus emerged in the international community – the New York consensus (Richmond 2004; Pugh 2002). It is about the international promotion of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, civil society, and capitalist markets in post-conflict societies. In the new millennium, the liberal peacebuilding consensus evolved into a more pragmatic direction. As international peacebuilders encountered ever more problems and

⁴ Risse and Sikkink define socialisation as the induction of new members into the ways of behavior that are preferred in a society (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 11). Barnett and Duvall (2005) define 'socialization is the process of turning compulsory power into productive power'.

critics pointed out deformations and unintended consequences in peacebuilding interventions, the New York consensus evolved in a seemingly less liberal direction. Powerful stakeholders, such as the United States, the United Kingdom and international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank have promoted models of peace-support interventions that prioritise institutionalisation before liberalisation (Paris 2004). In many cases, this has involved significant emphasis on statebuilding and associated ‘good governance’ tasks. Peacebuilding failures in the 1990s created great interest (academic and political), with particular attention devoted to spoilers or ‘groups and tactics that actively seek to hinder, delay, or undermine conflict settlement through a variety of means and for a variety of motives’ (Newman and Richmond 2006: 1; Stedman 1997). Spoiling effectively challenges the naïve assumption that all conflict parties want peace or that all parties want liberal peace. Spoiler analyses have shown that local actors may well seek to shape the peace process and peace settlement in accordance with their own non-liberal interests and visions (Richmond 2006). For example, this was the case in Bosnia.

Statebuilding can be understood as a harsher variant of liberal peacebuilding more focused on security and institutions (Richmond and Franks 2009). Its main difference is that it introduces an explicit security agenda into peacebuilding and an explicit concern with state institutions as well as (formal) sovereignty, borders and territoriality (Paris and Sisk 2008; Ghani and Lockhart 2009; Chandler 2010a; Call and Wyeth 2009). International statebuilding is seen as an effort to give peace an institutional framework, i.e., to ground it, render it sustainable and to lock it in. The dominant players in the current world order (select Western states, donors, IFIs, and international organisations) play the lead role in building post-conflict states. The term statebuilding belongs to the same conceptual field as the term state-formation, but represents another more externalised dimension of this spectrum. The former denotes a deliberate political project and the latter refers to a contingent historical process that constrains, enables and generally shapes state-building (domestic or international) (Berman and Lonsdale, cited in Bliesemann de Guevara 2010: 116; Tilly 1975). Accounts of statebuilding thus have to pay attention to the broader context (political, economic, cultural, etc.) of state formation to be able to make sense of the challenges, deformations, successes and failures of statebuilding (Richmond forthcoming).

The official purpose of peace- and statebuilding is to maintain international order and protect vulnerable people from their own predatory or failed state elites. Its record is at best uneven (for a more positive assessment, see Berdal 2009; Page Fortna 2008; Paris 2010). Peacebuilding of a liberal type – and statebuilding are closely associated with the governance turn – they institute governance states rather than government states (Chandler 2010a).

3.2.1. Variations of Liberal Peace

Richmond usefully identifies four distinct strands of thinking about liberal peace which statebuilding and peacebuilding are crucial for: the victor’s peace, institutional peace, constitutional peace and civil peace. These strands, in turn, can be seen to underpin three gradations of the basic liberal peace models (Richmond 2007; Richmond and Franks 2009).

The victor’s peace is built on the foundation of military victory on the battlefield by one of the parties to the conflict, which either succeeds on its own or with the active military support of external actors. The successful party then dominates the peacebuilding process. The proponents of the victor’s peace argue that it leads to sustainable peace because it ensures that the political institutions and the policy process in post-conflict societies reflect the actual distribution of power among local social forces. Institutional peace embeds post-conflict societies in international legal and normative structures and assigns international actors the

role of monitoring domestic conduct and, if necessary, correcting deviations from international standards. Constitutional peace rests on the Kantian triad of democracy, free trade and cosmopolitan values. Finally, civil peace, which is an ideal rather than existing practice, is formed by politically mobilised citizens who play a lead role in a dialogical construction of peace that takes on board both international standards and local traditions. These four strands of thinking about liberal peace are the ingredients of three basic peace models – the conservative, orthodox and emancipatory model (Richmond 2007; Richmond and Franks 2009).

The conservative model expresses the victor's peace. It advocates an authoritarian approach (such as the institutionalisation before liberalisation model associated with Roland Paris (2004)) that relies on top-down strategies and the imposition of conditionality to channel the peacebuilding process in the desired direction. The orthodox model represents the current peacebuilding consensus and is informed by the institutional strand of thinking about liberal peace. Many current UN, EU, and IFI peacebuilding strategies embody this orthodoxy. It goes beyond the conservative model by combining top-down and bottom-up strategies, though the stress remains on the former. Also, this model relies on conditionality, though its harder edges are softened by the discourse of local ownership. Reform advocacy zeroes in on security sector reform (SSR), institutional reform, good governance projects, rule-of-law programming, the promotion of human rights and democracy, economic reconstruction and development. The rationale underpinning the orthodox model is not primarily the balance of power and institutional checks and balances, though they are considered to be important, but an institutional framework that allows for and facilitates political deliberation and argumentation among local actors and a transparent, efficient and accountable policymaking system.

Finally, the emancipatory model is a regulative ideal as to how liberal peace ought to/might look like. Central to it are the everyday needs of populations in post-conflict societies, specifically understood in policy terms as civil society and a social contract and their roles in defining the emancipatory roles to be carried out by external actors. So this model involves meaningful engagement between top-down and bottom-up, as well as internal and external actors. This model takes seriously local traditions and contexts, and transcends donor-driven peacebuilding that prioritises the requirements of external actors. It is based on an ethical reading of liberal peacebuilding. Richmond defines ethical peacebuilding derived from this model as being grounded in 'an ontological commitment to care for others in their everyday contexts, based upon empathy, respect and recognition of difference' (Richmond 2009a: 566). CORE is designed to carry out comparative research into the precise and variable configuration of the elements of liberal peace found in concrete India and EU conflict governance initiatives. Richmond's typology serves as a basic framework for such a comparison.

Liberal peacebuilding has developed on an ad hoc basis in the post-Cold War period. Its practice and rhetoric have attracted a significant critical literature. Two broad types of critique can be identified: mainstream and radical critiques.

3.2.2. Mainstream Critique of Liberal Peacebuilding

Given the great, and with hindsight unjustifiable expectations of a brand new era of global liberal peace, the difficulties encountered by international peace- and statebuilders and the deformations their work led to was bound to generate considerable criticism. Much of this criticism has a narrow policy-orientation and advocates technical fixes and can be said to be in the problem-solving paradigm. A non-exhaustive list includes the following complaints:

The sponsors of international peacebuilding have insufficient political will and stamina to commit sufficient resources to the job and to remain engaged as long as it takes to do finish it; they have limited knowledge of the situation on the ground; there is a lack of coordination among different internationals involved in peacebuilding and between them and local authorities; civil-military cooperation often leaves much to be desired in situations in which the construction of peace goes hand in hand with combating insurgents; there remain intractable difficulties in objectively assessing success and failure of projects; international peacebuilders often subscribe to a one-size-fits-all blueprint for building peace; and they leave too large an expatriate footprint, which puts the sustainability of their reforms at risk once they leave the country.

Yet there is also a deeper mainstream criticism of liberal peace- and statebuilding. In particular, critics (academics and NGOs) have deplored the refocusing on security in peacebuilding after 9/11 and the morphing of liberal peacebuilding into the more authoritarian, top-down and security-centred building of state institutions – statebuilding (Duffield 2007). Roland Paris (2010) has been one of the most influential voices of the moderate critics, who remain committed to the basic idea of liberal peace- and statebuilding. His main argument is that all good things do not go together in the outside-in construction of peace. Democratisation and marketization are not necessarily mutually reinforcing, nor are sustainable peace and quick political liberalisation (Paris 2002). In particular, democratic elections are not a panacea and may even entrench conflict parties if elections are held too early after the conflict. Also, the introduction of capitalist markets and economic liberalisation are likely to aggravate economic inequalities, which may have been one of drivers of the conflict in the first place. Paris developed his critical position into a problem-solving approach, which highlights the importance of first building political and economic institutions before democratising and liberalising post-conflict societies – institutionalisation before democratisation (Paris 2004).

3.2.3. Radical Critique of Liberal Peace- and Statebuilding

More important for CORE's research agenda is the radical criticism of liberal international peace- and statebuilding, which has accumulated in recent years (the discussion that follows overlaps with the discussion of the criticism of governance presented below). The general thrust of the critique is nicely captured by Richmond. Liberal peace- and statebuilding in its current configuration is considered 'ethically bankrupt, subject to double standards, coercive and conditional, acultural, unconcerned with social welfare and unfeeling and insensitive towards its subjects' (Richmond 2009a: 558).

One of the most common radical criticisms of liberal international peace- and statebuilding is that it amounts to a depoliticisation of an eminently political task – to build good order in post-conflict societies. As this overlaps with the critique of governance, it will be discussed in the next section. A second critique is that the dominant neoliberal peace- and statebuilding and conflict resolution approaches fail to positively affect the everyday lives of citizens in post-conflict societies and thus undermining the emergence of a social contract between state and society (Tadjbakhsh and Schoiswohl 2008; Richmond 2009a). Neoliberal interventions presuppose that 'the freedoms derived from political rights are more significant than need or material gain for individuals in post-conflict situations' (Richmond 2009a: 568-9). International peace- and statebuilders are incapable of responding to social and economic inequality and insecurity other than by further extending the reach of markets and limiting public policies designed to contain the free play of supply and demand (Pugh, et al. 2008; Divjak and Pugh 2008). Neoliberal prescriptions have been mainstreamed into peacebuilding

interventions, to the extent that few question the automatic way in which unelected international financial institutions such as the World Bank assume a seat at peace negotiations. Not having a positive agenda for addressing the everyday needs and aspirations of individuals and communities, especially marginalised ones, and being unable to deliver a peace dividend, neoliberal peace- and statebuilding zeroes in on challenges to itself – spoiling, criminality, corruption, etc. In this way, critics argue, internationals fail to live up to their ethical responsibility – the responsibility to care for the other.

Third, radical critics often zero in on the power asymmetries between peacebuilders (international NGOs, dominant states, IOs) and locals and the consequences that flow from them. This raises the issue of epistemic violence and the disturbing continuities between colonialism and the failed modernisation strategies of the 1950s and 1960s on the one hand, and internationally-sponsored peacebuilding, on the other. ‘Liberal peace has followed liberal imperialism in asserting a superior moral order, knowledge, justice and freedom and devaluing, indeed discounting, local experiences of peace and politics and their relationship’ (Richmond forthcoming: 4; Bendaña 2005; Lacher 2007; Jahn 2007a; 2007b). Closely related, liberal peace has been used to maintain and police the life-chance divide between the developed and the underdeveloped, ensured life and uninsured life (Duffield 2007; 2008; 2010). Fourth, critics argue that outside-in constructions of peace are mostly donor- rather than context-driven. They employ increasingly standardised construction blueprints that universalise a narrow Western experience. When used, bottom-up approaches often are makeshift or make-belief: civil society ‘is often a donor-sponsored artifice’ (Richmond forthcoming). Legitimate local traditions (political, cultural, economic) are sidelined or instrumentalised, often after having been duly ‘mainstreamed’ and thus de-localised, to advance external agendas under the banner of local ownership (Mac Ginty 2008; 2010a). This contributes to a lack of local groundedness and legitimacy of peace- and statebuilding guided by a remote metropolis (EU or Indian state elites). Fifth, international statebuilding engenders the informalisation and internationalisation of the post-conflict state and these processes create structural obstacles standing in the way of constructing liberal democratic states (Bliesemann de Guevara 2010). Sixth, the radical critique charges that liberal peace- and statebuilding lacks reflexivity. It is not sufficiently reflective about its ontological, epistemological and methodological presuppositions. This gap engenders a lack of sustained reflection on who liberal peace is for and what it means in post-hostility theatres (Richmond 2009a). Finally, and fundamentally, critics charge that dominant forms of internationally-supported peacebuilding and statebuilding produce a poor quality or virtual peace. This is often characterised by continuing physical and economic insecurity, the capture of the peace by local elites, and the failure of the peacebuilding or governance interventions to deal with the fundamental issues maintaining the conflict. Thus, for example, the Dayton Peace Accords dealt with the manifestations of conflict but failed to tackle the conflicting nationalism that sustained it. In the case of development-related conflicts in India, dispute resolution interventions by governments fail to take seriously the role of a development model based on capital accumulation by entrepreneurial elites and their political supporters.

3.3. Governance and Its Critics

Recently there has been a governance turn in a number of social sciences. The concept is understood to reflect fundamental changes in policymaking and politics. Governance theory attempts to explain collective decision-making in the context of a multitude of actors and the absence of a clear hierarchy between them. On the one hand, many such as Keohane and Nye may see governance as a way of maintaining order according to the highest standards of the dominant states which form international institutions. Governance thus informs government. On the other hand, it is a term which as Chandler (2010a) points out represents a step back or

a watering down in some ways of the ambitious claims made about liberal rights and states. It amounts to a devaluing of local autonomy and of international responsibility.

The traditional ‘Westphalian’ or Weberian state represents hierarchical rule. It possesses the legitimate monopoly of the use of force and rules by fiat. Markets represent anarchical rule in which order emerges from the back of the decentralised decisions and actions of self-interested individuals. Governance differs from both forms of ordering. It is premised on the fragmentation of state authority and the diffusion of sovereignty to actors and arrangements below (regional and local governments, NGOs) and above the state (international organisations and regimes, close policy coordination among states, international NGOs). Public and private actors work together in policy networks. A key feature of governance is thus that it encourages and relies on the involvement of civil society actors (business, scientists, NGOs, etc.) in public policymaking and implementation. Cooperation is based on shared interests and/or norms. Given the differences in actor constellations and the complex set of relationships between the state institutions and sub-state actors, governance takes different forms in different places (see Table 1 for the link between governance and levels of analysis in the context of peace and conflict studies). Important for CORE’s comparative research design, the modernizing state of India and the EU with its postmodern institutional set-up may be confronted with different challenges while having a different set of governance tools at their disposal. To tease out the similarities and differences in how these two very different actors govern or engage conflicts (conflict governance), and the differences they make on the ground, are key objectives of CORE.

Table 1:

Levels of analysis	Literature
EU / India: institutions & agendas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multi-level governance / global governance (Strange 1996, Douglas 1999, Virilio 1995, Kohler-Koch & Rittberger 2006, Hooghe & Marks 2001, Murphy 2000)
regional / local implementation of central policies	
Civil society: networks, NGOs,	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Domestic agency (Salamon 2001, Sorensen 2006, McGinnis 1999)

The table was created by Sandra, St Andrews

While for mainstream scholars and practitioners, the promotion of governance is the best way to promote peace and democracy, critics point out that its record shows that it neither promotes stable peace nor democracy. For supporters of current forms of peacebuilding and conflict resolution the promotion of governance is about the international monitoring and control of the exercise of outmoded forms of sovereignty, understood as policy autonomy, by

non-responsive and/or oppressive state elites; nurturing and developing local civil society and the private sector which can check the influence of predatory elites and spoilers of the peace; promoting broad-based policy networks of stakeholders that constrain and penetrate the state; establishing good governance where none was before; speeding up the recovery of post-conflict societies, or their development more generally, by connecting them to transnational flows (capital, expertise, culture, etc.); shifting the focus from the political to the technocratic in order to avoid the conflictual nature of electoral politics and the ideological contingencies of party politics.

Critics of contemporary modes of peace- and statebuilding stress the downsides of governance (Chandler 2000; 2006; 2010a; Bickerton 2007). As Chandler (2010a) argues, a key feature of really existing liberal governance is that it actually represents a form of post-liberal governance (governing as discourse and practice) that differs from what government in liberal-democratic states has traditionally been understood to be about. In his view, the post-liberal reversal of the meaning of key liberal terms engenders a disdain for policy autonomy – self-government and representational legitimacy. Policy autonomy is considered to be problematic since it generates the risk of intemperate, imprudent, irresponsible, populist and so on policies that disrupt technocratic requirements of good governance and international policy coordination. After the post-liberal term, governance is primarily about relationship management, which involves domestic as well as external actors in arrangements of pooled or shared sovereignty (for affirmative views, see Rosenau 1995; Krasner 2004; Keohane 2002). Governance is not, Chandler claims, about how citizens take charge of shaping political order around democratically legitimated collective goals. Approaching the issue differently, Richmond argues that post-liberal governance has to be distinguished from post-liberal peace, which emerges from the interaction and hybridisation of both local and international norms and expectations and agencies – from local actors and institutions to states, regional organisations like the EU and international organisations (Richmond 2007; 2011b). The contradiction between post-liberal governance and post-liberal peace represents a key area of interest for this project.

Closely related, Chandler defends Westphalian sovereignty against its dilution by governance promoters. Sovereignty has morphed from a right that every state can claim to a responsibility of post-conflict states to act (domestically and internationally) in accordance with international standards. Non-Western states are constrained to anchor themselves tightly to international institutions over which they have little influence. Through the re-framing of sovereignty as capacity for good governance, this de facto disempowerment of post-conflict states is represented as the empowerment of their citizens and civil societies. Thus for Chandler governance promotion in (post-)conflict settings is a discourse and a set of technologies (global surveillance, disciplinisation, reduction of politics to biopolitics) that disempower all local agency and enable and legitimise large-scale policy interference by Western states (or the metropolis) in the non-Western world (or the periphery surrounding the metropolis). Paradoxically, this interference is carried out and legitimised in the name of the powerless and the victims of conflict. Such interventions, Chandler argues, lead to the faking or mimicry of liberal order and peace. Behind the formal façade of Western-style institutions, the operation of power is shaped by traditional, non-Western practices (Chandler 2000; Bliesemann de Guevara 2010). In short, Chandler and fellow critics argue that liberal peace- and statebuilding amounts to the promotion of governance states which depoliticise what ought to be a highly political endeavour: to build peace and good order in post-conflict settings.

Richmond concurs that third-generation peacebuilding creates a virtual peace that often has little relevance for the everyday lives of individuals and communities, marginalise them and fails to understand their agency and the legitimacy they produce (Richmond 2007). Yet he also argues that while what Chandler and others describe as the top-down constructions of governance states may be a fantasy of the official programme of liberal peace- and statebuilding, when internationals meet the local and the everyday hybridity emerges and novel forms of peace are created that often, though not always, harbour the potential for a repoliticisation and emancipatory transformation of liberal peace- and statebuilding. In a similar vein, the work of Mac Ginty (2010b; 2011) and others suggest that the depoliticisation argument marginalises local and critical agencies and overlooks resistance to outside-constructions of peace and the effects they have on governance and peace. Bliesemann de Guevara (2010: 115) goes further, claiming that such views rest on Euro-centric conceptualisations of state and society, which do not reflect organisational forms prevalent in non-Western states. One of the main items on CORE's research agenda is to trace and theorise local-liberal encounters, the agencies (local, national, regional, global) involved in them, the agonistic negotiations and translations characterising their relations, the facilitating conditions and the blockages they face and their unintended and intended effects (for clarification, see below).

3.4. Globalisation and Regionalisation as Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies

Globalization has been described in abstract terms as being about the transformation of our fundamental categories through which we understand and experience the world. Globalisation engenders transformations in conceptions of time and space – with the former speeding up and the latter shrinking. In associated albeit more concrete terms, the term refers to ‘the intensification of worldwide social relations and interactions such that distant events acquire very localized impacts and vice versa. In involves a rescaling of social relations’ as they are stretched across territorial boundaries (Held and McGrew 2007: 4-5). The driving forces behind globalisation include capitalism, technological changes and the pluralisation of salient world political actors such as terrorist networks, NGOs, and international institutions. Globalisation involves the globalisation of governance mechanisms or political technologies, with international organisations and international non-state actors playing an increasingly important role in contributing to the governance of the Global South and especially post-conflict societies. Some authors refer to this as the internationalisation of the state or the governmentalisation of world politics (Ferguson and Gupta 2002).

An important aspect of globalisation is that it proceeds unevenly. Thus, a key defining feature of globalisation is that it makes borders (territorial, biopolitical, intellectual, etc.) more porous. Yet while things such as ideas, values, goods and diseases can cross borders more easily, other ‘things’ remain more or less place-bound. For instance, movements of the poor of the global South to the global North are heavily restricted. Some researchers argue that peace- and statebuilding is one of the ways to keep it this way, to prevent underdeveloped and post-conflict societies from threatening the social cohesion and bio-economic equilibrium of employment and social insurance in the Global North. Peacebuilding and other technologies of governance are used to ‘restrict or manage the circulation of incomplete and hence potentially threatening life, or return it from whence it came.’ (Duffield 2008: 146; 2006; 2010). An alternative take on globalisation is that it engenders ‘the development of a common consciousness of human society on a world scale’ (Shaw 2000: 11-2; Linklater 2005). In this perspective, humanitarian interventions and peacebuilding (UN, EU, etc.) are an expression of this new cosmopolitan ethos and the global human rights revolution (R2P, etc.), which it has created.

An important strand of the globalisation literature links the phenomenon to conflict. One common argument is that by challenging state sovereignty, both from below the state and from above, globalisation undermines the legitimacy of the state and weakens its steering capacity. What is more, the destruction or weakening of traditional modes of life by the globalisation of life styles and the distributional consequences of global capitalism cause economic, moral and other grievances in poorer countries that may then be picked upon by conflict entrepreneurs. As previously mentioned, in this view economic globalisation may become a cause for conflicts (ethnic, cultural, religious) when it is used by entrepreneurs to mobilise disaffected people. In a similar vein, conflicts may be seen as a defensive reaction by disaffected populations to the liberalisation of all aspects of life and deterritorialisation brought about by globalisation (Ben-Porat 2006). Another take on the link between globalisation and violence is that the globalisation of culture disrupts local systems of meaning-making, which in turn makes nation-building more difficult and violence correlated with it more likely in the Global South (Blum 2007).

Yet not only is globalisation often a source of conflict, it also makes war and peace a phenomena in which the local and the international are inextricably connected. CORE is explicitly designed to take account of these local-international connections. Both war and peacebuilding are at the same time local and international, with the latter taking the form of diplomacy, increasingly standardised international peace- and statebuilding practices, arms shipments, cross-border identity politics, etc. Globalisation shapes the conditions in which conflicts are fought out and peace is built (James and Friedman 2009). The speeding up of time and the shrinking of space are doubtlessly an enabling and facilitating condition of the rise of liberal international peacebuilding, though, as we shall further below, CORE is more interested in how the everyday and local resist and transform practices of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Instant and empathy-generating world-wide reports about conflicts, either by 24 hour t.v. or, more recently, by ordinary citizens using social media such as twitter and mobiles, have shaped the discursive environment in which the dominant states of the international community, international organisations and ordinary people around the world relate to conflicts and peace. This has created a push for and legitimised humanitarian interventions and peacebuilding. Moreover, a key element of the globalisation of peacebuilding is what we referred to above as the internationalisation (some authors use the term transnationalisation) of the state. International peacebuilding thus involves ‘a form of “shadow alignment” where mechanisms replicate state functions, [...] without being controlled by the state. It is argued that, in the fullness of time, the fragile state will grow into and take over such shadow mechanisms’ (Duffield 2006: 11)

An important element of globalization is the simultaneous process of increasing regionalisation (Cooper, et al. 2008), a process often defined as cooperation or the pooling of resources for common ends on a level distinct from both the national and the global (Graham 2008: 160), that has some basis in human or physical geography (Danspeckgruber 2005: 30). Regionalisation can be seen as an answer to problems of coordination and public good provision but also as a reaction to decreasing state capacity (Milward 2000; Wolf 1999). In any case, conflict resolution and peacebuilding have been significantly affected by these developments, primarily along two main dimensions. First, regionalisation has become a buzz-word, highlighting where the primary responsibility should lie for external efforts at conflict resolution, accentuating the obligations as well as the primacy of local actors (Graham 2008). This, in turn, can be seen as a reaction to a number of concerns: it is meant to keep interventionism by the great powers at bay by giving priority to regional initiatives and concerns; it aims at responding to the increased awareness of the regional dimensions and

dynamics of conflicts (Richmond 2002: 155-6; Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1998), where regions are often seen as entities “whose security is indivisible” (Vaclav Havel, cited in Zielonka 2007: 50); in some cases it can build on the greater legitimacy of regional intervention; and it is used to try to deflect responsibilities, and the costs associated with them, to other international actors (Chandler 2010b). Both India and the EU are central actors to their region, and therefore the more the regional aspect of conflict management comes to the fore, the more these two are seen as primary holders of responsibility for conflict resolution and peacebuilding within and around their borders.

Second, and more importantly for CORE, regionalisation is now also seen by the New York consensus as an effective tool of peacebuilding insofar as it can provide an answer to calls for autonomy by ethnic or other identity groups without granting them sovereignty (Danspeckgruber 2005), while also increasing integration and interdependence, themselves considered to be conducive to peace according to standard International Relations theory. This is of special importance for the European Union, whose historical roots reach down deep into such grounds, for its foundational form, the European Coal, Iron and Steel Community was originally conceived as a radical form of economic integration in order not only to solve the problems of economic development after World War II, but simultaneously to constitute a peace project, making war between the participants both physically impossible and unimaginable (Dedman 1996; Thody 1997; Laffan, et al. 2000). The EU has a history of using the enlargement of its membership as a tool to stabilize regions, ensure peace and secure its borders (Diez, et al. 2008; Tocci 2007; 2010). Such arguments weighted heavily in favour of the accession process of the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe and of the Western Balkans (Hill 2002; Zielonka 2007). Regionalisation is also applied in relation to regions that cannot aspire to full membership in the near future: the EU's set of policies aiming at managing its border regions include the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, its primary financial tool the MEDA Programme and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)(Björkdahl, et al. 2009).

Regionalisation, then, is often seen as a ‘a model for offering a community the most sought-after freedoms, while also assisting other neighbouring communities and avoiding the difficult path of redrawing international boundaries’ (Danspeckgruber 2005: 36). While regionalisation holds out the promise of a hybrid peace that traverses the local, national, regional and global, its current form denies this potential through its administrative, technocratic and managerial approach to peacebuilding-through-governance, which, in addition, neglects the everyday and the critical agencies embedded in it.

4. CORE's New Horizons: Exploring Transitions from Liberal to Postcolonial Peace

4.1. Postcolonialism

CORE's innovations are crucially related to postcolonialism. Based on the conceptual and theoretical departures discussed in this section, and further concretised in a series of research question listed in the section 3, CORE aims at exploring the enablers and blockages standing in the way of a transition from neoliberal to postcolonial peace. It does so by drawing on and putting into conversation a broad range of critical authors, who share postcolonial sensitivities, even if they are not postcolonial researchers themselves. As mentioned at the outset, postcolonialism influences CORE in two ways. First, post-colonial sensitivities characterise CORE's general approach to knowledge production and relations between Indian and EU researchers (see section 1). Second, postcolonial issues are a major concern of the research project. In general terms, postcolonialism is concerned with analysing the lived experience of global power inequalities and the self-authorisation of cultural, political and

economic superiority (Seshadri-Crooks 2000). As will be discussed below, postcolonialism critically engages with issues of autonomy, indigeneity, the subaltern, agency (especially in its marginal forms), resistance, justice, hybridity and translation.

The first generation of post-colonial researchers investigated the genealogy of Orientalism, paying particular attention to the effects of colonial textuality, namely how it produced the Orient as colonisable. They used their genealogical approach to criticise scholarship for its neglect of its own complicity in producing and maintaining centre-periphery relations characterised by physical violence, epistemic violence, the deformation of subjectivities, material inequality and the differential application of norms and rules – injustice (especially Said 1978; 2006; Fanon 2005). Postcolonialism thus was from the very beginning a platform for critically and constructively engaging with dominant forms of life. Later generations of postcolonial scholars expanded this critical agenda. They explored how dominant discourses are appropriated, misappropriated and mocked by subaltern agencies; how hybridity emerges from the complex interplay among and translations between colonial and subaltern agencies (political, economic, social and cultural); subaltern rebellion and more hidden transcripts of resistance; genealogies of modernisation and development policies; the forms and effects of unequal cultural and discursive exchanges in the postcolonial age between the supposedly modern and the non-modern, the supposedly developed and the non-developed; the political economy of postcolonial relations; and the psychological effects and conditions of (post-)colonialism (among many others, see Nandy 1989a; Bhabha 2004; Spivak 1993; 1999; Kapoor 2008; Chakrabarty 2000; Ferguson 1997; Escobar 1995; Gupta 1998; Prakash 1999; Chatterjee 1995; Haynes and Prakash 1992; Scott 1999; Mitchell 2002). These literatures have implications for any research that seeks to critically engage with and intervene in governance, peacebuilding and conflict resolution as social, political and cultural practices (Richmond 2011b).

CORE's post-colonial research agenda, which will be detailed below, flags a number of issues that are, by and large, ignored or sidelined by mainstream peace- and statebuilding research. To begin with, CORE studies the technologies of power deployed by Indian and EU conflict governance and the rationalities underpinning them. It goes beyond mainstream work by paying attention to seemingly minor practices, or practices seemingly far removed from peacebuilding (e.g. the use by the Indian state of biometrics in conflict zone)⁵, to show the manifold ways in which governors seek to govern and steer the conduct of subaltern agencies. Second, CORE goes beyond a concern with the exercise of power and its effects and investigates local agencies, notably critical ones, and their interaction with outside-in peace- and statebuilders. It studies how they accommodate, implement, deflect, modify, ignore, resist and hybridise the liberal peace agenda. It explores the often inconspicuous ways in which supposedly powerless subjects in post-conflict societies, who are seemingly in help of external expert assistance, engage in modes of agency that resist and modify liberal peace (Richmond 2009a; forthcoming). Third, CORE studies the everyday in peace- and statebuilding, as opposed to the public-political stage on which the drama of politics is played. The everyday is a site in which local peacebuilding agencies, solidarity and needs emerge and in which the local, regional, national, international and global meet and transform each other. Fourth, CORE pays attention to culture. Yet it does so in a manner fundamentally different from mainstream work. It neither conceives of culture as a pathological or quaint relic that liberal peace has to brush aside nor as an exotic resource that can cure third-generation peace- and statebuilding from its many shortcomings. CORE regards conflict governance as a semiotically mediated, i.e., as culturally embedded and transacted phenomenon, involving the

⁵ Comments by PRIO.

production and systematization of particular languages, images, rhetorics (cf. Kapoor 2008: 19). Fifth, CORE investigates indigenous peacebuilding and hybridity. It does so not in an instrumental mode – what can we take from these practices to plug the holes in liberal peace – but in a postcolonial mode that critically interrogates the epistemic violence of the West, which presents its intellectual, moral, political, etc. orders as superior to those of less developed or less modern others. It carries out its interrogation by engaging with and supporting local knowledges, tracing the hybridities that emerge when they meet with their liberal/international/global others and by interrogating the potential of hybridities to ground sustainable everyday peace that speaks to the needs and aspirations of individuals and communities and that combines liberal and non-liberal elements. The presupposition of this line of research is that the next generation of peace and peacebuilding must be the hybrid product of a centre-periphery world system - a ‘world phenomenon’ as Dussel put it in a different context (Enrique Dussel, cited in Meyer 2008), in which ‘the weak and the strong [work] together, as jointly responsible for making history’ (Barkawi and Laffey 2006: 333). Fifth, CORE analyses the historical continuities as well as discontinuities of EU and Indian conflict governance, the intellectual and cultural resources on which they draw, their mutual interaction and historical lineages and the knowledges and practices they marginalise or suppress. Finally, CORE takes note of a weakness in many postcolonial studies, namely that they focus on discourse and culture at the expense of materiality (Kapoor 2003). Not unlike Gupta, Ferguson or Kapoor, CORE places its explorations of agency, everyday, resistance, culture and hybridity into the structural context of institutionalised international capitalism and the connections it has with and the constraints it imposes on peace- and statebuilders as well as individuals and communities in post-conflict societies. In what follows these themes at the heart of CORE will be further explicated.

4.2. Cultures of Conflict, Peace and Liberal Conflict Governance

Culture is not just a contested term but a notoriously vague one. In positivist research, a thin approach to culture is favoured that sees it as a set of variables among others that influence war and peace. CORE adopts a richer and more hermeneutic concept of culture. In this view, culture can be defined as a particular way of knowing and labelling difference (Brigg 2010: 338) or as a semiotic practice (Geertz 1973), grounded in everyday life, through which shared signs and symbols are deployed to represent our world (Kapoor 2008: 21). Importantly, CORE does not regard cultural differences as being simply out there, waiting to be seized upon by scholars. Its research is informed by the postcolonial insight that cultures are the effects of discriminatory practices (Bhabha 2004). The importance CORE attaches to researching cultures of and in conflict, peacebuilding and conflict resolution reflects the conviction that there is a need to go beyond ethnocentric knowledges of conflict governance if peace is to be just, locally owned and sustainable and grounded in a civil contract between all stakeholders (local and international) involved in constructing peace.

Culture has been described as the most important issue in conflict governance (Ramsbotham, et al. 2005: 302). This insight is in line with a broader cultural turn in the social sciences (for IR, see e.g. Lapid and Kratochwil 1996). Yet mainstream research remains divided about how to think about culture and about how it matters. Positivist research has not been able to establish any firm causal pathways and mechanism that shape the relationship between cultures of conflict and conflict and cultures of peace and peace. As one observer put it, there are no ‘straightforward conclusions about conflict behaviour over time or among cultures’ (Brigg 2010: 332). What is widely accepted though is that culture shapes how conflicts are waged and conflict resolution is pursued. Culture can thus be a resource in conflict governance as well as for conflict mobilisation such as in many ethnic conflicts. It can

facilitate peace and fuel conflict. An argument often made is that political entrepreneurs or, as Crawford calls them, cultural entrepreneurs take advantage of societal grievances to ‘politicize culture or protest cultural discrimination for political or economic gain’ (Crawford 2007: 32). This is closely linked to the notion of identity conflicts (see below). As mentioned previously, an important ‘tool’, both in theory and practice, for reengineering cultural sources of conflicts is socialisation. ‘Socialization for democratic attitudes and for handling conflicts peacefully entails activities that aim at enhancing a culture of peace’ (Paffenholz and Spurk 2010: 70).

Until recently, conflict research stressed the pathologies of non-western conflict cultures (Park 2010).⁶ More recently culture has been appropriated as a resource by international peacebuilders eager to mobilise indigenous peacebuilding practices (Mac Ginty 2010a; Schaefer 2010). Yet culture is not something particularistic that is opposed to universality. There is a culture of liberal peacebuilding, even if this is often not acknowledged by international peacebuilders (Park 2010; Brigg 2010). This culture is institutionalised in the New York consensus, which expresses a world political culture of liberal peacebuilding that shapes the agendas, strategies and practises of peacebuilders around the globe. This culture of liberal peacebuilding represents a culturally particular way of tackling conflict, which is characterised by certain continuities with European colonialism. If the cultural bias of liberal peacebuilding is denied by those practicing it, they risk turning what they do into a form of culture colonialism (Kent 2006).

From a critical perspective, Chandler has recently argued that discourses of culture have been replaced by discourses of civil society, which stress the autonomy and rationality of citizens in post-conflict societies. International peacebuilders who frame the problems of post-conflict societies in terms of the discourse of civil society argue that the root cause of conflict is wrong choices by individuals, choices which are subsequently institutionalised in dysfunctional organisational forms. The discursive transformation of the problem of collective culture into problems of individual choice, and their institutional consequences, ‘enables these choices to become understood as being amenable to policy intervention’ – to international peace- and statebuilding (Chandler 2010a: 179).

CORE goes beyond existing research by conceiving of culture in a postcolonial register. This has two implications. CORE aims at de-provincialising the cultures of international peacebuilding and conflict resolution and at validating the importance of local cultures, including their recessive traditions (Nandy 1998), while at the same time de-romanticising them.

The culture of liberal peacebuilding is a semiotic system and a set of practices and materialities that have been struggling to pacify the world by combating rogues (subjectivities, communities, non-state actors, states), which threaten its hegemonic aspirations. This has involved massive efforts to export neoliberal capitalism, liberal institutions and norms and ways of doing things (political, economic). In this way the liberal culture of peacebuilding and conflict resolution have displayed a homogenising thrust and even a missionary zeal. Crucial for CORE, this liberal culture has two features that have undermined its efforts to build locally legitimate and sustainable peace that speaks to the concerns and needs of those living in post-conflict settings. First, those operating within the dominant culture of conflict governance (practitioners and scholars) tend to regard their

⁶ The discussion of such cultural pathologies is often linked to discussions of spoiling and spoilers.

meaning system as having unquestioned universal validity. Paraphrasing Kapoor, they thus overlook that what they do is ‘semiotically mediated, that is, it is culturally embedded and transacted, involving the production and systematization of particular languages, images, rhetorics (Kapoor 2008: 19). Cultures of liberal conflict governance are thus under-researched. Moreover, from a postcolonial perspective it becomes clear that cultures of liberal peace- and statebuilding are not authentically Western, autonomous and self-enclosed (Huntington 1298). The global culture of conflict governance as it is institutionalised in the major global institutions and policies of key actors (Western & non-Western) is an intertextual hybrid that has emerged from the absorption and transformation of diverse discourses (cf. Kristeva 1980). To explore the genealogy of EU and Indian cultures of conflict governance is one of the main objectives of CORE.

Second, those operating within the liberal culture of peace- and statebuilding often oppose their supposedly universally valid knowledge paradigms and sense-making practices to the particularistic cultures they encounter in post-conflict settings. In line with established modernisation doctrine, which seeks to tame cultures and instrumentalise them in pursuit of economic growth and statebuilding (cf. Nandy 1984; 1989b), local cultures are thus approached as targets of re-engineering since they are seen as having made possible the conflict. At the same time, harmless exotic cultural practices are subjected to the curious attitudes of the museum visitor. Either way, local culture is mostly seen as being best kept away from politics and conflict governance. Thus, the first two generations of peace and conflict studies by and large ignored the concept. They operated with the Enlightenment concept of the abstract human whose essential traits and behaviours are independent of cultural influences. Recently, there has been some modification of this stance. Responding to the failures of liberal peace- and statebuilding, indigenous peace practices have been re-classified by some as resources in conflict governance. Yet this turn towards local cultural practices is often shaped by instrumental calculations that admit only those practices and discourses into peace- and statebuilding that are compatible with its established norms and beliefs. Liberal peacebuilding mostly remains closed as a site for the agonistic meeting of divergent cultures and their mutual translation and transformation (there are reasons, though, to believe that the EU has the capacity to go beyond third-generation approaches, see Richmond, et al. 2011). As mentioned above, local cultural practices are mainstreamed and thus de-localised before being incorporated into the dominant culture. Local cultures are thus given short shrift, a fact which has been aggravated by the neoliberal turn in peacebuilding in the last decade or so. It has led to what Richmond calls the culture–welfare paradox: ‘The liberal focus [in peacebuilding] removes culture and context and the neoliberal focus removes needs’ (Richmond 2011b: 57). No wonder that conflict governance’s acultural or instrumentally cultural strategies fail to give liberal peace greater local groundedness and legitimacy. CORE goes beyond such an instrumental approach to local cultural practices and investigates the role of culture for a locally rooted and contextualised peace has not been reflected in research.

Local cultures of and in conflict and peace can be usefully conceived in terms of ‘notions of self-expression, memory, self-government and self-determination’ (Richmond 2011b: 45) and in terms of contextualised webs of meaning out of which local peacebuilding agencies emerge. Just like global cultures, local cultures are for the most part translocal, i.e., they have been affected by regional, state, international and global contacts. This cautions against any essentialising of cultures of conflict, peace and conflict governance.

By failing to take local cultures seriously on their own terms, liberal conflict governance disempowers local agencies, thus undermining the creation of a strong social contract

underpinning liberal peace and undermining its own claim that it promotes the local ownership of conflict governance. Yet even when displaced by outside-in peacebuilders, local cultures are affecting their enterprise in often unacknowledged or even unrecognised ways. CORE analyses both the cultural enablers and shapers of local and everyday peacebuilding agencies, the transaction of local and liberal-international cultures, albeit on a terrain that favours, in terms of social power and resources, the liberal, and the unintended consequences of these zones of contact. In its case studies, CORE aims at uncovering the repertoire of indigenous knowledges that are relevant to peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Through its research CORE aims at bringing to light nuanced richness, the tensions and even contradictions in cultures of conflict, peace and conflict governance.

Closely related to the concept of culture is the concept of identity. It can be defined as a set of 'images of individuality and distinctiveness ("selfhood") held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with significant "others" ' (Jepperson, et al. 1996: 59). Such images of selfhood are not free-floating. They are structurally determined. Cultures provide a basic repertoire of social identities, which come in two forms: seemingly private and public (collective, group) identities such as class, ethnicity, religion, etc. Identities are institutionalized in particular institutions and organisations and may be specific to particular roles, which, in turn, may be part of wider national cultures of governance. Individuals are socialised into identities.

CORE is primarily concerned with conflict identities. They are characterised by 'diametrically opposed ways in which both sides experience the conflict in the context of increasingly self-referential perceptions' (Albert, et al. 2008: 18). Ethnic, nationalist and religious identities have been particularly prominent in post-Cold war conflicts. The persistence of these group identities is sometimes linked to state formation, or state disintegration, and globalisation and the dislocations and grievances they engender. Identity conflicts are thus often mixed up with distributional struggles over resources. But there is a widely shared view that without political entrepreneurs (ethnic, religious) who instrumentalise identity markers, identity conflicts would not be so frequent and not lead to such viscous and protracted conflicts as they often do (Aspinall 2007; Parekh 2008; Devetak 2008). As Devetak (2008: 14) puts it with regard to ethnic identities, 'appeals to history, identity and ethnic prejudice ... affirm distinct ethno-nationalist identities and thereby serve the political purposes of shoring up the power base and economic interests of unscrupulous political elites'.

Through the use of various discursive and material technologies, governors of all sorts (mothers, lawyers, councillors, bosses, peacebuilders, etc.) often seek to engineer identity change. Yet identity is not simply a structure for which individuals act as mere supports. Agency and structure co-constitute each other. Identity is endogenous to interaction. In enacting or performing their structurally shaped identities or roles, individuals negotiate their precise meaning in interaction with others, possibly in line with strategic considerations (for different angles on this dynamic, see Goffman 1956; Rose 1990). This applies to both private and group identities. In short, social identities exist insofar as they are performed and transformed – reproduced and modified by culturally embedded agencies in and through everyday discourses and material practices (Bhabha 2004; Butler 1997). Such dynamics are of particular interest to CORE.

4.3. Agency & the Everyday in Conflict Governance and Liberal Peace

Local and especially critical agencies are at the heart of CORE as without local agencies peace, whether liberal or post-liberal, cannot be built and sustained. CORE conceives of agency not in narrow rationalist terms, which regard agency as unproblematic, universal and non-cultural and always already constituted. It has a much richer understanding of agency. Agency emerges out of everyday webs of meaning. In mainstream peace- and statebuilding literature the everyday is mostly absent. It is either regarded as irrelevant to the macro-politics of the liberal peace or hopelessly out of synch with the requirements of a modern, liberal polity, quaint or outright dangerous. This reflects the traditional modernist bias, which contrasts the triviality of the everyday with the drama of the political stage, scientific progress, high culture, etc. In anthropology and ethnography the study of the everyday in pre-modern communities has been one of its initial *raison d'être*s, first-generation sociologists studied the transitions and transformations associated with everyday life in the city in the decades around the turn from the 19th to the 20th century, and Gramsci's notions of hegemony and common sense are closely linked to the notion of the everyday. However, post-1945 scholarly attention to the everyday has until recently been limited. One of the first sustained analyses of the everyday was carried out by Lefebvre in the late 1940s. He emphasised the 'extraordinary in the ordinary' (Elden 2004: 111). The everyday is 'what is left over' after all superior and specialised modes of life have been stripped away (Lefebvre, cited in Highmore 2000: 3). Lefebvre's interest in the everyday was fuelled by his interest in uncovering those cultural resources and knowledges in everyday life that can resist its colonisation by capitalism and its calculative approach to life. From a conservative political disposition, as opposed to Lefebvre's radical one, de Certeau (2000), too, focused on the everyday as a site of resistance to the encroachments of modernity. He analysed it as an unconscious and conservative refusal, not the rowdy, life-affirming, anti-hierarchical resistance that fights capture by any social authority, which was at the heart of Lefebvre's discussion of the rural festival as a site with revolutionary potential. Since then the everyday has been rediscovered, theorised and investigated by scholars situated in different fields, ranging from postcolonial studies to IR, sociology (notably symbolic interactionism), feminism and Science and Technology Studies (Bleiker 2003; Escobar 1992; 1995; Scott 1989; Haynes 1992; Goffman 1956; Callon 1986; Latour 1987; Enloe 1993; Chatterjee 1995; Chakrabarty 2000; Spivak 1988). The tools and insights developed by these literatures have until very recently been ignored by conflict governance research (Poulligny 2006; Richmond 2011b). CORE will focus on the everyday in liberal peace and peace- and statebuilding.

The concept of the everyday is closely associated with the notion of culture but it is not the same. 'Culture is not something that exists in the abstract; it is embedded in practices, in the everyday life of people' (Escobar 1995). The everyday is important to conflict governance research because it is about 'culturally appropriate form of individual or community life and care, and the critical and often resistant agencies which emerge and constitute contextual legitimacy' (Richmond 2011b: 15). It is a site of agency, resistance, solidarity and self-determination. Clearly, liberal peace that is bypassing the everyday and its agencies has little chance of being legitimate, sustainable and relevant for those it is supposed to be for – ordinary people in post-conflict settings.

CORE explores the everyday in depth. It conceives of it as a multi-dimension phenomenon that includes both semiotic and material practices and structures. The everyday is the site where agency, solidarity and (often unconscious) resistance against disciplinary and modernising peacebuilding technologies will often manifest itself. It is a repository of alternative knowledges and norms and a site for the low-key (tactical in de Certeau's terminology) reappropriation of social space structured by the imperatives of contemporary

peace- and statebuilding. It is the space where the local, regional, national, international and transnational meet, i.e., where hybridity is produced. The focus on the everyday engenders a concern the affective life of individuals and communities, not in a therapeutic register as so well criticised by Pupavac (2000; 2004), but as linked to the subjective aspects of peace, the importance of needs in all their variety and an empathetic approach to peacebuilding. Importantly, to study the everyday implies allowing voice to alterity and its diverse agencies. While this raises ethical questions related to discursive violence, this is precisely what CORE is interested in: to identify and analyse exemplary ways in how the liberal and non-liberal meet in the everyday and negotiate their differences. Also, CORE's research agenda extends to the issue as to how the everyday in post-conflicts settings affects traditional notions and performances of sovereignty. Thus CORE aims at exploring how the everyday configures social space in post-conflict settings and how this configuration might be in tension with, or opposition to territorial and sovereign forms of produced social space. The research question here is to what extent liberal peace- and statebuilding engenders pressures for post-sovereign political forms. Last but not least, CORE pays attention to the fact that the everyday is local but at the same time transversal and transnational. It is not a timeless essence. Nor are those populating it a unified mass. CORE is careful neither to romanticise the everyday nor to reduce local agencies to the subaltern. The everyday and the agencies that populate it are heterogeneous and they have their own contested histories, full of material and symbolic struggles and they bear the mark of hegemonic ideas and practices (but see Scott 1985).

4.4. Indigeneity & Indigenous Peacebuilding

Closely related to the notions of the everyday and agency is the notion of indigeneity. Research and policy practitioners have long ignored traditional and indigenous approaches to peacebuilding. Recently this has changed as practitioners and scholars cast for ways to solve the apparent failures of third generation peacebuilding (Mac Ginty 2010a; 2008; 2011). So, for example, reconciliation practices in Timor Leste and Rwanda have drawn on traditions of local level truth-telling exercises. This 'rediscovery' of local, traditional, indigenous and customary approaches to peacebuilding and dispute resolution can be seen as a reaction to some of the failings of internationally-led peacebuilding. In that respect, it points to peacebuilding lesson learning. It is in keeping with an increasing emphasis (at the rhetorical level at least) on local participation and ownership in development and peacebuilding initiatives. The instrumental usage of indigenous peacebuilding practices raises questions on the extent to which indigenous practices are really indigenous if they are funded, encouraged, rehabilitated and shaped by external agents. Critics point to a range of facsimile or ersatz indigenous processes that have been captured by external and national elites but which operate under the banner of localism. Thus, for example, the NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan often encourage local communities to organise shuras, or local councils. On the one hand, these traditional councils draw on accepted norms of decision-making. On the other, however, they are induced by external agents and often bastardised in the process. In cases like this, international actors see indigenous approaches to peacebuilding in an instrumental way, as tools for a wider process of stabilisation. Under such circumstances, and without popular support, these so-called indigenous processes are unlikely to be sustainable or to have much leverage among the relevant population.

Also, it is worth mentioning that indigenous approaches to peacebuilding do not have universal appeal among those committed to the liberal peace. Indeed, in many ways, traditional and customary approaches to peacebuilding are antithetical to some of the core aims of liberal institutionalism. Such approaches may sit uncomfortably with the technocracy and ethnocentric norms that underpin many of the programmes and projects through which liberal peacebuilding is operationalised. For example, western notions of gender inclusion

may stand in contrast to traditional patriarchal norms that privilege the position of older males in a community. Insofar as liberal peace- and statebuilding turns to indigenous peacebuilding, it often adheres to romanticised imaginings of the authenticity and power of indigenous practices, i.e., forms of Orientalism that impose Western concepts, norms and judgements on the indigenous and exoticise it. CORE will neither succumb to such an orientalist gaze nor study how indigenous peacebuilding can best be instrumentalised to legitimise third-generation peace- and statebuilding and render it sustainable. The value that such instrumentalisation can add to existing conflict governance is in any case limited. If liberal peace- and statebuilders admit only 'save' indigenous practices that can be tamed, modified and streamlined so as 'to suit modern Western norms of peacebuilding' (Mac Ginty 2010a: 355), then any gains in legitimacy and sustainability of peace will be limited because it is a make-believe turn to indigeneity, one filtered through dominant categories. Alternatively, if liberal peace- and statebuilders were to genuinely negotiate and interact with indigenous peacebuilding practices, including non-liberal forms, then this would inevitably lead to a transformation of third-generation peacebuilding (Mac Ginty 2010b; Richmond 2011b). It is this latter point that CORE wants to explore further. How can third-generation peacebuilding be transformed into a more self-reflexive, dialogical, context-sensitive and egalitarian enterprise in which the whole range of local and international actors work together to emancipate post-conflict societies from conflict, instability, oppression and to meet their wants? CORE will probe the resilience, alternatives and local agencies engendered by indigenous peace practices, examine how they have already modified the liberal conflict governance agenda and explore how still more far-reaching hybridisations can be enabled and what they have to contribute to the next stage in peacebuilding.

At the same time, CORE is careful not to romanticise indigenous peacebuilding (Mac Ginty 2008; 2010a; Richmond 2009a; 2011a). After all, local cultures may display their own forms of violence and exclusions, though of course this is not all that they display, and their relationship with the global human rights framework may need to be worked out (Schaefer 2010). But, crucially, this working out has to involve more than the guardians of liberal peacebuilding. It has to involve local, critical and liberal as well as non-liberal agencies and a readiness on the part of internationals to abandon Orientalist attitudes. Also, CORE is aware that not all indigenous peacebuilding traditions will be equally valuable in the transition to fourth-generation peacebuilding. As Mac Ginty has pointed out, those practices designed to deal with small-scale challenges to public peace in a traditional society may be ill suited to deal with the stress of a society recovering from mass-scale warfare or genocide and the social dislocations brought about by it, the international intervention and globalisation. Despite some drawbacks associated with indigenous peacebuilding, it remains one of the analytical foci of CORE. This is for three reasons. Firstly, traces of a turn to localism and indigeneity can be found in the peacebuilding policies of the EU and India. Secondly, the CORE is particularly interested in informal types of governance and dispute resolution, and the lessons that can be learned from these. Thirdly, the project seeks to identify the interfaces between top-down formal and institutional types of conflict resolution governance, and more informal bottom-up processes.

4.5. Local Agencies Between Resistance & Translation

The concept of agency is crucial to CORE. As discussed above, agency is culturally embedded, associated with indigenous peacebuilding practices and often manifests itself in the everyday. CORE is particularly interested in critical agencies. While initially postcolonial research in the form of the work of the subaltern studies group focused on open, self-conscious rebellions and organised violence by those who had been denied agency by local

elites and historiography (Prakash 1994), more recent postcolonial research has highlighted the ordinariness of resistance, its often unconscious modes of expression and its manifold effects on the operation of power and the institutional forms it takes (Haynes and Prakash 1992; Gupta 1998; Parry 1995; Bhabha 2004). This turn in postcolonialism is mirrored in sociological, feminist, anthropological and poststructuralist research that focuses on 'textual insurrection' (Parry 1995: 42) as well as material but small-scale and everyday forms of resistance (Burawoy, et al. 2000; Scott 1989; 1985). This research zeroes in on the agency and power of the weak. In the context of peacebuilding and conflict resolution, Richmond refers to infrapolitics - 'modes of critical, often resistant agency via which individuals and communities mobilise in hidden and fragmented ways for peace on contextual, rather than merely external terms' (Richmond 2011b: 2). Resistance can be active or passive, violent or non-violent. CORE is especially interested in civil forms of resistance that happen out of the public limelight and that lack the capacity for organisational disruption. These are the hidden transcripts of resistance, happening in the everyday but modifying, (mis)appropriating, opposing, accommodating, collaborating with and deflecting the discourses and practices of liberal conflict governance and producing, as discussed further below, hybrid peace. This form of resistance has by and large escaped mainstream research, which is focused on spoilers (locus classicus: Stedman 1997) and will be one of the research foci of CORE.

Equally important for CORE is to explore how peacebuilding-as-resistance interacts with peacebuilding-as-accommodation and peacebuilding-as-liberation to produce 'a complex mix of international hegemony, local resistance, mimicry, agency, and subversion' (Richmond 2011b: 149) and to facilitate, or block, the emergence of fourth-generation postcolonial peace. The dynamics unleashed by these encounters involve translation, understood not as a technical problem of translating one tongue into another but the cultural and ethical problem of how dominant and subordinate discourses relate to one other in agonistic fashion, which preserves rather than overcomes cultural and epistemic differences. Postcolonial research shows that the subaltern can use the dominant discourse to subvert it and the practices associated with it through mimicry, which may slide into mockery, and thus reveal the instability of dominant discourses and their tensions and contradictions (for different ways to analyse such discursive insurrection, see e.g. Prakash 1999; Bhabha 2004). This insight has not yet been utilised in studies of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. CORE will step into the gap. In doing so it is sensitive to the challenge of researching subaltern speech and the correlated issue of difference and hybridity (Spivak 1988). Translation understood as a cultural or ethical process inevitably leads to the hybridisation of the discourses that encounter each other in and through translation (Butler 2000; Spivak 1993). It implies a willingness of speakers and listeners, including liberal peacebuilders and researchers studying peacebuilding and conflict resolution, to allow their discourses to be modified by the terms of the others they encounter. This requires respect and empathy. The point here is that postcolonial peace can only emerge through translation and this process has so far been neglected in research. Moreover, available evidence, limited as it is, suggests that conflict governance and its transformations and hybridisations are shaped in many ways by resistance and the associated phenomenon of translation and that both resistance and translation are contextual and heterogenous rather than generic and monolithic. However, systematic research into these phenomena is so far very limited. This is one of the gaps CORE aims at filling.

4.6. Governmentalities of Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution

The work of Michel Foucault is one of the key inspirations for and powerful influences on postcolonialism even though he himself did not study coloniality and postcoloniality. Indeed, there are few, if any postcolonial scholars who do not in one way or another utilise Foucault's

tools. This affinity has to do with the poststructuralism that postcolonialists share with Foucault and the fact that he is the power analyst par excellence, which endears him to postcolonialists for whom the analysis of discursive and other power inequalities is of course crucial. Yet while Foucault is an important source for postcolonialism, there are few postcolonial scholars who limit themselves to, or draw primarily on Foucault (Kalpagam 2001; Scott 1995; Eudaily 2004; Ferguson 1997). Looking beyond postcolonialism, Foucault's tools, especially the notion of governmentality, have found their way into research into peace- and statebuilding and conflict resolution, in Richmond's work as well as that of a range of other scholars (Chandler 2010a; Duffield 2007; 2008; 2010; Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė 2005; Merlingen with Ostrauskaitė, 2006; Merlingen forthcoming; Reid 2010; Zanotti 2010; Debrix 1999; Escobar 1995; Duffield and Hewitt 2009). CORE, too, draws on Foucault's tools but it follows the postcolonial lead and goes beyond Foucault by putting him into conversation with the literatures and scholars discussed previously. This will allow CORE to customise those Foucauldian tools on which it draws, especially the notion of governmentality, without replicating Foucault's ethnocentric Western research agenda, which was focused on advanced liberal countries rather than the international and relations between the Global North and the Global South. Moreover, the hybridisation of Foucault will enable CORE to focus on resistance and local agencies as opposed to the programmes of authorities, which is the main focus of many governmentality studies.

The concept of governmentality and the toolbox associated with it is useful to examine three aspects of peacebuilding and conflict resolution that are at the heart of CORE's research agenda. First, governmentality provides analytical leverage to explore the epistemic frameworks in and through which peacebuilding and conflict resolution are framed. This is a small but well established line of research in the field of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. The value CORE adds to this research is a comparative dimension – contrasting official EU and Indian rationalities – and, more importantly, contrasting the counter-rationalities of subaltern agencies, which has so far not been done. Second, Foucault is useful for investigating how rationalities are translated into practices through variegated and often small-scale political technologies that shape the subjectivities and conduct of those to whom they are applied. Third, if methodologically upgraded, Foucault is useful for studying how rationalities and technologies are handled and experienced by national and international peace- and statebuilders and by everyday agencies living on the construction sites. Finally, it is important to highlight that one of the limits of the study of governmentalities is that it can only capture those agencies that consciously and deliberately think about and intervene in politics and order-making. What this approach cannot capture are unconscious and everyday forms of agency and their effects such as those involved in the hidden transcripts of resistance (Scott 1989). CORE will analyse these modes of agency with the help of the concepts outlined previously.

4.6.1. Rationalities or Mentalities of Peacebuilding

The notion of mentality or rationality enables researchers to investigate systematically how hegemon and subalterns think about politics and rule. A political rationality is a particular kind of discourse that delimits in practical detail a field of political intervention – the subjects, objects and practices to be governed – and lay out the appropriate means by which this ordering is to be accomplished. The point here is that a political rationality shapes what is and is not thinkable, reasonable, practicable and doable in relation to governance. Moreover, political rationalities are relatively autonomous systems of meaning. In line with poststructuralism, they are not conceived of as proxies for actors' intentions or motives. Rationalities can be analysed along a number of dimensions. Miller and Rose suggest three

questions, which will also be asked by CORE (Rose and Miller 1992; Rose 1999). First, the normativity of rationalities (dominant and counter-hegemonic, local and international) can be interrogated. What are the ideals and the *telos* to which peacebuilding are directed? CORE will pay particular attention to local imaginaries as opposed to the *telos* envisaged by officials (national, international, transnational). It will ask what are considered to be – within the terms of a given discourse – the *appropriate powers* of different agencies and the appropriate modes of peacebuilding? Second, CORE examines on the basis of what *knowledge claims* agencies located at different but interrelated levels (everyday/local, regional, state, international, global) make sense of conflict and peacebuilding, their nature and dynamics? Third, it asks by means of what *vocabulary* these agencies frame reality in ways that make it amenable to, resilient against, incompatible with and accommodating of either everyday peace visions and projects or national and international peacebuilding interventions?

4.6.2. *Translations: Exploring the Operations and Effects of Technologies of Governance*

‘Political technology’, another key concept of governmentality theory, refers to the practices and devices through which political rationalities are operationalized in political programmes and activities. The notion thus has an elite focus. CORE will go beyond this narrow focus to include a concern with how local agencies draw on their own customary technologies, or build new and often hybrid ones to circumvent, supplement, replace or resist the conflict resolution technologies brought in by national and international authorities. What, then, is a technology? Foucauldian researchers often use the concept to refer to inscription devices such as statistics, reports, charts, tables and map. CORE will expand this list to include more mundane technologies such as storytelling, rituals, myths and other counter-memories. Irrespective of its form, what is important about a technology is that it is a signifying device that constructs and acts upon reality (Miller 1990: 333). Even if not referred to as technologies, the notion of signifying practices and means plays an important role in studying the epistemic power of colonialism and post-colonialism as well as resistance towards them (Mitchell 2002; Kalpagam 2001; Hannah 2000; Ferguson 1997; Prakash 1999; Chatterjee; Nandy 1989a). A somewhat broader conceptualization of political technologies, which plays an important role in the Paris School of international security studies and has also been applied to peacebuilding and in postcolonial studies, expands the notion of signifying devices to investigate the discursive elements in a variety of technologies of power such as surveillance, (risk-)control technologies or mentoring and counter-technologies of power such narratives of suffering, litigation or practices of the self, all of which aim at (re)constituting social identities, interests, relations and conduct in line with hegemonic, subaltern or new hybrid codes (Zanotti 2008; Merlingen with Ostrauskaitė, 2006; Scott 1995; Gupta 2001; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Chatterjee 1995; Selmeczi 2011; Richmond and Franks 2009). By studying political technologies, CORE goes beyond the dominant critical approaches in peacebuilding and conflict resolution research and, incidentally, much postcolonialism, which focus on discourses and frames – a politics of text and talk - at the expense of the technical operations and means through which the subjects, objects and processes of peace- and statebuilding are formed. Moreover, through its concern with technologies CORE makes seemingly innocuous governance practices and devices recognizable as vehicles of power and resistance that shape peace- and statebuilding in fundamental ways.

4.6.3. *Translations: Tracing Lived Experiences and Practices*

Many ‘Western’ Foucauldian analyses of liberal governmentalities centre on rationalities and technologies of rule. They explore their intellectual conditions of possibility and their truth, norm and power effects. Yet they often stop short of examining actual practices of rule and resistance, let alone how the associated political technologies are handled, interpreted,

justified and experienced by those involved in their operation (operators and targets). Hence, many such analyses are informed by nominalism (Rose 1999: 19). Yet not all Foucault-inspired research restricts itself in this manner. Postcolonial researchers do not; nor does Foucault-inspired actor-network analysis, which specialises in tracing the often unexpected and winded paths through which rationalities are translated into practices, the obstacles these translations encounter, the detours translators find around them and the unintended effects of these complex dynamics (Latour 1986; Callon 1986; Law 1986). CORE, too, looks at these translations because it is at this point in peacebuilding and conflict resolution that things get messy and hybrid peace is produced because those charged with translating liberal international rationalities into practice are embodied actors, rather than abstracted, calculating machines as imagined by rational choice approaches dominant in conflict resolution research, and as such they may be unreliable, feckless or have their own agendas. Moreover, they do their translations in particular and often ill-understood contexts (cultural, political, economic, social) and translate to local agencies, who may resist being enrolled into their programmes, advance their own counter-rationalities of peacebuilding and conflict resolution and turn the meaning of translated terms upside down and against internationals. Because of such dynamics international peace- and statebuilders (state and non-state) are likely to haphazardly modify or deliberately re-programme the rationalities they are expected to act out, either on their own or, more importantly and interesting for CORE, in and through agonistic negotiations with their local interlocutors. Such interactions and mediations among heterogeneous local, regional, state, international and global agencies are the sociological stuff out of which hybridity emerges (cf. Mac Ginty 2010b; Richmond 2011b) and this is what CORE wants to explore in rich empirical detail. To do so, it goes beyond Foucauldian discourse analysis and uses ethnographic and other interpretative methods of close-up observation and face-to-face conversation in field research.

4.7. Hybrid Peace

Hybrid peace as a regulatory ideal is not simply about the coexistence or toleration of difference but about mutual penetration of self and other, i.e., the internalisation of difference. It refers to the interplay between top-down and bottom-up actors, norms and structures to produce fusion or composite forms of peace, politics and conflict. In an optimistic scenario, a hybrid peace may be regarded as conflict management whereby the interaction between internal and external actors produces some sort of pacific equilibrium that involves a mixture of indigenous and international practices. Hybrid peace is thus transformative peace, where what is modified is both the liberal and the local as well as the agency of all stakeholders involved in peacebuilding and conflict resolution, from the local to the global.

Irrespective of the regulatory ideal, hybrid peace is what is de facto created by liberal peace- and statebuilding (Mac Ginty 2010b; 2011; Richmond 2011a). Yet it is not always a desirable form of peace as it may represent a combination of negative practices of both the local and the international (Richmond 2011b: 18). While it is tempting to regard hybrid forms of peace and governance as a conflict between the liberal and illiberal, such a view reflects ethnocentrism and excludes the possibility of local forms of conflict transformation, pluralism and acceptance of diversity. None of this is to romanticise localism or hybridity, it is merely to hold open the possibility of positive forms of hybridity that approach the regulatory ideal described above. Proponents of liberal peacebuilding may be tempted to see hybridity as policy failure, or the subversion by local actors of technocratic and institutionalist policies based on western legalistic standards. In some cases, a hybrid political regime may combine authoritarian or ethno-nationalist rule and democracy (Richmond forthcoming; Fawn and Richmond 2009). De facto hybrid peace, whether desirable or not, is often the result of critical

agency by those who are not supposed to have agency, adjustments by internationals and nationals to accommodate local cultures or simply the unintended consequence of the programmes and actions of national and international peace- and statebuilders.

One of the advantages of the concept of hybridity for the CORE project is that it encourages us to see past the oppositional binaries of the international, formal and institutional on the one hand, and the local, informal and traditional on the other. It encourages us to critically appraise notions of discrete actors and ideas and to look at the processes whereby different actors and ideas interact. It also encourages us to focus on the agency of local actors, and the systems of survival, governance and resistance that they develop in order to survive and develop in contexts affected by conflict and international peace-support interventions. Many of these forms of local agency may be ‘hidden’ or unseen, and they represent what Richmond (2009b) has described as contextually-relevant forms of peace that constitute a post-liberal peace or local-liberal hybridity. While internationally-sponsored institutional approaches to peacebuilding and governance often wield significant material power (for example, in terms of access to positions of office or to reconstruction funding), this is not the same as legitimacy or affective resonance among the population. It may be the case that locally formulated forms of governance and peacebuilding are able to achieve legitimacy more effectively.

CORE will examine the concrete historical pathways through which hybrid peace emerges in the cases it studies, the agencies (everyday and official) involved in its construction, the transversal cultures sustaining them and the processes through which they are transformed, the heterogeneous technologies deployed by locals, nationals and internationals in peacebuilding and conflict resolution, the rationalities underpinning them, the translations between different idioms of peace and peacebuilding approaches, the negotiations entered among the stakeholders, the resistances put up and so forth. In a further step, CORE explores the conditions, blockages and processes that give rise to, or oppose, the willed creation of a 4th-generation of peace – a deliberate hybridisation of liberal peace (local-liberal) aimed at putting in place an everyday form of peace that escapes territorial notions of sovereignty and represents and speaks to all aspects of life – material needs and living standards, physical and ontological security (identity), culture, gender, rights, political participation (Richmond 2011b; forthcoming; 2009a). CORE looks at its EU and Indian cases with a view to identifying and analysing instances of deliberate hybridisations of liberal peace, the agencies involved, their dialogical and agonistic encounters, which are always embedded in unequal power relations, and the negotiations, translations, accommodation and resistance characterising their relations as they look beyond liberal peace to create a postcolonial peace. Importantly, CORE acknowledges that if Orientalism is to be avoided, such encounters cannot exclude agencies that take the form of liberal’s other. Hence, with due regard for a contextualised ethics, CORE will critically engage with such agencies too. More generally, CORE aims at unearthing and theorising unscripted encounters and empathetic approaches to the creation of an everyday and contextual peace that is committed to care, respect and acceptance of difference and otherness, that aims at being sustainable and legitimate and that takes note of the needs and expectations of those living in post-conflict communities as well as international norms.

5. CORE’ Research Questions

This section draws out a number of conclusions from the discussion above and the DoW as submitted to the Commission to define an initial menu of analytical choices and research questions that are the core of CORE. The menu is broad enough to enable CORE researchers

to go off in different directions (in terms of methods, concrete research questions, theoretical tools, etc.) according to their expertise and interests and according to the empirics unfolding in their field research while at the same time highlighting shared analytical concerns and preoccupations that give CORE its identity and analytical coherence. Importantly, the menu is not set in stone. It is a 'living document' that will be adjusted as research proceeds in line with unfolding empirical evidence and evolving analytical insights.

5.1. Theme A: Rationalities of Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution (Indian & EU; official & everyday; dominant & resisting)

The analytical focus of this theme is on the morphology (the conceptual links formed by governmentalities, their premises, discursive moves, blind spots, biases, etc. both in regard to how the causes and effects of conflicts are framed and how conflict settlement, resolution and peace- and statebuilding are imagined) and the genealogy of the discourses informing and legitimising particular conflict governance initiatives in India and the EU. Crucially, CORE will analyse both official and everyday rationalities of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. The theme raises a number of analytical issues related to the identification, analysis and comparison of the range of official governmentalities, and counter-governmentalities, employed and found in Indian and EU conflict governance.

✓ What governmentalities of conflict governance are out there in the conflicts we analyse? Are there different, competing official governmentalities? What counter-governmentalities formulated by local agencies, including local NGOs, churches, trade unions, etc. are out there in our cases? What is the morphology of these various governmentalities? For instance, are there governmentalities that understand the conflicts they deal with as a defensive reaction to the encroachment of global liberalism on local life? If so, what policy conclusions are drawn by such governmentalities? How do official governmentalities (at least those which do not share this assessment) respond to and cast doubt on such challenging discourses that undermine their own standing?

✓ How can we account for the differential strength of different governmentalities? Is this primarily an issue of how well they connect to other, legitimate discourses, or to the institutional location of the governmentality, the material resources its proponents can mobilise, etc.?

✓ Who are the agencies considered competent to plan and run conflict governance initiatives? What role and influence distribution among networked agencies is envisaged?

✓ Who is considered competent in providing input into governance initiatives and why?

✓ What is the nature of the conflict governance matrix - the relative emphasis put on security as opposed to care (concern for social welfare and justice)?

✓ How did the governmentalities emerge and on what (disparate) knowledges did they draw and which did they neglect and cast aside?

✓ Is there a colonial discourse heritage in conflict governance mentalities? How has colonial rule shaped Indian conflict governmentalities over time?⁷ To answer this question, governmentalities of conflict governance have to be analysed diachronically.

✓ To what extent and if so how does Europe/West work as a silent reference point in the examined conflict governance initiatives?

✓ To what extent, and if so how precisely, do governmentalities articulate teleological transition narratives centred on notions of modernity or other meta-narratives?

✓ How do governmentalities conceive of the individuals and communities living in (post-)conflict zones? What sorts of agencies and attributes are ascribed to them and how are they thought to be able to contribute, or obstruct, peace?

⁷ This point was suggested by PRIO.

- ✓ What self-other images animate these governmentalities?
- ✓ How do governance mentalities change when governance shifts into a crisis mode?⁸
- ✓ Are there any systematic differences in how notions such as peace, justice or individual needs are framed by EU and Indian conflict governance governmentalities and between different conflict governance governmentalities in European and Indian conflicts? How are these differences justified? Can we detect any culturally specific ways in our cases of framing peace, human rights, democracy, policing, the role of civil society and the rule of law? If so, what explains these specificities?

5.2. Theme B: The Translation of Peacebuilding Rationalities into Practice and its Effects

5.2.1. Exploring the Operation and Effects of Local, National & International Technologies of Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution

This section raises a number of analytical issues related to the identification, analysis and comparison of the range of technologies employed in Indian and EU conflict governance.

- ✓ What peacebuilding and conflict resolution technologies are used in our cases?
- ✓ What effects do these technologies have on the conflict? What is their problem-solving capacity evaluated both in terms of the goals of the governmentalities and the expectations of those to which they are addressed?
- ✓ How precisely do post-colonial responses, notably everyday resistance and critical agencies shape the operation of governance technologies?
- ✓ How does the local context, especially culture and the everyday, affect the operation and impact of the conflict governance technologies?
- ✓ How precisely is third-generation peace- and statebuilding transforming the local into a site of contestation and the emergence of hybridity?
- ✓ What spaces and subjects do peace- and statebuilding technologies constitute? In particular, do they transform, or perhaps (re)produce, conflictual identities? How are such identity-shaping effects generated?⁹
- ✓ How and with what effect do conflict governance technologies interact with the governance instruments of routine government/governance such as those used to promote economic modernisation and development? In pursuing this broad question, some research teams may analyse the connection between conflict governance and state-society relations and state capacity, including, in relation to the Indian conflicts, issues such as the demise of the Congress system, the changing capacity of the central state and the evolving institutional configuration, including elements of de-institutionalisation, of state-society relations.¹⁰
- ✓ What unintended side-effects (positive or negative), if any, do particular conflict governance initiatives generate? How can we account for these unintended consequences?
- ✓ How does conflict governance affect local power configurations? To pursue this question, some research teams may investigate the ‘politics and power contestations that undergird a specific programme of governance and mediate how it will actually be delivered and

⁸ This analytical focus was suggested by PRIO.

⁹ The analytical focus on the ways in which conflict governance governs and alters identities has been suggested by PRIO.

¹⁰ These points have been suggested by Amit, (JNU).

received' and more broadly, 'who gives, who takes, who manipulates, who corners, who passes these [project and development funding] on, how and to what effect?'¹¹

5.2.2. Tracing the Lived Experiences and Practices of Agencies (everyday & official; local, regional, national, international and global; liberal and non-liberal) in Peace- and Statebuilding & Conflict Resolution

This section raises a number of analytical issues related to how the operators of the conflict governance technologies and those addressed by them interpret, experience, justify and resist them and how they interact with each other.

- ✓ How are national and international conflict governance performances interpreted by local audiences (elites, officials and civil society actors who are 'improved' and tutored by peacebuilders)? How do they perceive conflict governance projects – as credible, authentic, other-regarding, etc., or as fake, alien, self-interested, etc.?
- ✓ What micro-level forms of peacebuilding, accommodation, misappropriation, mockery, resistance (active, passive) can we detect in the everyday spaces of local peacebuilding, which are left vacant by outside (central government or EU) peace- and statebuilders?
- ✓ What infrapolitics of peacebuilding can we detect – what 'modes of critical, often resistant agency via which individuals and communities mobilise in hidden and fragmented ways for peace on contextual, rather than merely external terms' (Richmond 2011b: 2). Answering these questions requires exploring the various ways (intellectual, normative, material, institutional, elite, everyday) in which critical local agency is expressed in liberal peacebuilding projects.
- ✓ Along the same lines, which local agencies resist which outside-in conflict governance initiatives? How do they justify their resistance and what are the effects of their conduct on the institutions, norms and processes of peace- and statebuilding in EU and Indian contexts?
- ✓ On what counter-narratives do local agencies draw in their efforts to transform outside-in peacebuilding into inside-out peacebuilding that is relevant to their contexts and everyday material needs, interests and identities?
- ✓ How do local agencies view the conflicts in which they are embroiled (say, regarding the role of class, caste, religion, etc.) and what do they think of the governance initiatives intended to help them resolve their conflicts?
- ✓ How do those who run national, international or transnational conflict governance initiatives on the ground seek to legitimise and make tangible their claim to providing apolitical advice and how do locals experience the language of expertise-based authority?
- ✓ To what extent is there a willingness and capacity of those running outside governance initiatives to adjust their programmes and activities to local circumstances and wishes?
- ✓ What culturally rooted narratives do those running outside-in conflict governance initiatives develop to defend their interventions vis-à-vis locals (their morality, effectiveness, neutrality, etc.)? What narratives do they develop to justify modifications of their governmentalities vis-à-vis their principals?

¹¹ These points were suggested by Sumona (PRIA).

5.3. Theme C: The Role of Hybridity, Local Need Fulfilment and Dialogue in Building Sustainable Peace

Impact analyses of conflict governance initiatives tend to look at determinants such as the objectives, budgets and manpower mobilised by peace- and statebuilders; their coordination with military forces in theatre (if counter-insurgency or peacekeeping is ongoing) and with other international actors on the ground; and a laundry list of possible contextual correlates of sustainable peace. CORE focuses on three features or relations of sustainable and just peace that have recently been identified by critical approaches. As Richmond has put it, a ‘research agenda is needed which engages with an understanding of the dynamics of the relationship between the liberal and the local, and of the interface between the two in terms of everyday life for local communities and actors, as well as for more abstract institutional frameworks’ (Richmond 2009a: 576). The three key relations that CORE will trace and investigate are local-international hybrids, the effect, or lack thereof, of conflict governance on the everydayness in post-conflict societies and dialogical relations between (inter)national and locals. Culture and identity (ethnic or otherwise) are key dimensions of these relationships. CORE explores the forms (or deformations) that these relations take in our case studies, their similarities and differences across cases, accounts for the revealed patterns and investigates what differential impact they have, especially on the everyday lives of people in (post-)conflict zones. The guiding principles of this theme are to get as close as possible at the everyday – and its critical agencies- in peacebuilding – how individuals and communities are affected, how they cope, resist, etc. and to learn from our cases about how to engage constructively, in a post-colonial register, with (non-liberal) others in a non-relativistic (pluralist is perhaps a better word) manner. This analytical focus raises a number of questions.

- ✓ To what extent is there a ‘cultural match’ between the norms underpinning centrally devised conflict governance initiatives and local, historically grounded norms?
- ✓ How do cultural differences between India and the EU affect their conflict resolution and peacebuilding frameworks? To what extents are certain cultural features more conducive to facilitate or encourage more ‘authentic’ and ‘resonant’ forms of institutions, governance and peace?
- ✓ How do participants in conflict governance at all levels deal with cultural mismatches?
- ✓ What impact do cultural mismatches have on project implementation and local life?
- ✓ How does culture nourish, or perhaps impede, critical local agency?
- ✓ What sorts of conflict governance initiatives make the most difference to people?
- ✓ What sorts of hybrid liberal-local peace models can we detect in the cases?
- ✓ Are there components of hybrid conflict governance which actually undermine the peace or conflict resolution, say, by inadvertently reinforcing exclusive ethno-national identities?
- ✓ Which hybrids promote sustainable and fair peace?
- ✓ How and with what effects are indigenous practices interacting with official conflict governance initiatives?
- ✓ What forms does dialogue take in peacebuilding? This may involve a descriptive account of dialogic situations and dialogic relations, an analysis of the discursive and institutional forms of dialog and its geopolitical and ethno-political contexts.¹²
- ✓ Can we identify and trace elements of a ‘pedagogy of peace’ among the whole range of locals and internationals, through which the divide between the local and the international is opened up and both are transformed in the process (Richmond 2011b).
- ✓ As part of this theme, CORE teams may also investigate how, through what conceptual, procedural and institutional measures, culturally sensitive methods of impact assessment can be created.¹³

¹² These points have been suggested by Sabyasachi (MCRG).

6. Summing Up

CORE's research agenda directs us to carry out research into the manifold aspects of the infrapolitics of peacebuilding. Through its analytical focus on the hidden transcripts of peacebuilding and everyday agencies, CORE goes far beyond mainstream conflict resolution, peace- and statebuilding research to bring into view aspects of peacebuilding and conflict resolution which are crucial to what happens on the ground but which remain largely under-researched. CORE explores in-depth and through interpretative and ethnographic methods how local and often critical agencies emerge in (post-)conflict sites, interact with national, regional, international and transnational authorities and transform themselves and others in this way, thus producing hybrid forms of peace. In line with its postcolonial sensitivities, CORE is thus especially interested in subaltern agency, without romanticising or essentialising it, difference and resistance, without, however, neglecting agencies located at different levels of analysis. Indeed, it holds the view that in peacebuilding and conflict resolution the different levels of analysis (local, national, regional, international, global) at which agencies are located are constantly involved in dialogue, thus breaking down any firm boundaries between them. From a macro perspective, an important research agenda for CORE is to identify the elements out of which new post-liberal, mediated 4th-generation discourses and practices of peacebuilding, as well as nasty forms of hybrid peace, are currently emerging. What sorts of agonistic relations, institutional forms and psychologies are needed to encourage and enable the emergence of postcolonial peace out of the encounters between liberalism and the (non-liberal) everyday? Ultimately, what CORE is after is to identify the contours and to analyse and understand the agencies and processes involved in the transition to positive, postcolonial peace, which valorises politics, difference, contestation, the everyday and hybridity. In short, CORE aims at contributing to the construction of novel contextual peacebuilding theory (Richmond 2011b).

7. Innovations to Come

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This section is deliberately left empty. It symbolises two things. CORE's theoretical framework is a living document that will be adjusted as our research unfolds and it is a collaborative enterprise to which we all contribute.

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¹³ This focus was suggested by Berghof.

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