




Cultures of Governance
and Conflict Resolution
in Europe and India



D.5.1 Survey preparation background report

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D.5.1 Survey Preparation Background Report

This report constitutes the basis for CORE's fieldwork in the six conflict regions Bihar, Bosnia, Cyprus, Georgia, Kashmir and Northeast India. The report is a collection of information on international, public and private governance initiatives, which are expected to have an impact on conflict dynamics. The key objective with this report is to provide an overview of those measures, explain their possible link to conflict resolution strategies and reflect the engagement of external and domestic actors in the conflict region. The contributors to the case briefs are:

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I Bihar

1.1 Overview

Naxalism or left wing extremism (LWE), the primary category for the state to view the latest wave of violent conflict of Bihar/Jharkhand, has remained neglected since the late 1980s as no governmental report has looked into the causes of this discontent. The government's response to the violent conflict has been dialectical at best. While the default response of the state is to activate the security apparatuses of the state in the name of upholding 'law and order'¹, the state has also undertaken some measures of reform. These policies, including the reservation policy², the tribal sub-plan and joint forest management³, the *garibihatao* and 20 point welfare program⁴, aimed to improve the condition of the 'oppressed exploited classes'⁵. Thus "except for a few knee jerk responses there had not been any sustained administrative and development action" to deal with the challenge⁶.

However with the turn of the century, increasing incidents of attacks on state and private property and increasing numbers of police casualties led the central government to view naxalism as "a serious threat to internal security in the country...[and] a matter of grave concern"⁷. Naxalism was no longer seen as "merely a law and order problem"⁸. The government acknowledged that "naxalites typically operate in a vacuum created by inadequacy of administrative and political institutions, espouse local demands, and take advantage of the prevalent disaffection and perceived injustice among the under privileged and remote segments of the population"⁹. It was also pointed out that "systematic efforts are made by them to prevent execution and implementation of development projects, deliberately target critical infrastructure like railways, roads, power and telecommunications, and to try and create an environment, through violence and terror, where the governance structures at field levels are shown as being ineffective"¹⁰.

Therefore the state envisages pursuing “a multi-pronged strategy...of sustained and effective police action coupled with accelerated socio-economic development and management of public perception ...to effectively tackle the naxalite menace”¹¹. However, the state’s multi-pronged approach has been rather ineffective as is evident from the increasing violence reflected in figures presented in the annual report of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Hence, governance initiatives, which are relevant to conflict resolution may be classified into the following categories:

1.2 State power: security architecture and its buttressing

Security related measures have been the most evident response of the state since Naxalism emerged in the year 2003-2004 as a central security focus of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).

Security Related Expenditure Scheme: Initially it only included financial assistance for the central government police modernization and security related expenditure¹². The Security Related Expenditure Scheme was comprehensively revised in February 2005 to include items used in anti-naxal operation¹³. This scheme was extended for a further period of five years beyond March 31, 2006¹⁴.

Police Modernization Scheme: In 2003-04, the ‘Police Modernization Scheme’ was funded by the central government for naxal-affected districts under the recently revised modernization of State Police Forces Scheme¹⁵. In 2007-08, special plans were prepared to equip and upgrade the intelligence capabilities for the states of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa¹⁶.

Training of Security personnel: In the 11th Plan period, the Ministry of Home Affairs established 20 Counter Insurgency and Anti Terrorist (CIAT) Schools in the States of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and Assam and introduced training of the State Police Forces to combat terrorism/naxalism¹⁷.

Since 2005 the Indian Reserve Battalion has been expanded to not only supplement the security apparatus in the states but also provide gainful employment to the youth, particularly in naxalite-affected areas¹⁸.

1.3 Socio-economic transformation: 'integrated' development

The government proposes to “accord a higher priority in their annual plans to ensure integrated development of naxal-affected districts”¹⁹.

The Planning Commission included 55 naxal affected districts under the *Backward Districts Initiative* component of the *Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana* to fill in critical gaps in physical and service infrastructure. On January 3rd, 2005 general approval was given for the use of up to one hectare of forest areas for security and socio-economic infrastructure²⁰. In 2006-07, this component was subsumed within the newly launched Backward Region Grant Fund scheme covering a total of 250 districts and to be administered by the Ministry of Panchayati Raj²¹.

The *Scheduled Tribes and other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act of 2006* seeks to establish a legal framework for recording the forest rights. The State Governments have been asked to give special attention to the proper implementation of this scheme, particularly in the areas affected by Naxalite activities²².

The *Integrated Child Development Services Scheme* was launched on 2nd October 1975, to improve the nutritional and health status of children, to lay the foundation for proper psychological, physical and social development of children, to achieve effective co-ordination of policy and implementation amongst the various departments in charge of child health policies, and to enhance the capability of the mother to look after the normal health and nutritional needs of the child through proper nutrition and health education.

Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana was launched on 25th December 2000 to provide all-weather access to hitherto isolated areas. The primary objective of this initiative is to connect remote villages through roads, which are operable throughout the year in order to facilitate the movement of products and people to and from those areas, in particular

access to health care and markets for agricultural produce. *Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana* was launched in April-2005 by merging all established schemes for electrifying villages and habitations.²³

Sarva Siksha Abhiyaan was launched to promote universal elementary education. The programme encompasses the appointment of teachers, teacher training, qualitative improvement of elementary education, provision of teaching materials, establishment of block and cluster resource centres for academic support, construction of classrooms and school buildings, establishment of education guarantee centres, integrated education of the disabled and distance education.

Indira Awaas Yojana was launched during 1985-86 as a sub-scheme of Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme and continues as a sub-scheme of Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY) since its launch in April 1989. It has been delinked from the JRY and has been made an independent scheme with effect from January 1, 1996. The objective of *Indira Awaas Yojana* is primarily to provide grants for the construction of houses to members of scheduled castes/scheduled tribes, freed bonded labourers and to rural poor below the poverty line. From 1995 to 1996 the initiative's benefits have been extended to ex-servicemen, widows or next-of-kin of defence personnel and paramilitary forces killed in action.

Starting with the Eleventh Plan, the *National Rural Drinking Water Programme* strives to achieve drinking water security in rural India by improving as well as augmenting existing wells. Through community-managed budgeting of village water and the preparation of security plans, the programme envisages to enhance the use and harvesting of groundwater, surface water and rainwater. According to this initiative drinking water security can be ensured through Panchayati Raj Institutions and community involvement in a decentralized approach.

The *Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act of 2005* intends to improve rural households' income security by providing at least one hundred days of guaranteed wage employment each financial year to every household, whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled manual work.

The *National Rural Health Mission (2005-2012)* was launched to carry out necessary architectural correction in the delivery system of basic healthcare. The goal of the mission is to improve the availability of and access to quality health care, especially for those residing in rural areas, the poor, women and children throughout the country with a special focus on 18 States, including Bihar and Jharkhand.

In order to ensure the effective implementation of the above policies the government has set up a whole range of *review and monitoring mechanisms*. These include the Task Force on Naxalism, the Coordination Centre, the Standing Committee of the Chief Ministers of the naxal-affected States, the Inter-Ministerial Group, the Empowered Group of Ministers, the Naxal Management Division, and Action Plans by States. The Management Information System²⁴ has been monitoring the implementation of flagship programmes in 35 focus districts.²⁵

Guidelines for *surrender-cum rehabilitation of left-wing extremists* were put in place. The rehabilitation package included a stipend of 2,000 for three years, vocational training, the immediate grant of 1.5 lakhs and other incentives to surrender weapons.²⁶

1.4 Participation as a tool of a new governmentality

With the enactment of the 73rd *Amendment* and the recent *elections to the 3-tier Panchayati Raj institutions (PRIs)*, the mechanisms of decentralized local government have come to be deployed for a variety of governance initiatives. PRIs are seen as both, local mechanisms of participatory governance as well as tools for a more coherent and effective public policy process, which arguably has an important bearing on conflict resolution in the two States. Projects like *Capacity Development for Local Governance*, *Support for Operationalisation of NREGA*, and *Strengthened Access to Justice* are programmes run by the UNDP in Bihar and Jharkhand with the objective of poverty reduction and democratic governance. Transparency International India has launched *Pahal: Shaasan Sudhaar Ki Ore* as a grassroots initiative to empower people through training, engagement and participation in backward rural areas of various states like Jharkhand and Bihar in 2010.

In the case of Bihar, the '*Jankari*' call centre²⁷, an award-winning e-governance initiative for citizens seeking information over the phone, has attracted significant public participation and emboldened citizens to make direct complaints to the Chief Minister. *Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojna (JGSY)* has been restructured and streamlined since 1st April 1999 to sponsor demand-driven village infrastructure and generate employment for the unemployed poor in the rural areas. The initiative is implemented by the Village Panchayats with the approval of Gram Sabha.

In Jharkhand, the *Janshala Program* is a collaborative effort of the Government of India and five UN agencies – UNDP, UNICEF, UNESCO, ILO and UNFPA – to provide program support for universal elementary education in India. The Jharkhand Government has also formulated its *Rehabilitation and Resettlement policy* in 2008. Through the *Jharkhand Skills Livelihoods Mission* set up in 2009, a consultation has been organised bringing together leading skill development institutions and experts to help chart a strategy for the state in collaboration with UNDP. The Government of Jharkhand additionally established the *Jharkhand Industries Rehabilitation Scheme 2003* for the renovation of large, medium and small scale industrial units. The *Ayurvedic Health Centre Scheme for Schedule Tribes*, introduced in 2001, provides free ayurvedic medical facilities to the members of Scheduled Tribes. In 2008, the *Chief Ministers Special Food Security Scheme for Primitive Tribe Groups*, was introduced to provide food grains (rice and wheat) free of cost to all families of Primitive Tribes. Moreover, *Birsa Munda Awas Yojna for Primitive Tribe* was started in 2001 to provide homes to the families of Primitive Tribes. *Ashram/Eklavya schools for Scheduled Tribe students* were established in 2006. Those schools accommodate teachers and students on campus. The *Gokul Gram Development Programme* was launched in 2001 to provide infrastructure, develop grazing areas, distribute food supplements for milk production, sponsor training programmes and provide training in the preparation of bio fertilizers from cattle waste.

Though not an exhaustive list, the aforementioned initiatives have been aimed to enhance the security and socio-economic development of the conflict-affected areas of mainland

India. However, it has been the implementation of these policies that has been a major lacuna in the effective resolution and management of conflicts in Bihar and Jharkhand.

II Bosnia and Herzegovina

The long and devastating conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BiH) ended with the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace, commonly referred to as the Dayton Agreement, in Paris on 14 December 1995. The Dayton Agreement foresaw a significant involvement of the international community in overseeing its implementation and in governing Bosnian society. Nearly 16 years later, the international community still remains present and active in BiH.

2.1 International governance actors and initiatives

When it comes to international governance actors in BiH, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) plays the most prominent role. Established to oversee the implementation of the peace accord's civilian aspects, the OHR has executive powers and actively participates in the political life of the country. Despite talks about the closure of the OHR, the country's political crisis since its October 2010 general elections has ensured the HR's key role in governing BiH. The OHR's work is overseen by the international Peace Implementation Council (PIC), whose Steering Board meets several times a year in Sarajevo.

Careful evaluation of the OHR's role in affecting the conflict dynamics in BiH, however, requires analysis of the European Union's and the United States' interaction with the OHR's work. The EU, in particular, has been pushing for the OHR's closure, going as far as making EU membership contingent upon the transfer of full autonomy to the government of BiH.²⁸ The US, on the other hand, along with Turkey as a representative of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, has always insisted on maintaining the OHR on the ground due to the concern that mass violence might reoccur should the Republika Srpska try to secede.²⁹ At the same time, the Russian Federation has continuously insisted on the closure of the OHR.

The EU's approach to governance in BiH is multifaceted. Due to the HR being double-hatted as Special Representative of the EU and BiH's aspirations for EU membership, the

Union has significant leverages at its disposal. Recently, this influence manifested itself in the reforms undertaken by the end of 2010 with the goal of meeting the conditions for visa liberalisation with the EU. Moreover, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) of 2008 became one of the guiding documents for reform efforts in BiH, 'bringing the country closer to certain European standards'. In addition, the EU is present through two missions on the ground – the military mission EUFOR Althea and the EU Police Mission (EUPM). EUFOR Althea took over NATO's Implementation Force in overseeing the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement implementation. More recently, EUFOR has taken on a number of other tasks as well, 'supporting BiH's Euro-Atlantic ambitions', in addition to contributing to a safe and secure environment. At present, the mission has around 1,600 troops deployed in the country. Its executive mandate was renewed by the UN Security Council in November 2010.³⁰ The EU Police Mission, on the other hand, was launched in 2003 as the first EU civilian security mission, with a mandate to 'monitor, mentor and advise' the Bosnian police. EUPM has been extended a few times and is seen to have played an essential role in the police reform in post-conflict BiH.

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has also been present on the ground and has been fundamental not only in gathering first-hand field information, but also in running numerous programmes promoting 'good governance' and strengthening civil society. Similarly, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has also been very active in promoting 'good governance' in the country through its Democratic Governance programme.

2.2 Governance initiatives and actors at state and entity-level

At state and entity level the arena gets even more crowded. With the Annex IV of the Dayton Agreement, a complex government structure was introduced in post-conflict BiH. At state level, the country has a three-member rotating Presidency, with a Bosniak, a Croat and a Serbian member. The state is composed of two entities, the Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbian Republika Srpska, and Brcko District, which has a special status. The entities have used the seemingly desynchronised stands within the Peace Implementation Council's Steering Board to advance their

interests and strengthen their negotiating positions. In particular, the politicians from Republika Srpska have challenged the constitutionality of OHR decisions and pushed for its closure. At the same time the Croatian part of the Federation showed secessionist aspirations similar to the Republika Srpska's ambitions after claims of marginal Croatian representation in the governing structures of BiH, since the two biggest parties representing Bosnian Croats were not included in the Federation Government.

This complex state structure further expands into the entities. The Federation is composed of ten cantons, each of which is further subdivided into municipalities. Given the decentralisation of the country, the 79 municipalities³¹ also play an important role in the governance of BiH.

In addition to these public governance actors and initiatives, BiH have been involved in several multilateral initiatives, such as the Regional Cooperation Council, the successor of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, which “promotes mutual cooperation and European and Euro-Atlantic integration in South East Europe in order to inspire development in the region to the benefit of its people.”³² Moreover, relations with Croatia have improved due to a number of bilateral cooperation agreements. Prominent among those were agreements between Croatia and BiH on police cooperation and mutual recognition as well as enforcement of court rulings in criminal matters.³³ As a consequence of the Serbian Assembly's passing of a resolution to condemn the genocide in Srebrenica relations with Serbia have similarly improved. Nevertheless, Belgrade is often seen to be pursuing a double-edged strategy – internationally acting as BiH's ‘good neighbour’ while locally supporting the Republika Srpska's secessionist politics.

2.3 Private governance initiatives

Despite not being actively involved in the policy process and lacking public recognition as relevant actors, NGOs have initiated meaningful private governance initiatives in BiH. Numerous NGOs are active across the country, many of which are related to the war and its consequences. For instance, there are several NGOs dealing with the families of victims, war veterans, war survivors, returnees, etc. Most of the global and European

student networks such as AIESEC and Model UN also have their local branches in BiH. The Centres for Civic Initiatives have become an important governance actor as an NGO, which supports citizens' participation in the democratic processes as well as building problem-solving capacity both of organisations and of individuals across the country.³⁴ A few think tanks have been very active in the policy-making process and have engaged in discussions over specific policy issues both domestically and internationally. One such example is the Foreign Policy Initiative that aims to provide expert opinion on issues related to foreign policy and European integration.³⁵

Importantly, various donors have been active in promoting certain agendas (such as strengthening civil society or local governance) and have thus supported numerous activities of local actors related to their initiatives. Such donors include, but are not limited to the Open Society Fund (as well as the Open Society Institute), the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). The Open Society Fund, for instance, claims to be "committed to the development of an economically and socially sustainable country marked by tolerance; good governance; and an open, democratic civil society, [through programs that] focus on government accountability, education, women, Roma, and youth empowerment"³⁶ and consequently, supports activities in that domain.

Finally, when it comes to business governance initiatives, it is important to mention the initiatives undertaken and supported by Fahrudin Radoncic, a Bosniak media mogul, businessman and politician. Radoncic, who was an active member of the BiH army during the war, is the owner of a publishing company named Avaz, which publishes *Dnevni Avaz* (Daily Voice), one of the newspapers with the biggest circulation and number of website hits in the country. In addition, his company publishes further papers and magazines, some of which are political. Along with owning the biggest media empire in BiH, Radoncic is also a successful businessman in the construction sector. Moreover, in 2009 he established a political party and in 2010 ran as a Bosniak candidate for the Presidency. Some see him as the 'protector' of Bosniak interests, while others criticise his 'too pro-Bosniak' stances. Through his numerous initiatives and the publications of his media group Radoncic's influence is seen as far-reaching, contributing to the small

circulation of Dnevni Avaz in the Republika Srpska. Overall, Fahrudin Radoncic is perceived as a powerful figure with a significant influence over both politicians and even more so, ordinary citizens.

III Cyprus

In contrast to CORE's other case studies, Cyprus's separation of the two feuding communities into ethnically homogenous and geographically distinct entities poses a very different set of challenges in the area of governance solutions to conflict resolution. In many other cases, it is the close proximity of antagonistic communities to one another, which causes tensions over trust in shared institutions, especially with regard to nationalist politicians, oppressive tendencies of security forces, executive authorities' biases in decision-making or parliamentary majorities' power to marginalize minorities. The Cypriot conflict, in contrast, remains frozen due to an obsessive concern about sovereignty and also a lack of inter-communal interaction. As much as the geographical and political separation of the two states of Cyprus may have facilitated people's everyday lives in the aftermath of the hostilities, the partition also aggravates inter-communal confidence-building between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

Hence, governance initiatives for reconciliation need to create shared platforms and institutions to avoid further identity mobilization along ethnic lines as one of the root causes of the conflict.³⁷ But first they need to overcome the problem of sovereignty, whether shared through a federal system or other such arrangement, whereby Greek Cypriot nationalists moderate their claims for a return of territory and control of sovereignty, and Turkish Cypriot nationalists are able to relinquish their dream of recognised independence.

For the purpose of this report, the governance initiatives will be divided into international, public and private measures, depending on who envisaged and who implements an initiative rather than who sponsors it.³⁸ Moreover, governance approaches could take two forms: Micro-politics, which work at the grassroots level with the objective to establish forums for cross-communal dialogue or to broaden peace constituencies, while macro-politics seeks to induce systemic exchanges or dependencies between conflict communities.

3.1 International governance initiatives

In the case of Cyprus, the major conflict-relevant governance initiatives have tended to emanate from the United Nations and the European Union. Both organisations have proposed comprehensive frameworks that would allow for the management of macro-political and constitutional issues, as well as on-the-ground peacebuilding and confidence building measures. One example for this was the 2001 Partnership for the Future, an initiative carried out by the UNDP and financed by the EU with the aim to contribute to the peacebuilding process at different levels of intervention ranging from urban infrastructure rehabilitation to financial assistance for small and medium-sized enterprises as well as the de-mining of the buffer zone.³⁹

In terms of economic development, two international governance initiatives will be of particular interest to our fieldwork: the *Cyprus Partnership for Economic Growth Program* and the EU's *Green Line Regulation* (Council Regulation No. 866/2004), which were both initiated in 2004. The first one is funded by USAID and implemented by International Executive Service Corps (IESC), a member organization of Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance (VEGA).⁴⁰ It aims to accelerate economic growth in the Turkish-Cypriot community to directly support economic interdependence and integration as well as the adoption and implementation of EU standards, ensuring that the Turkish-Cypriot community 'can shoulder its share of the economic costs of conflict settlement and reunification'.⁴¹ The latter measure refers to a regulation managed by the DG Enlargement Task Force of the EU, which seeks to deal with the movement of persons and goods across the line.⁴²

Diplomatically, the most significant international governance initiative in recent years was the so-called '*Annan Plan*', which proposed a loose federation of the Turkish north and the Greek south. Since the Greek Cypriots rejected this proposed solution in a referendum, most international actors have placed more emphasis on small-scale civil society measures, aiming to create inter-communal trust at the micro-level. In this respect, our fieldwork will look into the modus operandi, underlying assumptions and possible effects of international intervention to promote civil society activism in

initiatives such as the *Cypriot Civil Society Strengthening Programme* of 2007, the *Cyprus 2015 Initiative* and the *Cypriot Civil Society in Action Programme* initiated in 2010.

The Cypriot Civil Society Strengthening Programme, funded by USAID, seeks to provide sustainable local capacity building for both, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot civil societies.⁴³ Involved in this attempt to reinforce the role of civil society organizations are the International NGO Training and Research Centre in cooperation with the Management Centre and the NGO Support Centre as its local partners.

The second example for this type of governance measure, *the Cyprus 2015 Initiative*, receives support from the UNDP and the EU, and is implemented by the Joint Programme Unit for UN/Interpeace Initiatives. It aims at improving awareness, understanding and trust between the two antagonistic communities through de-politicized information, more fluid channels of communication between the leadership and the general public and a better informed policy-making process.⁴⁴ The EC's *Cypriot Civil Society in Action Programme*, in comparison, takes a step back and has tasked the International NGO Training and Research Centre to 'examine how civil society in both parts of Cyprus has worked and is working, to promote trust, cooperation, and reconciliation across the island'.⁴⁵

Beyond these initiatives, we will examine the work of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)'s *Action for Cooperation and Trust* initiative, which aims to foster cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on issues such as the environment, education and cultural heritage. This followed a UNDP-sponsored 1998-2005 bi-communal development programme and attempts to create opportunities for both communities to work together on concrete projects, benefitting the wider economies on the island, while at the same time promoting tolerance and mutual understanding.⁴⁶

3.2 Public governance initiatives

Since 2004, when the most significant peace talks in recent years broke down after the failure of the Annan Plan, public governance initiatives aiming at conflict resolution have

been sparse. Politicians' reluctance at both sides of the Green Line to throw their weight behind conflict settlement has often been explained by factors ranging from resurgent nationalistic tendencies in their national media and within their own political elites to disillusionment of their domestic constituencies with the interventionist role played external actors as well as with the other side of the conflict.⁴⁷ We will examine concessions offered by both governments in recent years, their limitations as well as the substance pertaining to the explanations mentioned above.

As a concrete example for current public governance initiatives, we will – among other activities - analyse institutions like the *Turkish Cypriot Immovable Property Commission*, which set out to solve conflicting property claims mainly resulting from the Turkish occupation. The Commission was established under Law 67/2005 of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus in accordance with rulings of the European Court of Human Rights. By examining claims for restitution, compensation and exchange, the commission is supposed to perform a crucial role in resolving inter-communal tensions over property rights, emanating from the displacement caused by the partition.⁴⁸ The commission's reconciliatory objective can only be achieved though, if it manages to offer solutions that are regarded as just by both sides. If considered as biased by one community, however, the initiative could further entrench the conflict, which makes it worthy of analysis.

5.3 Private governance initiatives

Moreover, in terms of private governance initiatives, we will look into business-based approaches as well as women's and youth initiatives for conflict resolution. Interesting approaches in first category are for instance the *Participatory Development Project* of the Union of Chambers of Turkish Cypriot Engineers and Architects and the Cyprus Technical Chamber. This project seeks to engage Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the planning of shared spaces, with a particular emphasis on cultural heritage and environmental initiatives.⁴⁹ *Celebrating Diversity and Volunteerism across Cyprus* is another initiative whose work will be analysed in our fieldwork. Here, the Cyprus Turkish Association of Managers (CTAM) in partnership with the NGO Support Centre cooperate in order to promote a more conducive environment for further development of

trust, dialogue, cooperation and closer relationships between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots.⁵⁰ The *Economic Interdependence Project* is another initiative emanating from business communities on both sides of the border. Its approach differs slightly from the two previous measures in its focus on creating economic interdependence through a variety of interventions including research, joint business partnerships and raising public awareness of the benefits of economic cooperation.⁵¹

In terms of youth initiatives, we will look into the work of the *Participatory Development Project* which prepares youth and teachers to play an active role in the reconciliation process, *Technology For Peace* (TFP) which uses information technology to provide a body of material and knowledge relevant to the peace efforts in Cyprus and the *Cyprus Network for Youth Development*, initiated by the Turkish Mediation Association and the Greek Soma Akriton Youth Organisation. The latter targets youth, youth leaders and teachers in an approach to ‘actively engage young people in peace building, to empower and support the youth to play an active role in the reconciliation process and to build and strengthen the necessary support structures for them to continue in youth activism’.⁵²

Moreover, we will analyse the work of the non-governmental Cypriot women’s organization ‘*Hands Across the Divide*’, which strives to enhance the role of women in peacebuilding and looks at the conflict through a gender lens, while also aspiring to reunification, democratization and gender equality.⁵³ From a governance point of view this initiative deserves attention not only due to its longevity, but also given its organisational structure as the first bi-communal group in Cyprus to have only one management overseeing the operations in both states.⁵⁴

IV Georgia

4.1 Public governance initiatives

Prior to the August 2008 war, the Georgian government preferred to concentrate on short-term initiatives aimed (in its view) at conflict resolution. Its main goal, however, was the consolidation of its political and military power. Following the rose revolution in 2003, Georgia's constitution was revised under the initiative of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, reinforcing presidential power over parliament. This trend was reversed, however, after the 2008 war, when Georgia's constitution was revised again, so as to strengthen parliamentary power and foster a greater separation of powers through an enhanced role of the prime minister. The new constitution will enter into force in 2013. As for the consolidation of military power, the period prior to August 2008 was marked by large military spending on the Ministry of Defence and on the reconstruction of the national army, accompanied by hard military rhetoric. All this induced growing fear within the separatist entities of renewed hostilities. However, after the Georgian-Russian war, the Georgian government's assumption that a strong military entails a strong state, able to re-integrate the lost entities into Georgia, has changed. Military spending and a militarized rhetoric have diminished.

In 2010, the Georgian government launched its new State Strategy on the Occupied Territories: engagement through cooperation. In the framework of the Peace Initiative for Abkhazia, the Georgian President offered "broad autonomy" and wide-ranging self-governance to Abkhazia. Furthermore, the new post of Vice-President of Georgia was established and reserved for an Abkhaz representative; the Abkhaz were guaranteed posts in all ministries and state agencies; and the Georgian government proposed the establishment and joint management of a free economic zone covering the Gali and Ochamchire regions. The Abkhazs were also offered a veto right on all issues regarding the constitutional status of Abkhazia, as well as the development of the Abkhaz culture, language and identity. The Georgian strategy foresaw the creation of three working

groups – legal, economic and political – tackling the main objectives of the initiative. The Georgian government moreover asked the international community to act as the guarantor of a peaceful settlement in Georgia.⁵⁵

In the peace proposal for South Ossetia instead, Georgia called for the non-use of force and accepted to take on all social obligations regarding the population of the region, i.e. financial compensation for the families who suffered damages in the conflict of 1991-92. Furthermore, it offered the unconditional protection of the principles of self-determination of nations, the respect for cultural and ethnic identity, human and minority rights as well as the equality of citizens, as stipulated by Georgia's constitution. The proposal stated that the territory of South Ossetia should be restored within the administrative borders prior to the outbreak of conflict in 1992, i.e. it should include the regions of Tskhinvali, Java, Znauri and Akhagori. It stated that South Ossetia would represent an autonomous entity within Georgia and would be governed by the Head of South Ossetia and a parliament, both elected through direct elections by secret ballot. The local population would be granted the right to elect the self-governing bodies of regions, towns and villages. The government of Georgia would ensure guaranteed quotas for South Ossetians' representation in federal ministries and state agencies. Additionally, the Ossetian language would enjoy the status of an official language and education in Ossetian would be guaranteed. The Georgian government would also finance the Ossetian television, radio and print media.⁵⁶

Thus, prior to the 2008 war, the Georgian government attached prime importance to hard power, i.e. to its military build-up, while framing (and disguising) this as part of a broader peacebuilding strategy. The August war brought about a fundamental change to Georgia's approach. The Georgian government has now adopted a soft power approach (or even a neo-liberal approach based on building a decentralized state) to resolve conflicts in the long run by reinforcing its internal democracy, following the line chosen by the EU. Reforms in different governmental structures and services have become the main elements for conflict resolution. These initiatives encompass the reconstruction of infrastructure, city rehabilitation projects, local self-government reforms; the establishment of patrol police; economic reforms such as the creation of free industrial

zones, a liberalized tax policy and customs reform, the privatization of state property, a liberal labour code, a free trade regime with Turkey and the CIS countries as well as reforms in education, social and healthcare. Yet, this new strategy of conflict resolution has neither been the outcome of endogenous factors, nor did it result from a successful democratic transition in Georgia (inter alia, promoted and assisted by the EU). It can rather be seen as an aftereffect of the Georgian-Russian war, which brought to the fore Georgia's inability to re-conquering its lost territories by military means.

4.2 International governance initiatives

International governance initiatives, however, were slashes in scope and scale after the re-eruption of the Abkhazian and South Ossetia conflict in 2008. The activities of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) were scaled back in Abkhazia, after Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution on 16th June 2009, which was supposed to extend its mandate.⁵⁷ UNOMIG was established on 24th August 1993 by Security Council Resolution 858. It was initially composed of 88 military observers, but soon expanded considerably. The purpose of the mission was primarily to monitor the implementation of the Abkhaz-Georgian ceasefire agreement of 27th July 1993.⁵⁸ However, the mandate was soon expanded encompassing broader areas such as human rights and the protection of refugees.⁵⁹ Starting as a peacekeeping mission UNOMIG with its broader mandate also began working towards sustainable and economic development. This was carried out along with political efforts to reach a settlement to the conflict. After 2008, despite the withdrawal of UNOMIG, the UNHCR, UNDP, WFP, and UNICEF continued their presence in Abkhazia. Through these agencies, the UN has continued to have an impact on socio-economic development, human rights and other areas of social protection.⁶⁰

The UNDP is particularly active in funding initiatives within its programmes on crisis prevention, recovery and democratic governance. One of these initiatives is the assessment of social vulnerability across Georgia.⁶¹ The UNHCR is mainly involved in monitoring, advocacy and standard setting on Internationally Displaced Persons (IDP`s), through its "shelter plus" approach and community mobilization framework.⁶² UNICEF,

in contrast, supports national efforts in enhancing the provision of health services for children in conflict.⁶³

Like UNOMIG also the Organization for Security and Cooperation and Europe (OSCE) Mission to Georgia failed to achieve a renewal of its mandate regarding its operations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.⁶⁴ The mandate expired on January 1st 2009 after Russia blocked its routine annual extension.⁶⁵ The Greek Foreign Minister and Chair of the OSCE at the time Dora Bakoyanni expressed her disappointment with the failure to reach consensus: “As a result, one of the largest on-the-ground missions of the OSCE in the region was led to an end – despite the clear need, recognized by many states taking part in it, for the organization to be present in order to contribute toward security and stability in the region”.⁶⁶ The OSCE mission was established in 1993 and its activities had supported the UN-led peace process in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone. Moreover, the Mission had regularly monitored, analyzed and reported developments in the economic, energy and environmental sectors. An important initiative to monitor human rights was the Human Rights Office in Abkhazia (HROAG), jointly staffed by the OSCE and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).⁶⁷

The European Union began to engage with Georgia’s territorial conflicts in the late 1990s, endorsing, as a premise, Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and thus not recognizing the de facto independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Its non-recognition has meant also a non-engagement policy with the separatist entities. The premises of the EU’s governance initiatives in Georgia’s conflict prevention, transformation and resolution prior to and after the August 2008 war develop/ed through five overlapping dimensions: the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and development (initially through TACIS and then the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) financial instruments); financial assistance to international NGOs in order to provide mediation forums as well as direct funding to local civil society; direct financial assistance to IDPs and rehabilitation projects for the conflict zones; the enhancement of regional cooperation and the development of bilateral and multilateral relations between the EU and Georgia.

With the curtailing of the UN and OSCE activities in Georgia's breakaway regions, the EU increased its presence through its Monitoring Mission (EUMM). In other words, post 2008 the EU also moved into the security-related aspects of Georgia's conflicts.⁶⁸ The EUMM's main responsibilities are to report on local grievances regarding gender and human rights issues, the security situation and the presence of military and police forces in the area. Moreover, the EUMM monitors the compliance with the Memoranda of Understanding signed by the Mission and the Georgian Ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs. However, the EUMM is currently only able to monitor Georgian-controlled territory and continues its (hitherto unsuccessful) efforts to negotiate access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU's current presence and activities thus only contribute to confidence building in the areas adjacent to Abkhazia.⁶⁹

Other EU initiatives are channeled through the EU Delegation to Georgia. The Delegation, among other things, manages the EIDHR, which seeks to strengthen the role of civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reforms, the reconciliation of group interests and the expansion and consolidation of political participation and representation.⁷⁰ The Delegation also funds several initiatives and actively supports justice, freedom and security initiatives such as combating human trafficking, drugs, and organized crime. Moreover the delegation supports human rights, democratization and sponsors several civil society initiatives within the education, health and social development sector.⁷¹

Through its Special Representative to Georgia (Pierre Morrel) the EU also contributes to the implementation of the agreement reached on 8 September 2008 between Moscow and Tbilisi, as well as the ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008. His mandate is carried out in close coordination with the UN and OSCE under the umbrella of the Geneva International Discussion.⁷² The six-point agreement of 12 August 2008 together with its follow-up document of 8 September 2008 envisaged the creation of this new platform involving the EU, the OSCE, the UN and the US, as well as the conflict parties Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. To date, the Geneva talks have generated limited concrete results. Its hitherto single achievement was Russia's decision to withdraw its military troops from Perevi, a small Georgian village beyond the South Ossetian

administrative border. More broadly however, the forum remains a unique international mediation platform, which keeps the conflict parties at the negotiating table and in contact with one another.

Thus throughout the first post-war phase, the principal means through which the Union tried to induce peace in the region was the provision of aid as well as democracy promotion, state-building and civil society development initiatives in Georgia proper. The implicit aim was that of raising the appeal of reintegration of the secessionist entities into Georgia. The European Union's policy ethos and logic in the conflict-governance nexus were and continue to be framed within the liberal peace paradigm, which views democratization both as an end of state-building and a means to induce conflict transformation.

The August 2008 war marks the beginning of the EU's direct involvement in conflict management. Given that the war has directly threatened European security interests, the EU has begun to add conflict management activities to longer-term and more structural approaches premised on democracy promotion. These mediation activities have not entailed a broader conflict transformation/resolution approach, however. Indeed, the Geneva forum seems to be aimed at crisis management (mainly to prevent another confrontation between Georgia and Russia) rather than Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-South Ossetian reconciliation. The EU has not yet designed a strategy in this direction, its approach towards conflict resolution in Georgia was and continues to be pragmatic and reactive.

Since the 2008 war, the military-security decisions of South Ossetia have been delegated to Russia through bilateral agreements, with the 2009 military cooperation agreement providing Russia with the authority to station troops and maintain military bases in South Ossetia for 49 years, as well as to jointly protect the borders for renewable 5-year periods.

The same treaty was agreed with the Abkhazian authorities. In 2010, 3,800 Russian troops deployed in South Ossetia, located in Tskhinvali, Java and the village of Kanchaveti, in Akhalkgori, and an estimated 900 border troops have been deployed along

South Ossetia's administrative boundary with Georgia, replacing Ossetian security forces. In addition, Russia has been restoring and building transportation routes between Russia and South Ossetia that can be used both for civilian and for military purposes. Following the August 2008 war, Russia has also increased its military presence in Abkhazia. The estimated number of Russian security personnel deployed in Abkhazia lies between 4,000-5,000.⁷³ Furthermore, Russia is upgrading the Gudauta military- and Ochamchire naval bases. Moscow also finances the budgets of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This includes infrastructure projects and local pensions. Thus the Russian governance premises in de facto republics largely amount to an exclusive security focus without any concern for the development of democracy and good governance. It is unknown if the latter are simply left to the Abkhaz and Ossetian authorities, as there is a dearth of information about the development of democracy, civil society, freedom of assembly and mass media.

4.3 Private governance initiatives: NGOs and business community

As for non-state initiatives in the field of governance, there have not been radical changes over time. According to Kvarchelia, "with the exception of humanitarian organizations, international NGOs (INGOs) only began to show interest in Abkhazia a few years after the Georgian-Abkhaz war ended".⁷⁴ The initiatives of the numerous INGOs and private international foundations operating in Georgia have varied from development projects to projects aimed at supporting governance reform. The few INGO's that became engaged in Abkhazia have focused exclusively on the need to resolve the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Many of the INGOs have managed to develop good cooperative relationships with local organizations and hence have gained an in-depth understanding of the local context. This has enabled several INGOs to support work on the development of local civil initiatives, strengthening democratic institutions etc.⁷⁵ The first and perhaps most influential non-governmental actors to carry out work on conflict transformation in Abkhazia were the University of Maryland (US), the George Mason University and the Norwegian Refugee Council.

The INGOs that were mainly involved in initiatives aimed at strengthening civil society and democratic institutions include the University of California (Irvine), the British

NGOs Conciliation Resources, International Alert and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), the Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management, and the South Caucasus Bureau of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, the Swedish Kvinna till Kvinna (Women for Women) and the Toledo International Centre for Peace.⁷⁶ The American National Democratic Institute for Foreign Affairs (NDI) also carries out important initiatives, directing their programmes at civil society development, women's political participation and local governance.⁷⁷ It is important to note that the incidents in August 2008 followed by the declaration of Abkhaz independence created entirely new conditions for INGOs working in Abkhazia. In this context, the fact that INGO activities were not brought to a halt is particularly important to acknowledge.⁷⁸

As for South Ossetia, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was the only international organization involved in humanitarian, development or monitoring work. In 2009, through mini-grants to support small businesses, it implemented economic development projects for residents of border villages and refugee families. In 2010, the focus shifted to distributing seeds and fertilizers to families in rural areas.

V Kashmir

In order to understand the governance initiatives of Indian government in Jammu and Kashmir, it is important to note that the term “governance” in this section of the report is being understood primarily as a political phenomenon, including both the governing institutions and implications of governance initiatives as well as processes for power-sharing among diverse communities living in the state.⁷⁹

Hence, the basis of most governance initiatives lies in the special status of Jammu and Kashmir enshrined in the Indian constitution via Article 370 along with the fact that Jammu and Kashmir is the *only* state in India, which has a separate state constitution. The constitutional provisions are thus key in shaping the basic parameters of the governing institutions in Jammu and Kashmir. Other historical milestones are the unprecedented land reforms undertaken by Sheikh Abdullah, which radically altered the political and class character of the state, various commissions like the Gajendragadkar commission report (1968) and the Sikri commission report (1979) on redressing the regional imbalances within Jammu and Kashmir state.⁸⁰

In the last two decades — the latest phase of conflict in Kashmir — governance initiatives have been undertaken both in the public and the private domain. Those in the public domain may be broadly divided into three categories depending on their rationale, objectives and institutional bases. However useful for analytical purposes, such distinctions rarely hold ground in the given conflict situation.

5.1 Public governance initiatives: conflict dynamics

The first set of initiatives is geared towards addressing the political dynamics of the conflict, raising the question as to who exercises power in Jammu and Kashmir and on whose behalf. The majority community of Kashmiri Muslims seeking secession from the Indian state spearheaded the armed insurgency in the early 1990s. Over time, however, this issue has become much more complex mainly due to the diverse political character of

the state whereby different communities have differing notions of ‘self-rule’, self-determination and ‘Kashmiri nationhood’. As a result, their political demands range from a sovereign and independent Jammu and Kashmir state to re-negotiation of Jammu and Kashmir’s autonomous status within the Indian Constitution, to Jammu and Ladakh’s demands of autonomy from Srinagar, the Union Territory’s status for the Ladakh region as well as to establishing a range of political safeguards for its minorities, including though not restricted to Kashmiri Pandits, Paharis and Gujjars. Given the diverse and often conflicting nature of these political demands, a key objective of many political initiatives of the central and state governments is to re-work the rules-of-the-game of power sharing between different communities within the Jammu and Kashmir state on the one hand and, between the Jammu and Kashmir state and New Delhi, on the other.

Of particular importance in this respect are the recommendations of the State Autonomy Committee and the Regional Autonomy Committee, submitted in 1999.⁸¹ Later, the UPA regime started a Roundtable initiative in February 2006 under the leadership of Dr Manmohan Singh by inviting all the stakeholders of the conflict. This included the mainstream and separatist leaders of the Kashmir Valley as well as the leadership of minority communities in a bid to impart an inclusive character on such deliberations. The separatists decided to abstain from the process. Nevertheless, this initiative led to the establishment of five working groups, including one on the centre-state relations and another on confidence-building measures between different constituents of Jammu and Kashmir’s civil society. The resulting reports, submitted by the working groups in 2007, would be worth examining, even though their recommendations have not been implemented.⁸² The most recent initiative of this kind includes the UPA-2 regime’s appointment of three interlocutors, aiming to recommend measures for renegotiating the relations at the centre-state and state-region level. If need be, these renegotiations could reach as far as the intermediate layers of governance. In this context, the case study will also take into account the People’s Democratic Party’s “self-rule” proposals and separatist leader Sajjad Lone’s proposition of “achievable nationhood” in addition to scores of memorandums, submitted to the above-mentioned Commissions over time.

The study will document the successive central and state governments' efforts to hold a dialogue with various factions of the separatists' and the militants' leadership through all-party delegations as well as individual governmental and non-governmental personnel over the years. Moreover, it will study the state assembly elections held in 1996, 2002 and 2008, examining to what extent these ballots have succeeded in restoring the legitimacy of the democratic processes in the state. Fostering the legitimacy, transparency and accountability of the governing apparatus at the state-level constitutes the predominant rationale of these reform processes. From this standpoint, the study will furthermore examine the processes that led to the establishment of an Autonomous Hill Council each in Leh and Kargil districts of the Ladakh region, their workings and impact on ameliorating the conflict between the local communities, in this case the Ladakhi Buddhists and local Muslims known as Argons and the Shia Muslims of Kargil. Last but not the least, the state government's initiative to hold municipal elections and this year's panchayat elections are important for activating and democratizing another layer of governing institutions at the grassroots level.

5.2 Public governance initiatives: minority and human rights

The second category of initiatives pertain to the civic domain, which calls for the government authorities to adopt a humane approach in matters of governance and safeguard the fundamental rights of people and eschew human rights violations. These imperatives, on the other hand, need a careful balancing with the needs of the police and the security forces fighting militant insurgents. The majority of militants is from abroad and has replaced the local Kashmiri cadre in the past decade and half. This study will examine the *modus operandi* of the Unified Command designed to improve and institutionalize the coordination between security forces and the civil administration, to raise new paramilitary units like Rastriya Rifles with the aim of reducing the army deployments in Jammu and Kashmir, to set up Jammu and Kashmir's police special task force unit. Moreover, the Unified Command erects or demolishes checkpoints, reduces the army and BSF troops in the state and also addresses the debate on the removal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. At the same time, the state government pursues

initiatives on amnesty and rehabilitation of the militants and their absorption as police personnel on special duties; and recruitment into the paramilitary forces as well as the army.

The study will also look into a host of measures initiated to streamline the operations of the civil administration. Among those are the ones proposed by the working group on good governance in Jammu and Kashmir established by the round table initiative of PM Manmohan Singh in 2006, which submitted its report in 2007. In recent years the Amarnath land row, RTI, the permanent resident disqualification bill and the domestic violence bill have polarized public opinion, making those government initiatives worthwhile studying. Other policies that need to be examined include: the state government's comprehensive return and rehabilitation policy for Kashmiri Pandit migrants in the Kashmir Valley, state policies towards refugees belonging to the Sikhs and Hindus who settled in Jammu and Kashmir during the partition in 1947 without being granted citizenship,⁸³ the Jammu and Kashmir e-Governance Agency as well as the Right to Information Act and appointment of an Information Commissioner in Jammu and Kashmir.

5.3 Public governance initiatives: local economy

A third category of public governance initiatives refers to those devised for strengthening the local economy of Jammu and Kashmir state and making it more self-reliant. Additionally, those measures attempt to counter the vested interests of those gaining from the continuation of conflict. This study will begin with an analysis of various packages of economic assistance initiated at different points of time: in 1993, the central government had announced an economic package for the state of Jammu and Kashmir, including expanded facilities for higher education, infrastructure projects (repair and construction of roads and bridges), the opening of rehabilitation and training centres for detained militants, the revival of the Governor's advisory council and the re-opening of Srinagar's passport office, All India Radio and Doordarshan stations. The working group on economic development established by the round table initiative of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2006 had submitted its report in 2007. Other such measures include:

the Prime Minister's 100 crore reconstruction package for Jammu and Kashmir, the setting-up of the special task forces for making recommendations to address development-related needs of Jammu and Ladakh regions in 2010, the central government's special assistance for Leh and Kargil to provide relief for those hit by the floods in 2010, various central schemes under which the state government can get grants or loans for various developmental initiatives, and state government policies promoting the IT sector and industrial development along with their planning documents during this period.

5.4 Private governance initiatives

Private governance initiatives in Kashmir initiated by civil society actors may also be broadly divided into three categories: those performing the role of a 'watchdog', those focused on education and development-related activities, and those facilitating the peace process by promoting dialogue between the government and the separatists as well as between Jammu and Kashmir's various communities and with those living across the line-of-control. The subsequently listed initiatives are illustrative, not exhaustive.

The Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society and the Jammu and Kashmir Federation of Civil Society Organizations are two apex bodies of the state, which collectively and through its individual constituents including the public commission on human rights, people's rights movements, the Kashmir Voluntary Association Network and the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP) fall into the first category. Their governance initiatives are dedicated to attracting public attention to their causes and seeking judicial redress for cases of human rights violations. Moreover, they aim to mobilize support for the revocation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) and the Disturbed Areas Act, seek the release of political prisoners and demand the demilitarization of the state through the withdrawal of the army and its paramilitary forces. Some of these organizations such as the APDP are home grown, while others such as the Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Global Peace Foundation are part of wider international bodies, which in turn seek to build coalitions with other like-minded bodies in the international domain.

The second category comprises of civil society organizations, dedicated to supporting society's poor, marginalized and disadvantaged sections through educational and development-related initiatives such as those offered by Mercy Corps and the Aga Khan Foundation. The Youth Parliament, Yateem Trust, Prakruthi's work for women's empowerment and Human Effort for Love and Peace (H. E. L. P.) focus primarily on educating victims of turmoil. Hence, they provide healthcare to violence-affected women and children in addition to supporting the relief and rehabilitation of physically challenged and economically deprived persons, among other activities.

The third kind of civil society initiatives are those promoting a dialogue between different stakeholders. For instance, Athwaas (meaning 'a warm greeting or handshake' in Kashmiri), an initiative of WISCOMP comprises a group of Muslim, Hindu and Sikh Kashmiri women who foster peace constituencies and explore possibilities for a just peace. Their activities range from active listening, trauma counseling, conflict transformation workshops, articulation of the concerns of women to policymakers and government interlocutors to programs, facilitating economic empowerment and political awareness. Likewise, the Women's Initiative for Peace in South Asia (WIPSA) had first visited Jammu and Kashmir in the summer of 2000 and established its new chapter in Jammu. The Delhi-based Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation has a special focus towards promoting a dialogue between the two parts of Kashmir across the LoC and between its three regions: Jammu, the Valley and Ladakh.

Finally, the field study in Jammu and Kashmir will try to understand and analyze the complex yet powerful forces of political economy and their inter-linkages at the local, national and international levels. Some of those forces and inter-linkages may sustain the conflict, while others are seeking to end it. Hence, our understanding of governance initiatives' effectiveness in managing and/or resolving this conflict will remain incomplete without the sound analysis of those issues.

VI North East India

The form of governance determines the manner in which power is exercised in the public sphere, and democratic governance derives its mandate, legitimacy, credibility and acceptability from consensus and persuasion. In other words, social life is coordinated through governance. The government outlines only one among a multitude of structural components of governance. After all, governance initiatives need to negotiate the embedded ideas of community and their politicized character, in particular in the regions, such as India's Northeast. Governance could be disrupted in such regions, if the foremost minority communities are considered as ethnic 'others'. It is important to recall that India's Northeast hosts about 42% of India's indigenous communities, where each group attempts to retain its individual cultural identity.

India's Northeast consists of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura. As of late, Sikkim is also considered to be a part of this region. The region is characterized by distinct ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic plurality. Moreover, Northeast India has important natural resources, like oil, timber, and hydropower potential. So far much of these resources have been extracted and utilized for the benefit of the rest of the country, while the states of the region have been largely excluded from these benefits. This has gradually sensitized the local inhabitants about the use of these resources. Therefore, resource politics has added a significant dimension to the governance in the region.

The partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947, and again in 1971, led to large-scale cross-border migration after the formation of Pakistan, and subsequently of Bangladesh. The geographical proximity, cultural immediacy and existing economic interdependence among the communities sharing the same territorial space in the pre-partition years shaped the colonial and then the post-colonial history of India's Northeast in many ways.

In the post-partition era, India's Northeast became virtually landlocked, surrounded by 'inhospitable' neighbours. Even with the mainland India, the only land-link is through the

'chicken-neck' Siliguri corridor. Therefore, the partitions crippled crucial economic linkages between Kolkata, Chittagong (now in Bangladesh) and India's Northeast. The traditional transportation routes, like the inland waterways, road, and railway communications were abruptly out of bounds. Whereas the earlier channels of rail, road and river, linking the Chittagong and Calcutta ports, suddenly became unavailable, alternative routes were prohibitively expensive.

The 'Inner Line Permit' system of the colonial era (which is in operation in the post-colonial period as well), in a way, prohibited access to large parts of India's Northeast to all 'outsiders', except those who obtained special prior permission from the government. But, as many of the 'recent immigrants' have been employed in the different sectors of the formal economy in the post-colonial era, like in state-run factories and institutions, the grievances of the local inhabitants have increased in many cases and the indigenous people have turned xenophobic in a few cases. In this scenario, the insurgencies and movements seeking autonomy or independence or the assertion of an identity distinct from the rest of India has created a mental divide as the rest of India considers the areas of Assam and beyond as a remote place in perpetual turmoil.

In view of all these factors, there is a need to select a set of recent governance initiatives that have been taken to address conflicts in India's Northeast, and analyse the discourses of those governance initiatives. There is also a need for field-based analysis of governance initiatives implemented in this region marked by the long drawn-out and multi-layered conflicts. In other words, it is important to flag a few such governance initiatives at the very outset.

First of all, recognizing the special requirements of the region and the need for significant levels of government investment, the Government of India has recognized the Northeastern States as Special Category States. And, one of the major governance initiatives has been the liberal development assistance to these states.

Second, the Northeastern Council (NEC) was established under the NEC Act of 1971 to work as an advisory body in connection with the socioeconomic development and balanced development of the seven States of India's Northeast. The functions of NEC are

to discuss matters of common interest in the field of economic and social planning of the region and advise both the central and concerned state governments regarding the action to be taken on such matters, formulate regional plans and recommend the manner in which the regional plan/s may be implemented. The NEC is also in charge of monitoring the progress of sanctioned projects' execution and of recommending to the central government the quantum of financial assistance to be given to the States.

Third, the central or federal planning assistance to these States has been provided on liberal terms. It is interesting to observe that, for these Special Category States of India's Northeast, the per capita level of central assistance is among the highest in the country. The programmes under the scheme include, among other things, special initiatives (10% Mandatory Earmarking of Funds for India's Northeast). Special attention has been given to the economic development of this region from the 8th five-year plan period onwards. In October 1996, the government of India announced the new initiatives for the North Eastern Region. These included a number of measures for the development of the NER, which encompassed policy changes, special area development and development projects in the key sectors. Arrangements were also made for the Non-Lapsable Central Pool of Resources (NLCPR) and setting up of the Ministry of Development of the Northeastern Region. The NLCPR created in 1997-98, and operationalized in 1998-99, is a response to the accumulation of the unspent balance of the ministries'/departments' mandatory 10% budgetary allocation. The broad objectives of the NLCPR Scheme is to ensure the speedy development of the infrastructure by way of filling the existing economic and social infrastructural gaps in the region by making funds available from the pool. The Department of the Northeastern Region is responsible for the coordination of the planning, execution and monitoring of the special developmental schemes and projects. According to an assessment made by the Department of the Northeastern Region, the central ministries/departments invested Rs.35,186.30 crore between 1998-99 and 2005-06. Over and above, the central government has also been announcing special packages for the socio-economic development of India's Northeast from time to time.

Fourth, in the latest phase of globalization, India's Look East Policy relies upon the historical and cultural continuity of India's Northeast and the continuity of the South and

Southeast region as a whole. However, many scholars have argued that this can spell disaster to the region unless the existing conflicts are managed and peace is ensured in this region, and unless this policy is designed to address the overlapping issues of borders, citizenship and labour migration. After all, in the present policy context, the borders are primarily viewed as the gateways for trade and commerce and less as the traditional boundaries. In the same context, the question of trans-border labour migration remains unresolved and contested. Therefore, if India's Look East Policy can supersede the older border control regime and if its anachronistic character is realized, India's Northeast can benefit immensely.

Fifth, each state of India's Northeast has a different administrative structure under India's constitution. Some areas are under the sixth schedule of the constitution of India or under the special constitutional safeguards. The sixth schedule is applicable to the three autonomous councils in Assam, namely North Cachar Hills, Karbi Anglong and Bodo Territorial Council as well as the whole of Meghalaya and the hill areas of Tripura. India's constitution was amended in 1963 to introduce Article 371A to bring civil affairs in Nagaland under the tribal customary laws. Similarly, Article 371G introduced in 1986 conferred the same powers on Mizoram. It is stated in Article 371A of the constitution that, notwithstanding anything in this constitution – no act of parliament in respect of (i) religious or social practices of the Nagas; (ii) Naga customary law procedure; (iii) administration of civil and criminal justice; and (iv) ownership of land and its resources shall be the exclusive domain of the state of Nagaland.

The government of India undertook a further reorganisation of its Northeast and the North East Areas (Reorganisation) Act of 1971, which was brought into force in January 1972. This led to the formation of the states of Manipur, Meghalaya and Tripura and the Union Territories of Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh (earlier known as NEFA). As a result of this legal amendment these areas ceased to be part of Assam.

Sixth, some traditional institutions with exclusive character deny women and ethnic 'others' any representation or role in the decision-making and are in conflict with rational-legal institutions, resulting in the disjuncture of governance. Hence, the

government of India has initiated several peace initiatives in order to deal with the multiple conflict situations in India's Northeast. In many cases, however, these peace initiatives were used to create divisions among an existing insurgent group and put different kinds of pressure on one or two groups to surrender arms and join the so-called mainstream. Therefore, whereas the peace overtures of the Shillong initiatives (November 1975) could 'tame' the Naga National Council (NNC) led by A.Z. Phizo, it gave rise to the new insurgent group of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980, led by Isak Chisi Swu, Thuingaleng Muivah and S.S. Khaplang. Subsequently, the NSCN also split into two in 1988 to form two separate and rival insurgent groups of NSCN(I-M) and NSCN(K).

Seventh, the question of autonomy seems to be linked with the success of peace accords in this region. Otherwise, the accords are unlikely to be 'rational instruments' of governance. In many instances of India's Northeast though, this question was not addressed or at best addressed tangentially without detailing the forms of autonomy to be granted to the rebel communities.

Eighth, although the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security urges the Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all the decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict, very few institutional initiatives at the governmental levels have been taken so far in this regard. However, women's groups, like the Naga Mothers Association (NMA), have been involved in the peace initiatives in Nagaland and Manipur. The NMA has attempted to persuade the leadership of the Naga insurgent factions and the other Naga organizations to scale down the violence. It has organized various rallies and appeals to stop violence. In fact, its campaign "Shed No More Blood" has served as a channel of communication for various Naga groups and spread the message that peaceful conditions are the prerequisite for human development. The NMA has also coordinated with different churches in Nagaland to give momentum to the ongoing peace process between the Union Government and the Naga insurgent organizations. It has also participated in meetings and conferences with the Naga Students' Federation (NSF), the Naga Hoho, and

the Naga People's Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR). The Naga Hoho, the apex council of the Naga tribes, also has been active in efforts to bring about unity among the various militant factions and to find an acceptable solution. Similarly, in Manipur, the Meira Paibies, or the Naga Women's Movement, Manipur (NWUM), have been active in playing a similar role in peace-making.

Ninth, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) indicates the reluctance of the government to manage the conflicts of the region with adequate political measures. The AFSPA was passed in 1958, as a short-term measure to contain insurgency in the Naga Hills, but has remained in place for more than half a century. Similarly, the relocation of villages and consequent regrouping of those villages to contain insurgencies in India's Northeast by the Indian State has a lasting impact on the politics and society of the region.

India's Northeast is a place, in some ways comparable to the Balkans, where the ongoing protracted conflicts are myriad and multiple in nature. There are conflicts between the state and societal groups, conflicts among different ethnic groups sharing the same territorial space for centuries, as well as conflicts between the union and state governments. To deal with this complex situation, in India, there have been arrangements of the federal administration, other institutional mechanisms for granting autonomy to the indigenous communities, like the autonomous councils proposed in the sixth schedule of the constitution of India. However, the limited form of autonomy provided by the sixth schedule of India's constitution could not contain the search for self-determination of the Naga peoples, who in 1973 achieved 'statehood' within the Indian Union without giving up military resistance for full independence. Moreover, there have been peace initiatives, like the ongoing peace talks of the government of India with the insurgent groups like NSCN (I-M) and ULFA. In view of those peace negotiations between the NSCN (I-M) and the government of India (since 1997), and the recent peace initiatives taken by India's government and Assam's government since 2010-11, it can be expected that another era of insurgencies and autonomy movements in India's Northeast is drawing to a close, giving rise to a different phase of movements for autonomy or insurgencies to be unravelled. However, such predictions remain to be tested.

Therefore, it is evident that, there has not been any dearth of governance initiatives in India's Northeast in the post-colonial period to manage conflicts and wage peace. These initiatives have been in the form of special economic packages, the North East Reorganization Act, Article 371, and the 6th Schedule of the Constitution of India, peace dialogues, and the recent civil society initiatives. But, the question remains whether these governance and peace initiatives can manage the multiple conflicts in India's Northeast unless justice is done to the wronged individuals and communities. After all, can there be peace without justice?

¹ Pradhan H. Prasad, "Agrarian Unrest and Economic Change in Rural Bihar: Three Case Studies", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 10, (1975), 933-37; Krishna Chaitanya, "Social Justice, Bihar Style", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 26, (1991), 2612; Susana B. C. Devalle, *Discourses of Ethnicity: Culture and Protest in Jharkhand*, (New Delhi: Sage, 1992), 193-227.

² Arvind Sinha, "Social Mobilisation in Bihar: Bureaucratic Feudalism and Distributive Justice", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 31, (1996) 3289.

³ Amit Prakash, *Jharkhand: Politics of Development and Identity*, (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2001) 198-205.

⁴ Prasad, Agrarian Unrest, 933-37; Arvind N. Das, "Landowners' Armies Take over 'Law and Order'", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 21, (1986) , 17-18; Chaitanya, Social Justice, 2612; Prakash, Jharkhand, p.198-205.

⁵ Prasad, Agrarian Unrest, 933-37; Das, Landowner Armies, 17-18; D.N., 1988; Chaitanya, Social Justice, 2612.

⁶ Planning Commission, *Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas*, (New Delhi: Government of India, 2008), 2.

⁷ Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report 2003-04*, (New Delhi: Government of India 2004), 40.

⁸ Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report 2004-05*, (New Delhi: Government of India 2005), 39.

⁹ Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report 2006-07*, (New Delhi: Government of India 2005), 24; Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report 2007-08*, (New Delhi: Government of India 2009)18; Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report 2008-09*, (New Delhi: Government of India 2005), 15; Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report 2010-11*, 20.

¹⁰ Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report 2007-08*, 19; Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report 2008-09*, (New Delhi: Government of India 2005), 16; Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report 2010-11*, (New Delhi: Government of India 2005), 21.

¹¹ *ibid.*

¹² Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual report 2003-04*, 43.

¹³ Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual report 2005-06*, 26.

¹⁴ Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual report 2006-07*, 26.

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- ¹⁵ Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual report, 2003-04, 43.
- ¹⁶ Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual report, 2007-08, 26.
- ¹⁷ Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual report 2010-11, 27.
- ¹⁸ Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual report 2005-06*, 27; Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report 2006-07*, 26; Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report 2010-11*, 27.
- ¹⁹ Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report 2003-04*, 44.
- ²⁰ Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report 2005-06*, 28.
- ²¹ Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report 2006-07*, 27.
- ²² Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report 2007-08*, 22.
- ²³ The definition of electrified village has changed over the years. Since 2004-05, a village would be declared as electrified, if basic infrastructures are provided in the inhabited locality, the Dalit Basti hamlet where it exists, and public places.
- ²⁴ <http://pcserver.nic.in/lwe>
- ²⁵ Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report 2010-11*, 28-30.
- ²⁶ Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report 2010-11*, 31.
- ²⁷ The initiative started as a programme called '*Janta Ke Darbar Mein Mukhya Mantri*' programme.
- ²⁸ See Peace Implementation Council Steering Board communiqués at: <http://www.ohr.int/pic/archive.asp?sa=on>. It should be noted, however, that the European Commission 2010 progress report on BiH is the first one where this condition has been omitted.
- ²⁹ Morton Abramowitz, "The US and the EU in Balkan kabuki," in *The Western Balkans and the EU: 'The hour of Europe'*, ed. Jacques Rupnik (Paris: Institute for Security Studies), 177.
- ³⁰ Denisa Sarajlić-Maglic, "BiH after the elections – a tale of disillusioned optimism," in *The Western Balkans and the EU: 'The hour of Europe'*, ed. Jacques Rupnik (Paris: Institute for Security Studies), 56.
- ³¹ 62 municipalities are located in the Republika Srpska alone.
- ³² Regional Cooperation Council, accessed at: <http://www.rcc.int/>
- ³³ Sarajlić-Maglic, "BiH after the elections," 49.
- ³⁴ Centres for Civic Initiatives, accessed at: <http://www.cci.ba/> (translation: author's)
- ³⁵ Foreign Policy Initiative, accessed at: http://vpi.ba/eng/index_eng.html
- ³⁶ Open Society Fund–Bosnia and Herzegovina, at Open Society Foundations, accessed at: <http://www.soros.org/about/locations/bosniaherzegovina>
- ³⁷ For this and other root causes of the conflict see: Oliver P. Richmond, "Decolonisation and post-independence causes of conflict: The case of Cyprus", *Civil Wars*, 5 (2002): 171- 178; Chaim Kaufmann, "An Assessment of the Partition of Cyprus", *International Studies Perspectives*, 8 (2007): 209 -212 / 206 – 223; Maria Hadjipavlou, "The Cyprus Conflict: Root Causes and Implications for Peacebuilding", *Journal of Peace Research*, 44 (2007): 349 -365: See also Oliver P Richmond, *Mediating in Cyprus*, London: Frank Cass, 1998.
- ³⁸ Hence, the subsequent classification is based on the idea of ownership. Grassroots activities sponsored by international actors, for instance, do not count as international, but as private initiatives.

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- ³⁹ UNDP Partnership for the Future. http://www.undp-pff.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1&Itemid=2
- ⁴⁰ USAID, “CyPEG Final Report,” online at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACK032.pdf
- ⁴¹ USAID in Cyprus, <http://www.usaid.gov/cy/cypeg.htm>
- ⁴² EU in Cyprus, http://ec.europa.eu/cyprus/turkish_community/index_el.htm
- ⁴³ INTRAC: Cyprus <http://www.intrac.org/pages/en/cyprus.html>
- ⁴⁴ Cyprus 2015: research and dialogue for a sustainable future. http://www.cyprus2015.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19&Itemid=27&lang=en
- ⁴⁵ INTRAC: Cyprus <http://www.intrac.org/pages/en/cyprus.html>
- ⁴⁶ UNDP Cyprus Portal. <http://mirror.undp.org/cyprus/>
- ⁴⁷ For detailed analysis of recent concessions, their limitations and the political constraints facing the Turkish as well as the Greek Cypriot governments see: International Crisis Group, “Cyprus: Six Steps”, 3; Hugh Pope, “Solving the EU-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle”, International Crisis Group, 23 April 2010, www.crisisgroup.org ; Thomas Diez and Nathalie Tocci, “The Cyprus Conflict and the Ambiguous Effect of Europeanization”, *The Cyprus Review*, 22:2 (2010), 175 – 186.
- ⁴⁸ For detailed information about the historical background, the centrality of unresolved property claims in the conflict and the approach to conflict resolution applied by the commission see International Crisis Group, “Cyprus: Bridging the Property Divide”, Europe Report No. 210, 9 December 2010, www.crisisgroup.org .
- ⁴⁹ Participatory Development, http://www.undp-act.org/data/fast_facts_participatory_dev.pdf
- ⁵⁰ Cyprus Turkish Association of Managers: Current Projects. http://www.ktyd.eu/CProjects/CelebratingDiversity_Volunteerism.html
- ⁵¹ Economic Interdependence, http://www.undp-act.org/data/fast_facts_interdependence.pdf
- ⁵² Cyprus Network for Youth Development <http://www.multiculturalcyprus.org/page.php?bid=16>
- ⁵³ Hands Across the Divide, <http://www.handsacrossthedivide.org/node/95>
- ⁵⁴ Hands Across the Divide, <http://www.handsacrossthedivide.org/node/95>
- ⁵⁵ Government of Georgia, *State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement Through Cooperation*, 2010. See also: Government of Georgia, *Action Plan for Engagement*, 2010, http://www.government.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=225.
- ⁵⁶ Initiative of the Georgian Government with Respect to the Peaceful Resolution of the Conflict in South Ossetia, (08.04.2008), http://smr.gov.ge/en/tskhinvali_region/policy/peace_plan.
- ⁵⁷ UNOMIG Official Website: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unomig/>; Parliamentary Assembly, *The war between Georgia and Russia: one year after*, Council of Europe, September 2009.
- ⁵⁸ Natela Akaba, The role of Inter-Governmental structures in the resolution of the Georgian – Abkhaz conflict and political stabilization in the region, in *International Engagement in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict resolution process*, International Alert, May 2010: 12.

⁵⁹ UNOMIG Official Website (Mandate):

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unomig/>

⁶⁰ Irakliy Khintba, Consequences of the withdrawal of the UN Mission and Prospects for International Presence in Abkhazia, in *International Engagement in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict resolution process*, International Alert, May 2010: 34.

⁶¹ UNDP Official Website, UNDP in Georgia:

http://www.undp.org.ge/index.php?sec_id=33&lang_id=ENG

⁶² UNHCR, 2011 Country Operations Profile: <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48d2e6>

⁶³ UNICEF-Georgia Official Website: <http://www.unicef.org/georgia/overview.html>;

Immunization campaign aims to keep Abkhazia region polio-free

⁶⁴ Parliamentary Assembly (2009), The war between Georgia and Russia.

⁶⁵ Vladimir Socor, OSCE Mission in Georgia on its death bed, Eurasia Daily Monitor 6: 3 (2009)

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34311

⁶⁶ Matt Robinson, “UN Monitors leave Georgia, OSCE shuts”, Reuters, June 30, 2009.

⁶⁷ UNOMIG, Human rights office in Abkhazia: <http://www.unomig.org/operations/hroag/>

⁶⁸ Fischer, Sabine (2009), EUMM Georgia in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (eds) *European Foreign and Security Policy: The first 10 years*, Paris:EU Institute for Security Studies, p.389.

⁶⁹ EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) homepage:

http://www.eumm.eu/en/about_eumm

⁷⁰ EU Delegation to Georgia, EIDHR:

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/eu_georgia/tech_financial_cooperation/instruments/european_instrument_for_democracy/index_en.htm

⁷¹ Delegation of the European Union to Georgia, Official Website:

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/projects/overview/index_en.htm

⁷² EUMM, EU Special Representative:

http://eumm.eu/en/eu_in_georgia/eu_special_representative_for_the_crisis_in_georgia

⁷³ International Crisis Group, *Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence*, Europe Report, N°202, (26 February 2010),

[http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/202_abkhazia_deepening_dependence.ashx](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/202_abkhazia_deepening_dependence.ashx).

⁷⁴ L.Kvarchelia, *The Role of International NGOs in the Georgian- Abkhaz Conflict Transformation Process in International Engagement in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict resolution process*, International Alert, May 2010: 47.

⁷⁵ Ibid

⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 53-54.

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 59

⁷⁸ Ibid

⁷⁹ Though both parts of Kashmir across the Line-of-Control fall within the purview of the Kashmir conflict, the proposed study will primarily focus on the Indian side.

⁸⁰ These have been discussed in several books including, Navnita Chadha Behera, *State, Identity and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh* (New Delhi: Manohar) 2002; Balraj Puri, *Kashmir: Towards Insurgency* (New Delhi: Orient Longman), 1993; Shridhar Kaul

and H.N. Kaul, *Ladakh Through the Ages: Towards a New Identity* (New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company), 1992; and Balraj Puri, *Jammu and Kashmir: Triumph and Tragedy of Indian Federalization*, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1981 among others.

⁸¹ The original texts of State Autonomy Committee and the Regional Autonomy Committee Reports along with the memorandums submitted by various groups to these two committees.

⁸² The original texts of the Working Group Reports.

⁸³ Due to their lack of citizenship, these refugees cannot vote for the state assembly elections since 1947 under the constitution of Jammu and Kashmir

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